Cable Viewer

Currently released so far... 6094 / 251,287

### Articles

Brazil Sri Lanka United Kingdom Sweden Editorial United States Latin America Egypt Yemen Jordan

### Browse latest releases

2010/11 2010/12 2011/01 2011/02 2011/03
2010/11/28 2010/11/29 2010/11/30
2010/12/01 2010/12/02 2010/12/03 2010/12/04 2010/12/05 2010/12/06 2010/12/07 2010/12/08 2010/12/09 2010/12/10 2010/12/11 2010/12/12 2010/12/13 2010/12/14 2010/12/15 2010/12/16 2010/12/17 2010/12/18 2010/12/19 2010/12/20 2010/12/21 2010/12/22 2010/12/23 2010/12/24 2010/12/25 2010/12/26 2010/12/27 2010/12/28 2010/12/29 2010/12/30
2011/01/01 2011/01/02 2011/01/04 2011/01/05 2011/01/07 2011/01/09 2011/01/10 2011/01/11 2011/01/12 2011/01/13 2011/01/14 2011/01/15 2011/01/16 2011/01/17 2011/01/18 2011/01/19 2011/01/20 2011/01/21 2011/01/22 2011/01/23 2011/01/24 2011/01/25 2011/01/26 2011/01/27 2011/01/28 2011/01/29 2011/01/30 2011/01/31
2011/02/01 2011/02/02 2011/02/03 2011/02/04 2011/02/05 2011/02/06 2011/02/07 2011/02/08 2011/02/09 2011/02/10 2011/02/11 2011/02/12 2011/02/13 2011/02/14 2011/02/15 2011/02/16 2011/02/17 2011/02/18 2011/02/19 2011/02/20 2011/02/21 2011/02/22 2011/02/23 2011/02/24 2011/02/25 2011/02/26 2011/02/27 2011/02/28
2011/03/01 2011/03/02 2011/03/03 2011/03/04 2011/03/05 2011/03/06 2011/03/07 2011/03/08 2011/03/09 2011/03/10 2011/03/11 2011/03/13 2011/03/14 2011/03/15 2011/03/16 2011/03/17 2011/03/18 2011/03/19 2011/03/20 2011/03/21

### Browse by creation date

66 72 73 75 79 85 86 88 89 90 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10
1966/12
1972/02 1972/08
1973/04
1975/03
1979/08
1985/03
1986/05
1988/01
1989/12
1990/01 1990/07 1990/08 1990/10
2000/06 2000/09 2000/11
2001/02 2001/03 2001/07 2001/10 2001/11
2002/02 2002/03 2002/04 2002/07 2002/11 2002/12
2003/02 2003/03 2003/04 2003/05 2003/06 2003/07 2003/08 2003/09 2003/10 2003/11 2003/12
2004/01 2004/02 2004/03 2004/04 2004/05 2004/06 2004/07 2004/08 2004/09 2004/10 2004/11 2004/12
2005/01 2005/02 2005/03 2005/04 2005/05 2005/06 2005/07 2005/08 2005/09 2005/10 2005/11 2005/12
2006/01 2006/02 2006/03 2006/04 2006/05 2006/06 2006/07 2006/08 2006/09 2006/10 2006/11 2006/12
2007/01 2007/02 2007/03 2007/04 2007/05 2007/06 2007/07 2007/08 2007/09 2007/10 2007/11 2007/12
2008/01 2008/02 2008/03 2008/04 2008/05 2008/06 2008/07 2008/08 2008/09 2008/10 2008/11 2008/12
2009/01 2009/02 2009/03 2009/04 2009/05 2009/06 2009/07 2009/08 2009/09 2009/10 2009/11 2009/12
2010/01 2010/02

### Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z
Embassy Athens Embassy Asuncion Embassy Astana Embassy Asmara Embassy Ashgabat Embassy Ankara Embassy Amman Embassy Algiers Embassy Addis Ababa Embassy Accra Embassy Abuja Embassy Abu Dhabi Embassy Abidjan Consulate Amsterdam American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura Embassy Buenos Aires Embassy Budapest Embassy Bucharest Embassy Brussels Embassy Bridgetown Embassy Bratislava Embassy Brasilia Embassy Bogota Embassy Bishkek Embassy Bern Embassy Berlin Embassy Belgrade Embassy Beirut Embassy Beijing Embassy Banjul Embassy Bangkok Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan Embassy Bamako Embassy Baku Embassy Baghdad Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen Embassy Conakry Embassy Colombo Embassy Chisinau Embassy Caracas Embassy Canberra Embassy Cairo Consulate Curacao Consulate Ciudad Juarez Consulate Chennai Consulate Casablanca Consulate Cape Town
Embassy Dushanbe Embassy Dublin Embassy Doha Embassy Djibouti Embassy Dhaka Embassy Dar Es Salaam Embassy Damascus Embassy Dakar Consulate Dubai
Embassy Freetown
Embassy Guatemala Embassy Gaborone Consulate Guadalajara
Embassy Helsinki Embassy Harare Embassy Hanoi Consulate Hermosillo Consulate Hamburg
Iran RPO Dubai Embassy Islamabad Consulate Istanbul
Embassy Jakarta Consulate Jerusalem Consulate Jeddah
Embassy Kyiv Embassy Kuwait Embassy Kuala Lumpur Embassy Kinshasa Embassy Kigali Embassy Khartoum Embassy Kathmandu Embassy Kampala Embassy Kabul
Embassy Luxembourg Embassy Luanda Embassy London Embassy Ljubljana Embassy Lisbon Embassy Lima Embassy Lilongwe Embassy La Paz Consulate Lagos
Mission USNATO Embassy Muscat Embassy Moscow Embassy Montevideo Embassy Monrovia Embassy Minsk Embassy Mexico Embassy Mbabane Embassy Maputo Embassy Manama Embassy Managua Embassy Malabo Embassy Madrid Consulate Munich Consulate Montreal Consulate Monterrey Consulate Milan
Embassy New Delhi Embassy Nassau Embassy Nairobi Consulate Naples
Embassy Ouagadougou Embassy Ottawa Embassy Oslo
Embassy Pristina Embassy Pretoria Embassy Prague Embassy Port Au Prince Embassy Phnom Penh Embassy Paris Embassy Paramaribo Embassy Panama Consulate Peshawar
Embassy Quito
REO Basrah Embassy Rome Embassy Riyadh Embassy Riga Embassy Reykjavik Embassy Rangoon Embassy Rabat Consulate Rio De Janeiro Consulate Recife
Secretary of State Embassy Stockholm Embassy Sofia Embassy Skopje Embassy Singapore Embassy Seoul Embassy Sarajevo Embassy Santo Domingo Embassy Santiago Embassy Sanaa Embassy San Salvador Embassy San Jose Consulate Strasbourg Consulate Shenyang Consulate Shanghai Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis Embassy Tripoli Embassy Tokyo Embassy The Hague Embassy Tel Aviv Embassy Tehran Embassy Tegucigalpa Embassy Tbilisi Embassy Tashkent Embassy Tallinn Consulate Tijuana
USUN New York USEU Brussels US Mission Geneva US Interests Section Havana US Delegation, Secretary UNVIE Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius Embassy Vienna Embassy Vatican Consulate Vladivostok
Embassy Windhoek Embassy Wellington Embassy Warsaw
Embassy Yerevan Embassy Yaounde
Embassy Zagreb

### Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
AR AJ ASEC AE AEMR AF AMGT APER AG AM AORC AU AS ACOA AX AFIN AL AFFAIRS AA AMED ABLD AROC ATFN ASEAN AFGHANISTAN ADCO AO AFU AER AODE ABUD ATRN APECO ASUP AID AC AGMT AVERY APCS ASIG ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
BU BM BEXP BR BA BRUSSELS BL BO BTIO BH BE BK BX BIDEN BG BY BF BBSR BC BT BB BILAT BMGT BTIU
CH CU CJAN CMGT CVIS CO CA CE COUNTER CASC CBW CG CI CS CDG CIA CACM CDB CAN CN CY COE CD CM COUNTRY CLEARANCE CPAS CACS CWC CF CONDOLEEZZA CT CARSON CL CR CIS CLINTON CODEL CTM CB COM CKGR CV CJUS COUNTERTERRORISM
DJ DEAX DA DOE DISENGAGEMENT DEA DK DHS DR DTRA DS DOD
EINV ECON ENRG EPET ETRD EAGR ELAB EUN EFIN EAID EU EIND ETTC ECPS EWWT ES EG EXTERNAL EMIN ECIP EINDETRD EN EAIR EZ EUC EI ELTN EREL ER ECIN ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS EFIS EC ENVR ECA ET ENERG EINT ENGY ETRO ELECTIONS ELN EK EFTA ECONCS ECONOMICS EUR ECONEFIN ENIV EINVETC EINN ENGR ESA ETC ETRDEINVTINTCS ESENV ETRDECONWTOCS ENVI EUNCH ENNP ECUN EINVEFIN
FR FAO FTAA FARC FREEDOM FI FBI FJ FINR FMLN
GM GZ GTMO GOI GG GV GH GA GT GR GE GAZA GCC GOV GY GTIP GANGS
HO HURI HA HU HR HUMAN HILLARY HK HSTC HYMPSK
IR IS IZ IN IT IAEA ID IO IV ICTY IQ ICAO INTERPOL IPR INRB ITPHUM IWC IC IIP ICRC ISRAELI IMO IL IA INR ITALIAN ITALY ITPGOV IZPREL IRAQI ILC IRC INRA INRO IRAJ IEFIN IF INTELSAT IACI ICJ IBRD IMF ITRA
JAMES JA JO JOSEPH JP JOHNNIE JM JUS
KCRM KCOR KDEM KPAO KG KTIP KICC KNNP KV KBCT KPAL KTFN KU KSPR KJUS KHLS KTIA KWBG KMDR KGHG KN KUNR KS KIRF KISL KFRD KIPR KAWC KPWR KCIP KSUM KWAC KMIG KOLY KZ KAWK KSEC KIFR KDRG KDEMAF KFIN KGIC KGCC KPIN KBIO KHIV KSCA KE KPKO KPLS KIRC KRAD KMCA KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KWMN KACT KGIT KPRP KOMC KSTC KFLU KBTS KPRV KBTR KVPR KTDB KERG KWMM KRVC KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KSTH KSEP KNSD KFLO KMPI KVIR KNUP KTER KCFE KNEI KDDG KHSA KMRS KHDP KTLA KPAK KNAR KREL KPAI KTEX KNPP KCOM KNNPMNUC KO KPOA KLIG KOCI KRFD KHUM KDEV KNUC KCFC KOMS KWWMN KTBT KSAF KCRS KR
LY LG LE LH LI LO LOG LT LTTE LU LAB
MCAP MO MNUC MARR MPOS MASS MOPS MAR MD MX MZ MEPP MA MR ML MIL MTCRE MOPPS MAPP MU MY MASC MP MT MERCOSUR MK MDC MI MAPS MCC MASSMNUC MQADHAFI MUCN MTCR MG MTRE MEPI MV MC MRCRE
NATO NI NG NO NL NU NIPP NPT NS NSG NA NZ NATIONAL NP NRR NAR NE NASA NK NPG NT NGO NSF
OVIP OTRA OPRC OSCI OTR OREP ODIP OPDC OSAC OAS OEXC OIIP OFDP OSCE OECD OPCW OPIC OIC OFFICIALS OIE OVP
PINR PGOV PBTS PREL PTER PE PO PROP PHUM PBIO PARM PECON PINS PM PK PHSA PREF PL PAK POGOV PINL POL PSOE PKFK PMIL PY PFOR PALESTINIAN PHALANAGE PARTY PRAM PAO PA PMAR PGOVLO POLITICS PUNE PORG PHUMPREL PF POLINT PHUS PGOC PNR PGGV PNAT PGOVE PRGOV PRL PROV PTERE PGOF PHUMBA PARMS PINT PINF PEL PLN PG POV PEPR PSI PU POLITICAL PARTIES
QA
RS RU RO RW RIGHTS RF RICE ROBERT RFE REGION RP
SP SOCI STEINBERG SN SA SY SNAR SMIG SO SENV SCUL SR SF SG SW SU SL SZ SIPRS SH SI SNARCS SOFA SANC SHUM SK ST SC SYR SAN SEVN
TI TX TU TW TC TERRORISM TPHY TRGY TS TIP TBIO TSPA TH TO TZ TK TSPL TNGD TINT TRSY TR TFIN TD TURKEY TT TP
UK UZ UNMIK UN US UG UNSC UP USEU UY UNGA UNO UV USUN UNESCO UNEP UNDP UNCHS UNHRC UNAUS USTR UNVIE UNCHC UE UNDESCO UNHCR USAID UNDC UAE
VE VZ VT VTPREL VN VM
WI WTRO WTO WTRQ WWARD WB WHA WBG WA WHO WMO WEU WZ
XF XA XG XT XM XR XS XL XH XZ XW XY XE XD XK XC
YI YM YE YMCS
ZP ZR ZI ZU ZB ZF ZO ZANU ZA ZOELLICK ZK ZJ

### Browse by classification

CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN SECRET SECRET//NOFORN UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

### Community resources

Follow us on Twitter Check our Reddit Twitter this Digg this page Contact us on IRC

courage is contagious

### Viewing cable 09BAGHDAD3195, IRAN/IRAQ: THE VIEW FROM NAJAF

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:

- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09BAGHDAD3195.

Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
09BAGHDAD3195 | 2009-12-14 09:09 | 2010-12-05 12:12 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Baghdad

`

    VZCZCXYZ0000
    PP RUEHWEB

    DE RUEHGB #3195/01 3480957
    ZNY CCCCC ZZH
    P 140957Z DEC 09
    FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5706
    INFO RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
    RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

` `

    C O N F I D E N T I A L BAGHDAD 003195

    SIPDIS

    DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/IR, NEA/I, AND NEA/FO LIMBERT, CORBIN.

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/06/2019
    TAGS: PGOV PECON PREL IR IZ
    SUBJECT: IRAN/IRAQ: THE VIEW FROM NAJAF

    Classified By: Political M/C Gary A. Grappo for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

    ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Local interlocutors from Najaf's social,
    economic, political and military circles discussed with
    Post's Senior Iran Watcher (IW) and PRToffs the scope of
    Iranian influence in the province, the role of the Shia
    clerical establishment (Marja'iyyah), notably Grand Ayatollah
    Ali Sistani, and the challenges confronting the province's
    farmers who are unable to compete with Iranian-subsidized
    produce. Interlocutors generally cautioned against a
    premature U.S. departure and agreed that Iran remains an
    influential force in Najaf, leveraging its ties with Iraqi
    political groups to extend its influence. Iran remains wary
    of Sistani's social and political clout among Shias, notably
    in Iran, given the Grand Ayatollah's rejection of the Iranian
    regime's adherence to clerical rule (vilayat-e-faqih). END
    SUMMARY

    ¶2. (C) During a recent visit to Najaf, local interlocutors,
    including the province's head of military intelligence; the
    chairman of the Provincial Council; a well-connected Shia
    businessman; the president of the farmer's union; the chief
    judge of the province; and a representative of the local
    Chamber of Commerce shared their views on the state of
    political and economic development in the province and Iran's
    role.

    Provincial Council Chairman
    ---------------------------

    ¶3. (C) Sheikh Fayedh al-Shimerri, the Chairman of Najaf's
    Provincial Council, a religious cleric turned politician and
    member of Maliki's State of Law coalition asserted that
    Iraqis throughout the country were growing increasingly
    frustrated with foreign interference, notably from Iraq's
    neighbors. He singled out Saudi Arabia and Iran as the
    biggest culprits, but noted that a "mental revolution" was
    underway among Iraqi youth against foreign agendas seeking to
    undermine the country's stability, pointing to such trends in
    Anbar against the Saudis, Najaf against the Iranians, and
    Mosul against the Turks.

    ¶4. (C) Al-Shimerri echoed other interlocutors' concerns
    about a premature U.S. departure from Iraq and risks of a
    political and security vacuum. He noted that Iran had formed
    the Iraqi National Alliance (INA) political coalition
    comprised of the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI) and
    the Sadrists, among others, in an effort to bolster ISCI's
    image as the pan-Shia party of choice in the elections.

    ¶5. (C) Al-Shimerri expressed concerns about rumors
    circulating in Najaf that the USG was sponsoring a Baathist
    conference in the U.S. IW dismissed the news as baseless
    rumors intended to undermine the USG-GOI relationship.
    (NOTE: A recent press report in an ISCI-owned media also
    mentioned a proposed Baathist conference scheduled to be held
    in Washington in February. END NOTE).

    Keeping the U.S. Bogged Down
    ----------------------------

    ¶6. (C) Major Uday, a provincial military intelligence
    officer and Maliki supporter, described Iran as a threat to
    Iraqi stability, commenting that the Iranian government's
    (IRIG) goal is to keep the U.S. bogged down in Iraq in order
    to discourage U.S. military reprisals against the IRIG for
    its nuclear program. He commented that Iran fears Iraq's
    potential influence in the region, and will continue to
    support local proxies to exert its influence and undermine
    Iraq. "Iran does not offer its support for free," Uday
    noted, there will be a price to pay for each proxy in
    exchange for Iranian support.

    ¶7. (C) Uday is supportive of Maliki's decision to forego (at
    Q7. (C) Uday is supportive of Maliki's decision to forego (at
    least for now) a political alliance with the INA that is
    dominated by the pro-Iranian Sadrist Trend and ISCI. Joining
    the INA will only undermine the integrity of Iraqi security
    institutions as ISCI/Badr and the Sadrists will try to fill
    key security positions with their own supporters, many of
    whom are unprofessional and sectarian, Uday cautioned. The
    Badr Organization, heavily influenced by Iran, continued to
    maintain a very effective intelligence arm, according to
    Uday. Many former Iraqi fighter pilots who flew sorties
    against Iran during the Iran-Iraq war were now on Iran's hit
    list (NOTE: According to Uday, Iran had already assassinated
    180 Iraqi pilots. END NOTE).

    ¶8. (C) Uday also noted that Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM) elements
    often resort to bribes (USD 10-20K) to secure the release of
    supporters in GOI detention and that the Najaf anti-terrorism
    unit regularly receives cash offers to release detainees. He
    asserted that Najaf's police chief, Abd Al-Karim (aka Abu
    Ahmad Al-Miyahi), is a "former" member of Badr with dubious
    loyalties. Najaf's chief justice, Kareem Faroon, a
    well-respected judge also alleged that the Iraqi police were
    responsible for placing an IED close to the PRT base in
    November. "He (police chief) is a bad guy. After all, he is
    still part of the militia (Badr)," Judge Faroon asserted.

    Sistani: "What Do the Americans Want?"
    ----QDI>RpQd%'MkQQto pulse the cleric on
    his views about matters of political consequence. Kelanter
    explained that Sistani's son, Muhammad Ridha, serves as the
    main conduit of information between his father whenever a
    religious/political message needs to be conveyed to Shia
    imams in the country.

    ¶12. (C) Sistani does not allow Iranian students to enroll
    in the howzeh (religious seminary) in order to prevent IRIG
    infiltration, Kelanter asserted. Kelanter himself is
    suspicious of Iranian intentions and asserted that the imams
    of the holy Abbas and Husayn shrines in Karbala, Shaykhs
    Karbal'aie and Safi, were "in the pocket of the Iranians",
    despite their proclaimed loyalties to Sistani.

    The Sadrists
    ------------

    ¶13. (C) Regarding the Sadrists, Kelanter recalled fondly his
    time as a student of the late Muhammad Sadiq al-Sadr (Moqtada
    Al-Sadr's father), commenting that, unlike his radical son,
    the late cleric was admired and respected by many Iraqis. He
    Qthe late cleric was admired and respected by many Iraqis. He
    criticized Moqtada for failing to capitalize and build on his
    father's legacy. Al-Shimmeri also praised the efforts of
    Sadr's father and sought to distinguish between "good" and
    "bad" Sadrists; the former being adherents of Sadr's father.
    Major Uday believes the Sadrists are politically weak and
    continue to splinter as former JAM elements form their own
    groups. (NOTE: Major Uday believes Al-Shimmari is a closet
    Sadrist despite his public alliance with Maliki's coalition.
    Al-Shimmari commented that the Iranians had told the wayward
    Moqtada to stay-put in Iran for the time being. END NOTE).

    Farmers: Iran and Syria Waging Economic Warfare
    --------------------------------------------- --

    ¶14. (C) Jabar Al-Garawi, the head of Najaf's Farmers' Union
    commented that most farmers support PM Maliki for his
    increasingly non-sectarian political message and success in
    improving security. However, he complained that Iran and
    Syria were waging economic warfare on Iraqi farmers by
    flooding provincial markets with low cost/quality produce
    that are heavily subsidized by their respective governments.

    ¶15. (C) Iraq's neighbors were pursuing such measures in
    order to prevent economic development, thereby forestalling
    the continued success of Iraq's new democracy, Al-Garawi
    alleged. These problems were further aggravated by water
    shortages due to the ongoing drought, the high cost of fuels,
    outdated farming techniques, and power shortages, he noted.
    Al-Garawi confirmed that the Najaf Provincial Council had
    recently voted to ban the import of foreign tomatoes into
    Najaf in an effort to bolster local producers. (NOTE: 60
    percent of Najaf's labor force works in agriculture. The
    sector is the province's most important revenue generating
    industry, followed by religious tourism. END NOTE).

    ¶16. (C) Samira Al-Halawi, an outspoken female member of the
    Najaf Chamber of Commerce, having recently returned from a
    USG-sponsored visitors program in the U.S., railed against
    Iran's pervasive commercial influence in Najaf, noting that
    many Iranian-owned companies secure favorable contracts in
    the province by capitalizing on ties with local politicians.
    She also criticized Iraqi politicians "for being ignorant
    and overly-reliant on clerics" for their political welfare.

    COMMENT
    -------

    ¶17. (C) Najaf, as the epicenter of Shia Islam, carries
    significant importance for Iran and its overall campaign to
    expand its sphere of influence in Iraq and the region. The
    city is home to many Iranian pilgrims and traders eager to
    profit spiritually and financially from the city's religious
    and commercial offerings. There is general awareness and
    acknowledgment among many Iraqis that Iran's influence,
    albeit a historic reality, does not always translate into
    mutual benefit for Najafis. Many also acknowledge that Iran
    will continue to capitalize on its ties to the city in order
    to foster greater socio-economic dependencies. The extent of
    its ability to influence the ways of the Marja'iyyah are more
    limited, particularly during Sistani's tenure, given the
    clerical establishment's unrivaled theocratic and geographic
    prominence when compared to its "sister city" Qom.
    HILL

`