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### Viewing cable 06LIMA622, NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTOR'S BRIEFING ON

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
06LIMA622 | 2006-02-14 18:06 | 2010-12-12 21:09 | SECRET | Embassy Lima

`

    P 141809Z FEB 06
    FM AMEMBASSY LIMA
    TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8733
    INFO AMEMBASSY BOGOTA PRIORITY
    AMEMBASSY CARACAS PRIORITY
    AMEMBASSY LA PAZ PRIORITY
    AMEMBASSY QUITO PRIORITY
    AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO PRIORITY
    AMCONSUL GUAYAQUIL PRIORITY
    CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
    DIA WASHDC PRIORITY

` `

    S E C R E T LIMA 000622

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/09/2031
    TAGS: PTER PGOV PE
    SUBJECT: NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTOR'S BRIEFING ON
    SENDERO LUMINOSO

    REF: A. 05 LIMA 5397
    ¶B. 05 LIMA 5203

    Classified By: D/Polcouns Art Muirhead for Reason 1.4 (B, D)

    ¶1. (S) SUMMARY. National Intelligence Directorate Chief
    Julio Raygada sees SL as collaborating with the narcotics
    trade, but does not consider the Senderistas to be simply
    "narco-terrorists;" he asserts that the group remains
    ideologically focused in its activities. Raygada points out
    that in recent fatal attacks, SL employed its traditional
    tactic of using a temporary strike force that fades back to
    civilian cover. He believes SL intends to use this technique
    to increase the pace of its "popular war" through selective
    assassinations and armed take-overs of villages, eventually
    carrying its struggle from the countryside to the cities.
    There is increased SL political activity throughout the
    country, including reinvigoration of regional committees, and
    infiltration of vulnerable institutions. SL is thriving
    militarily by preying on economic activity in Peru's
    interior, not just from protecting narcotics trafficking, but
    also through bribes from illegal loggers, fuel smugglers,
    fruit growers and sugar producers. END SUMMARY.

    ¶2. (C) Ambassador received a briefing on 1/26 from DINI
    (National Intelligence Directorate) Chief Admiral (R) Julio
    Raygada on the organization and current direction of Sendero
    Luminoso (SL). Raygada had served as the Acting Director of
    National Intelligence for over a year while Peru's
    intelligence systems were undergoing reorganization, and he
    became the permanent DINI head after the regulations on
    Peru's new National Intelligence System (SINA) were published
    in the Official Gazette on January 4. On 2/2, Raygada gave
    D/Polcouns an expanded version of the SL briefing, the
    salient points of which follow.

    ¶3. (S) Although he stressed at the outset that he does not
    equate Peru's situation with Colombia's, Raygada expressed
    concern about the growth of coca cultivation here. DINI
    believes that coca cultivation has grown from 44,000 hectares
    in 2004 to 56,000 hectares currently. In addition, the
    density of cultivation has increased, especially in
    non-traditional areas, meaning that the potential for cocaine
    production in Peru has increased by an even greater margin.
    Traffickers export coca paste and cocaine with relative ease
    using medium to large ocean-going vessels, departing in many
    cases from the southern coast of Peru. Areas of intense coca
    cultivation, in particular the Monzon Valley, have become in
    essence liberated areas, with little state presence. Groups
    with political agendas, not just SL but also Ollanta Humala's
    Nationalist Party and the Peruvian Communist Party, are
    attempting to portray themselves as the advocates of coca
    producers.

    ¶4. (S) Although Raygada sees SL as collaborating with the
    narcotics trade in ways that are similar to Colombia's FARC,
    he does not believe that the Senderistas have morphed into
    "narco-terrorists." He thinks instead that SL continues to
    adhere to many of its own distinct tactics and long-term
    objectives. SL does not maintain a uniformed standing army.
    SL tactics in recent fatal attacks (Refs) have tended even
    more toward their traditional approach of putting together a
    temporary strike force that carries out an operation and goes
    back to civilian cover. SL intends to use this technique to
    increase the pace of its "popular war," eventually carrying
    this struggle from the countryside to the cities. There are
    indications that Sendero is reviving its practice of
    selective assassinations, and of armed take-overs of villages
    to capture and gather information on opponents.

    ¶5. (S) SL is also undergoing renewed efforts to fortify its
    infrastructure and bases of support. 10,057 persons accused
    or convicted of terrorist activity were released from jail
    between 1982 and 2005, and many have retained their
    connection with SL. Raygada believes that SL has 2,000
    active members at present, although just a few hundred are
    armed combatants. SL documents recently seized by the police
    refer to the group's historic and doctinaire view of their
    struggle to come to power. The documents make reference to
    the "Fight on Two Fronts" (i.e. armed and political,
    abbreviated as L2L in Spanish), and to passing into the
    "Fourth Phase" (NFI) of SL's revolution against the Peruvian
    State.

    ¶6. (S) SL's political strategy is to organize "pockets" of
    activity: reinvigorated regional committees in the north,
    south, central highlands, Huallaga Valley and metropolitan
    Lima; "popular committees" engaged in fund-raising in 70
    villages throughout the coca zone; control of Peruvian
    Popular Aid (Socorro Popular del Peru), an NGO that was
    initially created to support families of prisoners;
    infiltration of rural peasant patrols (groups originally
    created to oppose Sendero) in coca-growing areas;
    infiltration of the radio broadcast industry, in particular
    in the northern cone of Lima; and positioning members in key
    positions in universities and in the national teachers union.
    Raygada also alleged that NGOs such as the Legal Defense
    Institute (IDL) and Living Justice (Justicia Viva), which
    have received Embassy funding support, are knowing advocates
    of Sendero.

    ¶7. (S) Militarily, the SL combatants in the north (Huallaga
    Valley) are well organized in columns SL refers to as "mobile
    networks" of 12 to 30 individuals. These groups prey upon
    the economic activity (licit and illicit) along the Belaunde
    and Basadre Highways. There are three different groups of SL
    combatants in the south (Apurimac and Ene Valleys). These
    groups are more widely separated than those in the north, and
    tend to live in jungle camps, rather than under cover in
    villages (as in the north). Besides "assessments" (cupos)
    for protecting narcotics trafficking, the SL combatants in
    both regions receive money from illegal loggers, fuel
    smugglers, fruit growers and sugar producers. DINI recently
    received information that SL had gotten $10,000 (possibly a
    loan) from the Peruvian Communist Party. DINI believes SL
    has also solicited funds from the FARC.

    POWERS

`