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### Viewing cable 09BOGOTA2376, COLOMBIA DCA NEGOTIATIONS -- EMBASSY IDEAS FOR

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
09BOGOTA2376 | 2009-07-27 22:10 | 2011-03-20 12:12 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Bogota
Appears in these articles: http://www.elespectador.com/wikileaks

`

    VZCZCXYZ0000
    PP RUEHWEB

    DE RUEHBO #2376/01 2082208
    ZNY CCCCC ZZH
    P 272208Z JUL 09
    FM AMEMBASSY BOGOTA
    TO RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL PRIORITY
    RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
    RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9972
    INFO RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA PRIORITY 9051
    RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS PRIORITY 2551
    RUEHPE/AMEMBASSY LIMA PRIORITY 7850
    RUEHZP/AMEMBASSY PANAMA PRIORITY 3962
    RUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO PRIORITY 8544
    RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
    RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
    RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
    RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC PRIORITY
    RUCNFB/FBI WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY

` `

    C O N F I D E N T I A L BOGOTA 002376

    SIPDIS

    FOR USSOUTHCOM GEN FRASER AND ASD/HDASA PAUL STOCKTON

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/27/2019
    TAGS: MARR PREL MOPS PGOV MCAP KTIA PTER CO
    SUBJECT: COLOMBIA DCA NEGOTIATIONS -- EMBASSY IDEAS FOR
    TRACK II

    REF: BOGOTA 1334

    Classified By: Ambassador William R. Brownfield, Reasons 1.4 (b and d)

    SUMMARY
    --------

    ¶1. (C) The GOC expects positive signals soon on Track II
    issues as DCA negotiations wrap up.  They have repeatedly
    stated that satisfaction on Track II is a precondition for
    closing out the DCA.  Embassy recommends positive responses
    without additional commitments, specifically a U.S. Air
    Force-to-Colombian Air Force letter offering an air defense
    assessment team, an OSD-to-MOD letter offering working level
    discussions on stockpile agreement process, and upgrade for
    the operating arrangement to the level of SOUTHCOM
    Commander-CHOD.  END SUMMARY.

    SECURITY ASSISTANCE COMMITMENTS TIED TO DCA
    --------------------------------------------
    ¶2. (C) From the inception of negotiations on a Defense
    Cooperation Agreement (DCA) with Colombia, the Government of
    Colombia (GOC) has asked for several additional security
    assistance-related issues to be addressed in the same
    process.  They accepted our argument that these issues would
    be covered in a parallel, but separate (so-called Track II)
    process, and that we would not move forward on them until we
    saw light at the end of the tunnel on the DCA negotiations.
    With recent high level GOC public support for the DCA, and
    considerable progress in the last negotiating round, we now
    see that light.  Following are Embassy ideas on how to
    address Track II.  These are suggestions; we acknowledge that
    the Department of Defense (DOD) and U.S. Southern Command
    (SOUTHCOM) are the ultimate decision-makers on these issues.
    But we also note that the GOC has said repeatedly they will
    not sign the DCA until they have satisfaction on Track II
    issues.

    ¶3. (C) GOC concerns on Track II have focused on three areas.
    First, they are interested in an air defense system tied into
    the Cooperative Security Location (CSL) structure.  Second,
    they want assurances of access to U.S. arms, systems, or
    technology in case of a national security emergency in the
    region, whether by stockpile agreement or some other process.
     Third, they want access to all aspects of the CSL once
    operational--including space, intelligence product, and
    infrastructure.  In each case, the GOC is interested in the
    substantive issue itself, but also in being able to transmit
    to their public that they obtained benefits connected somehow
    to the DCA.  Along those lines, Embassy suggests responses
    that do not offer everything the GOC has requested, but
    enough to allow them to point to progress.

    AIR DEFENSE SYSTEM
    -------------------
    ¶4. (C) As the GOC looks to Venezuela's acquisition of
    sophisticated Russian Sukhoi aircraft, they would love to
    have an equally sophisticated air defense system.  The
    Colombian military views the Sukhoi in Venezuelan hands as a
    legitimate threat to national security.  This may well be the
    case.  It is our judgment, however, that the GOC has not even
    begun the necessary assessment, analysis, and planning for an
    air defense system.  We suggest an offer that responds
    without making a long term commitment.  Specifically, a
    mil-to-mil letter--we recommend U.S. Air Force South
    (AFSOUTH) Commander to Colombian Air Force (COLAF)
    Commander--offering to send an assessment team to Colombia at
    an early opportunity.  The team would assess current
    Colombian capabilities, potential air defense needs,
    realistic budget considerations, and options.  We would be
    clear from the beginning that the team has no authority to
    make commitments.

    STOCKPILE AGREEMENT
    -------------------
    ¶5. (C) It is our judgment that the GOC has not even decided
    if they wish to pursue a stockpile agreement with us.  But
    since they have raised it in side conversations, we recommend

    that we open a dialogue.  The device could be a letter from
    an appropriate official in the Office of the Secretary of
    Defense (OSD) to an appropriate official in Ministry of
    Defense (MOD) (we recommend DASD/HD&ASA/WHA to new Vice MOD
    Arbelaez) offering to initiate working level dialogue on the
    process to reach a stockpile agreement.  As with the air
    defense assessment offer, the letter would make no
    commitments other than information on the process by which a
    stockpile agreement is concluded.

    ACCESS TO CSL FACILITIES AND INFRASTRUCTURE
    -------------------------------------------
    ¶6. (C) In some ways, this is the easiest of the three.  Since
    the CSL will be on an operational COLAF base, the GOC will
    have de facto access anyway.  They realize that.  But they
    want to have something they can show to their public
    suggesting they got more than Ecuador ten years ago.  The
    solution, we suggest, is the mil-to-mil operating arrangement
    that is signed following the DCA.  Under the Manta agreement,
    this document was signed by SOUTHCOM J5 Director and host Air
    Force Commander.  It lays out operational understandings and
    procedures for the CSL.  It is not a political or policy
    document.  We suggest that the operating arrangement be
    upgraded to SOUTHCOM Commander-Chief of Defense (CHOD).  It
    says the same thing.  It is still a non-political document.
    But it allows them to say they got something more than
    Ecuador.

    ¶7. (C) GOC negotiators in the next DCA round will realize we
    are approaching the endgame in the negotiations.  President
    Uribe again directed his negotiators on July 23 to conclude
    an agreement as soon as possible.  They will ratchet up the
    pressure and will note that they cannot sign the DCA until
    they have understanding on Track II.  Embassy recommends that
    we have something concrete to say on the subject by the
    August 11 negotiating round.
    Brownfield

    =======================CABLE ENDS============================

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