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### Viewing cable 07PARIS3668, FRENCH MFA READOUT ON AUGUST 23 TEHRAN VISIT BY

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
07PARIS3668 | 2007-09-05 12:12 | 2010-11-29 12:12 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Paris

`

    VZCZCXRO8568
    OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDIR RUEHKUK
    DE RUEHFR #3668/01 2481250
    ZNY CCCCC ZZH
    O 051250Z SEP 07
    FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9883
    INFO RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE

` `

    C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 003668

    SIPDIS

    SIPDIS

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/05/2017
    TAGS: PREL PGOV FR IR
    SUBJECT: FRENCH MFA READOUT ON AUGUST 23 TEHRAN VISIT BY
    ELYSEE ADVISER RICHIER AND MFA DAS GELLET

    REF: PARIS 3645 (NOTAL)

    Classified By: Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Josiah Rosen
    blatt for reasons 1.4. (b) and (d).

    ¶1.  (C)  Summary:  The GOF took a hard line during an August
    23 trip to Tehran by French presidency strategic affairs
    adviser Richier and French MFA DAS-equivalent Gellet that
    Iranian leader Khamanei's foreign policy adviser Velayati
    hoped would open a new channel to Paris.  Gellet explained
    August 31 that Velayati was apparently operating from a
    flawed premise that Nicolas Sarkozy would free France from
    its "dependence" on the USG.  Velayati further believed
    France could be broken away from the P-5 over further
    sanctions against Iran.  Gellet said Richier previewed for
    Velayati the line Sarkozy would use in a subsequent speech to
    French ambassadors that the world faced a "catastrophic"
    choice between Iran with a bomb or bombing Iran.  Although
    Velayati's hopes were shattered, Iran is still interested in
    the channel; Gellet said that Richier has the lead in
    deciding what the GOF will do next.  Gellet expressed a
    strong French desire to remain informed on U.S. plans
    regarding Iran particularly should we decide to take military
    action against Iran.  End summary

    ¶2.  (C)  French MFA DAS-equivalent for Iran, Iraq, and the
    Gulf Franck Gellet on August 31 provided a readout on his
    August 23 visit to Tehran accompanying the French
    presidency's strategic affairs adviser Francois Richier.  The
    visit followed an invitation from Ali Akbar Velayati, former
    Iranian foreign minister and current foreign affairs adviser
    to Supreme Leader Khamanei.  Gellet confirmed information
    that the French Embassy in Washington communicated to the
    Department that Velayati wanted to establish a new direct
    channel to Paris.  Gellet elaborated that Velayati's
    (apparently convoluted) thinking had been expressed in an
    article he had written that took the view that the election
    of Nicolas Sarkozy gave France a chance to break free of its
    "dependence" on the U.S. in terms of its foreign policy.
    Velayati, according to Gellet, believed that Chirac had been
    entirely beholden to the U.S. during his presidency.
    Sarkozy's election, therefore, offered Iran a chance to
    appeal to France in a way that would allow France to follow
    its independent line a la de Gaulle and thus pry France loose
    from the coalition that now sought to impose tougher
    sanctions on Iran over its nuclear program.

    ¶3.  (C)  Despite this clearly flawed analysis of France's
    position and political dynamics, the GOF decided this opening
    was important enough to explore.  Gellet recounted how he and
    Richier met Velayati, heard him out, and proceeded to burst
    his bubble.  Richier, according to Gellet, told Velayati that
    Sarkozy was firm on the nuclear issue and previewed for him
    the line that Sarkozy would use in his August 29 speech to
    French ambassadors that under current circumstances the world
    faced the stark alternative that Iran would obtain "the bomb"
    or be bombed.  Velayati was not happy to hear this but did
    not close the door to further discussion.  Gellet surmised
    that Velayati believes the French are still susceptible to
    Iranian blandishments and wants to keep some sort of
    alternative line open to the Elysee.

    ¶4.  (C)  Gellet stressed that Velayati's initiative was not
    taken without reference to others in the Iranian government.
    Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister for Legal and International
    Affairs Abbas Araghchi sat in on the Velayati meeting just as
    Velayati attended a meeting Gellet and Richier had with
    Araghchi.  Gellet did not indicate what other subjects came
    up, but Velayati's pitch was the main one.  When asked
    whether France felt the visit had been worthwhile and what
    sort of follow-up there might be, Gellet was vague.  He said
    that Richier, in his Elyse capacity, would decide what to
    do, including whether to keep this dialogue going.  Gellet
    surmised that Richier would be willing to discuss this
    further with USG officials, like PM A/S Rood, in future
    meetings to discuss next steps in the nuclear fuel dispute.

    ¶5.  (C)  Gellet found the visit a bit surreal but quite
    indicative of the bizarre way Iran functions.  He noted the
    diffusion of power among different entities and the
    uncertainty that pervades Iranian decision making.  Velayati
    clearly sought to minimize or counterbalance President
    Ahmadinejad's hard line but without actually taking a softer
    line himself.  Iran's core position, therefore, did not seem
    to be shifting or subject to any flexibility.  When asked how
    France understood Sarkozy's either/or statement on Iran had
    played in that country, Gellet replied that Iranian
    authorities seem to have largely kept it out of the national
    media.  The implication that France sees Iran facing a
    serious risk of military retaliation over its stance was thus
    largely unreported.  Gellet argued that this suits Velayati's
    calculations because the impression remains that Iran can

    PARIS 00003668  002 OF 002

    somehow turn to France to blunt American pressure to impose
    more sanctions and escalate the situation.

    ¶6.  (C)  On the issue of escalation, Gellet asked that the
    USG keep France informed of its thinking as regards possible
    military action against Iran.  He claimed that the Elysee
    worries about being blindsided if or when the time comes for
    a strike.  The timing and magnitude of such action, i.e., a
    surgical strike or a more generalized campaign, could have
    enormous stakes in terms of French interests.  Gellet noted,
    in this vein, French concerns about Iranian retaliation
    against the Gulf States and their capacity to respond.  He
    surmised that a U.S./France dialogue, if it were to develop,
    might occur at a much higher level than his.  His hope, which
    was personal as much as he said it reflected official
    thinking, was that we would keep the French in the loop as we
    moved into the next phase of high-tension diplomacy focused
    on further UNSC sanctions.

    ¶7.  (C)  Comment:  It appears that this latest Iranian
    initiative to open a new channel to Paris is unlikely to
    change the dynamics of Tehran's ongoing confrontation with
    the world.  The French seem keen to reassure us that they are
    not wavering.  President Sarkozy's tough words to the French
    Ambassadors conference following the meetings in Tehran made
    that point loud and clear.  On whether to engage more
    intensively with the French about the various contingencies
    related to Iran, we believe we should continue to test
    Sarkozy's apparent desire to deal with us differently than
    his predecessors did.  As an indication of different French
    thinking, the newspaper "Le Monde" reported active discussion
    in the Elysee of sanctions targeting Iran outside the UNSC
    that France could impose alone or potentially with others in
    the EU.  The article made clear that, as "fissures" seem to
    be appearing among the P-5 over Iran, France seems to be
    toughening its position.  We will follow up with Richier for
    his take on this visit.

    Please visit Paris' Classified Website at:
    http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm

    STAPLETON

`