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### Viewing cable 07SANJOSE175, CAFTA: ARIAS ADMINISTRATION FLEXES LEGISLATIVE

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
07SANJOSE175 | 2007-01-30 20:08 | 2011-03-03 16:04 | UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY | Embassy San Jose

Appears in these articles:
http://www.nacion.com/2011-03-03/Investigacion/NotasDestacadas/Investigacion2697430.aspx
http://www.nacion.com/2011-03-03/Investigacion/NotaPrincipal/Investigacion2697496.aspx
http://www.nacion.com/2011-03-03/Investigacion/NotasSecundarias/Investigacion2697489.aspx
http://www.nacion.com/2011-03-03/Investigacion/NotasSecundarias/Investigacion2697532.aspx
http://www.nacion.com/2011-03-03/Investigacion/NotasSecundarias/Investigacion2697535.aspx
http://www.nacion.com/2011-03-03/Investigacion/NotasSecundarias/Investigacion2701964.aspx
http://www.nacion.com/2011-03-03/Investigacion/Relacionados/Investigacion2701965.aspx

`

    VZCZCXYZ0009
    PP RUEHWEB

    DE RUEHSJ #0175/01 0302018
    ZNR UUUUU ZZH
    P 302018Z JAN 07
    FM AMEMBASSY SAN JOSE
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7099
    INFO RUEHZA/WHA CENTRAL AMERICAN COLLECTIVE

` `

    UNCLAS SAN JOSE 000175

    SIPDIS

    SENSITIVE

    SIPDIS

    For WHA/CEN and WHA/EPSC

    STATE PASS TO USTR FOR AMALITO

    E.O. 12958: N/A
    TAGS: ETRD EINV ECIN PGOV CS
    SUBJECT: CAFTA: ARIAS ADMINISTRATION FLEXES LEGISLATIVE
             MUSCLES

    REF: A. 2006 SAN JOSE 1792,

          ¶B. 2006 SAN JOSE 2617,
         ¶C. 2006 SAN JOSE 2779

    ¶1. (U) SUMMARY.  After a seemingly slow start this month, prospects
    for CAFTA ratification have taken a leap forward.  The Arias
    administration used its 38-seat working coalition and creative
    interpretation of parliamentary rules to limit the number of
    sessions for CAFTA debate, making full ratification more likely by
    May 2007.  The Arias administration similarly expedited
    consideration of legislation to break the telecom monopoly, one of
    the most difficult components of the CAFTA implementation agenda.
    These rule changes were accompanied by public calls from MinPres
    Rodrigo Arias and 2nd VP Kevin Casas for Costa Ricans  to "take
    their destiny in their hands" and move forward (using majority
    rules) instead of pursuing "the dangerous mirage of consensus."
    Min. Arias even expressed hope that CAFTA could be ratified and
    implemented by October 2007. The combination suggests a (welcome)
    Arias administration offensive not only to ratify/implement CAFTA,
    but to make the Legislative Assembly more effective, taking
    advantage of public disillusionment with the "just say no" PAC-led
    opposition.  There will no doubt be bumps in the road ahead,
    however.  Union leaders and other CAFTA opponents have called for a
    national strike in late February.  END SUMMARY.

    ------------------
    A SLOW START . . .
    ------------------

    ¶2. (U) As the Legislative Assembly resumed business after the
    holiday recess, it appeared the CAFTA momentum which had built
    slowly in late 2006 (reftels) had softened.  The PAC-led opposition
    waited until January 12, the last possible day, to submit its nearly
    500-page minority report from the International Relations Committee.
     This tactic, along with the sheer bulk of the Committee's overall
    report (which totaled nearly 4,000 pages), delayed the required
    publication in the official GOCR gazette, which in turn slid the
    projected January 26 start of the CAFTA debate.

    ¶3. (SBU) One veteran Assembly staffer told us the PAC maneuver, plus
    the likely flood of motions expected from the opposition, likely
    would lead to CAFTA ratification in late-May or mid-June, unless the
    GOCR exercised more legislative discipline.  On January 18, in a
    strategy meeting organized at Embassy behest, the GOCR's CAFTA team
    from the Ministry of Foreign Trade (COMEX) was slightly more
    sanguine.  The COMEX team believed it would be possible for
    legislative rules to be interpreted to permit the first of two
    required ratification votes by early April, just before the Easter
    Week recess.  The final vote would then take place in May, following
    the required 30-day Supreme Court review of constitutionality.  The
    COMEX team described a parallel effort to have Assembly committees
    begin action on the implementing legislation.

    ----------------------------
    . . . THEN, A QUICK RECOVERY
    ----------------------------

    ¶4. (U) The COMEX assessment proved accurate. In parliamentary moves
    that obviously caught the opposition off guard, the Arias
    administration began to wield its 38-seat coalition as a
    super-majority, changing legislative rules to accelerate the CAFTA
    process.  On January 18, the PLN-led coalition (also including the
    ML, PUSC and two single-seat parties) voted to move two telecom
    bills from the standing committee, where they had languished, to a
    newly formed special committee that was given one month to hold
    hearings and vote the matters up or down.  The maneuver took place
    so quickly that PAC legislators, trying to walk out of the Assembly
    to prevent a quorum, found themselves technically voting in favor of
    the rule change (since an "aye" vote is registered by legislators
    standing up).

    ¶5.  (U) On January 22, the PLN-led coalition proposed another rule
    change, which would limit the plenary debate on CAFTA to 22
    sessions, with a possible one-time extension of six additional
    sessions, after which a vote must take place.  The proposed rule
    change was approved in committee on January 24 and is expected to be
    approved by the full plenary, again using the administration's
    38-seat working coalition, early the week of January 29.  Depending
    on how many sessions are devoted to CAFTA debate, the 26-session
    limit should make the first ratification vote possible by late March
    or early April, as the COMEX team predicted.  One experienced PUSC
    staffer told us January 23 she had never seen any Costa Rican
    legislature act so quickly.

    ---------------------------------
    TIME FOR POLITICS, NOT PERFECTION

    ---------------------------------

    ¶6.  (U) In public comments the week of January 22, Minister of the
    Presidency Rodrigo Arias, 2nd Vice President Kevin Casas and
    Assembly President Fernando Pacheco articulately framed the
    political debate.  In an op-ed, Arias challenged Costa Rica to "take
    our destiny in our hands", construct "broad political agreements",
    and move the country ahead with support of the majority.  Directly
    targeting PAC, he warned that pursuit of a unanimous national
    consensus would be a "dangerous mirage" and "interminable debate" of
    any initiative, CAFTA or not, would only be a "tangible
    demonstration of our dysfunctional politics."  Casas and Pacheco
    gave similar messages to a legislative law seminar, stressing that
    perfect consensus was elusive, the Costa Rican people wanted results
    from their representatives, and there was "no contradiction" between
    "speed and quality" in the Assembly.

    ¶7. (U) Minister Arias capped the week with a lengthy newspaper
    interview printed on January 27.  He explained how PAC intransigence
    in the International Relations Committee had energized the
    administration's efforts to build an effective working coalition, so
    Costa Rica could get beyond CAFTA, a key component, but only one
    component of President Arias's broader development agenda.  Minister
    Arias said the administration had to focus on its priorities, and
    was working with all its coalition partners on issues of interests
    to them (in exchange for their CAFTA support).  Arias was cautiously
    optimistic that the rule changes would stand up to Supreme Court
    scrutiny, and he expressed hope that, using the revised rules and
    maintaining coalition unity, CAFTA could be approved and ratified by
    October 2007.  Minister Arias also left the door open to work with
    the PAC on issues other than CAFTA.

    --------------------------
    . . . BUT IT WON'T BE EASY
    --------------------------

    ¶8. (U) As expected, union leaders and other CAFTA opponents have
    called for a national protest, including strike action, for late
    February.  (Their target date is February 26.) The pressure tactics
    have begun already.  Following the first rules change (which would
    accelerate legislation to open the telecom sector), leaders of the
    telecom and electricity workers union packed the Assembly gallery
    and warned pro-CAFTA legislators, such as Jose Mario Echandi of the
    one-member National Union Party, "we know where you live."  (Echandi
    told the media he has requested extra police protection in his
    neighborhood.)  The opposition is also likely to challenge the rule
    changes in the Supreme Court, but coalition legislators and Assembly
    staffers tell us that the GOCR is pro-actively consulting the Court
    already, in anticipation of challenges. In his January 27 interview,
    Minister Arias threw down the gauntlet to opponents, noting that
    demonstrations would be permitted, but roadblocks would be dealt
    with "respectfully but forcefully."

    ------------------------------
    COMMENT: FINALLY, SOME MUSCLE
    ------------------------------

    ¶9. (SBU) This combination of words and deeds is welcome and
    illustrates the sort of disciplined, organized "realpolitik"
    leadership the Arias administration must continue to demonstrate in
    order to ratify and implement CAFTA.  Making the Legislative
    Assembly more effective, taking advantage of current public
    disillusionment with the "just say no" PAC-led opposition, would
    also have long-term positive benefits for Costa Rica, and has found
    resonance with coalition legislators who do not want this
    legislature to be perceived as feckless, as was the case with the
    previous one.  The consensus ideal will not fade quickly (or
    quietly) here, however, and the Costa Rican political system still
    offers far more ways to get to no than to yes, whether in the
    legislature, in the Supreme Court, or on the streets.  Nevertheless,
    the Arias administration, in its own way, has started 2007 on the
    political offensive.  That by itself is significant.
    LANGDALE

`