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### Viewing cable 07THEHAGUE1729, NETHERLANDS/AFGHANISTAN: DESPERATELY SEEKING

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
07THEHAGUE1729 | 2007-09-19 16:04 | 2011-01-17 00:12 | SECRET | Embassy The Hague

`

    VZCZCXYZ0022
    OO RUEHWEB

    DE RUEHTC #1729/01 2621613
    ZNY SSSSS ZZH
    O 191613Z SEP 07
    FM AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0313
    INFO RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
    RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 2690
    RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 0303
    RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA PRIORITY 5166
    RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHDC PRIORITY
    RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
    RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
    RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
    RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY

` `

    S E C R E T THE HAGUE 001729

    SIPDIS

    SIPDIS

    STATE FOR EUR/WE, EUR/RPM, SCA

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/19/2017
    TAGS: PGOV PREL NATO AF NL
    SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS/AFGHANISTAN: DESPERATELY SEEKING
    SOMEONE...

    REF: THE HAGUE 1625 AND PREVIOUS...

    "
    122868,9/19/2007 16:13,07THEHAGUE1729,"Embassy The
    Hague",SECRET,07THEHAGUE1625,"VZCZCXYZ0022
    OO RUEHWEB
    DE RUEHTC #1729/01 2621613
    ZNY SSSSS ZZH
    O 191613Z SEP 07
    FM AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0313
    INFO RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
    RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 2690
    RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 0303
    RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA PRIORITY 5166
    RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHDC PRIORITY
    RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
    RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
    RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
    RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
    ","S E C R E T THE HAGUE 001729
    SIPDIS
    SIPDIS
    STATE FOR EUR/WE, EUR/RPM, SCA
    E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/19/2017
    TAGS: PGOV PREL NATO AF NL
    SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS/AFGHANISTAN: DESPERATELY SEEKING
    SOMEONE...
    REF: THE HAGUE 1625 AND PREVIOUS
    Classified By: Ambassador Roland Arnall, for reasons 1.4 (b,d)

    ¶1. (S) SUMMARY: The Dutch Cabinet is prepared to approve an
    extension of the Dutch mission in Uruzgan for approximately
    1,200 troops, but only if a third party (or parties) steps
    forward to replace the 400 or so Dutch troops who will need
    to be withdrawn. Dutch lobbying efforts -- bilaterally and
    through NATO -- to find a new partner have been unsuccessful
    so far, and time is running out, as the Cabinet must submit a
    decision to Parliament by mid-October. On September 19,
    Foreign Minister Verhagen explicitly asked the U.S. to assist
    the Dutch in identifying and soliciting possible
    contributions. He also made clear that the Dutch would
    accept U.S. military support for the ISAF mission in Uruzgan,
    if offered. END SUMMARY.

    ¶2. (S) On September 19, Ambassador Arnall was summoned to the
    Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs to receive an urgent
    message on Afghanistan from Foreign Minister Maxime Verhagen.
    Dutch POLDIR Pieter de Gooijer also attended the meeting.
    According to the Foreign Minister, intensive Dutch efforts to
    secure ""third party"" troops to support ISAF operations in
    Uruzgan province have, so far, failed to produce concrete
    results -- and time is running out.

    ¶3. (S) Verhagen stressed that he and Prime Minister
    Balkenende were personally committed to continuing the Dutch
    presence in Uruzgan. Politically and logistically, however,
    it was just not possible to maintain the current deployment
    level. The Cabinet was therefore proposing a draw-down of
    roughly 25 percent of the current force -- about 400 troops
    -- which would allow the Dutch to retain leadership of the
    Uruzgan mission with a remaining force of roughly 1,200
    troops. Verhagen emphasized that he believed he had secured
    full Cabinet support -- including from Finance Minister
    Wouter Bos and Development Minister Koenders -- for an
    extension at this level, but ONLY if a third party or parties
    agreed to replace the departing Dutch troops. The third party
    contributions should fill seven ""modules"" the Dutch have
    shared with NATO: 1) Camp protection (two platoons of 30
    each); 2) Field Hospital (40 - 60 personnel); 3) two ""OMLTs""
    (40 personnel); 4) two battle groups (250 - 260); 5) a PRT
    mission team (5-6 plus security); 6) F-16 support (4-6
    aircraft); and 7) helicopters (although the Dutch consider
    this an RC-South, rather than Dutch, responsibility.)

    ¶4. (S) Verhagen said he did not anticipate serious
    parliamentary opposition to a reduced extension provided
    sufficient third party forces could be secured. Without
    additional partners, however, there would be no majority in
    Parliament in favor of the mission, as both the coalition
    partner Labor Party (PvdA) and the opposition Liberal Party
    (VVD) had made this a non-negotiable condition of their
    support. (Note: EMBOFF contacts this week with the Foreign
    Affairs Spokesmen of both parties support this statement.)
    According to Verhagen, the choice for the GONL is clear:
    either find enough partners to stay, or leave Uruzgan by
    August 2008 when the initial deployment runs out.

    ¶5. (S) Unfortunately, according to Verhagen, intensive Dutch
    efforts to secure contributions from potential partners have
    so far failed to produce concrete results. He noted that he
    was particularly disappointed that the Slovak Foreign
    Minister had been unable to make a significant commitment
    during a September 13 visit to The Hague, despite earlier
    indications to the contrary. The Dutch have now approached
    more than a dozen countries, including many identified by
    NATO as potential contributors, mostly without success (see
    list in para. 9). Time, meanwhile, is running out; the
    Cabinet is committed to providing a proposal to Parliament
    before the internal debate on the Foreign Affairs Budget
    begins at the end of October, and would hope to have a
    decision prior to the NATO Defense Ministerial in Noordwijk
    October 24-25.

    ¶6. (S) Verhagen said he had called the Ambassador in
    specifically to request U.S. assistance in finding the
    additional troops necessary to allow the Dutch to continue
    the Uruzgan mission. Since Dutch bilateral efforts and
    approaches to NATO have failed, he said, the Dutch are now
    turning to us in the hope that we can shake something loose.
    Verhagen added that the Dutch also wanted to ensure that we
    were not competing for the same resources -- there had been
    rumors that some countries were not open to Dutch requests
    because they anticipated filling other missions. He mentioned
    Poland, Hungary, Ukraine, and Slovakia as specific countries
    where he believed U.S. lobbying on behalf of the Dutch
    requests could be especially effective, but was also open to
    suggestions.

    ¶7. (S) In response to a question from Ambassador Arnall,
    Verhagen said it did not matter to the Dutch whether the gaps
    were filled by one large deployment or several smaller ones,
    provide issues of command and control could be worked out.
    (Note: Other contacts at the MFA and MOD had previously
    expressed a strong preference for one large contribution over
    multiple smaller ones.) He also said the Dutch would be open
    to U.S. contributions, assuming the
    U.S. forces would operate under ISAF (vice OEF) command.

    ¶8. (S) COMMENT: After months of receiving mixed signals --
    possibly due to divisions within the Cabinet -- the Foreign
    Minister's message could not be clearer: the Dutch will stay
    in Uruzgan if they get the additional troops, but cannot do
    so without them. It is also clear that the Dutch do not
    believe they can find the troops without USG assistance. In
    a separate meeting with POLCOUNS, Karel van Oosterom (PM
    Balkenende's Foreign Policy Advisor) reaffirmed that the
    Prime Minister is determined to see the mission extended, but
    believes U.S. support in finding additional troops will be
    critical. Van Oosterom added that the Prime Minister had
    recently beaten back an effort by PvdA cabinet members to
    link the Uruzgan extension issue to a possible referendum on
    the EU reform treaty, making the ""third party"" issue, in his
    view, the last meaningful remaining hurdle to achieving an
    extension. If we want the Dutch to maintain a significant
    presence in Uruzgan, now is the time to weigh in seriously
    with potential partners. END COMMENT.

    ¶9. (S) SUMMARY OF DUTCH THIRD PARTY LOBBYING: According to
    Pieter Jan Kleiweg, the head of the Dutch MFA's Uruzgan Task
    Force, the Dutch have directly approached the following
    countries for support with the following results:
    - Germany, Norway, Sweden, Finland, Lithuania, Latvia,
    Slovenia, Japan, and South Korea: all ""very negative"";
    - Poland, Hungary, Belgium, Slovakia, Denmark: ""not
    positive,"" although the Belgians and Danes might be prepared
    to provide F-16 support in the Southern region more
    generally.
    - France: ""not positive,"" but Dutch are hoping British might
    be willing to weigh in.
    - Czech Republic: ""not available,"" as already heading a PRT
    in Lowgar
    - Singapore: Dutch approaching jointly with Australians;
    might be able to provide field hospital (but no commitment.)
    - Indonesia: No success; said might be willing to provide
    ""one policeman,"" at most.
    - Ukraine: Next on Dutch list; will approach week of
    September 24.
    Arnall

`