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### Viewing cable 09MEXICO748, CIUDAD JUAREZ AT A TIPPING POINT

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
09MEXICO748 | 2009-03-13 13:01 | 2011-03-16 12:12 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Mexico
Appears in these articles: http://wikileaks.jornada.com.mx/notas/funcionarios-de-seguridad-en-ciudad-juarez-darian-la-bienvenida-a-la-asistencia-de-eu

`

    VZCZCXYZ0008
    RR RUEHWEB

    DE RUEHME #0748/01 0721336
    ZNY CCCCC ZZH
    R 131336Z MAR 09
    FM AMEMBASSY MEXICO
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5614
    INFO RUEHXC/ALL US CONSULATES IN MEXICO COLLECTIVE
    RHMFISS/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC
    RUEHC/DEPT OF LABOR WASHINGTON DC
    RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
    RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
    RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
    RHMFISS/HQ USNORTHCOM
    RUEAHLA/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
    RUEABND/DEA HQS WASHINGTON DC
    RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC

` `

    196778
    2009-03-13 13:36:00
    09MEXICO748
    Embassy Mexico
    CONFIDENTIAL
    09CIUDADJUAREZ22
    VZCZCXYZ0008
    RR RUEHWEB

    DE RUEHME #0748/01 0721336
    ZNY CCCCC ZZH
    R 131336Z MAR 09
    FM AMEMBASSY MEXICO
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5614
    INFO RUEHXC/ALL US CONSULATES IN MEXICO COLLECTIVE
    RHMFISS/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC
    RUEHC/DEPT OF LABOR WASHINGTON DC
    RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
    RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
    RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
    RHMFISS/HQ USNORTHCOM
    RUEAHLA/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
    RUEABND/DEA HQS WASHINGTON DC
    RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC

    C O N F I D E N T I A L MEXICO 000748

    SENSITIVE
    SIPDIS

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/21/2017
    TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR MX
    SUBJECT: CIUDAD JUAREZ AT A TIPPING POINT

    REF: CIUDAD JUAREZ 000022

    Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Charles V. Barclay.
    Reason: 1.4 (b), (d).

    ¶1. (C) Summary.  The federal government has dramatically
    expanded the size and scope of Joint Operation Chihuahua by
    ordering the deployment of an additional 5,000 troops and
    some 2,000 federal police officers to Ciudad Juarez in an
    attempt to combat high rates of violence in the area.  The
    chain of command and division of responsibilities remains
    unclear.  More clear is the dramatic -- if possibly temporary
    -- drop in violence since the arrival of the federal forces.
    No one seems to know for sure what is responsible for the
    diminution in violence, but Consulate officers do note a
    reduction in tension among the city,s residents.  There
    seems to be broad agreement in Ciudad Juarez in identifying
    several key next steps necessary to achieving any lasting
    improvement in the city's security situation.  While local
    observers do not necessarily see Joint Operation Chihuahua as
    infinitely sustainable or desirable, the presence of federal
    forces bearing the burden of local law enforcement activities
    may provide a window of opportunity for reconstructing the
    city's ruinous municipal police, which is critical to a
    long-term, sustainable improvement in Ciudad Juarez's
    security environment.  The window is closing fast, however,
    as the local government moves forward with its efforts to
    create a 3,000-strong police force, with or without a clear
    strategy or endgame in mind. End Summary.

    Joint Operation Chihuahua: Mechanics...
    ---------------------------------------

    ¶2. (C) In response to a then unprecedented spasm of violence
    in Ciudad Juarez and throughout the State of Chihuahua during
    the first three months of last year, the federal, state, and
    local governments announced in March 2008 the start of Joint
    Operation Chihuahua.  The centerpiece of the Operation was
    the deployment of some 2,000 military and 500 federal police
    forces who were reportedly instructed to work with their
    state and local law enforcement counterparts to combat the
    insecurity resulting from a bloody feud between the competing
    Juarez and Sinaloa cartels (ref a).  While Joint Operation
    Chihuahua succeeded to an extent in disrupting the cartels,
    narcotics trafficking networks, as a public security effort
    the Operation proved to be a significant failure.
    Recognizing this, on February 25, 2009, the National Security
    Council unveiled a new plan to dramatically increase the size
    and scope of the operation as bloodshed in Juarez continued
    to escalate in the first months of 2009.  Federal, state, and
    local leaders in Juarez, as well as state delegates from the
    Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) and the National
    Action (PAN), told Poloffs that the federal government's
    decision to expand Operation Chihuahua was a response to a
    direct petition by PRI Governor Jose Reyes Baeza for help in
    quelling the violence, although Operation spokesman Enrique
    Torres Valadez indicated that the federal government pressed
    the governor to accept additional aid.  The federal
    government has announced plans to deploy an additional 5000
    troops and 2000 federal police officers to the area to retake
    control of what was a quickly deteriorating situation.  So
    far, some 2000 of those additional soldiers and 500
    additional federal police have arrived on station and begun
    to take up policing duties in Ciudad Juarez.

    ¶3. (C) Secretary of Public Security (SSP) Genaro Garcia Luna
    laid out for Embassy NAS Director on February 27 a six-point
    strategy for the Operation, which contacts in Juarez across
    the board indicated is being implemented.  The strategy
    includes: 1) retaking control of the streets; 2) closing down
    hubs for blackmarket activities; 3) seizing the city's two
    Centers of Communication, Command, and Control (C-4s), which
    serve as a sort of local security coordination center; 4)
    installing throughout the city a number of new surveillance
    cameras; 5) assuming customs responsibilities; and 6) taking
    control of the municipal police leadership, which has been
    absent since the second in command was assassinated on
    February 17, 2009 and the police chief resigned three days
    later.  According to contacts in local government and from
    the Operation, they have already done the first three items,
    will be taking control of customs this week, and are
    formalizing authority over municipal police responsibilities
    on March 13.

    ¶4. (C) The chain of command and division of responsibilities
    in Joint Operation Chihuahua is unclear.  According to Torres
    Valadez and Consulate law enforcement officials, the military
    is the top Operation authority and General Felipe de Jesus
    Espitia, the Commander of Zone 5 who is based in Chihuahua
    City but frequently travels to Juarez, is primarily running
    the show.  The city is divided into six sections, with a
    colonel responsible for each one.  The military runs its own
    command center in Juarez, which is not an integrated
    facility, and contacts were vague on the role C-4 centers
    will play in the process.  There appears to be a great deal
    of suspicion among the various entities, the exception being
    a generally effective working relationship between the army
    command and the state attorney general,s office.  There is
    limited information sharing, although some contacts reported
    that -- with the exception of the Juarez municipal police,
    with which no other organization shares reporting -- this
    problem may be in the process of resolution.  The top
    military, federal, state, and local police officials, as well
    as the mayor and officials from the governor's office, meet
    on a weekly basis to coordinate activities.

    ¶5. (C) It is similarly difficult to discern how the Joint
    Operation Chihuahua surge will play out on the ground and the
    role the municipal government will or will not play.  The
    military was scheduled to assume full control of municipal
    police leadership and responsibilities on March 13, and
    Consulate law enforcement officials and local contacts noted
    that municipal officers are technically supposed to ride
    along with soldiers to make arrests for non-federal offenses.
     Poloffs did not see any such joint patrols or fixed posts
    and question whether the military, which has a distrust of
    the police at all levels, is so willing to deeply engage
    their civilian counterparts.  Operation Spokesman Torres
    Valdez vaguely said that "all forces" are supposed to arrive
    on the scene when arrests are made, but offered few details
    as to the mechanics or legality of such a convergence.
    Ciudad Mayor Jose Reyes Ferriz, who has for years resided in
    El Paso, supposedly has at least some authority over city
    security policy and rebuilding the municipal police force,
    but the military will also reportedly be involved in the
    efforts and the extent to which it consults with him is
    ambiguous.

    ...Atmospherics...
    ------------------

    ¶6. (C) Consulate officers and contacts noted a sense of
    relief in the city's population following the new arrival of
    troops and federal police.  Local businesses, such as
    restaurants and other social establishments, appeared to be
    more frequented than in the past several months, and streets
    seemed overall busier.  Poloffs observed Ciudad Juarez
    residents walking in city parks and running alongside heavily
    trafficked roads.  Consulate officers suggested that Juarez
    residents tend to quickly take advantage of temporary
    improvements in the security situation, then return to their
    houses when conditions deteriorate.

    ¶7. (C) Poloffs were struck by the high number of federal
    police officers patrolling the major streets and the
    relatively less frequent sightings of troops, except for in
    the border regions, other critical infrastructure points, and
    at checkpoints.  Torres Valadez explained the disparity as a
    result of the different deployment patterns of the different
    forces.  The military is reportedly focused on the areas of
    higher levels of crime and violence, which tend to be on the
    outskirts of the city.  Conversely, the federal police have
    been specially charged with securing the commercial
    districts, which are more often traveled by US officials.

    ...Short-Term Impact.
    ---------------------

    ¶8. (C) Ciudad Juarez contacts ranging from political leaders,
    federal and state prosecutors, and officials from the mayor
    and governor's offices were cautiously positive when
    discussing the results thus far from the expanded Operation
    Chihuahua.  Murder rates have dramatically dropped since
    February 25, from about ten homicides a day to about 2-3 per
    day over the past week, and residents generally feel safer
    due to the troop presence.  Nevertheless, contacts were quick
    to point out that violence levels similarly dropped soon
    after the initial March 2008 deployment, only to hit even
    higher levels in May 2008, levels that were sustained until
    the most recent federal surge.  Local officials credit the
    operation with providing better intelligence into organized
    crime activities, which could lead to a greater number of
    arrests.

    ¶9. (C) Theories vary on what is responsible for the
    diminution in violence.  The Juarez city government, perhaps
    optimistically, suggests the Operation is causing the
    "cockroach effect," forcing cartel operatives to scatter and
    relocate to other border states.  Mayor Reyes Ferriz says he
    expects the cartel wars to move to Sonora.  U.S. law
    enforcement officials hold a different view.  They indicated
    that organized crime elements are lying low to observe and
    collect intelligence on military and federal police
    activities so as to better avoid the patrols and determine
    their next steps in Juarez, as they did after the March 2008
    deployment, and that the cartels will renew the fight in the
    coming weeks.  The Mexican army generals in charge of the
    regional zone and the Juarez garrison agree with the U.S. LEA
    assessment, as does the Chihuahua state attorney general,
    although they suggest that monthly homicide figures going
    forward will be about half the 230 recorded in February 2009.

    ¶10. (C) Not unexpectedly, opinions are mixed as to who stands
    to gain or lose the most politically from the results of the
    Operation.  PAN State legislators suggested that the federal
    government could benefit from a successful deployment, since
    President Calderon showed resolve and action in responding to
    a clearly overwhelmed PRI mayor and governor.  PAN deputy
    Hiram Apolo Conteras noted, however, that the party's
    opportunity to profit from any security improvements come
    election time may be limited by the state and local
    government's strong influence over the local media outlets.
    PRI state legislator Antonio Andreu noted that the party's
    prospects could be rocky for the July vote since he perceived
    the population to be blaming the regional leaders for
    security woes rather than the federal government.  The troop
    presence currently has wide public support -- Apolo Conteras
    reported up to a 90 percent approval rating for the military
    presence -- but some observers voiced their fear that
    organized crime elements will use false accusations of human
    rights abuses by military and police elements to erode public
    tolerance of the Operation.  (Note: Chihuahua Attorney
    General Patricia Gonzalez says that some of these reports of
    abuse, especially as carried out by the federal police, are
    true.  End note.)  Regardless, most politicians opined that
    at the end of the day, voters may privilege economic concerns
    -- particularly employment -- over security problems,
    suggesting that election results are far from certain.

    Looking Ahead
    -------------

    ¶11. (C) There seems to be broad agreement in Ciudad Juarez in
    identifying several key next steps necessary to achieving any
    lasting improvement in the city's security situation.  All
    contacts recognized that a sustained military and federal
    presence, particularly at its current size, is not a
    sustainable solution, if for no other reason than the cost.
    Most of the 2000 newly arriving federal police officers will
    be housed in area hotels, which may be a boon to the local
    tourism industry, but a financial burden on the federal
    government.

    ¶12. (C) First, contacts all said that the municipal police
    force must be rebuilt and reformed so as to provide the most
    basic policing services to the population.  Criminal elements
    in Juarez appear to be devolving into criminal gangs that are
    less organized, more erratic, very violent, and involved in a
    variety of criminal enterprises, making recapturing the
    streets even more complicated and making more necessary the
    development of a professional local patrol force.  Mayor
    Reyes Ferriz has informed Consulate officers that of the
    1,600 municipal preventive police officers who were on duty
    on January 1, 2008, 800 have been fired, quit to avoid
    completing a federal government background check, or been
    killed.  Their replacements are brand new.  The city
    government seems to have an idea as to how to go about
    purging the force of corrupt elements -- the mayor claimed in
    April 2008 that 99 percent has been corrupted by drug
    trafficking organizations -- and is continuing with the
    application of confidence control tests such as polygraphs,
    psychological exams, drug tests, and lifestyle surveys.  The
    new National Public Security System, created by legislation
    passed in the federal congress in December and mimicked by
    the Chihuahua state congress, provides a framework for such
    measures, but it seems to be coming together only piecemeal
    in Ciudad Juarez.  Still, the city government wants to build
    a force of 3,000 officers by the end of the year.  Local
    officials are optimistic that there will be few problems with
    recruitment as employment in the region has been hit hard by
    the economic crisis.

    ¶13. (C) Beyond numbers, the municipal government indicated
    that the police need higher quality training, salary, and
    equipment, such as encrypted communication systems.  City
    Manager Guillermo Dowell was not able to elaborate for
    Poloffs a training strategy that will create a more
    professional police force and better inoculate them against
    infiltration by organized crime.  Moreover, municipal police
    lack any sort of investigQe capacity, and the city appears
    to either not understand or to be disinterested in taking on
    the investigative responsibilities that the state attorney
    general says were assigned to them in the 2008 federal
    reforms.  In practice, this keeps the city police from doing
    anything but the most rudimentary arrests and complicates
    their ability to complement the state's progressive judicial
    reform efforts.  Contacts also reported a need for higher
    police salaries and the development of a career service and
    benefits plan for officers.  Most officers currently make 600
    to 800 USD a month, which leaves them highly vulnerable to
    bribes from drug trafficking organizations.  The city
    government is uncertain about future federal funding levels.
    Last year Juarez reportedly received significant funds as
    part of the SUBSEMUN, a special federal subsidy for high
    crime areas, but city officials are afraid that the Operation
    Chihuahua expansion may cut into future funding.

    ¶14. (C) Observers across the board -- from politicians to
    federal prosecutors -- highlighted the need to more involve
    civil society in combating the violence problem.  Ciudad
    Juarez is a city of passing or temporary residents, with many
    people arriving to try to make their way to the United States
    or to work in the maquilas.  Perhaps because of the transient
    nature of the population, little has evolved by way of civic
    identity or consciousness.  PRI deputy Andreu indicated that
    the state is working to replicate the creation of citizen
    security observatory councils to offer insight and input into
    security operations and solutions.  City Manager Dowell also
    highlighted efforts by the city government to encourage
    stronger values, sense of community, and an understanding for
    the value of civic participation at the community level, in
    part through a "Municipal Alliance for Order and Respect."

    Comment
    -------

    ¶15. (C) Joint Operation Chihuahua at the very least has
    provided a momentary respite for residents suffering from
    months of escalating crime rates and blood violence.   It is
    unclear at this point how long the increase in the Joint
    Operation is sustainable or even desirable, but most
    observers recognize that the expanded deployment is not the
    final situation to security woes.  In the best case scenario,
    the presence of federal forces bearing the burden of local
    law enforcement activities may provide a window of
    opportunity for rebuilding the city's ruinous municipal
    police, which is critical to a long-term, sustainable
    improvement in Ciudad Juarez's security environment.  Ciudad
    Juarez security, municipal, state and federal officials all
    indicated they would welcome U.S. assistance, with the
    municipal government particularly interested in help from the
    United States in training its new police force.  The window
    is closing fast, however, as the local government will move
    forward with its efforts to create a 3,000-strong police
    force, with or without a clear strategy or endgame in mind.

    Visit Mexico City's Classified Web Site at
    http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/wha/mexicocity and the North American
    Partnership Blog at http://www.intelink.gov/communities/state/nap /
    BASSETT

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