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### Viewing cable 08CONAKRY163, A PRIVATE CHAT WITH GUINEAN PRIME MINISTER LANSANA

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
08CONAKRY163 | 2008-05-05 14:02 | 2010-12-25 21:09 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Conakry

`

    VZCZCXRO5641
    OO RUEHPA
    DE RUEHRY #0163/01 1261450
    ZNY CCCCC ZZH
    O 051450Z MAY 08
    FM AMEMBASSY CONAKRY
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2474
    INFO RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
    RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 0529
    RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
    RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
    RHMFISS/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE PRIORITY
    RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY

` `

    C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 CONAKRY 000163

    SIPDIS

    STATE FOR AF/W
    PARIS FOR DEA (S. HOUSTON)

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/03/2013
    TAGS: EAGR ECON GV PGOV PHUM SNAR
    SUBJECT: A PRIVATE CHAT WITH GUINEAN PRIME MINISTER LANSANA
    KOUYATE

    REF: A. CONAKRY 0162
    ¶B. CONAKRY 0148
    ¶C. CONAKRY 0155

    Classified By: Ambassador Phillip Carter III for reasons 1.4 (b) & (d)

    ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: On May 3, Ambassador Carter met with Prime
    Minister Lansana Kouyate at the EMR for 90 minutes. Kouyate,
    who was traveling to Kuwait that evening, had just come from
    a meeting with President Conte at his farm in Dubreka where
    the PM discussed plans for a possible cabinet reshuffle, and
    the creation of a government committee to address Guinea's
    growing food crisis. The Ambassador's meeting covered a
    number of topics, from the Ambassador's latest travels into
    Guinea's interior to Kouyate's most recent meeting with
    President Conte, to the current political and economic
    challenges facing the country. The issue of Guinea's growing
    narcotics trafficking problem was also raised with some
    surprising insights regarding the apparently strained
    relationship between President Conte and his eldest son
    Ousmane, a leading figure in the country's drug trade. END
    SUMMARY

    -----------
    Elections
    -----------

    ¶2. (U) Kouyate was clearly pleased to be meeting with the
    Ambassador, stating that it had been a while since he had an
    opportunity to exchange ideas. Noting the Ambassador's recent
    travels throughout the country, Kouyate asked about the
    Ambassador's impressions. The Ambassador told the PM that it
    is clear that the elections are a topic of much interest
    among the various groups he had met with, including local
    political, youth and civil society leaders. However, he
    shared his impression that people seem frustrated, with many
    feeling that the government is not doing enough to ensure
    that the elections will be well organized, free and fair. The
    Ambassador stressed the need for better communication among
    these different groups in the countryside, emphasizing that
    the regional CENI representatives and local officials
    (Governors and Prefects) need to define their respective
    roles and responsibilities in order to avoid confusion as
    election day approaches. According to the Ambassador,
    everyone seemed to be waiting for instructions from Conakry
    rather than initiating the necessary dialogue amongst
    themselves. On this score, the PM stated that he will be
    convening a meeting of all political parties, the CENI, the
    Ministry of Interior and donors to discuss what needs to be
    done to get the process rolling in a more determined fashion.
    The Ambassador told the PM that he hoped that the CENI would
    also receive additional funding from the government, beyond
    the paltry 500 million GnP (about $110,000) it has already
    received. Kouyate said that he is looking to address the
    CENI's budget shortfall through a supplemental allocation to
    the "initial" allotment.

    ¶3. (SBU) The Ambassador also noted that many interlocutors
    were concerned about the growing ethnic character of each of
    the parties as well as the parties' apparent lack of action
    with respect to the elections. The PM responded by saying
    that the issue of ethnicity is not new or unique to Guinea,
    but that if any party wants to build the political standing
    necessary to control the National Assembly or win the
    Presidency, it will need to garner support from all of the
    country's ethnic groups. He shared the Ambassador's view that
    even within the Malinke, Sousou, or Fulani ethnic groups,
    there are divisions that will likely prevent any one
    political party from claiming the complete support of any one
    ethnicity. He pushed back on the Ambassador's assertion that
    the parties were not preparing themselves. The PM said that
    while the official campaign period is legally limited to a
    certain number of weeks before the election, the parties are
    actively seeking candidates and marshaling resources. He
    described one recent instance where a party had imported a
    container of promotional materials, such as Tee-shirts and
    caps with logos, and sought an exemption for the $500,000
    duty imposed by customs, which he could not waive. The PM
    mentioned the law passed in May 2007 that obligates the
    Guinean Government to provide registered political parties
    with some public funds, and said that he had directed the
    Finance Minister to fulfill this obligation.

    CONAKRY 00000163  002 OF 004

    ------------
    Food Crisis
    ------------

    ¶4. (C) Turning to economics, the Ambassador said that the
    government's recent ban on agricultural exports would likely
    cause more harm that good over the medium term, and would do
    nothing to solve the problem of rising food prices globally.
    The Ambassador noted that during his recent visit to the
    Forest Region, several producers complained about the ban.
    He stressed that banning exports creates a disincentive to
    farmers to increase production since their market is
    effectively cut off. Kouyate acknowledged the Ambassador's
    concerns, and emphasized that he is deeply committed to a
    liberal and open economic policy. However, he noted that,
    globally, there is a growing protectionist trend among
    countries that export agricultural commodities such as rice.
    He said he understood donor objections, but that the ban is
    an expedient necessity to support Guinean consumers who are
    increasingly squeezed by rising food prices. He added that
    local exporters deposit their profits into foreign accounts,
    meaning that Guinea gains little financially, if anything,
    from agricultural exports. The Ambassador responded that an
    export ban does not resolve the problem of repatriated
    revenues/profits, and urged the PM to focus on resolving
    problems that continue to inhibit local production. Kouyate
    stated that his government would clarify its policy to focus
    on certain essential staples.

    ¶5. (SBU) On the issue of food assistance, the Ambassador
    urged the PM to improve his government's coordination on this
    matter. The PM revealed that he had just left President Conte
    with a draft decree to establish a government steering
    committee on this subject, that Conte had agreed, and that
    the Agriculture Minister would receive the signed decree from
    Conte the following day.

    -----------------------------------
    Ministers, Governors, and Prefects
    -----------------------------------

    ¶6. (SBU) The Ambassador commended the PM on his selection of
    Governors and Prefects, many of whom are viewed as dynamic
    individuals truly concerned about their communities, but
    pointed out that despite these appointments, people are
    increasingly frustrated, viewing the government as largely
    ineffective. Kouyate recalled that, during a trip to Morocco
    shortly after he had appointed these new administrators, he
    was complemented by the then Moroccan PM because the majority
    of his prefects had received their administrative training
    from one of Morocco's best schools. Kouyate was unaware of
    this connection but later found out that the Minister of
    Interior had selected the prefects because of this specific
    training. While he said he was pleased with his governors and
    prefects, (with the notable exception of the Kindia Prefect
    who had been recently appointed by Conte and was considered a
    corrupt political hack - reftel A), he added that they lacked
    resources and basic equipment. He said that he would be
    providing 50 vehicles and uniforms to these local officials
    to help them in their activities before the elections.

    ¶7. (C) At the national level, Kouyate said he is looking to
    shake up his cabinet, an idea he proposed when he had met
    earlier that day with Conte. Kouyate told the Ambassador that
    he is looking to get rid of a handful of ministers he
    described as "not productive" and "not loyal." He also said
    that he plans to restructure certain ministries that are "too
    heavy." He specifically mentioned the Ministries of
    Education; Youth, Sports, and Culture; and Industry and
    Commerce as those that will be split. He stated that Conte
    supported this idea and that upon Kouyate's return from
    Kuwait; the two would look at the PM's restructuring plan
    more closely and select new ministers. Just as important,
    Kouyate added that he hoped he would be able to also
    restructure the civil service, which is seen as a major
    obstacle to reform.

    ------------------------------
    The Bete Noir - Ousmane Conte
    ------------------------------

    ¶8. (C) The Ambassador expressed his concerns about the
    growing drug trade in Guinea. Noting that until recently,

    CONAKRY 00000163  003 OF 004

    much international attention was focused on Guinea Bissau as
    the first narco-state emerging in West Africa, the Ambassador
    said that it appears that the center of this illicit activity
    had now shifted to Guinea. As the Ambassador spoke, Kouyate
    visibly slumped in his chair, and then leaned toward the
    Ambassador, and said that he is aware of this problem and
    that the major Guinean trafficker is President Conte's son,
    Ousmane. He revealed that about eight months ago, an aircraft
    from Colombia or Venezuela was interdicted by local police at
    the airport in Faranah, a small city in the Middle Guinea
    region. When informed about the interdiction by the Minister
    of Interior, Kouyate instructed him to conduct a full
    investigation, seize the contraband and prosecute those
    responsible.

    ¶9. (C) A couple of days later, the Minister returned to
    inform the PM that the plane and its cargo had been released
    by the head of the National Gendarmerie, General Jacques
    Toure. Kouyate said he was furious and convoked Toure to his
    office. When initially confronted, Toure reportedly denied
    releasing the aircraft, but later told the PM that the
    illicit operation was lead by Ousmane Conte. (Bio note:
    Kouyate stated that he knows Toure well as they are related
    to each other through Kouyate's mother's family). Kouyate
    challenged Toure, asking him if he had informed anyone about
    this matter or if he had raised it with President Conte
    directly. Toure reportedly said he had not. Kouyate said he
    chastised Toure for his actions. He told the Ambassador that
    he then went to the First Lady, Henriette Conte, about
    Ousmane's complicity. Henriette reportedly described Ousmane
    as totally out of control, and directed the PM to take the
    matter up directly with the president. When Kouyate raised
    the incident, President Conte reportedly asked why his son
    would do such a thing. Kouyate told the president that it was
    a way for his son to get rich quickly and that it reflected
    poor character. Kouyate said that he reminded Conte that he
    had raised concerns about Ousmane years ago with the
    President but that nothing had been done. Kouyate then
    revealed a confidence from Conte to the Ambassador,
    mentioning that the President has had no contact or any
    communication with his son in over two years. According to
    Kouyate, Conte stated clearly that if evidence develops that
    ties Ousmane to narcotics trafficking, then he should be
    arrested and prosecuted.

    ¶10. (C) Kouyate asked if the Ambassador could express his
    concerns about the growing drug trafficking problem in Guinea
    in an open and public manner, such as a letter. The PM said
    that such a communication would help his office to engage the
    President and the government about this growing problem. He
    also asked for whatever assistance the USG could provide to
    help his government interdict smugglers. The Ambassador said
    that he had serious concerns about corruption within Guinea's
    security services on this score, noting the discrepancy
    between a recent press article highlighting a seizure of one
    ton of cocaine and police stating that only 350 kilos had
    been found (reftels B and C). Kouyate stated that some of the
    police are likely involved. He added that since his arrival,
    over 30 police and security personnel have been arrested for
    crimes and corruption, and are now languishing in prison.
    According to Kouyate, this is unprecedented in Guinea's
    history. He stressed that he would work with the Ministry of
    Interior to ensure that "the forthright and correct police
    officers" would be tasked to stop any flight or ship trying
    to smuggle narcotics into Guinea. The Ambassador said that he
    would look into what he could do and that he would coordinate
    his efforts with his European counterparts. Kouyate repeated
    his request for a letter that outlined U.S. concerns about
    narcotics trafficking in Guinea. The Ambassador stated that
    he would meet the PM's request and have something for him
    upon his return from Kuwait.

    --------------
    Bilats Timing
    --------------

    ¶11. (U) Kouyate raised the much delayed bilateral
    consultations, stating that he was keen to have them. When
    the Ambassador noted that the dated that the Foreign Ministry
    had offered May 21-22, would not likely work for principals
    in the African Bureau, the PM stated that if possible it
    would be better to hold them in June or July, given his own
    travel schedule. The Ambassador stated that he would convey

    CONAKRY 00000163  004 OF 004

    this timeframe to Washington.

    -----
    Conte
    -----

    ¶12. (C) As the PM was leaving, the Ambassador asked him about
    Conte's health. Kouyate, slowly shaking his head said that
    "the president's health is up and down but he is not doing
    well." He admitted that "it is difficult to deal with that
    man", revealing that he is never sure what he is thinking.
    The Ambassador stated that he has been hearing much criticism
    of the president and that he is not well regarded in the
    countryside. Kouyate said that one does not need to leave
    Conakry to hear the same thing. He said that at a opening
    ceremony for a new stadium at the small university in
    Sonfonia, the crowds jeered every time Conte's name was
    mentioned. According to Kouyate, he had to admonish the
    crowds to be respectful, particularly given that the stadium
    is named after President Conte. "It was incredible" he said,
    shaking his head again with forlorn look on his face.

    --------
    Comment
    --------

    ¶13. (C) This was not the ebullient and positive PM of
    previous encounters. It is clear that political pressures and
    burdens of office have tempered Kouyate. His political
    ambition, though constrained, remains evident. For many
    pundits, the PM's tenure is almost over but he is fighting to
    hold on to his job. His feeble attempt to excuse the export
    ban reveals a man willing to use populist measures for
    political gain even while recognizing its negative economic
    impact. His plans to restructure his cabinet have been long
    in the making and he is undoubtedly under pressure to bring
    some of the old guard back. He will likely use the
    restructuring as an opportunity to engender new alliances and
    support. However, given his weak standing with civil society,
    the unions, and the presidential entourage, a cabinet shuffle
    could prove his undoing, if mishandled.
    CARTER

    ...

`