Cable Viewer

Currently released so far... 6061 / 251,287

### Articles

Brazil Sri Lanka United Kingdom Sweden Editorial United States Latin America Egypt Yemen Jordan

### Browse latest releases

2010/11 2010/12 2011/01 2011/02 2011/03
2010/11/28 2010/11/29 2010/11/30
2010/12/01 2010/12/02 2010/12/03 2010/12/04 2010/12/05 2010/12/06 2010/12/07 2010/12/08 2010/12/09 2010/12/10 2010/12/11 2010/12/12 2010/12/13 2010/12/14 2010/12/15 2010/12/16 2010/12/17 2010/12/18 2010/12/19 2010/12/20 2010/12/21 2010/12/22 2010/12/23 2010/12/24 2010/12/25 2010/12/26 2010/12/27 2010/12/28 2010/12/29 2010/12/30
2011/01/01 2011/01/02 2011/01/04 2011/01/05 2011/01/07 2011/01/09 2011/01/10 2011/01/11 2011/01/12 2011/01/13 2011/01/14 2011/01/15 2011/01/16 2011/01/17 2011/01/18 2011/01/19 2011/01/20 2011/01/21 2011/01/22 2011/01/23 2011/01/24 2011/01/25 2011/01/26 2011/01/27 2011/01/28 2011/01/29 2011/01/30 2011/01/31
2011/02/01 2011/02/02 2011/02/03 2011/02/04 2011/02/05 2011/02/06 2011/02/07 2011/02/08 2011/02/09 2011/02/10 2011/02/11 2011/02/12 2011/02/13 2011/02/14 2011/02/15 2011/02/16 2011/02/17 2011/02/18 2011/02/19 2011/02/20 2011/02/21 2011/02/22 2011/02/23 2011/02/24 2011/02/25 2011/02/26 2011/02/27 2011/02/28
2011/03/01 2011/03/02 2011/03/03 2011/03/04 2011/03/05 2011/03/06 2011/03/07 2011/03/08 2011/03/09 2011/03/10 2011/03/11 2011/03/13 2011/03/14 2011/03/15 2011/03/16 2011/03/17 2011/03/18 2011/03/19

### Browse by creation date

66 72 73 75 79 85 86 88 89 90 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10
1966/12
1972/02 1972/08
1973/04
1975/03
1979/08
1985/03
1986/05
1988/01
1989/12
1990/01 1990/07 1990/08 1990/10
2000/06 2000/09 2000/11
2001/02 2001/03 2001/07 2001/10
2002/02 2002/03 2002/04 2002/07 2002/11 2002/12
2003/02 2003/03 2003/04 2003/05 2003/06 2003/07 2003/08 2003/09 2003/10 2003/11 2003/12
2004/01 2004/02 2004/03 2004/04 2004/05 2004/06 2004/07 2004/08 2004/09 2004/10 2004/11 2004/12
2005/01 2005/02 2005/03 2005/04 2005/05 2005/06 2005/07 2005/08 2005/09 2005/10 2005/11 2005/12
2006/01 2006/02 2006/03 2006/04 2006/05 2006/06 2006/07 2006/08 2006/09 2006/10 2006/11 2006/12
2007/01 2007/02 2007/03 2007/04 2007/05 2007/06 2007/07 2007/08 2007/09 2007/10 2007/11 2007/12
2008/01 2008/02 2008/03 2008/04 2008/05 2008/06 2008/07 2008/08 2008/09 2008/10 2008/11 2008/12
2009/01 2009/02 2009/03 2009/04 2009/05 2009/06 2009/07 2009/08 2009/09 2009/10 2009/11 2009/12
2010/01 2010/02

### Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z
Embassy Athens Embassy Asuncion Embassy Astana Embassy Asmara Embassy Ashgabat Embassy Ankara Embassy Amman Embassy Algiers Embassy Addis Ababa Embassy Accra Embassy Abuja Embassy Abu Dhabi Embassy Abidjan Consulate Amsterdam American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura Embassy Buenos Aires Embassy Budapest Embassy Bucharest Embassy Brussels Embassy Bridgetown Embassy Bratislava Embassy Brasilia Embassy Bogota Embassy Bishkek Embassy Bern Embassy Berlin Embassy Belgrade Embassy Beirut Embassy Beijing Embassy Banjul Embassy Bangkok Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan Embassy Bamako Embassy Baku Embassy Baghdad Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen Embassy Conakry Embassy Colombo Embassy Chisinau Embassy Caracas Embassy Canberra Embassy Cairo Consulate Curacao Consulate Ciudad Juarez Consulate Chennai Consulate Casablanca Consulate Cape Town
Embassy Dushanbe Embassy Dublin Embassy Doha Embassy Djibouti Embassy Dhaka Embassy Dar Es Salaam Embassy Damascus Embassy Dakar Consulate Dubai
Embassy Freetown
Embassy Guatemala Embassy Gaborone Consulate Guadalajara
Embassy Helsinki Embassy Harare Embassy Hanoi Consulate Hermosillo Consulate Hamburg
Iran RPO Dubai Embassy Islamabad Consulate Istanbul
Embassy Jakarta Consulate Jerusalem Consulate Jeddah
Embassy Kyiv Embassy Kuwait Embassy Kuala Lumpur Embassy Kinshasa Embassy Kigali Embassy Khartoum Embassy Kathmandu Embassy Kampala Embassy Kabul
Embassy Luxembourg Embassy Luanda Embassy London Embassy Ljubljana Embassy Lisbon Embassy Lima Embassy Lilongwe Embassy La Paz Consulate Lagos
Mission USNATO Embassy Muscat Embassy Moscow Embassy Montevideo Embassy Monrovia Embassy Minsk Embassy Mexico Embassy Mbabane Embassy Maputo Embassy Manama Embassy Managua Embassy Malabo Embassy Madrid Consulate Munich Consulate Montreal Consulate Monterrey Consulate Milan
Embassy New Delhi Embassy Nassau Embassy Nairobi Consulate Naples
Embassy Ouagadougou Embassy Ottawa Embassy Oslo
Embassy Pristina Embassy Pretoria Embassy Prague Embassy Port Au Prince Embassy Phnom Penh Embassy Paris Embassy Paramaribo Embassy Panama Consulate Peshawar
Embassy Quito
REO Basrah Embassy Rome Embassy Riyadh Embassy Riga Embassy Reykjavik Embassy Rangoon Embassy Rabat Consulate Rio De Janeiro Consulate Recife
Secretary of State Embassy Stockholm Embassy Sofia Embassy Skopje Embassy Singapore Embassy Seoul Embassy Sarajevo Embassy Santo Domingo Embassy Santiago Embassy Sanaa Embassy San Salvador Embassy San Jose Consulate Strasbourg Consulate Shenyang Consulate Shanghai Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis Embassy Tripoli Embassy Tokyo Embassy The Hague Embassy Tel Aviv Embassy Tehran Embassy Tegucigalpa Embassy Tbilisi Embassy Tashkent Embassy Tallinn Consulate Tijuana
USUN New York USEU Brussels US Mission Geneva US Interests Section Havana US Delegation, Secretary UNVIE Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius Embassy Vienna Embassy Vatican Consulate Vladivostok
Embassy Windhoek Embassy Wellington Embassy Warsaw
Embassy Yerevan Embassy Yaounde
Embassy Zagreb

### Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
AR AJ ASEC AE AEMR AF AMGT APER AG AM AORC AU AS ACOA AX AFIN AL AFFAIRS AA AMED ABLD AROC ATFN ASEAN AFGHANISTAN ADCO AO AFU AER AODE ABUD ATRN APECO ASUP AID AC APCS AGMT ASIG AVERY ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
BU BM BEXP BR BA BRUSSELS BL BK BO BTIO BH BE BX BIDEN BG BY BF BBSR BC BMGT BB BILAT BTIU
CH CU CJAN CMGT CVIS CO CA CE COUNTER CASC CBW CG CI CS CDG CIA CACM CDB CAN CN CY COE CD CM COUNTRY CLEARANCE CPAS CACS CWC CF CONDOLEEZZA CT CARSON CL CR CIS CLINTON CODEL CTM CB CV COM CKGR CJUS COUNTERTERRORISM
DJ DEAX DA DOE DISENGAGEMENT DEA DK DHS DR DTRA DS DOD
EINV ECON ENRG EPET ETRD EAGR ELAB EUN EFIN EAID EU EIND ETTC ECPS EWWT ES EG EXTERNAL EMIN ECIP EINDETRD EN EAIR EZ EUC EI ELTN EREL ER ECIN ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS EFIS EC ENVR ECA ET ENERG EINT ENGY ETRO ELECTIONS ELN EK EFTA ECONCS EUR ENGR ECONEFIN ENIV EINVETC EINN ESA ETC ETRDEINVTINTCS ESENV ETRDECONWTOCS ENNP ENVI ECUN EINVEFIN
FR FAO FTAA FARC FREEDOM FBI FI FJ FINR FMLN
GM GZ GTMO GOI GG GV GH GA GT GR GE GAZA GCC GY GTIP GANGS
HO HURI HA HU HR HUMAN HILLARY HK HSTC HYMPSK
IR IS IZ IN IT IAEA ID IO IV ICTY IQ ICAO INTERPOL IPR INRB ITPHUM IWC IC IIP ICRC ISRAELI INTELSAT IMO IL IA INR ITALIAN ITALY ITPGOV IZPREL IRAQI ILC IRC INRA INRO IRAJ IEFIN IF IACI ICJ ITRA IBRD IMF
JAMES JA JO JOSEPH JP JOHNNIE JM JUS
KCRM KCOR KDEM KPAO KG KTIP KICC KNNP KV KBCT KPAL KTFN KU KSPR KJUS KHLS KTIA KWBG KMDR KGHG KN KUNR KS KIRF KISL KFRD KIPR KAWC KPWR KCIP KSUM KWAC KMIG KOLY KZ KAWK KSEC KIFR KDRG KDEMAF KFIN KGIC KGCC KPIN KBIO KHIV KSCA KE KPKO KPLS KIRC KRAD KMCA KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KWMN KACT KGIT KPRP KOMC KSTC KFLU KBTR KBTS KPRV KVPR KTDB KERG KWMM KRVC KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KSTH KSEP KNSD KFLO KMPI KVIR KNUP KTER KCFE KNEI KDDG KHSA KMRS KHDP KTLA KPAK KNAR KREL KPAI KTEX KNPP KCOM KNNPMNUC KO KPOA KLIG KOCI KRFD KHUM KDEV KNUC KSAF KCFC KWWMN KCRS KTBT KOMS KR
LY LG LE LH LI LO LOG LT LTTE LAB LU
MCAP MO MNUC MARR MPOS MASS MOPS MAR MD MX MZ MEPP MA MR ML MIL MTCRE MOPPS MAPP MU MY MASC MP MT MERCOSUR MK MDC MI MAPS MCC MASSMNUC MQADHAFI MUCN MTCR MG MTRE MRCRE MEPI MC MV
NATO NI NG NO NL NU NIPP NPT NS NSG NA NZ NATIONAL NP NRR NAR NE NASA NK NPG NSF NT NGO
OVIP OTRA OPRC OSCI OTR OREP ODIP OPDC OSAC OAS OEXC OIIP OFDP OSCE OECD OPCW OPIC OIC OVP OFFICIALS OIE
PINR PGOV PBTS PREL PTER PE PO PHUM PROP PBIO PARM PECON PINS PM PK PHSA PREF PL PAK PINT POGOV PINL POL PSOE PKFK PMIL PY PFOR PALESTINIAN PHALANAGE PARTY PRAM PAO PA PMAR PGOVLO POLITICS PUNE PORG PHUMPREL PF POLINT PHUS PGOC PNR PGGV PNAT PGOVE PRGOV PRL PROV PTERE PGOF PHUMBA PARMS PINF PLN PEL POV PG PEPR PSI PU POLITICAL PARTIES
QA
RS RU RO RW RIGHTS RF RICE ROBERT RFE REGION RP
SP SOCI STEINBERG SN SA SY SNAR SMIG SO SENV SCUL SR SF SG SW SU SL SZ SIPRS SH SI SNARCS SOFA SANC SHUM SK ST SC SEVN SYR SAN
TI TX TU TW TC TERRORISM TPHY TRGY TS TIP TBIO TSPA TH TO TZ TK TSPL TNGD TINT TRSY TR TFIN TD TURKEY TP TT
UK UZ UNMIK UN US UG UNSC UP USEU UY UNGA UNO UV USUN UNESCO UNEP UNDP UNCHS UNHRC UNAUS USTR UNVIE UNCHC UE UNDESCO UNHCR USAID UAE UNDC
VE VZ VT VTPREL VN VM
WI WTRO WTO WTRQ WWARD WB WHA WZ WBG WA WHO WMO WEU
XF XA XG XT XM XR XS XL XH XZ XW XY XE XK XD XC
YI YM YE YMCS
ZP ZR ZI ZU ZB ZF ZO ZANU ZA ZOELLICK ZK ZJ

### Browse by classification

CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN SECRET SECRET//NOFORN UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

### Community resources

Follow us on Twitter Check our Reddit Twitter this Digg this page Contact us on IRC

courage is contagious

### Viewing cable 09BERLIN431, NEW U.S. AF/PAK STRATEGY GENERATES GOOD WILL, BUT

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:

- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09BERLIN431.

Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
09BERLIN431 | 2009-04-10 10:10 | 2011-01-28 16:04 | SECRET | Embassy Berlin

`

    VZCZCXYZ0000
    OO RUEHWEB

    DE RUEHRL #0431/01 1001025
    ZNY SSSSS ZZH
    O 101025Z APR 09
    FM AMEMBASSY BERLIN
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3823
    INFO RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
    RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD PRIORITY 0501
    RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 0624
    RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
    RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 0860
    RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY
    RHMFISS/HQ USAFE RAMSTEIN AB GE PRIORITY
    RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
    RHMFISS/CDRUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GE PRIORITY

` `

    201836
    2009-04-10
    09BERLIN431
    Embassy Berlin
    SECRET
    09BERLIN369|09BERLIN382|09STATE31102
    S E C R E T BERLIN 000431

    SIPDIS

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/07/2019
    TAGS: PREL MARR ECON EAID NATO EU AF PK UN GM
    SUBJECT: NEW U.S. AF/PAK STRATEGY GENERATES GOOD WILL, BUT
    NOT MANY NEW GERMAN CONTRIBUTIONS

    REF: A. STATE 31102
    ¶B. BERLIN 382
    ¶C. BERLIN 369

    Classified By: POLITICAL MINISTER COUNSELOR JEFF RATHKE. REASONS: 1.4 (
    B) AND (D).

    ¶1. (S) SUMMARY. The new U.S. strategy for Afghanistan and
    Pakistan has been warmly received in Germany and has
    engendered considerable good will, but it has thus far
    yielded only a few additional commitments from Berlin -- the
    chief of which is a contribution of 50 million Euros to the
    Afghan National Army (ANA) Trust Fund. While German
    officials agree that the effort in Afghanistan, especially on
    the civilian side, needs to be ramped up, they believe that
    Germany -- as the third largest troop contributor and fourth
    largest donor -- is already doing more in Afghanistan.
    Chancellor Merkel has made clear in a number of public
    speeches and comments recently that Germany feels no
    compunction to significantly expand its effort in Afghanistan
    in the near term, beyond what it was already planning to do.
    While the German effort -- especially in terms of ground
    troops -- is likely to remain concentrated in the north for
    the foreseeable future, there are ongoing discussions in the
    German government about what impact the eventual transfer of
    lead security responsibility (TLSR) to the Afghans in the
    north should have on the current disposition of German
    forces. While MOD reportedly argues that TLSR should have no
    impact, German Special Envoy Muetzelburg believes it should
    allow some German forces to be shifted to the west of the
    country. Other German officials think that in the longer
    term, Germany should consider teaming up with the Netherlands
    in Uruzgan Province, since the two countries share the same
    philosophical approach in Afghanistan. But none of these
    bolder ideas for increased German engagement are likely to be
    considered or debated seriously until after the September
    Bundestag election. END SUMMARY.

    DEMARCHE

    ¶2. (C) Post delivered the talking points, civilian assistance
    non-paper and requests for specific German contributions
    contained in ref A to the MOD, MFA, Interior Ministry (MOI),
    Chancellery and Ministry of Economic Cooperation and
    Development (BMZ) in separate meetings on April 2, 3 and 6.

    GENERAL REACTION

    ¶3. (C) All the German officials with whom we spoke warmly
    welcomed the new U.S. strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan,
    with several viewing it as an affirmation of Germany's own
    networked security or comprehensive approach. Chancellery
    Afghanistan Desk Officer Irina Speck noted that the new U.S.
    strategy had not only been well-received in Europe, but also
    in the Muslim world, including Afghanistan. She said the new
    tone and the willingness to be self-critical were very much
    appreciated. Only a few concerns were raised. BMZ
    Afghanistan Desk Officer Martin Kipping wondered, for
    example, if the President's emphasis on counterterrorism
    action meant that the U.S. was scaling down its ambitions to
    help Afghans build a fully democratic state. He seemed
    relieved to hear that the U.S. was not abandoning its
    long-term goals for Afghanistan, but simply establishing
    short- and medium-term goals to better focus its engagement
    over the next three to five years. Regarding the planned
    deployment of more than 20,000 additional U.S. troops to the
    south, Chancellery Military Affairs Chief Col. Erich Vad
    thought one likely result would be an influx of insurgents
    northward into the German area responsibility. He said the
    Bundeswehr would have to expect more attacks and security
    incidents in the north as a result of this squeezing effect
    in the south.

    ¶4. (C) The reaction to the U.S requests for specific German
    contribution was also largely positive. German officials
    were clearly relieved, for example, that we had taken German
    domestic political realities into account and were not asking
    for German combat forces to be deployed outside the north.
    At the same time, our requests have yielded only a few
    additional commitments thus far. While German officials
    agree that the effort in Afghanistan, especially on the
    civilian side, needs to be ramped up, they believe that
    Germany is already doing its fair share in Afghanistan. They

    point out that Germany is not only the third largest troop
    contributor (with 3,900 troops currently deployed, a few
    hundred more on the way and authorization to go up to 4,500),
    it is also the fourth largest donor (with a total of 170.7
    million Euros committed to civilian reconstruction, economic
    development and humanitarian assistance in 2009 -- 80 million
    Euros from BMZ and 90.7 million from the MFA).

    ¶5. (C) The problem, as German officials see it, is not that
    they need to do more, but that they need to do a better job
    of publicizing what they are already doing. As Chancellor
    Merkel has made clear in a number of public speeches and
    comments recently, Germany feels no compunction to
    significantly expand its effort in the near term. Her belief
    is that, in the context of last October's renewal of the
    parliamentary mandate for the Bundeswehr's participation in
    ISAF, Germany has already taken a number of measures to boost
    its military and civilian engagement. She sees no reason to
    re-examine this issue again until the ISAF mandate comes back
    up for renewal, which has been deliberately set for December,
    safely after the Bundestag election in September.

    ¶6. (C) In private, Germans tell us that they are our most
    reliable partner because they, unlike the Dutch and
    Canadians, have committed themselves to staying indefinitely
    in Afghanistan and have not publicly announced a withdrawal
    date, notwithstanding the low German public support for the
    mission. (In a recent German magazine poll, 61 percent
    answered no to the question: Should the Bundeswehr remain
    stationed in Afghanistan? This tracks with INR surveys,
    which show that 58% oppose the Bundeswehr's participation in
    ISAF and only 39% support it.) When it is pointed out that
    Germany may never get credit for bearing its full share of
    the burden in Afghanistan as long as it refuses to send
    combat troops outside of the relatively peaceful north, the
    answer is a helpless shrug and the comment: We can live with
    that.

    ¶7. (SBU) Detailed German responses to ref A's requests for
    specific contributions are provided in paras 8-23.

    RC-NORTH ELECTION SUPPORT FORCE

    ¶8. (C) MFA ISAF Action officer Lukas Wasielewski noted that
    Sweden and Norway had just announced that they could not
    provide the promised forces to augment their PRTs during the
    upcoming Afghan election. As a result, there is now suddenly
    a shortfall of four platoons -- or about 120 soldiers -- for
    election support in the north. (As reported ref B,
    Wasielewski had highlighted previously that the requirements
    for election support in the north were completely fulfilled.)
    Wasielewski could not make any promises, but said that
    Germany was considering stepping in to fill the gap.

    FOCUSED DISTRICT DEVELOPMENT

    ¶9. (C) As reported ref B, Germany only began its
    participation in the focused district development (FDD)
    police training program in January, but based on the very
    positive results so far, it is already considering a
    significant expansion of its effort, from the currently
    planned 10 districts to 20. MFA Afghanistan-Pakistan Task
    Force Director Ruediger Koenig thought Germany's decision to
    be the first country to join the U.S. on FDD demonstrated its
    unique reliability as a partner. Helmut Teichmann, MOI
    Office Director for International Police Affairs, indicated
    that Germany,s goal of reaching 20 FDD districts by spring
    2010 would be facilitated by the opening of a new police
    training center in Kunduz this July. Teichmann, who just
    back from a visit to Afghanistan, noted that the building of
    a border police academy in Kabul was behind schedule and
    might not be opened until spring 2010. When completed, the
    academy will train 500 students a year.

    CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM

    ¶10. (SBU) Several of our German interlocutors noted that
    Germany is already quite active in efforts to improve the
    Afghan criminal justice system. According to the MFA
    Afghanistan action officer responsible for civilian
    reconstruction, Christian Dokter, the MFA spends about 2.5
    million Euros a year on a variety of legal training projects
    and support programs, while BMZ spends about 3 million Euros.

    The BMZ-funded rule of law programs include support for
    legal aid offices and a project to improve cooperation
    between police and state prosecutors in handling criminal
    cases.

    ¶11. (SBU) One of the main MFA programs is a legal training
    program run by the Max Planck Institute at the University of
    Heidelberg, which conducts workshops in Afghanistan for
    lawyers and judges and which also prepares legal texts and
    commentaries in Dari and Pashtu on the Afghan constitution
    and Afghan laws. Doktor said the program had been primarily
    focused in the north and Kabul up to now, but that courses in
    2009 would be extended for the first time to Afghans who live
    in the south and east. He estimated that more than 2,000
    Afghan jurists had been trained since the start of this
    program in 2005.

    ANA TRUST FUND

    ¶12. (C) FM Steinmeier announced at the May 31 Afghanistan
    Conference in The Hague that Germany would contribute 50
    million Euros to the ANA Trust Fund in 2009. Both MFA and
    Chancellery officials heralded the contribution as the
    biggest one to date and especially significant for a country
    that is also the third largest troop contributor. MFA ISAF
    Action Officer Wasielewski emphasized, however, that the
    commitment was for 2009 only. With Bundestag elections in
    September, a decision on future contributions to the Trust
    Fund in 2010 and beyond will be left to the next government.
    That said, Wasielewski thought it likely that Germany would
    continue to contribute to the Trust Fund at the current
    level, if not higher. He noted that the 2009 contribution
    had come out of the government's general finance fund, rather
    than out of any particular ministry's budget.

    ELECTRICAL POWER

    ¶13. (SBU) BMZ Afghanistan Desk Officer Kipping noted that
    renewable energy is one of BMZ's four priority areas in
    Afghanistan, and that it has already budgeted 27 million
    Euros to build one hydropower station in Kunduz (Khanabad)
    and two in Badakhshan (Keshem and Feyzabad). Kipping also
    noted that the BMZ has made some 5 million Euros available to
    support micro hydropower projects for small, isolated
    communities that would not be able to connect to a central
    grid, as is the case in much of Badakhshan. As far as the
    Northern Electric Power System is concerned, BMZ has
    committed some 24.4 million Euros to the construction of
    power stations and transmission lines.

    OMLTS

    ¶14. (SBU) As reported ref B, Germany, in cooperation with its
    northern partners, has committed to fulfill by the end of the
    year all of the OMLT requirements for the two brigades of the
    209th Afghan National Army (ANA) Corps based in the north.

    ¶15. (C) Regarding the possibility of allowing German OMLTs to
    deploy outside the north, at least into RC-West, both MOD and
    MFA claimed that they saw little practical necessity for
    German OMLTs to do this. MOD Political-Military Affairs
    Director Col. Bernd Schuett said that the 209h ANA Corps was
    responsible for the northern region, and the Afghan MOD had
    indicated no interest in re-deploying it or its subordinate
    units to other areas of the country. The 209th Corps was
    supposed to stay and operate in the north.

    ¶16. (C) MFA ISAF Action Officer Wasielewski claimed that
    apart from a single instance in 2006, there had been no
    concrete proposals by the Afghan MOD to send ANA Kandaks
    based in the north to other regions of the country -- even
    temporarily. Schuett emphasized that while German OMLTs
    (like any German unit) could, in theory, be deployed outside
    the north under an exception in the Bundeswehr's
    parliamentary mandate, such deployments had to be limited
    both in time and scope, and judged to be absolutely
    indispensable to the success of the ISAF mission. The German
    minister of defense himself had to make this determination.
    Both Schuett and Wasielewski agreed that there was little
    likelihood that German OMLTs would be deployed outside the
    north on this basis.

    ¶17. (C) With regard to the district of Gormach, which was

    provisionally transferred from the RC-West province of
    Badghis to the RC-North province of Faryab last November
    based on a presidential decree, Schuett and Wasielewski
    emphasized that Germany still considered the district to be
    part of RC-West, even though ISAF HQ has given RC-North
    operational responsibility for it. Therefore, German forces
    -- including OMLTs -- can only operate in Gormach under the
    exception in the parliamentary mandate.

    GERMANS TO THE WEST AFTER TSLR IN THE NORTH?

    ¶18. (S) In the context of the discussion about German OMLTs
    operating in RC-West, Wasielewski revealed that there are
    ongoing discussions in the German government about what
    impact the eventual transfer of lead security responsibility
    (TLSR) to the Afghans will or should have on the disposition
    of German forces in the north. Wasielewski said the MOD
    position -- especially that of Bundeswehr CHOD Gen.
    Schneiderhan -- is that TLSR should have no impact. MOD
    argues that German forces are already at minimal levels in
    the north, given the size of the area of responsibility, and
    that they need to remain in place to support/mentor Afghan
    National Security Forces (ANSF).

    ¶19. (S) Wasielewski said that Special MFA Envoy for
    Afghanistan and Pakistan Bernd Muetzelburg sees it
    differently, believing that TLSR should open the opportunity
    to shift some of Germany's forces to the west, especially to
    the neglected northern portion of the region. Wasielewski
    noted that RC-West is largely preoccupied with the difficult
    security situation in Farah, and does not have the troops to
    provide a sufficient presence elsewhere. Wasielewski pointed
    out that one could argue that such a shift in Bundeswehr
    forces would be in Germany's own self-interest, since this
    area is believed to be one of main infiltration routes for
    insurgents moving north. Wasielewski cautioned, however,
    that any such consideration will only be seriously
    entertained after the September Bundestag election.

    TEAMING UP WITH THE DUTCH IN URUZGAN?

    ¶20. (S) Another longer-term possibility for Germany's
    engagement in Afghanistan, according to Chancellery Chief of
    Military Affairs Col. Erich Vad, is teaming with the Dutch in
    Uruzgan Province. Vad noted that Germany and the Netherlands
    already have a close military relationship, as reflected in
    the joint German-Dutch Corps based in Muenster, and share the
    same military-civilian approach in Afghanistan. But he ruled
    out any concrete steps in this direction before the Bundestag
    election.

    PRT CIVILIAN EXPERTS AND PROGRAMS

    ¶21. (C) German officials have long expressed skepticism about
    the efficacy of trying to create a strong central government
    in a country that has never had one, so they are very open to
    the new emphasis in the U.S. strategy on engaging more at the
    provincial level. During her April 5-6 visit to Afghanistan,
    Chancellor Merkel met with Balkh Governor Atta and reportedly
    emphasized to him that more and more German development
    projects would be agreed and carried out directly at the
    provincial level, because routing everything through Kabul
    took too long.

    ¶22. (C) MFA Afghanistan-Pakistan Task Force Director Ruediger
    Koenig told us noted that while BMZ controls the bulk of
    German development funds and operates largely independently,
    the MFA civilian leader at each PRT has access to his or her
    own funds, which can be rapidly disbursed in support of
    hearts and minds projects of their choosing (subject to
    approval in Berlin). He noted, for example, that the
    civilian leader in Feyzabad had a budget of about 500,000
    Euros per year.

    ¶23. (C) Koenig also agreed on the need for more specialists
    at PRTs, especially agricultural specialists, noting that he
    was already fighting for that with German development
    agency GTZ. He said MFA was also pushing BMZ to put more
    emphasis on supporting agriculture. Currently, agriculture
    is only addressed indirectly in the BMZ plan for Afghanistan,
    which focuses on three other priority areas, in addition to
    renewable energy: drinking water, education and economic
    development.

    Koenig

`