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### Viewing cable 09BAGHDAD2561, THE GREAT GAME, IN MESOPOTAMIA: IRAQ AND ITS

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
09BAGHDAD2561 | 2009-09-24 03:03 | 2010-12-05 12:12 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Baghdad

`

    VZCZCXRO2989
    OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
    DE RUEHGB #2561/01 2670322
    ZNY CCCCC ZZH
    O 240322Z SEP 09
    FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4812
    INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE

` `

    C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 002561

    SIPDIS

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/18/2019
    TAGS: PGOV PREL IZ SY KU IR TU
    SUBJECT: THE GREAT GAME, IN MESOPOTAMIA: IRAQ AND ITS
    NEIGHBORS, PART II

    Classified By: Ambassador Christopher R. Hill, for reasons 1.4 b and d.

    ¶1. (U) This is the second of two cables reviewing Iraq's
    relations with key neighboring countries. this cable focuses
    on Iraq's relations with Syria, in the wake of the August 19
    bombings.

    ¶2. (C) Summary: Iraq's improving relations with its
    neighbors in 2008 and early 2009 represented a critical
    element in its efforts to maintain security and stability and
    normalize its position in the Gulf and the broader region.
    The August 19 bombings -- targeting the MFA, and by extension
    Iraq's improving relations with its neighbors -- represent a
    serious setback and have alarmed senior Iraqi officials,
    suggesting that Iraqi Sunni Arab neighbors in particular now
    view those earlier gains as "reversible." These fears help
    explain the rapid deterioration in relations with Syria and
    the GOI's demand that the UN intervene to investigate the
    August 19 bombings, so as to put Syria on notice that the
    international community is scrutinizing its use of Iraqi
    Ba'athist proxies to interfere in Iraq. Iraq's relations
    Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iran and Turkey are covered in Part I
    of this message. End Summary.

    PROGRESS WITH THE NEIGHBORS, 2008-09
    ------------------------------------

    ¶3. (C) From 2008 through much of the summer, Iraq's
    relations with its neighbors were on a positive trajectory
    overall. The breakthroughs in regional engagement began in
    the fall of 2008 (following sustained USG pressure), with the
    UAE, Bahrain, and Kuwait all sending ambassadors to Baghdad,
    along with Jordan, the Arab League, and Syria. Iraq also
    began its regular participation in the GCC 3 in 2008. While
    there was less formal movement in 2009, the positive trend
    continued, as the GOI named 58 new ambassadors and the
    Egyptian government took steps to return its ambassador. The
    continuing signs of improvement in security in Iraq in 2008
    and the first half of 2009 provided a growing sense that Iraq
    was becoming a much more secure place and getting strong
    enough to ward off, or at least better control, neighbors'
    meddling in its internal affairs.

    ¶4. (C) However, not all the trendlines were positive during
    this period. Despite pressure from us, the Saudis refused to
    send an ambassador (although they received Iraq's ambassador
    in Riyadh), reflecting Riyadh's and King Abdullah's, in
    particular, deep-seated doubts about a Shia-led democracy in
    Iraq. Relations with other key countries in the region,
    including Syria, Kuwait, and even Turkey, also experienced
    varying degrees of drag on positive movement, ranging from
    foreign fighters issues in Syria to Chapter VII issues in
    Kuwait and water shortfalls from Turkey. The perception
    among many Iraqis during this period was that despite the
    gains in normalization and regional integration, Iraq was a
    pitiful (former) regional giant, preyed upon and held back in
    various ways by neighbors intent on keeping it weak and
    taking advantage of it.

    AUGUST 19: A THREAT TO NORMALIZATION TRENDS
    -------------------------------------------

    ¶5. (C) The August 19 bombings which severely damaged the MFA
    and the Ministry of Finance buildings and Baghdad's
    residents' sense of improving security, brought these
    negative trendlines into sharp relief. The bombings undercut
    the perception of normalization that had become a commonplace
    over the past eighteen months (and undercut PM Maliki's
    platform of having delivered on security). Iraqis, both
    official and unofficial, believe it was no accident that one
    of the main targets, and the one that suffered the most
    Qof the main targets, and the one that suffered the most
    damage, is the MFA, symbol of Iraq's efforts to build
    relations with its neighbors and normalize its position in
    the region.

    ¶6. (C) In the immediate aftermath of the bombings, FM Zebari
    made accusations that one or more of the neighboring
    countries had conspired with al-Qaeda, possibly using
    proxies, to support the bombings. In a meeting with the
    Ambassador, PM Maliki referred to a "momentum of
    interference" that was building in the lead-up to the January
    national elections. Zebari described the next 5-6 month
    time-frame as "a period of maximum danger" for Iraq. The
    bombings were meant to convey the perception -- welcomed by
    some neighbors, he insisted -- that the security and
    normalization in Iraq of the past two years were "reversible."

    DO THE NEIGHBORS HAVE IT IN FOR IRAQ?
    -------------------------------------

    ¶7. (C) Iraqi contacts speculated that regional unease about

    BAGHDAD 00002561 002 OF 002

    a Shia-led Iraqi government, and about the democratic
    character of that government, a model that could eventually
    undermine the legitimacy of more autocratic regimes in the
    region, helped explain why some neighbors would prefer a weak
    and unstable Iraq, where security and political gains of the
    past two years are rolled back. Acting NSC Advisor Dr. Safa
    al-Sheikh described the neighbors as bent on intervening in
    Iraq, especially in the months leading up to the January 2010
    elections. While some used proxies to foment violence,
    others restricted themselves to money, media (propaganda),
    and meddling, all designed to help shape electoral
    coalitions, and block or further individual political
    careers, in order to better control Iraq and keep it weak,
    politically fractured, and pliable, insisted al-Sheikh. PM
    Maliki told the Ambassador that neighbors feared a resurgent
    Iraq that would capture too much of "the limelight."
    According to Maliki, neighbors also feared Iraq's "golden
    connection between Shia and Sunni Islam," a legacy that gives
    Iraq special precedence in the region. His argument is based
    on a well-acknowledged fact that Iraq is the grand junction
    of Shia and Sunni Islam as well as of the Arab world and
    Persia, making it, therefore, both strategically vital but
    also vulnerable. The view of key contacts here is that some
    of Iraq's Sunni Arab neighbors have concluded that in a
    stable, peaceful Iraqi democracy, Sunni political power in
    Iraq would be finished. These Arab neighbors, therefore,
    conclude that the only way the Sunnis will ever come back
    into power in Iraq is in the wake of a period of sustained
    instability and violence that de-legitimizes democratic
    governance and the Shia as Iraqi political leaders.

    RELATIONS WITH SYRIA IN CRISIS
    ------------------------------

    ¶8. (C) Relations with Syria suffered the most precipitous
    decline in the wake of the attacks, with mutual recalls of
    Ambassadors and public statements making clear the GOI felt
    Syria was complicit. While Syrian support for Iraqi
    Ba'athists has long been a significant bilateral irritant,
    the GOI's public claim that Syrian-based insurgents were
    responsible for August 19 represented a significant shift.
    To the al-Maliki government, the problem was now seen as an
    existential threat to the state and the GOI could no longer
    treat the issue with routine diplomacy, especially given
    fears these attacks were only the first wave. According to
    Maliki and al-Sheikh, senior Iraqi security officers had seen
    a growing body of intelligence in the months leading up to
    attacks indicating significant cooperation between Iraqi
    Ba'athists and al-Qaeda, although Sheikh acknowledged that
    the proof for Iraqi Ba'athist involvement in the August 19
    bombings had been assembled "somewhat quickly." He explained
    that at the cell level, Ba'athists participate with some
    al-Qaida groups -- usually disguising their Baathist
    sympathies -- and often dominate the local groups because
    they have highly prized skills such as experience handling
    weapons and explosives.

    ¶9. (C) Iraqi officials make clear that despite the current
    problems with Syria, they foresee the possibility of improved
    relations in the future. PM Maliki recently stated that Iraq
    wanted a harder-line USG policy toward Syria only to the
    extent it would help compel Syria to stop misbehaving and be
    a better neighbor. The problem, according to Maliki and
    others, is that Syria is a neighborhood menace with a history
    of fomenting violence and inciting instability in the region
    -- and it viewed these tactics as part of the standard tools
    Q-- and it viewed these tactics as part of the standard tools
    of diplomacy. Iraq's problem is that it is too weak on its
    own to intimidate Syria into behaving. With no troops "to
    mass on the border" as a threat, as Turkey had once done, and
    taking his cue from Lebanon's experience following the Hariri
    assassination, Maliki felt he had no recourse but to take the
    issue to the UNSC, hoping this diplomatic "stick" might
    persuade Bashar and his regime to back off. Iraq is looking
    to the United States and other members of the P-5 to endorse
    the appointment by the UNSYG of a senior official to
    investigate the August 19 bombings and external support for
    terrorism in Iraq. (NOTE: Not all Iraqi officials agreed
    with the PM's approach. On September 5, Iraq's three
    presidents -- Talabani, Hashimi and Abd al-Mahdi -- issued a
    statement calling for containing tension between Iraq and
    Syria through diplomatic channels, an obvious rejection of
    Maliki's insistence on UN involvement. END NOTE.)

    ¶10. (U) Iraq's relations Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iran and
    Turkey are covered in Part I of this message.

    HILL

`