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### Viewing cable 06SANJOSE444, MORAL POWER:" ARIAS AND NATIONAL SECURITY

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
06SANJOSE444 | 2006-02-24 21:09 | 2011-03-08 16:04 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy San Jose

Appears in these articles:
http://www.nacion.com/2011-03-06/Investigacion/NotasDestacadas/Investigacion2702320.aspx
http://www.nacion.com/2011-03-06/Investigacion/NotaPrincipal/Investigacion2702324.aspx
http://www.nacion.com/2011-03-06/Investigacion/NotasSecundarias/Investigacion2702325.aspx
http://www.nacion.com/2011-03-06/Investigacion/NotasSecundarias/Investigacion2702326.aspx
http://www.nacion.com/2011-03-06/Investigacion/NotasSecundarias/Investigacion2702327.aspx

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    VZCZCXYZ0001
    RR RUEHWEB

    DE RUEHSJ #0444/01 0552113
    ZNY CCCCC ZZH
    R 242113Z FEB 06
    FM AMEMBASSY SAN JOSE
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 4367
    INFO RUEHZA/WHA CENTRAL AMERICAN COLLECTIVE
    RHMFISS/HQ USSOUTHCOM J1 MIAMI FL

` `

    C O N F I D E N T I A L SAN JOSE 000444

    SIPDIS

    SIPDIS

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/16/2016
    TAGS: PINS PREL MASS SNAR SMIG SOCI PBTS NI CS
    SUBJECT: "MORAL POWER:"  ARIAS AND NATIONAL SECURITY

    REF: A. SAN JOSE 204

         ¶B. SAN JOSE 88
         ¶C. 05 SAN JOSE 2909
         ¶D. 05 SAN JOSE 2265

    Classified By: DCM Russell Frisbie for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

    Summary
    --------
    ¶1.  (C) National security in an Oscar Arias administration
    will be pursued at three levels:  (1) Internationally, Arias
    will use his prestige as a Nobel laureate to be an advocate
    for multilateralism, international law, and disarmament.  (2)
    At home the principal external security issues will be
    protection of Costa Rica's maritime zone, including from use
    by drug traffickers, and resolution of border and immigration
    problems with Nicaragua.  (3) Internally, Arias will focus on
    crime prevention, police training, and streamlining the
    criminal justice system.  Conspicuously absent from an Arias
    security strategy is any specific reference to civil unrest
    and the capacity of the police for dealing with it.  We
    expect international issues to be handled personally by Arias
    himself, and his first vice president Laura Chinchilla to
    play a primary role in those security matters touching
    directly on Costa Rica.  End summary.

    Costa Rica as a "Moral Power" in the World
    ------------------------------------------
    ¶2.  (U) In his campaign for president, Oscar Arias urged
    Costa Ricans to "think big," to make their small country a
    "moral power" in the world and a voice for international law,
    human rights, multilateralism, and disarmament.  He
    criticized the Pacheco administration for abandoning these
    principles, especially in supporting the "illegal war" in
    Iraq.  According to the National Liberation Party (PLN)
    Program of Government 2006-2010, an Arias administration will
    oppose "the unacceptable and illegal doctrine of preemptive
    war" and will be an advocate for the enlargement and
    "effective democratization" of the UN Security Council to
    include permanent members from the developing world.  (Note:
    The Pacheco administration has said that new "permanent"
    members should serve 8-year renewable terms.)

    ¶3.  (C) Arias is a fervent supporter of the International
    Criminal Court (ICC) and has complained to us about USG
    "unilateralism" with regard to U.S. refusal to join the court
    or support certain landmine bans and nonproliferation
    initiatives.  Arias has noted that Costa Rica contributed to
    the ICC's creation, and, in the words of the PLN Program of
    Government, its existence is "an extraordinary achievement of
    humanity and the beginning of the end of impunity for
    dictators and those who commit genocide and violate human
    rights."

    ¶4.  (C) During the interregnum between his 1986-1990
    presidency and his candidacy in the 2006 election, Arias used
    his status as a Nobel laureate to campaign for the abolition
    of national armies in Latin America and sub-Saharan Africa
    and for disarmament, focusing on conventional weapons (ref
    C).  Arias has expressed to us his disappointment about the
    lack of U.S. support for his Arms Trade Treaty proposal.  In
    his upcoming presidency Arias has told us he plans to launch
    a debt-forgiveness initiative designed to provide incentives
    for low and middle-income countries to reduce military
    spending (ref A).

    Defending Costa Rica from External Threats
    ------------------------------------------
    ¶5.  (U) In a 2004 roundtable discussion on "Security Policies
    and Strategies for the 21st Century," Laura Chinchilla, a
    recognized expert on security and now Arias's running mate
    for first vice president, enumerated what she considers to be
    the main external threats to Costa Rica.  First is the
    problem of drug trafficking (along with trafficking in arms
    and persons) in Costa Rican waters and across the land
    borders.  Costa Rica, because it is a natural bridge between
    drug-producing and drug-consuming countries, has seen an
    increase in associated crimes, corruption, and local drug
    consumption.

    ¶6.  (C) A second problem area is the tension on the border
    with Nicaragua because of a dispute concerning Costa Rican
    navigational rights on the San Juan River (ref D) and Costa
    Rica's efforts to control Nicaraguan immigration.  Arias has
    advocated a conciliatory approach to the San Juan River, but
    he has also expressed concern that in the event of a
    Sandinista victory in Nicaraguan elections, Nicaraguans will
    stream over the border to Costa Rica in numbers greater than
    ever.

    ¶7.  (U) Finally, though perhaps not an "external" threat, is
    the problem of preventing and responding to natural
    disasters, such as earthquakes, volcano eruptions, and
    floods.  Costa Rica's National Commission on Emergencies
    (CNE) has relied heavily on the Red Cross and the Office of
    Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) during recent floods.
    NASA's aerial mapping of the entire territory of Costa Rica
    and sampling of the atmosphere can be of great utility in
    planning to avoid or minimize the consequences of natural
    disasters.

    ¶8.  (C) Chinchilla believes that multilateral and regional
    cooperation is essential for Costa Rica to cope with security
    threats.  The illicit activities of international criminal
    organizations require an international response and close
    ties between the affected countries' police and judicial
    authorities.  In Costa Rica, Chinchilla wants to "rejuvenate"
    the intelligence service, which is directly under the
    president, to make it "less secret and more analytical."
    This concern of Chinchilla's appears to be born of her
    oft-expressed distrust of security organs that are not under
    strict democratic political control.  Chincilla was
    noncommital at best in response to Embassy calls to make it
    easier for the police to conduct wiretaps.  (Note:  Current
    law requires a judge not only to authorize wiretapes, but to
    monitor them personally.)

    Criminal Justice
    ----------------
    ¶9.  (U) Chinchilla has written numerous articles detailing
    her views on the need to reform the criminal justice system
    and improve crime prevention.  As deputy, she worked on a
    thoroughgoing revision of the penal code which is still not
    complete.  Her positions have been adopted by Arias and will
    inform the law enforcement policies of the Arias
    administration.  Chinchilla emphasizes that it is not enough
    to crack down on international trafficking of drugs; there
    must also be a focus on the sale of drugs on street corners,
    parks, bars, and schools.  Alcoholism is another serious
    threat to the nation's youth, and tough enforcement of laws
    must be combined with prevention and rehabilitation programs
    for alcoholics and drug users.

    ¶10.  (U) In addition to the proliferation of drugs and
    firearms in Costa Rica, Chinchilla sees multiple other causes
    of crime, including growing economic inequality, violence in
    the media, an ineffective judicial system, and poorly trained
    police.  She has also pointed out that the number of police
    in the country has not changed in the last three decades and
    that it is necessary to organize citizens to prevent crime in
    their communities.  She has suggested the establishment of
    specialized police task forces for the identification and
    capture of habitual criminals who prey on citizens and are
    responsible for the lion's share of crimes.

    ¶11.  (U) An overriding concern of Chinchilla's has been the
    "professionalization" and "demilitarization" of the police.
    Chinchilla has noted that the line between police and
    military and internal and external security is blurred in
    some Central American countries.  Because of their inability
    to fight crime effectively, the governments of El Salvador,
    Guatemala, and Honduras have used the armed forces to enhance
    police patrols for common criminals and gang members.  In
    Chinchilla's opinion, the police function must be
    unambiguously civilian and police must be trained constantly
    to respect democratic values and the rule of law.  Chinchilla
    opposed the establishment of a U.S.-sponsored International
    Law Enforcement Academy (ILEA) in Costa Rica because it would
    involve training some members of Latin American armed forces
    whom she believes are inappropriately carrying out police
    functions in their countries.

    Civil Unrest
    -----------
    ¶12.  (C)  Civil unrest is a serious security problem in Costa
    Rica not because it occurs often, but because the fear of
    unrest thwarts governmental policies and programs.  Because
    public sector trade unions threatened massive demonstrations
    against the U.S.-Central American-Dominican Republic Free
    Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR), President Pacheco dallied 14
    months before submitting the treaty to the Legislative
    Assembly for ratification.  He kept a telecommunications bill
    bottled up permanently in his office because of his fear of a
    violent reaction by the telecom labor unions.  Pacheco's
    Minister of Public Security constantly counseled the
    president against taking any actions that might anger the
    unions because he believed he could not handle strikes or
    civil disobedience on a large scale.

    ¶13.  (C) An Arias administration will face even greater
    challenges than Pacheco has with regard to civil unrest.
    Because of his support for CAFTA-DR and other free-market
    reforms, Arias has already been branded enemy number one by
    the public sector labor unions.  In April 2005, the so-called
    National Liaison Committee, which includes many unions,
    declared that it would not recognize the legitimacy of an
    eventual Arias presidency (05 San Jose 944).  Further,
    prominent union leaders have chosen to interpret the
    lower-than-expected vote for Arias in the February 5 election
    as "a deafening defeat of the neoliberal oligarchy supporting
    CAFTA-DR" and have said that further action on treaty
    ratification and implementation in the Legislative Assembly
    would be "an extremely dangerous provocation" and result in
    "fiery" street confrontations (San Jose 331).

    Comment
    -------
    ¶14.  (C) The security agenda of the incoming Arias
    administration does not deal directly with the issue of civil
    unrest.  Chinchilla blithely condemns other Central Americans
    for "militarizing" their police and weakening the
    independence of the judiciary in order rein in dissidents.
    She does not, however, conceive of threats to the established
    order in Costa Rica or detail methods of control.  This
    appears to be an important void in the stated Arias security
    strategy.

    ¶15.  (C) The other gap in the strategy concerns the lack of
    resources, exacerbated by the rejection of ILEA and refusal
    to sign an Article 98 agreement.  Arias had unrealistic
    expectations as to possible U.S. assistance in his
    administration, which we have tried to dampen.  Instead of
    hoping for outside material assistance, the Arias
    administration would do well to plan an effective national
    security strategy that might include reconsideration of
    current policies (e.g., on wiretaps) that encourage passivity
    on the part of the country's police and intelligence services.
    LANGDALE

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