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### Viewing cable 09LIMA1669, SCENESETTER FOR USSOUTHCOM COMMANDER, GENERAL DOUGLAS M.

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
09LIMA1669 | 2009-11-25 20:08 | 2010-12-12 21:09 | CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN | Embassy Lima

`

    VZCZCXYZ0000
    RR RUEHWEB

    DE RUEHPE #1669/01 3292049
    ZNY CCCCC ZZH
    R 252048Z NOV 09
    FM AMEMBASSY LIMA
    TO RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
    RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0156
    INFO RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
    RUEHAC/AMEMBASSY ASUNCION
    RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA
    RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 0067
    RUEHBU/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES
    RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS
    RUEHGE/AMEMBASSY GEORGETOWN
    RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ
    RUEHMN/AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO
    RUEHPE/AMEMBASSY LIMA
    RUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO
    RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO
    RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC

` `

    C O N F I D E N T I A L LIMA 001669

    NOFORN
    SIPDIS
    SOUTHCOM FOR POLAD

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 2019/11/25
    TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER MASS MOPS SOCI PE
    SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR USSOUTHCOM COMMANDER, GENERAL DOUGLAS M.
    FRASER

    CLASSIFIED BY: P. Michael McKinley, Ambassador, State, Executive;
    REASON: 1.4(A), (B), (D)

    ¶1. (C/NF) Summary: Embassy Lima warmly welcomes you to Peru.
    You will arrive at a time of strong GOP interest in expanding
    security cooperation with the United States. Under President Alan
    Garcia, Peru has been a reliable U.S. partner and played a
    constructive role in a complicated South America characterized by
    resurgent populism and periodic flashes of tension -- most recently
    between Colombia and Venezuela. Notwithstanding its recent strong
    economic growth and falling poverty levels, Peru still faces real
    security threats, primarily relating to drug trafficking and
    reemerging Shining Path terrorism. Your visit affords an
    opportunity to underscore our interest in supporting the GOP's
    efforts to combat these threats in the several discrete areas where
    we are best positioned to help. Peruvian sensitivities regarding
    U.S. Arms Sales to Chile, although overshadowed by allegations of
    Chilean espionage, remain acute and are likely to figure
    prominently in your meetings here. End Summary.

    Peru: A Good Friend in the Region

    ¶2. (C) We have built a strong bilateral relationship with Peru
    in recent years, partly embodied in the Peru Trade Promotion
    Agreement (PTPA). We also share a similar strategic vision, namely
    that the region's foremost security threats originate from
    transnational and non-state criminal actors such as
    narco-traffickers and terrorists, as well as resurgent populism and
    the meddling of Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez and his allies.
    At the same time, we have sought to support Peru's efforts to
    address the underlying causes of these threats -- including
    persistent (if falling) poverty, corruption and social inequality
    -- and to spread the benefits of economic development more widely.
    We have also sought to support Peru's plan to reorient its security
    posture away from its perceived conventional threats from its
    neighbors (mainly Chile) and to modernize its military's doctrines
    and retool its operational capabilities to confront its internal
    threats. The GOP sees the U.S. as an ally and has asked for our
    help. Despite our broadly shared interests, however, domestic and
    regional sensitivities about a too close military-security embrace
    with the United States persist.

    ¶3. (C) The GOP has played a constructive role in the region and
    sees challenges and opportunities through a similar policy prism.
    Under Garcia, Peru has helped to counter Bolivia and Venezuela's
    efforts to blame the U.S. for rising regional tensions. In the
    recent UNASUR President's meeting in Bariloche, for example, Garcia
    vigorously defended Colombia's sovereign right to work formally
    with the U.S. in combating drug trafficking and terrorism by means
    of the Defense Cooperation Agreement ( DCA). Peru was active in
    helping defuse the Colombia-Ecuador crisis in March 2008, and
    continues to seek to help repair and restore relations between
    those two countries. (Note: Colombian Embassy officials here have
    told us that Peru is Colombia's "only ally" in the region." End
    Note.) President Garcia's recent "Peace and Security Cooperation"
    initiative appears to be a serious attempt to promote regional
    stability and contain defense costs at a time of global economic
    recession. Garcia's proposals seek to prevent an arms race in the
    region, reduce military expenditures, formalize a non-aggression
    pact and field a regional defense force ("Fuerza Sudamericana de
    Paz e Intervencion").

    ¶4. (C) Peru's relations with Chile have been rocky following
    Peru's decision to take its maritime border dispute with Chile to
    the International Court of Justice in early 2008. Ties soured
    further following Peruvian complaints over Chile's "Salitre 2009"
    war games and have grown even tenser in the wake of allegations of
    Chilean spying. Relations with Bolivia have also been strained
    over alleged Bolivian political meddling, and personal insults
    between Presidents Garcia and Morales. The GOP remains concerned

    that Venezuela is trying to sow instability in the region through
    its covert support of radical and indigenous groups in Peru and
    elsewhere. Peru's robust engagement with (its former enemy)
    Ecuador represents its greatest diplomatic success to date, which
    MFA officials have told us is their "number one" foreign policy
    objective. Peru has signed onto Brazil's UNASUR South American
    integration plan and it desires a "strategic relationship" with
    Brazil, focused on integrating infrastructure such as the new
    inter-oceanic highways and investment. While it has respectful
    relations with other countries in the region, Peru feels a special
    kinship with Colombia for their similar drug trafficking and
    terrorism challenges and their shared view that free trade and
    openness to investment are the best way to foment economic growth
    and advance national development.

    Peru's Security Challenges and Threats

    ¶5. (C) Notwithstanding its recent strong economic growth and
    generally falling poverty levels, Peru faces a series of largely
    internal security challenges that could threaten its stability and
    continued progress. Social conflict is one, and the June 5
    violence in the northern Amazon city of Bagua in which 24 policemen
    and 10 civilians were killed was the government's most serious
    crisis to date. While a series of government miscalculations and
    missteps was largely to blame, radical and possibly foreign
    interference also played a role. That said, Peruvian military
    officials are likely to focus their discussions with you on the
    security challenges connected with drug trafficking and terrorism.
    GOP briefings to U.S. officials tend to downplay or omit perceived
    external threats to Peru such as Chile or Bolivia, but military
    planning, doctrine, force structure and spending remain (in our
    view) disproportionately focused on such threats.

    ¶6. (C/NF) Many analysts believe that SL, and its expanding
    connections with drug trafficking, is Peru's primary security
    threat - particularly in the VRAE. While there is continuing
    debate about whether SL has abandoned its ideological struggle and
    become just another narco-trafficking group, or rather adapted its
    approach to the historical realities of the day while maintaining
    its essentially political goals, the fact is that we know little
    about its true intentions. Peru's own intelligence apparatus, in
    disrepair since the collapse of the Fujimori regime, has only
    recently begun to rebuild its capabilities. What is known is that
    the SL threat was contained but not eliminated and may now again be
    expanding. Over the past 18 months, terrorists have killed over 50
    security forces, mostly in ambushes on isolated military patrols
    but in some cases in direct assaults on provisional military bases
    established as part of a targeted military operation in the heart
    of SL terrain. Additionally, SL members have conducted civic
    actions to gain the sympathy of local people and communities that
    have been largely abandoned by the state.

    Where the U.S. Can Help

    ¶7. (C/NF) Your visit affords an opportunity to underscore USG
    interest in supporting the GOP's efforts to combat these threats in
    the several discrete areas where we are best positioned to help.
    The key word, however, is "supporting." In this context, the GOP
    needs to develop a more effective political/military strategy for
    turning the tide against a reemerging SL increasingly intertwined
    with drug trafficking. We can help the GOP to fine-tune its plans,
    but government leaders must demonstrate the political will by
    committing funds, setting goals and benchmarks, and decisively
    moving forward on implementation. There have been some encouraging
    signs in this respect.

    ¶8. (C/NF) If an effective counternarcotics campaign and broader
    development objectives in the VRAE presuppose security, the most
    critical security need in the VRAE is for improved intelligence.
    In this connection, the GOP is seeking to rebuild its human
    collection capabilities. They also seek help in the area of
    electronic intelligence, particularly to see from above the dense
    jungle canopy. To seize the initiative and carry the fight to the
    SL, Peru's Armed Forces also seek support in training, equipment
    and transport. After extensive discussions at all levels, the GOP
    may ask for the USG to assist it in the three following areas:

    --- Help improve Peru's intelligence capabilities by providing
    FLIR, UAVs, and satellite imagery;

    --- Replace, replenish or repair their moribund helicopter fleet
    and;

    --- Support the construction of a fixed-wing airfield in Pichari
    and supply equipment and training, including on countering SL's
    increased use of home-made IEDs, mines and booby traps.

    While Peru's security forces have welcomed a broad USG-led ("Tiger
    Team") security review of their existing capabilities and threats,
    you should be prepared to discuss our ability to support, in these
    several discrete ways, Peruvian efforts to confront its real and
    immediate internal security threats in the VRAE.

    Tensions with Chile: Distracting the Focus

    ¶9. (C/NF) Peruvian sensitivities regarding U.S. Arms sales to
    Chile remain acute. The announced prospective U.S. sale to Chile
    of a Sentinel Radar system, a land to air defensive platform
    (Avenger) with stinger missiles, and 100 AMRAAM missiles to equip
    the 18 F-16s Chile recently purchased from Holland caused rankles
    in Peru, particularly as the government was then actively and very
    publicly promoting its "Peace And Disarmament" initiative with
    leaders around the region. That announcement has been overshadowed
    by allegations that a Peruvian Air Force NCO had been spying on
    Chile's behalf for the past 5 years - allegations that have
    dominated Peru's media for the past 10 days and sent its relations
    with Chile into a tailspin. Still, the U.S. arms sales are present
    in the minds of Peruvian political and military leaders, as tilting
    the military balance even more decisively in favor of Chile, and
    are likely to figure prominently in your meetings here.
    MCKINLEY

`