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### Viewing cable 09PARIS1534, FRANCAFRIQUE" -- MFA DISPUTES REPORTS ON A RETURN

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
09PARIS1534 | 2009-11-19 09:09 | 2010-12-04 12:12 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Paris

`

    VZCZCXRO2419
    PP RUEHBZ RUEHDU RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHRN RUEHTRO
    DE RUEHFR #1534/01 3230937
    ZNY CCCCC ZZH
    P 190937Z NOV 09
    FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7552
    INFO RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
    RUEHLI/AMEMBASSY LISBON PRIORITY 1111
    RHMFISS/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE PRIORITY

` `

    C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PARIS 001534

    SIPDIS

    DEPT FOR AF
    EMBASSIES LONDON AND LISBON FOR AFRICA WATCHERS

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/19/2019
    TAGS: PREL KDEM PGOV KCOR PTER PINR FR
    SUBJECT: "FRANCAFRIQUE" -- MFA DISPUTES REPORTS ON A RETURN
    TO BUSINESS AS USUAL

    REF: A. 08 PARIS 1501
    ¶B. 08 PARIS 1568
    ¶C. 08 PARIS 1698

    Classified By: Andrew Young, Political Counselor, reason 1.4 (b and d).

    ¶1. (C) Summary: MFA's AF Assistant Secretary-equivalent
    Stephan Gompertz denied that France's approach to Africa is
    backsliding into the patterns of previous administrations'
    "francafrique." He insisted that France is not interfering
    in African countries' internal politics. He said that in
    the recent examples of Gabon, Niger, and Guinea, France has
    supported democratic change. Gompertz admits the "insider"
    influence of Robert Bourgi, and laments that France is still
    not focused on a more strategic approach to Africa. At the
    same time, he claims, (somewhat questionably), that it is the
    MFA's leadership that is driving the GOF's relations in
    Africa. In our view, France remains committed to its stated
    policy of developing transparent partnerships with Africans
    but, when pressed by circumstances, may resort to the more
    opaque ways associated with "francafrique" when doing so is
    in France's national interest. End summary.

    ¶2. (C) During a November 17 meeting with Pol Minister
    Counselor, the MFA's AF Assistant Secretary-equivalent
    Stephan Gompertz disputed the assertions made in a November
    13 New York Times article that France "still pulls the
    strings" in Francophone Africa ("Ill Will Grows in a Former
    Colonial Regional as France Consorts With the Powerful," by
    Adam Nossiter), as well as similar commentary offered in
    recent weeks by the French media. Gompertz strongly denied
    that France interferes in a country's internal politics, and
    asserted that Sarkozy remains serious about moving away from
    the paternalistic and secret dealings of France's
    "francafrique" era. (Note: see Reftels for detailed
    analysis of "France's Changing Africa Policy." End note.)

    RECENT CRITICISMS ARE "UNFAIR"
    -----------------------------
    ¶3. (C) Responding to specific cases cited in the Nossiter
    article, Gompertz said the selective information presented
    was "unfair." He first seized on the example of Gabon's
    recent presidential elections, and insisted that France would
    have supported a different electoral outcome than Ali Bongo
    if the opposition had organized themselves to achieve
    victory. Having received almost 60 percent of the vote, it
    was the splintered and uncoordinated opposition that allowed
    Bongo to win, not France. Gompertz added that in his
    personal view Bongo was a more credible candidate than the
    two main opposition leaders, and asserted that Bongo has done
    "a pretty good job, so far," especially on addressing Gabon's
    endemic corruption.

    ¶4. (C) For Niger, Gompertz said that "we are troubled." (The
    day before, with AF DAS Fitzgerald, Gompertz said that France
    was "embarrassed" by the situation in Niger.) Gompertz
    claimed, however, that France led the international charge
    trying to stop President Tandja from changing the
    constitution and holding elections for a third term. He was
    bothered that the NY Times piece showed an old photo of
    Sarkozy and Tandja together, without explaining that Sarkozy
    later publicly advised Tandja to respect Niger's constitution
    and not stand for a third term. Gompertz added that after
    Tandja succeeded in his constitutional referendum, State
    Secretary Joyandet and later Foreign Minister Kouchner
    publicly and privately encouraged Tandja to postpone his
    election in order to work out a more democratic solution.
    Gompertz acknowledged that France had important interests in
    Niger, in particular its uranium concessions, and that France
    was very concerned about AQIM threats in the country. Still,
    it is unfair to describe France's efforts in Niger were not
    sincere, Gompertz said.

    ¶5. (C) The NY Times article also commented on the situation
    in Guinea, but Gompertz stressed that FM Kouchner was the
    most vocal and active critic of the regime after the
    September 28 violence. According to Gompertz, Kouchner
    pushed for the establishment of the International Contact
    Group, persuaded the EU to take a firm stand and pursue
    sanctions against Guinea's ruling junta, and it was Kouchner
    who convinced Senegalese President Wade to evacuate injured
    opposition leader Cellou Diallo to Dakar.

    ¶6. (C) Gompertz noted that Senior French officials, both at
    the MFA (and, in our experience, at the Elysee) routinely
    meet with African opposition leaders, both in Paris and
    overseas, adding that Joyandet was scheduled to meet with

    PARIS 00001534 002 OF 003

    Cellou Diallo that afternoon.

    FRANCE'S AFRICA POLICY DOES HAVE PROBLEMS
    -----------------------------------------
    ¶7. (C) Gompertz admitted that France's Africa policy does
    have problems, most notably, that France continues to focus
    most of its efforts on its former colonies, even though they
    are not necessarily the most strategically important.
    Gompertz hopes to push for a stronger engagement with
    Anglophone and Lusaphone Africa. (Note: GOF officials
    frequently cite Nigeria, Angola, and South Africa as three of
    France's key emerging partners in Africa. Gompertz was
    departing the same afternoon for Morocco and South Africa.
    End note.) Similarly, too much of France's political and
    cooperation resources in Africa are designed to reinforce its
    partnerships within the international "Francophonie"
    organization. Gompertz cited the example of Burundi, where
    English is replacing French as the most popular foreign
    language, but he said this is understandable given Burundi's
    important trade links in the East African Community. At the
    same time, he related that while he was Ambassador to
    Ethiopia, there was a strong demand for French language
    teachers, but France was not responsive in helping meet this
    need.

    ¶8. (C) Targeting more closely the topic of "francafrique,"
    Gompertz said he "regretted" that lawyer and presidential
    advisor Robert Bourgi (touted by the French press as the new
    standard bearer of the old "francafrique") was Sarkozy's
    friend, but "that's a fact of life." While admitting that
    Bourgi operates in the shadows and has influence on France's
    approach to Africa, Gompertz stated forcefully that policy
    for sub-Saharan Africa is led by "Kouchner, Joyandet, and
    me."

    COMMENT AND ANALYSIS
    --------------------
    ¶9. (C) The sincere and mild-mannered Gompertz almost worked
    up a dander in defending France's approach to Africa as well
    as the importance of the MFA's leadership. However, though
    not entirely at odds with Gompertz's assertions, the GOF's
    Africa policy hands increasingly suggest France's need to
    contrast the importance of stability in a volatile region
    with nobler democratic ideals, as has been shown in Niger,
    Mauritania, Madagascar, and, perhaps, now in Guinea.
    Unfortunately, there was not time during this meeting to ask
    about other notorious "francafrique" hotspots, such as the
    Republic of Congo, Togo, Cameron, and Equatorial Guinea.
    Also, by downplaying the role of Bourgi, and by not
    commenting on the important role of the Presidency's
    Secretary General Claude Gueant (also a friend of Bourgi) in
    shaping France's relations with African leaders, Gompertz,
    perhaps unwittingly, revealed his own concerns about a
    philosophical division between the Elysee and the MFA on
    Africa policy.

    ¶10. (C) Clearly, there is much jostling between the MFA and
    Presidency for Africa policy leadership. Remi Marechaux, one
    of the staff-level Africa advisors at the Elysee, scoffs
    whenever the issue of a resurgent "francafrique" is raised.
    He pointedly notes that during "francafrique's" heyday under
    the legendary Jacques Foccart, the Africa cell at the
    Presidency numbered about 80, including its own intelligence
    unit. Marechaux contrasts that with today's Africa cell at
    the Presidency, consisting of himself, Romain Serman (soon to
    be replaced by Clement Leclerc), and their recently-arrived
    boss (and Deputy Diplomatic Advisor) Andre Parant, who
    replaced Bruno Joubert. Marechaux bristles at the notion
    that the three of them are pulling strings the way their 80
    predecessors did. Marechaux says that the role of the
    Elysee's Africa cell is to channel the policy ideas of
    President Sarkozy (admittedly influenced by Bourgi, Gueant,
    special advisor Henri Guaino, and Sarkozy's other close
    associates) and that the MFA's role is to do what
    bureaucracies traditionally do -- either implement those
    ideas or explain, with bureaucratic thoroughness, why those
    ideas are not feasible.

    ¶11. (C) Our own view is that there is a wide range of policy
    approaches available to the French, a spectrum running from
    the more ideal approaches Sarkozy expressed in his early days
    in office (reftels) to the more opaque but possibly more
    expedient approaches conforming to the old "francafrique"
    model. Circumstances and the unpredictable, sometimes
    violent nature of events in Africa may at times tempt or even
    force the French to act less ideally than they may want -- a
    form of behavior familiar to every other government in the

    PARIS 00001534 003 OF 003

    world -- when decisions are based on a need to further the
    national interest in the most effective way possible, even
    when the most effective way may not be the prettiest way. We
    find the GOF's professional cadre of Africa hands accessible,
    open, and wanting to find common ground with the U.S. in many
    situations. Gompertz appeared as a man with a burden lifted
    when he was reminded of The New York Times' November 17
    article asserting large-scale corruption by Equatorial
    Guinean Minister (and the President's son), Teodoro Nguema
    Obiang, reportedly a frequent visitor to and investor in the
    U.S.

    ¶12. (U) Conakry and Tripoli minimize considered.
    PEKALA
    ...

`