Cable Viewer

Currently released so far... 6093 / 251,287

### Articles

Brazil Sri Lanka United Kingdom Sweden Editorial United States Latin America Egypt Yemen Jordan

### Browse latest releases

2010/11 2010/12 2011/01 2011/02 2011/03
2010/11/28 2010/11/29 2010/11/30
2010/12/01 2010/12/02 2010/12/03 2010/12/04 2010/12/05 2010/12/06 2010/12/07 2010/12/08 2010/12/09 2010/12/10 2010/12/11 2010/12/12 2010/12/13 2010/12/14 2010/12/15 2010/12/16 2010/12/17 2010/12/18 2010/12/19 2010/12/20 2010/12/21 2010/12/22 2010/12/23 2010/12/24 2010/12/25 2010/12/26 2010/12/27 2010/12/28 2010/12/29 2010/12/30
2011/01/01 2011/01/02 2011/01/04 2011/01/05 2011/01/07 2011/01/09 2011/01/10 2011/01/11 2011/01/12 2011/01/13 2011/01/14 2011/01/15 2011/01/16 2011/01/17 2011/01/18 2011/01/19 2011/01/20 2011/01/21 2011/01/22 2011/01/23 2011/01/24 2011/01/25 2011/01/26 2011/01/27 2011/01/28 2011/01/29 2011/01/30 2011/01/31
2011/02/01 2011/02/02 2011/02/03 2011/02/04 2011/02/05 2011/02/06 2011/02/07 2011/02/08 2011/02/09 2011/02/10 2011/02/11 2011/02/12 2011/02/13 2011/02/14 2011/02/15 2011/02/16 2011/02/17 2011/02/18 2011/02/19 2011/02/20 2011/02/21 2011/02/22 2011/02/23 2011/02/24 2011/02/25 2011/02/26 2011/02/27 2011/02/28
2011/03/01 2011/03/02 2011/03/03 2011/03/04 2011/03/05 2011/03/06 2011/03/07 2011/03/08 2011/03/09 2011/03/10 2011/03/11 2011/03/13 2011/03/14 2011/03/15 2011/03/16 2011/03/17 2011/03/18 2011/03/19 2011/03/20 2011/03/21

### Browse by creation date

66 72 73 75 79 85 86 88 89 90 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10
1966/12
1972/02 1972/08
1973/04
1975/03
1979/08
1985/03
1986/05
1988/01
1989/12
1990/01 1990/07 1990/08 1990/10
2000/06 2000/09 2000/11
2001/02 2001/03 2001/07 2001/10 2001/11
2002/02 2002/03 2002/04 2002/07 2002/11 2002/12
2003/02 2003/03 2003/04 2003/05 2003/06 2003/07 2003/08 2003/09 2003/10 2003/11 2003/12
2004/01 2004/02 2004/03 2004/04 2004/05 2004/06 2004/07 2004/08 2004/09 2004/10 2004/11 2004/12
2005/01 2005/02 2005/03 2005/04 2005/05 2005/06 2005/07 2005/08 2005/09 2005/10 2005/11 2005/12
2006/01 2006/02 2006/03 2006/04 2006/05 2006/06 2006/07 2006/08 2006/09 2006/10 2006/11 2006/12
2007/01 2007/02 2007/03 2007/04 2007/05 2007/06 2007/07 2007/08 2007/09 2007/10 2007/11 2007/12
2008/01 2008/02 2008/03 2008/04 2008/05 2008/06 2008/07 2008/08 2008/09 2008/10 2008/11 2008/12
2009/01 2009/02 2009/03 2009/04 2009/05 2009/06 2009/07 2009/08 2009/09 2009/10 2009/11 2009/12
2010/01 2010/02

### Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z
Embassy Athens Embassy Asuncion Embassy Astana Embassy Asmara Embassy Ashgabat Embassy Ankara Embassy Amman Embassy Algiers Embassy Addis Ababa Embassy Accra Embassy Abuja Embassy Abu Dhabi Embassy Abidjan Consulate Amsterdam American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura Embassy Buenos Aires Embassy Budapest Embassy Bucharest Embassy Brussels Embassy Bridgetown Embassy Bratislava Embassy Brasilia Embassy Bogota Embassy Bishkek Embassy Bern Embassy Berlin Embassy Belgrade Embassy Beirut Embassy Beijing Embassy Banjul Embassy Bangkok Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan Embassy Bamako Embassy Baku Embassy Baghdad Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen Embassy Conakry Embassy Colombo Embassy Chisinau Embassy Caracas Embassy Canberra Embassy Cairo Consulate Curacao Consulate Ciudad Juarez Consulate Chennai Consulate Casablanca Consulate Cape Town
Embassy Dushanbe Embassy Dublin Embassy Doha Embassy Djibouti Embassy Dhaka Embassy Dar Es Salaam Embassy Damascus Embassy Dakar Consulate Dubai
Embassy Freetown
Embassy Guatemala Embassy Gaborone Consulate Guadalajara
Embassy Helsinki Embassy Harare Embassy Hanoi Consulate Hermosillo Consulate Hamburg
Iran RPO Dubai Embassy Islamabad Consulate Istanbul
Embassy Jakarta Consulate Jerusalem Consulate Jeddah
Embassy Kyiv Embassy Kuwait Embassy Kuala Lumpur Embassy Kinshasa Embassy Kigali Embassy Khartoum Embassy Kathmandu Embassy Kampala Embassy Kabul Consulate Kolkata
Embassy Luxembourg Embassy Luanda Embassy London Embassy Ljubljana Embassy Lisbon Embassy Lima Embassy Lilongwe Embassy La Paz Consulate Lagos
Mission USNATO Embassy Muscat Embassy Moscow Embassy Montevideo Embassy Monrovia Embassy Minsk Embassy Mexico Embassy Mbabane Embassy Maputo Embassy Manama Embassy Managua Embassy Malabo Embassy Madrid Consulate Munich Consulate Montreal Consulate Monterrey Consulate Milan
Embassy New Delhi Embassy Nassau Embassy Nairobi Consulate Naples
Embassy Ouagadougou Embassy Ottawa Embassy Oslo
Embassy Pristina Embassy Pretoria Embassy Prague Embassy Port Au Prince Embassy Phnom Penh Embassy Paris Embassy Paramaribo Embassy Panama Consulate Peshawar
Embassy Quito
REO Basrah Embassy Rome Embassy Riyadh Embassy Riga Embassy Reykjavik Embassy Rangoon Embassy Rabat Consulate Rio De Janeiro Consulate Recife
Secretary of State Embassy Stockholm Embassy Sofia Embassy Skopje Embassy Singapore Embassy Seoul Embassy Sarajevo Embassy Santo Domingo Embassy Santiago Embassy Sanaa Embassy San Salvador Embassy San Jose Consulate Strasbourg Consulate Shenyang Consulate Shanghai Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis Embassy Tripoli Embassy Tokyo Embassy The Hague Embassy Tel Aviv Embassy Tehran Embassy Tegucigalpa Embassy Tbilisi Embassy Tashkent Embassy Tallinn Consulate Tijuana
USUN New York USEU Brussels US Mission Geneva US Interests Section Havana US Delegation, Secretary UNVIE Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius Embassy Vienna Embassy Vatican Consulate Vladivostok
Embassy Windhoek Embassy Wellington Embassy Warsaw
Embassy Yerevan Embassy Yaounde
Embassy Zagreb

### Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
AF AE AJ ASEC AMGT AR AU AG AS AM AORC ACOA AX AFIN AL APER AFFAIRS AA AEMR AMED ABLD AROC ATFN ASEAN AFGHANISTAN ADCO AO AFU AER AODE ABUD ATRN APECO ASUP AID AC AGMT AVERY APCS ASIG ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
BR BA BE BL BEXP BTIO BK BM BX BU BO BIDEN BG BY BF BBSR BH BC BT BRUSSELS BB BILAT BMGT BTIU
CH CASC CA CVIS CMGT CO CI CU CE CS CAN CN CJAN CY CG COE CD CM COUNTRY CLEARANCE CPAS CACS CWC CBW CF CONDOLEEZZA CT CARSON CL CIA CDG CR CIS CLINTON CODEL CTM CB COUNTER COM CKGR CJUS CV COUNTERTERRORISM CACM CDB
DA DOE DISENGAGEMENT DJ DEA DK DHS DR DTRA DS DOD DEAX
EPET EINV ECON ENRG EFIN ETTC EG ETRD EAGR ELAB EU EAID EIND EUN EAIR ER ECIN ECPS ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS EWWT EI EFIS ES EC EMIN ENVR ECA EXTERNAL ET ENERG EINT ENGY EZ EN ETRO ELECTIONS ELN ELTN EK EFTA ECONCS ECONOMICS EUR ECONEFIN ENIV EINVETC EINN ENGR ESA ETC ETRDEINVTINTCS ESENV ETRDECONWTOCS ENVI EUNCH ENNP ECUN EINVEFIN ECIP EINDETRD EUC EREL
FR FAO FTAA FARC FREEDOM FI FBI FJ FINR FMLN
GH GA GG GM GT GR GOI GE GAZA GV GCC GZ GOV GY GTIP GANGS GTMO
HU HR HUMAN HO HA HURI HILLARY HK HSTC HYMPSK
IZ IR IS IN INTERPOL IPR IT INRB IAEA ITPHUM IV IO ID IWC IC IIP ICRC ISRAELI IMO IL IA INR ITALIAN ITALY ITPGOV IZPREL IRAQI ICAO ILC IQ IRC ICTY INRA INRO IRAJ IEFIN IF INTELSAT IACI ITRA IBRD IMF ICJ
JO JOSEPH JA JP JOHNNIE JAMES JM JUS
KCOR KZ KDEM KN KNNP KPAL KU KCRM KE KSCA KS KJUS KFRD KTIP KPAO KTFN KIPR KPKO KISL KMDR KGHG KPLS KOLY KUNR KIRF KIRC KDRG KBIO KHLS KWBG KMCA KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KWMN KACT KV KGIC KRAD KTIA KCIP KGIT KAWC KPRP KOMC KSTC KFLU KSUM KBTS KPRV KBTR KVPR KTDB KERG KWMM KRVC KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KSTH KSEP KNSD KG KFLO KWAC KMPI KICC KVIR KBCT KNUP KTER KFIN KCFE KHIV KAWK KSPR KNEI KDDG KHSA KMRS KHDP KTLA KPAK KNAR KREL KPAI KTEX KNPP KCOM KNNPMNUC KO KPOA KLIG KOCI KRFD KHUM KDEV KNUC KCFC KOMS KWWMN KTBT KSAF KCRS KR KPWR KMIG KSEC KIFR KDEMAF KGCC KPIN
LE LH LY LI LO LOG LG LT LTTE LU LAB
MARR MOPS MTCRE MX MCAP MASS MO MNUC MZ ML MPOS MOPPS MAPP MU MY MA MASC MP MIL MT MR MERCOSUR MK MDC MI MAPS MCC MD MASSMNUC MQADHAFI MUCN MTCR MEPP MG MAR MC MRCRE MTRE MEPI MV
NATO NPT NL NI NU NO NS NSG NA NG NZ NATIONAL NP NRR NIPP NAR NE NASA NK NPG NT NGO NSF
ODIP OIIP OREP OVIP OEXC OPRC OFDP OPDC OTRA OSCE OAS OECD OPCW OSCI OPIC OIC OFFICIALS OIE OVP OTR OSAC
PGOV PINR PHUM PK PREL PTER PBIO PARM PSOE PBTS PREF PINS PL PE PKFK PO PHSA PROP PMIL PM POL PY PAK PFOR PALESTINIAN PHALANAGE PARTY PRAM PAO PA PMAR PGOVLO POLITICS PUNE PORG PHUMPREL PF POLINT PHUS PGOC PNR PGGV PNAT PGOVE PRGOV PRL PROV PTERE PGOF PHUMBA PARMS PINT PINF PEL PLN POV PG PEPR PSI PU POLITICAL PARTIES PECON POGOV PINL
QA
RS RU RW RIGHTS RF RO RICE ROBERT RFE REGION RP
SCUL SA SY SP SNAR SU SW SOCI SENV SL SMIG SO SF SR SG SZ SIPRS SH SI STEINBERG SNARCS SOFA SANC SHUM SK ST SC SAN SN SEVN SYR
TX TW TU TSPA TH TIP TI TS TRGY TC TO TBIO TZ TK TSPL TPHY TNGD TINT TRSY TR TFIN TD TURKEY TERRORISM TT TP
UK UG UP US UN UNSC UNGA USUN UY UNO UNESCO UNEP UNDP UNCHS UNHRC UNMIK UNAUS USTR UNVIE UZ USEU UV UNCHC UE UNDESCO UNHCR USAID UNDC UAE
VT VE VZ VTPREL VM VN
WTRO WTRQ WWARD WB WHA WI WBG WTO WHO WEU WZ WA WMO
XA XF XG XZ XR XW XY XL XM XE XD XK XH XT XC XS
YM YI YE YMCS
ZB ZI ZU ZO ZANU ZA ZOELLICK ZK ZP ZR ZF ZJ

### Browse by classification

CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN SECRET SECRET//NOFORN UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

### Community resources

Follow us on Twitter Check our Reddit Twitter this Digg this page Contact us on IRC

courage is contagious

### Viewing cable 06SANJOSE2685, SCENESETTER FOR PRESIDENT ARIAS VISIT

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:

- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #06SANJOSE2685.

Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
06SANJOSE2685 | 2006-11-28 23:11 | 2011-03-15 21:09 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy San Jose

`

    VZCZCXYZ0000
    OO RUEHWEB

    DE RUEHSJ #2685/01 3322314
    ZNY CCCCC ZZH
    O 282314Z NOV 06
    FM AMEMBASSY SAN JOSE
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6746
    INFO RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE
    RUEHZA/WHA CENTRAL AMERICAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

` `

    C O N F I D E N T I A L SAN JOSE 002685

    SIPDIS

    SIPDIS

    DEPT FOR WHA/CEN JASON MACK

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/28/2016
    TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR ETRD ECON CS
    SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR PRESIDENT ARIAS VISIT

    Classified By: Ambassador Mark Langdale for reason 1.4(d)

    -------
    SUMMARY
    -------

    ¶1. (C) President Arias and his administration are making
    progress on the ambitious agenda outlined in his inaugural
    address.  In October, long-planned, union-led national
    anti-CAFTA protests fizzled, a costly dockworkers, strike in
    a major port was resolved, and the legislature set a date
    certain (December 12) to move CAFTA-DR out of committee and
    to the full assembly for action.  CID-Gallup polls show a 60
    percent personal approval rating for Arias, with 50 percent
    describing his presidential performance as "good or very
    good."  Serious challenges remain, however.  Costa Ricans
    have less confidence in their governing institutions, and
    increasingly suffer the effects of underinvestment in the
    nation,s infrastructure, domestic security apparatus and
    education system.  While a slim majority of the population
    (and a solid majority in the legislature) favors CAFTA-DR,
    the ratification and implementation process is
    hyper-legalistic and torturously slow.

    ¶2. (C) Against this backdrop, Arias comes to Washington to
    seek USG understanding of Costa Rica,s "unique" political
    tradition which places a premium on consensus (thus mandating
    his deliberate approach to ratifying CAFTA-DR).  On
    international issues, Arias will seek recognition of Costa
    Rica,s "responsible" foreign policy, centered on initiatives
    such as the Costa Rica Consensus and the GOCR,s 2008-2010
    UNSC candidacy.  While differing on approaches to the Costa
    Rica Consensus and the UN Arms Transfer Treaty, the U.S and
    Costa Rica continue to be partners on consolidating democracy
    and encouraging prosperity in the region, fighting
    transnational threats such as drug trafficking and
    trafficking in persons, and protecting the environment.   The
    USG should urge Arias to continue moving forward on the
    ambitious agenda laid out at his inaugural address, which is
    consistent with the four pillars of USG policy in the
    hemisphere.  With focused and determined leadership,
    President Arias can position Costa Rica to achieve developed
    country status by its bicentennial in 2021.  END SUMMARY.

    ---------
    ITINERARY
    ---------

    ¶3. (SBU) This is Arias,s first visit to Washington this term
    as president.  He visited as a presidential candidate in June
    ¶2005.  In September 2006, he visited Florida for the Miami
    Herald,s Conference of the Americas and Colorado for a Nobel
    laureates, "PeaceJam" en route to the UNGA.  In addition to
    meeting with the President, Commerce Secretary Gutierrez and
    members of Congress, we understand that Arias,s December 3-6
    schedule includes meetings with officials from the IMF, IBRD,
    IBD and MCC.  He will also participate in events hosted by
    the Carnegie Endowment, Council of the Americas, and U.S.
    Chamber of Commerce, and address the OAS Permanent Council.

    ---------------------------
    SERIOUS CHALLENGES AT HOME
    ---------------------------

    ¶4. (C) Returning to office in May after a 16-year hiatus,
    President Oscar Arias faces a number of serious challenges.
    Costa Rica,s well-developed democracy, history of stability
    and relative prosperity (per capita income is approximately
    USD 4,700) continue to be strengths, but portions of the
    foundation of their past success are crumbling.  With the
    previous administration accomplishing very little and three
    former presidents facing corruption allegations, Costa Ricans
    have less confidence in their governing institutions.   They
    also suffer the effects of the nation,s creaky
    infrastructure and increased crime.  Only 35 percent of
    students entering the public school system graduate from high
    school.  The judicial system is broken.  For example, of
    37,000 robbery cases opened in 2005, only three percent ended
    with a conviction.  In World Bank rankings, Costa Rica places
    157th out of 175 in countries measured for protecting
    investors, and 114th in enforcing contracts.   On other key
    measures of international competitiveness, Costa Rica is also
    slipping.  The country dropped from 99th to 105th overall on
    the World Bank,s 175-country "Doing Business Index" for
    2006, and in the key measure of paying taxes, ranked 160th
    out of 175.

    --------------------------------------------
    AMBITIOUS AGENDA; EARLY TESTS OF LEADERSHIP
    --------------------------------------------

    ¶5. (SBU) In his inaugural address, Arias laid out an agenda
    that went right to the heart of these problems, based on the
    twin pillars of fiscal reform (overhauling the tax system)
    and a more open and competitive economy (enacting CAFTA-DR
    reforming the telecom and energy sectors, creating jobs).
    These reforms should provide Costa Rica the resources to
    modernize infrastructure, increase spending on education,
    modernize its institutions and invest in a more robust
    domestic security apparatus.  Along with conducting a
    principled foreign policy (see below) Arias,s inaugural
    goals are fully consistent with the four pillars of USG
    policy in the hemisphere: consolidate democracy, promote
    prosperity, invest in people and protect the democratic state.

    ¶6. (C) His administration, although talented, got off to a
    slow start.  The president was criticized for traveling too
    much out of the country and for having a detached leadership
    style.  Most newly appointed cabinet members expressed
    surprise and dismay at the abysmal state of the agencies they
    inherited.  Minister of the Presidency Rodrigo Arias (the
    president's younger brother) was especially hampered by the
    make-up of the new legislative assembly.   The diffused
    results of the 2006 elections significantly changed the
    political landscape, electing eight parties to the 57-member
    legislative assembly and forcing the Arias administration to
    learn how to combine with other parties to form a working
    majority.  (Arias,s National Liberation Party holds only 25
    of the 57 seats.)

    ¶7. (U) By October, the picture had brightened.  Long-planned,
    union-led national anti-CAFTA protests fizzled, a costly
    dockworkers, strike in the major Caribbean port of Limon was
    resolved, and the legislative assembly set a date certain
    (December 12) for the committee vote which would move CAFTA
    to the full assembly for action.  CID-Gallup polls show a 60
    percent personal approval rating for Arias, with 50 percent
    describing his presidential performance as "good or very
    good."

    ------------------------
    PRINCIPLED POLICY ABROAD
    ------------------------

    ¶8. (C) President Arias still views Costa Rica as an exemplar
    for Central America and a leader on principled global issues
    such as disarmament, social development, environmental
    protection and international law.  Under Arias, Costa Rica
    continues to think of itself as in Central America, but not
    of it, and is thus reluctant to engage deeply in regional
    cooperation efforts, especially on defense and security
    issues.  Earlier in his administration, Arias was one of the
    most vocal (and eloquent) critics of the Castro regime.  Over
    the last month, he has begun to take a lower profile.  For
    example, he initially committed to the Ambassador to raise
    Cuba publicly during the November Ibero-American Summit in
    Uruguay, but did not do so.  According to FM Bruno Stagno,
    this was a) because Arias was feeling "alone" on the issue,
    as other Latin leaders are reluctant to speak out, and b) so
    as not to invite criticism which might jeopardize Costa
    Rica,s prospects to be elected to the UN Security Council
    (UNSC) for the 2008-2010 term.

    ¶9.  (C)  Stagno has described the Arias Administration,s
    foreign policy priorities (in sequence) as 1) obtaining UN
    support for an international treaty on conventional arms
    transfers, 2) being elected in 2007 to the 2008-2010 GRULAC
    seat on the UNSC, 3) obtaining international (and USG)
    support for the San Jose Consensus (enhanced economic
    assistance and debt relief to "responsible" middle-income
    developing countries), and 4) building a new, international
    "rain forest" coalition, including countries such as Papua
    New Guinea and the Congo.   The GOCR views a UNSC seat as a
    key prerequisite to achieving the other three objectives.
    Costa Rican foreign policy seems to be geared increasingly
    towards "going with the flow" in the UN, to avoid frictions
    and maximize election prospects.  The UNSC election is
    coloring much of Costa Rica,s foreign policy calculus.

    ---------------
    U.S. OBJECTIVES
    ---------------

    ¶10.  (C) GENERAL:  The USG should encourage President Arias
    to pursue his goal of positioning Costa Rica to become a
    developed country by its bicentennial in 2021.  With focused
    and determined leadership, the Arias administration can
    achieve the president,s inaugural policy objectives by
    making the reforms necessary to strengthen Costa Rica,s
    position as a political and economic leader in Central
    America.   The USG shares this vision.  We want Costa Rica to
    succeed and be the best example of prosperity for the region.
     Because it is smaller, Costa Rica can "turn faster," but it
    must wean itself from a mindset that still looks first to
    traditional foreign assistance for development.  Costa Rica
    will successfully move up to developed country status by
    completing needed domestic reform that will stimulate private
    investment and enhance support from IFI,s.

    ¶11.  (C) CAFTA-DR:  The Arias administration has made this a
    top priority, and should be encouraged to keep moving.  The
    government has the votes for ratification, which should be
    completed by April 2007.  Full implementation will take
    longer.  Thirteen legal reforms must be enacted to make Costa
    Rican laws CAFTA-DR-compliant by the March 1, 2008
    implementation deadline.  Arias should be reminded of this
    deadline.  If raised, the USG is facilitating (via Colombia)
    anti-riot training for Costa Rican security force personnel,
    in advance of the next round of anti-CAFTA protests, expected
    to coincide with the first legislative assembly vote between
    mid-January and mid-February.

    ¶12.  (C) FISCAL REFORM:  This is another essential element in
    Arias,s domestic agenda.  In the 2006 World Bank "Doing
    Business Index," Costa Rica fell to 160 (out of 175) in
    paying taxes.  Creating and enforcing a sustainable tax
    structure will enable the GOCR to modernize its
    infrastructure while supporting social initiatives.  The USG
    has provided Treasury Department experts to advise the
    Ministry of Finance in tax administration and, more recently,
    budgeting, and has helped bring third-country experts (such
    as former Estonian PM Mart Laar) to Costa Rica.

    ¶13. (C) COMPETITIVENESS:  In his inaugural agenda, Arias
    vowed to "promote policies for sustained improvements in
    competitiveness."  The USG should encourage these reforms.
    Some key pieces are already in place.  The GOCR's current
    concessions law is based upon the successful Chilean model
    and amendments currently proposed will improve it.  The
    recent concessions granted to run facilities at Costa Rican
    Pacific port of Caldera are a success story and a model for
    the GOCR.  But, the government's mishandling of the San Jose
    Airport concession with Alterra over the past five years is
    of serious concern.  Focusing on reforms that improve Costa
    Rica's competitiveness rankings with the World Bank are
    essential to attracting greater foreign investment and
    creating a more dynamic economic environment.

    ¶14. (C) CUBA:  This is not the time to say less.  The Cuban
    people need continued statements from credible regional
    leaders like Arias on the need for democratic change and
    support for human rights in Cuba.  Such statements are fully
    consistent with Costa Rica,s well-deserved reputation as a
    strong advocate for democracy and human rights around the
    globe, and are in keeping with the principled foreign policy
    outlined in Arias,s inaugural address.  Arias should be
    encouraged to advocate such statements within the appropriate
    multilateral organizations.

    ¶15. (C) NICARAGUA:  Arias has taken a careful wait-and-see
    approach following Daniel Ortega,s election as president.
    With more than 300,000 Nicaraguans estimated to be in Costa
    Rica, and relying heavily on Nicaraguan labor to harvest
    coffee and perform other manual labor, the GOCR believes that
    bilateral relations with its neighbor must be handled very
    carefully.  Even so, the USG should urge Costa Rica to work
    quietly with other democracies to help keep Ortega in line

    ¶16. (C) REGIONAL SECURITY:   Arias should be commended for
    excellent bilateral counternarcotics cooperation.  Over 25
    tons of cocaine have been seized in Costa Rican territory in
    2006, mostly at sea.  Costa Rican authorities are honest and
    reliable partners in combating transnational crime with very
    limited resources.  At the same time, the GOCR continues to
    harbor strong reluctance to participate in anything that
    suggests a "militarization" of Costa Rica.  The USG should
    stress that regional cooperation with security forces is not
    "militarization," but is the only realistic way to confront
    regional security threats, including transnational crimes.
    USG-supplied military equipment and training has been
    essential to improving Costa Rica,s security forces.  The
    USG seeks a healthy regional dialogue, via the Central
    American Integration System (SICA in Spanish), on security
    issues of mutual concern such as organized crime, gangs and
    narcotrafficking.

    ------------------
    ARIAS,S OBJECTIVES
    ------------------
    ¶17.  (SBU) GENERAL:  On domestic issues, Arias will seek USG
    understanding of Costa  Rica,s "unique"  political tradition
    which places a premium on consensus and protecting the social
    welfare system.  This has mandated his careful, deliberate
    approach to ratifying CAFTA (see above).  On international
    issues, Arias will seek recognition of Costa Rica,s
    "responsible" foreign policy, centered on initiatives such as
    the Costa Rica Consensus and the GOCR,s 2008-2010 UNSC
    candidacy.

    ¶18.  (SBU) COSTA RICA CONSENSUS:   This initiative is based
    on the premise that Costa Rica and other middle-income
    developing countries have been "unfairly" cut off from the
    large foreign assistance flows of the past.  Arias proposes
    more aid and debt relief for countries that invest more for
    social programs and less for armaments.  As donor countries
    increase development assistance to the 0.7 percent of GDP
    target set in the UN,s Millennium Declaration, countries on
    the proper development path should be rewarded.  According to
    FM Stagno, the GOCR seeks to build global support for the
    initiative in time for a summit in 2008 or 2009.   Related to
    this, Arias may also urge that some portion of the Millennium
    Challenge Corporation (MCC) funds for Nicaragua be made
    available for Costa Rica, in light of the large population of
    Nicaraguan residents "south of their border," or that MCC per
    capita income limitations (which exclude Costa Rica) be
    relaxed.   Costa Rica is not eligible for MCC funds
    designated for Nicaragua, however, since these resources are
    targeted for infrastructure, environmental, business
    development and legal projects within Nicaragua.

    ¶19.  (C) USG and GOCR perspectives clearly differ on foreign
    aid issues.   Relying on international assistance is "old
    think" from the 1980,s, and will not generate anywhere near
    thebenefits possible from diect foreign investment. Arias
    may need to be reminded that as a "sustainig partner," we
    perceive Costa Rica to be well-plced to attract the foreign
    investment needed to odernize the country, fuel continued
    development and support Arias,s agenda.  For Costa Rca,
    the future is based on trade, not aid.  The USG will continue
    to offer technical assistance on regional security issues and
    on the implementation of further economic reforms.

    ¶20. (SBU) USG ASSISTANCE:  Arias should be aware that USG
    assistance has not been cut off completely.  The October 2006
    waiver of ASPA restrictions on International Military
    Education and Training (IMET) is permanent, and will mean
    additional (although small-scale) funding to assist GOCR
    security forces in the future.  Tropical Forest Conservation
    Act (TFCA) eligibility, being considered by Treasury, may
    lead to some targeted debt forgiveness for Costa Rica.   As a
    CAFTA-DR signatory, the GOCR is also eligible for a share of
    nearly USD 40 million in regional trade capacity building
    funds.

    ¶21.  (SBU) UN ARMS TRANSFER TREATY (ATT):   Arias may seek to
    persuade the USG to modify its direct opposition to this
    initiative.   On this issue, the USG and GOCR may have to
    agree to disagree .  As a world leader in reducing the sales
    of  illicit arms, the USG continues to believe that to be
    universal, and to include all major arms producers including
    Russia and China, an ATT would be a
    "lowest-common-denominator" agreement, and therefore not
    effective.  If Costa Rica is concerned about arms transfers,
    however, the GOCR should be encouraged to speak out against
    the destabilizing and disproportionate arms build up in
    Venezuela.

    ¶22.  (C) UNSC ELECTION FOR 2008-2010:  Arias may ask for USG
    support, concerned that Venezuela will again run, and that
    having a Central American nation on the Council now (Panama)
    could jeopardize Costa Rican prospects for 2008.  The GOCR
    should be encouraged not to mute its principled support for
    human rights as the 2008 UNSC election campaign continues.
    The USG seeks Costa Rican help to focus attention on human
    rights violations in countries such as Iran and Belarus, in
    addition to Cuba.

    ¶23.  (SBU) U.S. CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS:  Arias may point to
    the election results as suggesting a change in USG policy,
    e.g., more attention (and resources) for Latin America and
    more flexibility on trade agreements and immigration issues.
    Based on early indications, however, the effect may be just
    the opposite, especially on trade issues.  This underscores
    the need for Costa Rica to ratify and implement CAFTA-DR as
    soon as possible.
    LANGDALE

`