Cable Viewer

Currently released so far... 6093 / 251,287

### Articles

Brazil Sri Lanka United Kingdom Sweden Editorial United States Latin America Egypt Yemen Jordan

### Browse latest releases

2010/11 2010/12 2011/01 2011/02 2011/03
2010/11/28 2010/11/29 2010/11/30
2010/12/01 2010/12/02 2010/12/03 2010/12/04 2010/12/05 2010/12/06 2010/12/07 2010/12/08 2010/12/09 2010/12/10 2010/12/11 2010/12/12 2010/12/13 2010/12/14 2010/12/15 2010/12/16 2010/12/17 2010/12/18 2010/12/19 2010/12/20 2010/12/21 2010/12/22 2010/12/23 2010/12/24 2010/12/25 2010/12/26 2010/12/27 2010/12/28 2010/12/29 2010/12/30
2011/01/01 2011/01/02 2011/01/04 2011/01/05 2011/01/07 2011/01/09 2011/01/10 2011/01/11 2011/01/12 2011/01/13 2011/01/14 2011/01/15 2011/01/16 2011/01/17 2011/01/18 2011/01/19 2011/01/20 2011/01/21 2011/01/22 2011/01/23 2011/01/24 2011/01/25 2011/01/26 2011/01/27 2011/01/28 2011/01/29 2011/01/30 2011/01/31
2011/02/01 2011/02/02 2011/02/03 2011/02/04 2011/02/05 2011/02/06 2011/02/07 2011/02/08 2011/02/09 2011/02/10 2011/02/11 2011/02/12 2011/02/13 2011/02/14 2011/02/15 2011/02/16 2011/02/17 2011/02/18 2011/02/19 2011/02/20 2011/02/21 2011/02/22 2011/02/23 2011/02/24 2011/02/25 2011/02/26 2011/02/27 2011/02/28
2011/03/01 2011/03/02 2011/03/03 2011/03/04 2011/03/05 2011/03/06 2011/03/07 2011/03/08 2011/03/09 2011/03/10 2011/03/11 2011/03/13 2011/03/14 2011/03/15 2011/03/16 2011/03/17 2011/03/18 2011/03/19 2011/03/20

### Browse by creation date

66 72 73 75 79 85 86 88 89 90 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10
1966/12
1972/02 1972/08
1973/04
1975/03
1979/08
1985/03
1986/05
1988/01
1989/12
1990/01 1990/07 1990/08 1990/10
2000/06 2000/09 2000/11
2001/02 2001/03 2001/07 2001/10 2001/11
2002/02 2002/03 2002/04 2002/07 2002/11 2002/12
2003/02 2003/03 2003/04 2003/05 2003/06 2003/07 2003/08 2003/09 2003/10 2003/11 2003/12
2004/01 2004/02 2004/03 2004/04 2004/05 2004/06 2004/07 2004/08 2004/09 2004/10 2004/11 2004/12
2005/01 2005/02 2005/03 2005/04 2005/05 2005/06 2005/07 2005/08 2005/09 2005/10 2005/11 2005/12
2006/01 2006/02 2006/03 2006/04 2006/05 2006/06 2006/07 2006/08 2006/09 2006/10 2006/11 2006/12
2007/01 2007/02 2007/03 2007/04 2007/05 2007/06 2007/07 2007/08 2007/09 2007/10 2007/11 2007/12
2008/01 2008/02 2008/03 2008/04 2008/05 2008/06 2008/07 2008/08 2008/09 2008/10 2008/11 2008/12
2009/01 2009/02 2009/03 2009/04 2009/05 2009/06 2009/07 2009/08 2009/09 2009/10 2009/11 2009/12
2010/01 2010/02

### Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z
Embassy Athens Embassy Asuncion Embassy Astana Embassy Asmara Embassy Ashgabat Embassy Ankara Embassy Amman Embassy Algiers Embassy Addis Ababa Embassy Accra Embassy Abuja Embassy Abu Dhabi Embassy Abidjan Consulate Amsterdam American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura Embassy Buenos Aires Embassy Budapest Embassy Bucharest Embassy Brussels Embassy Bridgetown Embassy Bratislava Embassy Brasilia Embassy Bogota Embassy Bishkek Embassy Bern Embassy Berlin Embassy Belgrade Embassy Beirut Embassy Beijing Embassy Banjul Embassy Bangkok Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan Embassy Bamako Embassy Baku Embassy Baghdad Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen Embassy Conakry Embassy Colombo Embassy Chisinau Embassy Caracas Embassy Canberra Embassy Cairo Consulate Curacao Consulate Ciudad Juarez Consulate Chennai Consulate Casablanca Consulate Cape Town
Embassy Dushanbe Embassy Dublin Embassy Doha Embassy Djibouti Embassy Dhaka Embassy Dar Es Salaam Embassy Damascus Embassy Dakar Consulate Dubai
Embassy Freetown
Embassy Guatemala Embassy Gaborone Consulate Guadalajara
Embassy Helsinki Embassy Harare Embassy Hanoi Consulate Hermosillo Consulate Hamburg
Iran RPO Dubai Embassy Islamabad Consulate Istanbul
Embassy Jakarta Consulate Jerusalem Consulate Jeddah
Embassy Kyiv Embassy Kuwait Embassy Kuala Lumpur Embassy Kinshasa Embassy Kigali Embassy Khartoum Embassy Kathmandu Embassy Kampala Embassy Kabul
Embassy Luxembourg Embassy Luanda Embassy London Embassy Ljubljana Embassy Lisbon Embassy Lima Embassy Lilongwe Embassy La Paz Consulate Lagos
Mission USNATO Embassy Muscat Embassy Moscow Embassy Montevideo Embassy Monrovia Embassy Minsk Embassy Mexico Embassy Mbabane Embassy Maputo Embassy Manama Embassy Managua Embassy Malabo Embassy Madrid Consulate Munich Consulate Montreal Consulate Monterrey Consulate Milan
Embassy New Delhi Embassy Nassau Embassy Nairobi Consulate Naples
Embassy Ouagadougou Embassy Ottawa Embassy Oslo
Embassy Pristina Embassy Pretoria Embassy Prague Embassy Port Au Prince Embassy Phnom Penh Embassy Paris Embassy Paramaribo Embassy Panama Consulate Peshawar
Embassy Quito
REO Basrah Embassy Rome Embassy Riyadh Embassy Riga Embassy Reykjavik Embassy Rangoon Embassy Rabat Consulate Rio De Janeiro Consulate Recife
Secretary of State Embassy Stockholm Embassy Sofia Embassy Skopje Embassy Singapore Embassy Seoul Embassy Sarajevo Embassy Santo Domingo Embassy Santiago Embassy Sanaa Embassy San Salvador Embassy San Jose Consulate Strasbourg Consulate Shenyang Consulate Shanghai Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis Embassy Tripoli Embassy Tokyo Embassy The Hague Embassy Tel Aviv Embassy Tehran Embassy Tegucigalpa Embassy Tbilisi Embassy Tashkent Embassy Tallinn Consulate Tijuana
USUN New York USEU Brussels US Mission Geneva US Interests Section Havana US Delegation, Secretary UNVIE Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius Embassy Vienna Embassy Vatican Consulate Vladivostok
Embassy Windhoek Embassy Wellington Embassy Warsaw
Embassy Yerevan Embassy Yaounde
Embassy Zagreb

### Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
AR AJ ASEC AE AEMR AF AMGT APER AG AM AORC AU AS ACOA AX AFIN AL AFFAIRS AA AMED ABLD AROC ATFN ASEAN AFGHANISTAN ADCO AO AFU AER AODE ABUD ATRN APECO ASUP AID AC AGMT AVERY APCS ASIG ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
BU BM BEXP BR BA BRUSSELS BL BO BTIO BH BE BK BX BIDEN BG BY BF BBSR BC BT BB BILAT BMGT BTIU
CH CU CJAN CMGT CVIS CO CA CE COUNTER CASC CBW CG CI CS CDG CIA CACM CDB CAN CN CY COE CD CM COUNTRY CLEARANCE CPAS CACS CWC CF CONDOLEEZZA CT CARSON CL CR CIS CLINTON CODEL CTM CB COM CV CJUS CKGR COUNTERTERRORISM
DJ DEAX DA DOE DISENGAGEMENT DEA DK DHS DR DTRA DS DOD
EINV ECON ENRG EPET ETRD EAGR ELAB EUN EFIN EAID EU EIND ETTC ECPS EWWT ES EG EXTERNAL EMIN ECIP EINDETRD EN EAIR EZ EUC EI ELTN EREL ER ECIN ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS EFIS EC ENVR ECA ET ENERG EINT ENGY ETRO ELECTIONS ELN EK EFTA ECONCS ECONOMICS EUR ENGR ECONEFIN ENIV EINVETC EINN ESA ETC ETRDEINVTINTCS ESENV ETRDECONWTOCS ENVI EUNCH ENNP ECUN EINVEFIN
FR FAO FTAA FARC FREEDOM FI FBI FJ FINR FMLN
GM GZ GTMO GOI GG GV GH GA GT GR GE GAZA GCC GOV GY GTIP GANGS
HO HURI HA HU HR HUMAN HILLARY HK HSTC HYMPSK
IR IS IZ IN IT IAEA ID IO IV ICTY IQ ICAO INTERPOL IPR INRB ITPHUM IWC IC IIP ICRC ISRAELI IMO IL IA INR ITALIAN ITALY ITPGOV IZPREL IRAQI ILC IRC INRA INRO IRAJ IEFIN IF IBRD IMF INTELSAT IACI ICJ ITRA
JAMES JA JO JOSEPH JP JOHNNIE JM JUS
KCRM KCOR KDEM KPAO KG KTIP KICC KNNP KV KBCT KPAL KTFN KU KSPR KJUS KHLS KTIA KWBG KMDR KGHG KN KUNR KS KIRF KISL KFRD KIPR KAWC KPWR KCIP KSUM KWAC KMIG KOLY KZ KAWK KSEC KIFR KDRG KDEMAF KFIN KGIC KGCC KPIN KBIO KHIV KSCA KE KPKO KPLS KIRC KRAD KMCA KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KWMN KACT KGIT KPRP KOMC KSTC KFLU KBTS KPRV KBTR KVPR KTDB KERG KWMM KRVC KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KSTH KSEP KNSD KFLO KMPI KVIR KNUP KTER KCFE KNEI KDDG KHSA KMRS KHDP KTLA KPAK KNAR KREL KPAI KTEX KNPP KCOM KNNPMNUC KO KPOA KLIG KOCI KRFD KHUM KDEV KNUC KCFC KOMS KSAF KWWMN KCRS KTBT KR
LY LG LE LH LI LO LOG LT LTTE LAB LU
MCAP MO MNUC MARR MPOS MASS MOPS MAR MD MX MZ MEPP MA MR ML MIL MTCRE MOPPS MAPP MU MY MASC MP MT MERCOSUR MK MDC MI MAPS MCC MASSMNUC MQADHAFI MUCN MTCR MG MTRE MC MEPI MRCRE MV
NATO NI NG NO NL NU NIPP NPT NS NSG NA NZ NATIONAL NP NRR NAR NE NASA NK NPG NT NGO NSF
OVIP OTRA OPRC OSCI OTR OREP ODIP OPDC OSAC OAS OEXC OIIP OFDP OSCE OECD OPCW OPIC OIC OFFICIALS OIE OVP
PINR PGOV PBTS PREL PTER PE PO PROP PHUM PBIO PARM PECON PINS PM PK PHSA PREF PL PAK POGOV PINL POL PSOE PKFK PMIL PY PFOR PALESTINIAN PHALANAGE PARTY PRAM PAO PA PMAR PGOVLO POLITICS PUNE PORG PHUMPREL PF POLINT PHUS PGOC PNR PGGV PNAT PGOVE PRGOV PRL PROV PTERE PGOF PHUMBA PARMS PINT PINF POV PEL PLN PG PEPR PSI PU POLITICAL PARTIES
QA
RS RU RO RW RIGHTS RF RICE ROBERT RFE REGION RP
SP SOCI STEINBERG SN SA SY SNAR SMIG SO SENV SCUL SR SF SG SW SU SL SZ SIPRS SH SI SNARCS SOFA SANC SHUM SK ST SEVN SYR SC SAN
TI TX TU TW TC TERRORISM TPHY TRGY TS TIP TBIO TSPA TH TO TZ TK TSPL TNGD TINT TRSY TR TFIN TD TURKEY TT TP
UK UZ UNMIK UN US UG UNSC UP USEU UY UNGA UNO UV USUN UNESCO UNEP UNDP UNCHS UNHRC UNAUS USTR UNVIE UNCHC UE UNDESCO UNHCR USAID UNDC UAE
VE VZ VT VTPREL VN VM
WI WTRO WTO WTRQ WWARD WB WHA WBG WA WHO WMO WEU WZ
XF XA XG XT XM XR XS XL XH XZ XW XY XE XD XK XC
YI YM YE YMCS
ZP ZR ZI ZU ZB ZF ZO ZANU ZA ZOELLICK ZK ZJ

### Browse by classification

CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN SECRET SECRET//NOFORN UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

### Community resources

Follow us on Twitter Check our Reddit Twitter this Digg this page Contact us on IRC

courage is contagious

### Viewing cable 08BERN443, FM CALMY-REY SAYS DIALOGUE AND "DIPLOMATIC \

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:

- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #08BERN443.

Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
08BERN443 | 2008-08-28 15:03 | 2011-02-18 21:09 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Bern
Appears in these articles: www.letemps.ch/swiss_papers

`

    VZCZCXRO4059
    OO RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
    DE RUEHSW #0443/01 2411509
    ZNY CCCCC ZZH ZDK
    O 281509Z AUG 08
    FM AMEMBASSY BERN
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5286
    INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
    RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 0575
    RUEHLB/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT PRIORITY 0049
    RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA PRIORITY 1226
    RUEHLM/AMEMBASSY COLOMBO PRIORITY 0112
    RUEHKM/AMEMBASSY KAMPALA PRIORITY 0014
    RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY 1136

` `

    167757	2008-08-28 15:09:00	167757	2008-08-28 15:09:00	08BERN443	Embassy Bern	CONFIDENTIAL		VZCZCXRO4059\
    OO RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR\
    DE RUEHSW #0443/01 2411509\
    ZNY CCCCC ZZH ZDK\
    O 281509Z AUG 08\
    FM AMEMBASSY BERN\
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5286\
    INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY\
    RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 0575\
    RUEHLB/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT PRIORITY 0049\
    RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA PRIORITY 1226\
    RUEHLM/AMEMBASSY COLOMBO PRIORITY 0112\
    RUEHKM/AMEMBASSY KAMPALA PRIORITY 0014\
    RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY 1136	C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BERN 000443 \
     \
    SIPDIS \
     \
    DEPT FOR P (R.RANGASWAMY), EUR/CE (Y.SAINT-ANDRE), EB, AND \
    NEA/IR (H.WOOSTER) \
     \
    E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/27/2018 \
    TAGS: PREL PGOV KNNP PTER SZ
    SUBJECT: FM CALMY-REY SAYS DIALOGUE AND "DIPLOMATIC \
    ENGINEERING" ARE CHIEF SWISS FOREIGN POLICY INSTRUMENTS \
     \
    BERN 00000443  001.2 OF 003 \
     \
     \
    Classified By: POL/E Counselor Richard A. Rorvig; reason 1.4(d). \
     \
    ¶1. (C) Summary:  In an August 25 address to senior Swiss \
    diplomats, FM Calmy-Rey extolled dialogue and facilitation as \
    chief Swiss foreign policy instruments.  She used the term \
    "diplomatic engineering" in describing her vision of \
    Switzerland facilitating dialogue on difficult subjects.  A \
    rhetorical question Calmy-Rey posed in the course of her \
    speech was incorrectly spun in some international and Swiss \
    press as allegedly advocating dialogue with Usama bin Laden. \
    In response to these reports, the Department of Foreign \
    Affairs (DFA) released a press statement emphasizing that \
    Calmy-Rey did not propose or support such a dialogue.  At \
    several points in her August 25 speech, Calmy-Rey sought to \
    justify the approach she has taken to the Iran nuclear \
    problem.  She claimed that the "freeze for freeze" concept \
    was a suggestion made by Switzerland to "find a way to get \
    the blocked talks between Iran and the (P5 1) back in gear \
    and into substantive political negotiations."  She once again \
    argued that the EGL gas deal is in Switzerland's national \
    interest and said that it "hardly would have been possible" \
    without the diplomatic contacts the DFA had developed with \
    Iran in the course of its "dialogue" on the nuclear issue. \
    Though she remains very popular with the Swiss Left, \
    Calmy-Rey has faced a steady drumbeat of criticism in much of \
    the Swiss press this year, not least because of her very \
    damaging trip to Tehran in March in support of the EGL deal. \
    Calmy-Rey also has felt pressure to clarify her stance on the \
    Iran/nuclear issue in the wake of an August 20 press \
    conference in which Swiss President Couchepin stated that the \
    Federal Council supports the P5 1 initiative and had decided \
    that Switzerland will not undertake its own initiatives in \
    this area.  End Summary. \
     \
    ------------------------------------------ \
    Annual Gathering of Senior Swiss Diplomats \
    ------------------------------------------ \
     \
    ¶2. (SBU) In an August 25 address to 170 senior Swiss \
    diplomats gathered in Bern for the Department of Foreign \
    Affairs (DFA) annual ambassadors/CGs conference, FM Calmy-Rey \
    extolled dialogue and facilitation ("diplomatic engineering") \
    as chief Swiss foreign policy instruments.  Calmy-Rey \
    appeared to use the occasion to rebut continuing criticism -- \
    primarily from Swiss conservatives -- of her often \
    high-profile approach to sensitive issues.  While conceding \
    some limits to the prospects for dialogue, she argued that \
    Switzerland's willingness to talk, for example, with \
    Hizballah, Hamas, FARC, and the LTTE, was intended to draw \
    them into political solutions without legitimizing such \
    groups' terrorist methods that Switzerland condemns. \
     \
    -------------------------------------------- \
    Press Flap over Reference to Usama bin Laden \
    -------------------------------------------- \
     \
    ¶3. (U) In her opening remarks, Calmy-Rey asserted that Swiss \
    domestic press commentary seems dominated by "moralists" \
    advocating strict isolation of problematic state and \
    non-state actors.  She asked rhetorically, "should we listen \
    to these moralists?  And, if not, should we seek dialogue \
    without discrimination, even if that means sitting at a table \
    with Usama bin Laden?"  Calmy-Rey did not answer the question \
    explicitly in the course of her speech, but instead argued \
    that in each case the prospects for dialogue need to be \
    carefully reviewed.  She maintained that dialogue most of the \
    time is better than isolation, but does not mean "accepting \
    the unacceptable." \
     \
    ¶4. (U) French daily "Le Monde" subsequently incorrectly \
    reported that Calmy-Rey had advocated dialogue with Usama bin \
    Laden, prompting a brief frenzy of criticism in the Swiss \
    media and an August 26 press release by the DFA emphasizing \
    that Calmy-Rey's question was rhetorical, that she had not \
    promoted nor proposed dialogue with bin Laden, and that "in \
    practice there is no question of the DFA proposing a dialogue \
    with Usama bin Laden."  Swiss press commentators generally \
    accepted the clarification, but some argued that the Foreign \
    Minister unnecessarily had risked creating misunderstanding \
    on a very sensitive topic. \
     \
    ---------------------- \
     \
    BERN 00000443  002 OF 003 \
     \
     \
    Diplomatic Engineering \
    ---------------------- \
     \
    ¶5. (SBU) Calmy-Rey used the term "diplomatic engineering" in \
    describing her vision of Switzerland facilitating dialogue on \
    difficult subjects with ideas, in addition to logistical and \
    other material support.  She claimed that the "freeze for \
    freeze" concept in the context of the P5 1 offer to Iran was \
    a result of just this kind of engagement.  Even while lauding \
    Swiss diplomacy, Calmy-Rey said more needs to be done to \
    develop Swiss competencies with a view to making and managing \
    "diplomatic engineering" as a Swiss "trademark."  At the same \
    time, she assessed that Switzerland's lack of EU membership \
    and the Swiss form of government -- which lacks a unitary \
    Executive -- make Swiss international engagement more \
    difficult. \
     \
    -------------------------------- \
    Iran, P5 1, and the EGL Gas Deal \
    -------------------------------- \
     \
    ¶6. (C) At several points in her August 25 speech, Calmy-Rey \
    sought to justify the approach she has taken to the Iran \
    nuclear problem.  In this context, she said that Switzerland \
    "is in close contact with the P5 1 and other important actors \
    and had calibrated suggestions that made possible for all \
    sides to come closer together and to save face."  She claimed \
    that the "freeze for freeze" concept was a suggestion made by \
    Switzerland to "find a way to get the blocked talks between \
    Iran and the (P5 1) back in gear and into substantive \
    political negotiations."  Calmy-Rey claimed that "we were \
    always transparent with all partners and have in no case \
    undermined agreed international measures -- to the contrary." \
     \
    ¶7. (C) Calmy-Rey also used this opportunity to seek to defend \
    her support for the Swiss firm EGL's billion dollar gas deal \
    with Iran.  She once again argued that the deal is in \
    Switzerland's national interest and something that "hardly \
    would have been possible" without the diplomatic contacts the \
    DFA had developed with Iran in the course of its "dialogue" \
    on the nuclear issue.  Referring to criticism that her \
    support for the deal had damaged Swiss-U.S. relations, \
    Calmy-Rey said that "the United States questioned our support \
    for the gas delivery agreement signed by EGL, but we have \
    good and constructive relations with the United States -- \
    contacts were never so numerous as now." \
     \
    -------------------- \
    Calmy-Rey on Defense \
    -------------------- \
     \
    ¶8. (C) Though she remains very popular in her Swiss Socialist \
    Party and with others on the Swiss Left, Calmy-Rey has faced \
    a steady drumbeat of criticism in much of the Swiss press \
    this year, not least because of her very damaging trip to \
    Tehran in March in support of the EGL deal.  More recently, \
    allegations by Colombian officials that a DFA envoy acted \
    sympathetically to the FARC have kept her on the defensive, \
    as has, to a lesser degree, criticism that the ongoing crisis \
    in Georgia is a "boomerang effect" of recognizing Kosovo \
    independence, which Calmy-Rey strongly advocated.  The \
    rightist Swiss People's Party (SVP), having gone into \
    parliamentary opposition and no longer feeling bound by Swiss \
    government tradition of "collegiality", has maintained the \
    most vociferous criticism.  That said, the SVP is by no means \
    alone, with commentators from the Swiss political middle \
    frequently lamenting Calmy-Rey's often high-profile approach \
    to sensitive issues.  Responding to such critics, Calmy-Rey \
    asserted in her August 25 speech that "we were never a land \
    of courtly secret diplomacy -- transparency and \
    predictability of our foreign policy are the core of our \
    credibility." \
     \
    ¶9. (C) Regarding the Iran/nuclear issue, Calmy-Rey also has \
    felt renewed pressure to clarify her stance in the wake of an \
    August 20 press conference in which Swiss President Couchepin \
    said that Switzerland supports the P5 1 initiative and added \
    that the Federal Council had decided that Switzerland will \
    not undertake its own initiatives in this area.  In an \
    interview with the "Neue Zuercher Zeitung" published August \
    23, Calmy-Rey was asked about Couchepin's comments and \
    responded that Switzerland had not launched its own \
     \
    BERN 00000443  003.2 OF 003 \
     \
     \
    initiative, but had offered "diplomatic engineering" \
    (including the idea of "freeze for freeze") that had resulted \
    in the July "Geneva Talks" that the P5 1 and Iran had asked \
    the Swiss to host.  She further said that the Federal Council \
    "had good reason to be cautious," since Switzerland seldom is \
    engaged in international security policy matters of such high \
    importance.  Calmy-Rey added that the Federal Council had \
    feared that Swiss involvement in the issue could damage Swiss \
    relations with other states, but argued that the "Geneva \
    Talks" had "shown that not to be the case." \
    CARTER \	Embassy Bern	CONFIDENTIAL		VZCZCXRO4059\
    OO RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR\
    DE RUEHSW #0443/01 2411509\
    ZNY CCCCC ZZH ZDK\
    O 281509Z AUG 08\
    FM AMEMBASSY BERN\
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5286\
    INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY\
    RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 0575\
    RUEHLB/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT PRIORITY 0049\
    RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA PRIORITY 1226\
    RUEHLM/AMEMBASSY COLOMBO PRIORITY 0112\
    RUEHKM/AMEMBASSY KAMPALA PRIORITY 0014\
    RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY 1136	C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BERN 000443 \
     \
    SIPDIS \
     \
    DEPT FOR P (R.RANGASWAMY), EUR/CE (Y.SAINT-ANDRE), EB, AND \
    NEA/IR (H.WOOSTER) \
     \
    E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/27/2018 \
    TAGS: PREL PGOV KNNP PTER SZ
    SUBJECT: FM CALMY-REY SAYS DIALOGUE AND "DIPLOMATIC \
    ENGINEERING" ARE CHIEF SWISS FOREIGN POLICY INSTRUMENTS \
     \
    BERN 00000443  001.2 OF 003 \
     \
     \
    Classified By: POL/E Counselor Richard A. Rorvig; reason 1.4(d). \
     \
    ¶1. (C) Summary:  In an August 25 address to senior Swiss \
    diplomats, FM Calmy-Rey extolled dialogue and facilitation as \
    chief Swiss foreign policy instruments.  She used the term \
    "diplomatic engineering" in describing her vision of \
    Switzerland facilitating dialogue on difficult subjects.  A \
    rhetorical question Calmy-Rey posed in the course of her \
    speech was incorrectly spun in some international and Swiss \
    press as allegedly advocating dialogue with Usama bin Laden. \
    In response to these reports, the Department of Foreign \
    Affairs (DFA) released a press statement emphasizing that \
    Calmy-Rey did not propose or support such a dialogue.  At \
    several points in her August 25 speech, Calmy-Rey sought to \
    justify the approach she has taken to the Iran nuclear \
    problem.  She claimed that the "freeze for freeze" concept \
    was a suggestion made by Switzerland to "find a way to get \
    the blocked talks between Iran and the (P5 1) back in gear \
    and into substantive political negotiations."  She once again \
    argued that the EGL gas deal is in Switzerland's national \
    interest and said that it "hardly would have been possible" \
    without the diplomatic contacts the DFA had developed with \
    Iran in the course of its "dialogue" on the nuclear issue. \
    Though she remains very popular with the Swiss Left, \
    Calmy-Rey has faced a steady drumbeat of criticism in much of \
    the Swiss press this year, not least because of her very \
    damaging trip to Tehran in March in support of the EGL deal. \
    Calmy-Rey also has felt pressure to clarify her stance on the \
    Iran/nuclear issue in the wake of an August 20 press \
    conference in which Swiss President Couchepin stated that the \
    Federal Council supports the P5 1 initiative and had decided \
    that Switzerland will not undertake its own initiatives in \
    this area.  End Summary. \
     \
    ------------------------------------------ \
    Annual Gathering of Senior Swiss Diplomats \
    ------------------------------------------ \
     \
    ¶2. (SBU) In an August 25 address to 170 senior Swiss \
    diplomats gathered in Bern for the Department of Foreign \
    Affairs (DFA) annual ambassadors/CGs conference, FM Calmy-Rey \
    extolled dialogue and facilitation ("diplomatic engineering") \
    as chief Swiss foreign policy instruments.  Calmy-Rey \
    appeared to use the occasion to rebut continuing criticism -- \
    primarily from Swiss conservatives -- of her often \
    high-profile approach to sensitive issues.  While conceding \
    some limits to the prospects for dialogue, she argued that \
    Switzerland's willingness to talk, for example, with \
    Hizballah, Hamas, FARC, and the LTTE, was intended to draw \
    them into political solutions without legitimizing such \
    groups' terrorist methods that Switzerland condemns. \
     \
    -------------------------------------------- \
    Press Flap over Reference to Usama bin Laden \
    -------------------------------------------- \
     \
    ¶3. (U) In her opening remarks, Calmy-Rey asserted that Swiss \
    domestic press commentary seems dominated by "moralists" \
    advocating strict isolation of problematic state and \
    non-state actors.  She asked rhetorically, "should we listen \
    to these moralists?  And, if not, should we seek dialogue \
    without discrimination, even if that means sitting at a table \
    with Usama bin Laden?"  Calmy-Rey did not answer the question \
    explicitly in the course of her speech, but instead argued \
    that in each case the prospects for dialogue need to be \
    carefully reviewed.  She maintained that dialogue most of the \
    time is better than isolation, but does not mean "accepting \
    the unacceptable." \
     \
    ¶4. (U) French daily "Le Monde" subsequently incorrectly \
    reported that Calmy-Rey had advocated dialogue with Usama bin \
    Laden, prompting a brief frenzy of criticism in the Swiss \
    media and an August 26 press release by the DFA emphasizing \
    that Calmy-Rey's question was rhetorical, that she had not \
    promoted nor proposed dialogue with bin Laden, and that "in \
    practice there is no question of the DFA proposing a dialogue \
    with Usama bin Laden."  Swiss press commentators generally \
    accepted the clarification, but some argued that the Foreign \
    Minister unnecessarily had risked creating misunderstanding \
    on a very sensitive topic. \
     \
    ---------------------- \
     \
    BERN 00000443  002 OF 003 \
     \
     \
    Diplomatic Engineering \
    ---------------------- \
     \
    ¶5. (SBU) Calmy-Rey used the term "diplomatic engineering" in \
    describing her vision of Switzerland facilitating dialogue on \
    difficult subjects with ideas, in addition to logistical and \
    other material support.  She claimed that the "freeze for \
    freeze" concept in the context of the P5 1 offer to Iran was \
    a result of just this kind of engagement.  Even while lauding \
    Swiss diplomacy, Calmy-Rey said more needs to be done to \
    develop Swiss competencies with a view to making and managing \
    "diplomatic engineering" as a Swiss "trademark."  At the same \
    time, she assessed that Switzerland's lack of EU membership \
    and the Swiss form of government -- which lacks a unitary \
    Executive -- make Swiss international engagement more \
    difficult. \
     \
    -------------------------------- \
    Iran, P5 1, and the EGL Gas Deal \
    -------------------------------- \
     \
    ¶6. (C) At several points in her August 25 speech, Calmy-Rey \
    sought to justify the approach she has taken to the Iran \
    nuclear problem.  In this context, she said that Switzerland \
    "is in close contact with the P5 1 and other important actors \
    and had calibrated suggestions that made possible for all \
    sides to come closer together and to save face."  She claimed \
    that the "freeze for freeze" concept was a suggestion made by \
    Switzerland to "find a way to get the blocked talks between \
    Iran and the (P5 1) back in gear and into substantive \
    political negotiations."  Calmy-Rey claimed that "we were \
    always transparent with all partners and have in no case \
    undermined agreed international measures -- to the contrary." \
     \
    ¶7. (C) Calmy-Rey also used this opportunity to seek to defend \
    her support for the Swiss firm EGL's billion dollar gas deal \
    with Iran.  She once again argued that the deal is in \
    Switzerland's national interest and something that "hardly \
    would have been possible" without the diplomatic contacts the \
    DFA had developed with Iran in the course of its "dialogue" \
    on the nuclear issue.  Referring to criticism that her \
    support for the deal had damaged Swiss-U.S. relations, \
    Calmy-Rey said that "the United States questioned our support \
    for the gas delivery agreement signed by EGL, but we have \
    good and constructive relations with the United States -- \
    contacts were never so numerous as now." \
     \
    -------------------- \
    Calmy-Rey on Defense \
    -------------------- \
     \
    ¶8. (C) Though she remains very popular in her Swiss Socialist \
    Party and with others on the Swiss Left, Calmy-Rey has faced \
    a steady drumbeat of criticism in much of the Swiss press \
    this year, not least because of her very damaging trip to \
    Tehran in March in support of the EGL deal.  More recently, \
    allegations by Colombian officials that a DFA envoy acted \
    sympathetically to the FARC have kept her on the defensive, \
    as has, to a lesser degree, criticism that the ongoing crisis \
    in Georgia is a "boomerang effect" of recognizing Kosovo \
    independence, which Calmy-Rey strongly advocated.  The \
    rightist Swiss People's Party (SVP), having gone into \
    parliamentary opposition and no longer feeling bound by Swiss \
    government tradition of "collegiality", has maintained the \
    most vociferous criticism.  That said, the SVP is by no means \
    alone, with commentators from the Swiss political middle \
    frequently lamenting Calmy-Rey's often high-profile approach \
    to sensitive issues.  Responding to such critics, Calmy-Rey \
    asserted in her August 25 speech that "we were never a land \
    of courtly secret diplomacy -- transparency and \
    predictability of our foreign policy are the core of our \
    credibility." \
     \
    ¶9. (C) Regarding the Iran/nuclear issue, Calmy-Rey also has \
    felt renewed pressure to clarify her stance in the wake of an \
    August 20 press conference in which Swiss President Couchepin \
    said that Switzerland supports the P5 1 initiative and added \
    that the Federal Council had decided that Switzerland will \
    not undertake its own initiatives in this area.  In an \
    interview with the "Neue Zuercher Zeitung" published August \
    23, Calmy-Rey was asked about Couchepin's comments and \
    responded that Switzerland had not launched its own \
     \
    BERN 00000443  003.2 OF 003 \
     \
     \
    initiative, but had offered "diplomatic engineering" \
    (including the idea of "freeze for freeze") that had resulted \
    in the July "Geneva Talks" that the P5 1 and Iran had asked \
    the Swiss to host.  She further said that the Federal Council \
    "had good reason to be cautious," since Switzerland seldom is \
    engaged in international security policy matters of such high \
    importance.  Calmy-Rey added that the Federal Council had \
    feared that Swiss involvement in the issue could damage Swiss \
    relations with other states, but argued that the "Geneva \
    Talks" had "shown that not to be the case." \
    CARTER \

`