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### Viewing cable 09ASUNCION13, PRESIDENT LUGO DISCUSSES SECURITY AND DEFENSE

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
09ASUNCION13 | 2009-01-09 22:10 | 2011-03-20 07:07 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Asuncion
Appears in these articles: http://www.abc.com.py/nota/ministro-jugaba-juegos-con-lugo-y-con-usa

`

    VZCZCXYZ0000
    OO RUEHWEB

    DE RUEHAC #0013/01 0092220
    ZNY CCCCC ZZH
    O 092220Z JAN 09
    FM AMEMBASSY ASUNCION
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7509
    INFO RUCNMER/MERCOSUR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
    RHEHNCS/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
    RUEAHLC/HOMELAND SECURITY CENTER WASHDC PRIORITY
    RHMFISS/USSOCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
    RUEKJCS/USSOCOM WO WASHDC PRIORITY
    RHMFISS/HQ USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL PRIORITY

` `

    id: 186533
    date: 1/9/2009 22:20
    refid: 09ASUNCION13
    origin: Embassy Asuncion
    classification: CONFIDENTIAL
    destination: 09ASUNCION1|09ASUNCION3
    header:
    VZCZCXYZ0000
    OO RUEHWEB
    DE RUEHAC #0013/01 0092220
    ZNY CCCCC ZZH
    O 092220Z JAN 09
    FM AMEMBASSY ASUNCION
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7509
    INFO RUCNMER/MERCOSUR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
    RHEHNCS/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
    RUEAHLC/HOMELAND SECURITY CENTER WASHDC PRIORITY
    RHMFISS/USSOCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
    RUEKJCS/USSOCOM WO WASHDC PRIORITY
    RHMFISS/HQ USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL PRIORITY
    ----------------- header ends ----------------
    C O N F I D E N T I A L ASUNCION 000013
    SIPDIS
    STATE FOR WHA/BSC MDASCHBACH
    E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/31/2034
    TAGS: PGOV PREL PARM MASS PTER SNAR PA
    SUBJECT: PRESIDENT LUGO DISCUSSES SECURITY AND DEFENSE
    ISSUES WITH CHARGE
    REF: A. ASUNCION 001
    ¶B. ASUNCION 003
    Classified By: Charge d'Affaires, a.i. Michael J. Fitzpatrick for reaso
    ns 1.4 (b) and (d).
    -------
    SUMMARY
    -------
    ¶1. (S) President Lugo, joined by two close confidants,
    frankly and amicably discussed with Charge January 5 current
    security issues, principally the Paraguayan People's Army's
    New Year's Eve attack on an Army outpost and the separate
    subsequent capture by police of stolen plastic explosives by
    Army personnel (ref A and B); the U.S.-trained Joint Rapid
    Response Detachment (DCEI) and security cooperation; and
    possible threats of violence against himself, or his
    ministers. While the President was not overly concerned that
    any of the incidents represented clear or immediate threats
    to the government, he clearly was unhappy with the lack of
    inter-agency cooperation among his ministers and ministries.
    Lugo's posture during the meeting clearly indicated that he
    remains strongly supportive of USG assistance to DCEI, but,
    especially in the absence of his ministers, he remained his
    (usual) noncommital self. He did repeatedly commit, however,
    to have his government provide the Embassy with a written
    response as to the way forward on USG support for the DCEI,
    and perhaps even on US security assistance more generally, by
    January 16. END SUMMARY.
    ------------------------------------
    LUGO ON EPP AND EXPLOSIVES THEFT
    ------------------------------------
    ¶2. (S) President Fernando Lugo, Paraguayan National
    Anti-Drug Secretariat (SENAD) Minister Cesar Aquino, and
    informal advisor Omar Castarino discussed security issues
    January 5 with Charge and poloff (notetaker) in a cordial
    one-hour meeting in the President's office. Lugo told Charge
    that he was pleased with the government's initial response to
    the Paraguayan People's Army's (EPP) December 31 attack on an
    Army outpost in Tacuati, San Pedro Department (ref A). Lugo
    based his feedback on initial reports from the military
    detailing the deployment of 35 members of the Military's
    Joint Rapid Response Detachment (DCEI) to Tacuati to search
    for EPP suspects. He was decidely not pleased, however, with
    the interagency bickering that the attack provoked among the
    police, military, prosecutors and various public officials as
    to who was in charge of responding to the overall situation.
    ¶3. (S) President Lugo told Charge he was convinced the EPP
    was definitely not as large as the 300 members alleged in
    some reports. Rather, he said, it was a small group of known
    individuals (20-30) repeatedly committing the same illegal
    acts. "It,s the same people as always," he said, those
    responsible for a series of high-profile kidnappings in
    recenter years, first as members of the armed wing of the
    Free Homeland Party (PPL), and now as the EPP. Lugo said
    there were reports that law enforcement had surrounded one
    EPP member, and Lugo said he hoped that having a high-profile
    arrest by the end of the week would convince people of his
    genuine interest in shutting down the EPP. (NOTE:
    Paraguayan security forces have not yet apprehended any
    suspects in the Tacuati attack; additional military and
    police units, however, have since been sent into the area in
    the hopes of cornering or flushing out those involved. END
    NOTE.) Lugo also mentioned that the rural areas of the
    Concepcion/San Pedro border area (such as Tacuati) and the
    hilly areas of Paraguari Department as the two most troubling
    areas for these types of security threats. He was troubled
    by, but convinced that, the EPP was receving local support
    from narcotics traffickers (including some large land holders
    in San Pedro). He based that, he said, on his intimate
    knowledge of the area from his (eleven) years as Bishop in
    San Pedro. Lugo estimated that the EPP was not really a
    direct security threat to the nation but rather were stirring
    up trouble, scaring off legitimate investors, and providing
    an opportunity for many quarters to criticize the government
    -- and ultimately to trip him up.
    ¶4. (S) Lugo shared his concerns with Charge over that
    morning's breaking news story -- the arrest of Army personnel
    in possession of hundreds of pounds of C4 plastic explosives,
    possibly stolen from Paraguayan Army depots. Lugo said he
    was convinced that the the three sergeants publicly implicted
    "would not dare" to steal the explosives and guns recovered
    on their own. He saw it more in the context of the Army's
    "traditional" involvement in black market arms trafficking --
    and he said he expected that officers "with stars on their
    shoulderboards" were those really behind the incident.
    Charge committed USG efforts to work closely with prosecutors
    to trace the origins and possible chain of custody to any of
    the materials seized. The President lamented lack of controls
    on the country's stored munitions and the Charge reviewed
    September's USG-assisted destruction activity which reduced
    by some 60 percent Paraguay's stores of (often old/unstable
    munitions. The Pesident reiterated his concern for he lack
    of cooperation and coordination among the security forces,
    the police and prosecutors. Castorino told Lugo that a good
    model for just such coordination does indeed exist -- the
    DCEI.
    -----------------
    SUPPORT FOR DCEI?
    -----------------
    ¶5. (S) Charge and Castorino reviewed for the President the
    history and development of the DCEI, noting that the DCEI is
    tentatively scheduled to receive up to USD 1.2 million in USG
    assistance this year, including assistance for final round of
    selections and qualifications courses slated to start in
    March. (NOTE: The USG has provided USD 5 million in total
    assistance to DCEI since December 2006. END NOTE.)
    Castorino noted that had it not been for USG support for
    standing up the DCEI, the President would have been left
    without any rapid response capability at all -- like the DCEI
    he had just ordered deployed. Aquino noted that the DCEI had
    been very supportive of SENAD by providing cross-training to
    liaison officers and logistical support during
    counter-narcotics operations. Charge noted that, in the end,
    it had been the USG that paid for the gas and expenses for
    the DCEI to deploy in response to the President's orders that
    week. Lugo took that on board, and recalled favorably his
    November 18 visit to the DCEI headquarters in Asuncion and
    his field trip to Amambay Department with Ambassador Ayalde
    to observe SENAD and DCEI jointly conduct counter-narcotics
    operations.
    ¶6. (S) Charge told Lugo that the USG-Paraguayan bilateral
    support effort for the DCEI had been drafted, but never
    signed by the previous Paraguayan administration. President
    Lugo asked why that had been the case. Charge explained the
    USG had operated in good faith that we were responding to
    joint US-Paraguayan priorities in helping stand up the DCEI.
    President Duarte promised repeatedly to sign, but then took
    an increasingly anti-US stance as the Paraguayan elections
    came closer. (Lugo laughed at that, as Duarte's tactics had
    obviously failed.) Then we had to wait for those elections;
    and then President Lugo's inauguration; and then his meeting
    with President Bush; and then OUR elections and now the U.S.
    inauguration... President Lugo laughed aloud again in
    apparent agreement as Charge suggested this really has to
    stop. Charge emphasized to Lugo that the USG sought from his
    administration a written statement of support for the DCEI to
    share with the incoming Obama administration before the
    Embassy could even consider recommending continued USG
    support for DCEI. Charge put this in the context of the
    larger questions that the new US Administration would have:
    Where does Lugo wish to take Paraguay; where does he wish
    relations with the USG to go; and, specifically, where does
    he wish to take the relationship in terms of security and
    defense issues. Aquino and Castorino explained to Lugo that
    although the DCEI is operating legally under Paraguayan law
    and under the military's Special Forces division, it still
    needs to be codified in the law (for instance, to ultimately
    take receipt of U.S.-provided weapons) and it needs its own
    line item in the official budget. (NOTE: Both Aquino and
    Castorino -- who seem to have Lugo's ear, and seem to be
    among the select few he trusts -- were bullish about USG
    support for DCEI. Castorino told Lugo that Defense Minister
    Bareiro had been "playing games" with the USG and with the
    President. They disparaged Bareiro as increasingly
    influenced by the Paraguayan Movement Toward Socialism
    (P-MAS) leader Camilo Soares and Vice Foreign Minister Jorge
    Lara Castro (also viewed by many as an ideological leftist).
    END NOTE.)
    ¶7. (S) Charge provided Lugo a draft copy of a letter from
    Charge to Defense Minister Bareiro, requesting such a written
    affirmation of the Lugo administration's support for DCEI (as
    first requested by the Ambassador of Bareiro in
    mid-December). Lugo read the letter closely, asked that
    Aquino and Castorino provide any suggested edits (they had
    none). Lugo was relaxed and appeared supportive, but, in the
    end, was his usual non-committal self (perhaps especially so
    regarding something possibly still in debate within his
    motley cabinet and circle of advisors). But he quickly told
    Charge to proceed to send the letter to his Defense Minister,
    with copies to the Foreign Minister and himself. (This was
    done shortly after the meeting.) At no time was it suggested
    that either the Foreign Minister or Defense Minister be made
    aware of the Charge's discussion of this topic with the
    President. President Lugo committed at several points,
    however, to have a formal a response to the Embassy from his
    government by the end of the following week (i.e., the Friday
    before the U.S. Presidential inauguration/transition).
    (NOTE: Defense Minister Luis Bareiro Spaini responded
    January 8 to the Embassy's January 5 letter, thanking the
    Embassy for also sharing the request with the President and
    the Foreign Minister -- the two people, he said, with whom he
    needed to first meet in order to prepare a more definitive
    response. END NOTE.)
    -----------------------------
    POSSIBLE THREATS AGAINST LUGO
    -----------------------------
    ¶8. (C) Lugo told Charge that his sister, Mercedes, had
    received several calls with information about possible
    attacks on himself or possibly one of his Ministers to occur
    around the time of Holy Week (March). While he still only
    had initial scraps of info (from his traveling sister), Lugo
    said the threats appeared to be emanating from ex-military
    and/or ex-police (and possibly narco- or criminal-tied
    syndicates) -- not the EPP/Paraguayan People's Army. Lugo
    asked that the Embassy share any information it receives
    regarding possible threats against Lugo; as Charge and
    Ambassador had committed to do so even before he assumed
    office, Charge committed to bring forth any such threat
    information we may have. (NOTE: Charge subsequently asked
    Country Team members to check for any possible information
    related to these threats, which we will then loop back to the
    Presidency -- even if only to say that we have no such
    information. END NOTE.) Lugo concluded by saying he did not
    wish to jump to conclusions and "connect the dots" that did
    not merit connecting; he said he saw the EPP attack, the
    weapons thefts and the possible threat info his sister was
    picking up as separate and unrelated items. The President
    seemed relaxed and comfortable throughout the meeting, and,
    as always, open to learning new information related to things
    he did not know much about. At no time did he indicate he
    was feeling defensive, insecure or rattled by any of the
    threat information.
    -------
    COMMENT
    -------
    ¶9. (C) President Lugo was warm, welcoming, relaxed
    throughout the meeting. He conveyed the impression that he
    remains strongly supportive of USG assistance to Paraguay in
    general, and to the DCEI, in particular. The timing of this
    meeting -- in the immediate wake of both the EPP attack and
    the theft of military munitions -- was coincidental, though
    it may prove to be providential. Even though he was, in the
    end, positive yet non-commital (as is his style, to the
    frustration of all around him), he clearly recognized: a) All
    that the USG has done for Paraguay, b) The need for some
    clarity of his government's position, and c) The need for his
    government to get back to us formally (and with one common
    position) ASAP. END COMMENT.
    Please visit us at http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/wha/asuncion
    FITZPATRICK
    =======================CABLE ENDS============================

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