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### Viewing cable 06THEHAGUE834, AIVD REPORT...

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
06THEHAGUE834 | 2006-04-18 05:05 | 2011-01-17 00:12 | UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY | Embassy The Hague

`

    VZCZCXRO5897
    RR RUEHAG RUEHDA RUEHDF RUEHFL RUEHIK RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHLN RUEHLZ
    RUEHROV RUEHSR RUEHVK RUEHYG
    DE RUEHTC #0834/01 1080545
    ZNR UUUUU ZZH
    R 180545Z APR 06
    FM AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5414
    INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
    RUEAHLC/HOMELAND SECURITY CENTER WASHDC
    RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC

` `

    UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 THE HAGUE 000834

    SIPDIS

    DEPT FOR EUR/UBI, S/CT, D/HS, EUR/PGI, INL
    JUSTICE FOR OIA - JFRIEDMAN
    DHS FOR OIA - DSEQUEIRA

    SIPDIS

    SENSITIVE

    E.O. 12958: N/A
    TAGS: PTER PINR PINS PGOV NL
    SUBJECT:  AIVD REPORT...

    60789,4/18/2006 5:45,06THEHAGUE834,"Embassy The Hague",UNCLASSIFIED//FOR
    OFFICIAL USE ONLY,,"VZCZCXRO5897
    RR RUEHAG RUEHDA RUEHDF RUEHFL RUEHIK RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHLN RUEHLZ
    RUEHROV RUEHSR RUEHVK RUEHYG
    DE RUEHTC #0834/01 1080545
    ZNR UUUUU ZZH
    R 180545Z APR 06
    FM AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5414
    INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
    RUEAHLC/HOMELAND SECURITY CENTER WASHDC
    RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC","UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 THE HAGUE 000834
    SIPDIS
    DEPT FOR EUR/UBI, S/CT, D/HS, EUR/PGI, INL
    JUSTICE FOR OIA - JFRIEDMAN
    DHS FOR OIA - DSEQUEIRA
    SIPDIS
    SENSITIVE
    E.O. 12958: N/A
    TAGS: PTER PINR PINS PGOV NL
    SUBJECT: AIVD REPORT ON EMERGING TRENDS IN RADICALIZATION
    AND VIOLENT JIHAD IN THE NETHERLANDS

    ¶1. (U) SUMMARY. The AIVD, the Dutch civilian intelligence
    service, issued a report March 30 on the terrorist threat in
    the Netherlands, entitled ""Violent Jihad in the Netherlands:
    Current Trends in the Islamist Terrorist Threat."" The
    report concludes that the terrorist threat in the
    Netherlands now comes primarily from decentralized local
    networks based in the country, and that a process of
    ""autonomous radicalization,"" primarily through the Internet,
    is replacing top-down recruitment by charismatic leaders as
    the principal source of radicalization and incitement to
    violent action.

    ¶2. (U) A trend toward ""virtualization of jihad,"" in which
    extremist groups use the Internet to spread the ideology of
    violent Jihad, maintain contacts, and obtain training is
    also noted. The report highlights an increasingly prominent
    role played by radicalized young women and Dutch converts
    among extremist groups in the Netherlands. The report
    argues that countering the terrorist threat requires a wellbalanced,
    comprehensive effort that promotes integration,
    encourages the Islamic community to resist radicalization,
    and represses terrorist groups. End Summary.

    ¶3. (U) The report is part of a periodic series of AIVD
    reports on terrorist trends. The full text has been emailed
    to EUR/UBI, S/CT and INR. ""Violent Jihad"" examines
    four trends in Islamic terrorism in Europe and the specific
    situation in the Netherlands. The trends identified are: a
    shift from external foreign terrorist threat to an
    indigenous, or home-grown, terrorism, which the AIVD terms
    ""European jihad;"" a top-down process of decentralization and
    local implantation of jihadist networks; an ""opposing but
    complementary"" grass-roots process of radicalization and
    emergence of local jihadist networks; and the
    ""virtualization of jihad,"" in which the Internet has become
    the primary mechanism for dissemination of radical Islam and
    recruitment for Jihad.

    ¶4. (U) In the Netherlands the principal terrorist threat is
    now from decentralized local networks based in the
    Netherlands. These groups are comprised primarily of young
    Dutch Moroccans between 15 and 25 years old, often of Berber
    background, who are seeking their identity and status in
    Dutch society. The recruitment and radicalization of young
    Muslims born and bred in the Netherlands takes place
    principally through the Internet. ""Top down"" recruitment by
    charismatic leaders in mosques has largely been replaced by
    ""bottom up"" radicalization by groups of youths who discover
    radical Islam together, and incite each other to join the
    armed struggle. The AIVD refers to this phenomenon as
    ""autonomous radicalization.""

    ¶5. (U) According to the report, factors that play a role in
    radicalization and the willingness of young Dutch Muslims to
    use violence include frustration and dissatisfaction with
    their social position. They identify with neither the
    traditional Islamic culture of their parents nor secular
    Dutch society. Even relatively well-educated Dutch
    Moroccans are often dissatisfied with their place in
    society, in part as a result of discrimination and high
    rates of unemployment. Young second and third generation
    Dutch Muslims from other ethnic backgrounds are also seeking
    their identities within Dutch society, but undergo the
    process of radicalization to a significantly lesser extent
    than Dutch Moroccans. Radicalized young women are playing a
    more prominent and activist role in Jihad groups in the
    Netherlands than in other European countries. There is also
    a high profile group of Dutch converts to Islam among the
    radicalized networks. (COMMENT. Convicted Hofstad Group
    member Jason Walters is a dual national American Dutch
    convert. End COMMENT.)

    ¶6. (U) The attraction of radical Islam for Dutch Muslim
    youth has grown since the 2004 murder of Theo van Gogh. The
    report stresses, however, that most radicalized youth adhere
    to non-violent forms of political Islam; only as small
    minority join violent Jihad groups. Receptiveness to
    radicalization and readiness to engage in violent action,
    which the AIVD terms ""jihadization,"" results from a
    combination of youths' fixation on ""pure"" Islam as described
    in extremist websites and chat rooms, and dissatisfaction
    with local and international political and social
    circumstances, such as perceived discrimination against
    Islam in the West and the war in Iraq.
    THE HAGUE 00000834 002 OF 003

    ¶7. (U) Jihad networks in the Netherlands are driven
    primarily by domestic political events and have a strong
    focus on Dutch socio-political issues. The report stresses
    that in contrast to local networks in other European
    countries, which tend to seek ""soft"" targets frequented by
    large numbers of civilians, Dutch groups tend to target
    individual politicians -- such as outspoken parliamentarians
    Aayan Hirsi Ali and Gert Wilders -- and opinion leaders they
    consider to be ""enemies of Islam.""

    ¶8. (U) The AIVD has identified 10 to 20 loosely organized
    Jihad networks in the Netherlands. The Hofstad Group is the
    best-known Dutch local network. A network may have a
    permanent core of one or two persons surrounded by a limited
    number of active supporters, but it can also consist of
    dozens of people around a changing core group. Most Jihad
    networks operating in the Netherlands are comprised of
    European born individuals with Islamic backgrounds.
    Although these local groups often have contacts with other
    local and international groups, they are normally not
    controlled by external groups, but act instead on their own
    initiative in response to local developments.

    ¶9. (U) According to the AIVD, radicalization often develops
    into ""jihadization"" during small, informal discussions.
    Sometimes a charismatic leader plays a central role. For
    example, a Syrian preacher was initially the main
    inspiration for the Hofstad Group, though other group
    members, in particular van Gogh murderer Mohamed Bouyeri,
    also made ideological contributions to the radicalization
    process. Many local networks in the Netherlands are heavily
    influenced by ""neo-Takfir"" ideology, which the AIVD
    describes as a European adaptation of the extremist Takfir
    Wal Hijra ideology developed in Egypt in the 1960s. The
    relatively simplistic, often incoherent ""neo-Takfir""
    ideology justifies the use of violence against nonbelievers.
    In addition, the report notes the evolution of a
    local Dutch variant on radical Islam; though it does not
    lead directly to violent action, it does appear to lower the
    threshold for advocating Jihad. The ""neo-Takfir"" networks
    are almost all interlinked to some extent, according to the
    report. Some individuals linked to local networks are
    planning to travel to Iraq or other conflict areas to join
    the Jihad there, but most are focused on conducting Jihad at
    home.

    ¶10. (U) In addition to these ""home grown"" groups, there are
    a number of locally established internationally oriented
    networks, which are controlled from abroad, or in which
    foreign recruiters living in the Netherlands play a key
    role. There are a limited number of transnational networks
    in the Netherlands, according to the AIVD. The report
    downplays the role of Al Qaeda as a ""strategic mastermind""
    steering worldwide Jihad networks and preparing attacks,
    suggesting it has instead become a ""brand name"" and
    inspiration for decentralized Jihad networks that take
    action based on local conditions.

    ¶11. (U) The report raises the concern that the local
    networks will increasingly link up with international
    Jihadist elements. It states that the highest threat comes
    when the experience and methods of international networks
    are linked with the youthful enthusiasm for martyrdom of the
    local networks. There is some evidence that local networks
    in the Netherlands are going through a continuous learning
    process, and thus becoming more ""professional."" For
    example, the arrests and trials of Hofstad Group members
    have made them aware of police and AIVD strategy and
    tactics, and they have since displayed more sophistication
    in protecting their Internet communications.

    ¶12. (U) Moving from the specifics of the violent threat from
    Jihad networks to broader societal effects, the report
    stresses that radicalization not only raises the threat of
    terrorist attacks in the short term, but also jeopardizes
    social cohesion and solidarity in Dutch society, and
    ultimately poses a threat to the democratic order of the
    country. It posits that an effective counter-terrorism
    policy must be linked to promoting integration and
    mobilizing resistance within the Islamic community against
    radicalization, as well as the implementation of measures to
    prevent radicalization and repress terrorist individuals and
    networks.
    THE HAGUE 00000834 003 OF 003

    ¶13. (U) The report concludes that the Jihad threat might
    diminish if the Netherlands succeeds in reversing the trend
    of radicalization and ""Jihadization."" To accomplish this,
    it stresses, it is crucial to achieve a balance between
    protecting citizens from terrorism and preventing
    unjustified anxiety and social polarization, particularly
    since the latter could stimulate further radicalization.

    ¶14. (SBU) Comment. The AIVD report provides a thoughtful
    review of developments in the terrorist threat in the
    Netherlands. In documenting the social and psychological
    roots of the on-going processes of radicalization and
    receptiveness to violent Jihad among Dutch born Muslim
    youth, it makes clear, as AIVD Director van Hulst states in
    his foreword, that the terrorist threat is ""increasingly
    rooted"" in Dutch society. By highlighting the need for a
    strong effort to promote integration and avoid further
    polarization to counter the threat, the report makes a
    useful contribution to the on-going policy debate about how
    to respond effectively to the threat posed by ""home-grown""
    Muslim extremists without demonizing all Muslims in the
    Netherlands. END COMMENT.
    BLAKEMAN

`