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### Viewing cable 08LIMA1732, NEA A/S WELCH MEETINGS WITH SPANISH OFFICIALS

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
08LIMA1732 | 2008-10-31 21:09 | 2010-12-14 12:12 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Lima

`

    VZCZCXYZ0000
    PP RUEHWEB

    DE RUEHPE #1732/01 3052155
    ZNY CCCCC ZZH
    P 312155Z OCT 08
    FM AMEMBASSY LIMA
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9520
    INFO RUEHAC/AMEMBASSY ASUNCION PRIORITY 2051
    RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA PRIORITY 6100
    RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA PRIORITY 7962
    RUEHBU/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES PRIORITY 3506
    RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS PRIORITY 1254
    RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ NOV 5017
    RUEHMN/AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO PRIORITY 9604
    RUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO PRIORITY 2141
    RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO PRIORITY 2047
    RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
    RUMIAAA/USCINCSO MIAMI FL PRIORITY

` `

    C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 MADRID 001132

    SIPDIS

    DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/WE, NEA/RA, AF/RA

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/30/2018
    TAGS: PREL PGOV ECON KHDP ETRD ENRG EC PE
    SUBJECT: NEA A/S WELCH MEETINGS WITH SPANISH OFFICIALS
    OCTOBER 23

    MADRID 00001132 001.2 OF 005

    Classified By: DCM Arnold Chacon for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

    ¶1. (C) SUMMARY. NEA A/S Welch, accompanied by DCM, met
    with FM Moratinos, Director General for the Mediterranean,
    Magreb and Near Orient Fidel Sendagorta, and Policy Planning
    Director Andres Ortega on October 23 to discuss a wide range
    of issues including the Middle East Peace Process (MEPP), the
    Magreb, and Western Sahara, Syria, Lebanon, Iran, Iraq and
    Mauritania. In response to Welch's overview on the MEPP and
    the importance of a coordinated approach based on Quartet
    principles, Moratinos offered to help with keeping the
    process on track and said, "after her next trip, tell
    Secretary Rice to call me so I can reinforce her points."
    Policy Planning Director Ortega said that President Zapatero
    planned to travel to the Middle East in the near future to
    push for solutions, although he could not offer details on a
    possible itinerary. GOS officials, most likely Deputy
    Secretary-equivalent Angel Lossada, plan to visit Baghdad
    soon and Welch welcomed efforts to help integrate Iraq into
    the international community, adding that a Moratinos visit
    would be helpful. Spain believes Syria will move in a
    positive direction over the next few months, and that
    Moratinos' consistent outreach to the Syrian regime creates
    opportunities for it to align with the West rather than Iran.

    ¶2. (C) Presented with our views that the democratic process
    should be restored in Mauritania, Sendagorta argued that
    since its military gave the country form, we must work with
    the military to accomplish our goals. Spain's priorities in
    Mauritania were counter-terrorism, immigration, and to a
    lesser extent, fishing rights, and Sendagorta urged a quick
    solution that would prevent a political vacuum or armed
    conflict. He said Spain wants to engage with USG officials,
    especially the AF bureau, on the issue of Mauritania. Welch
    encouraged additional cooperation, since the US and Spain
    have different approaches, and reinforced that point with
    Ortega as well. END SUMMARY.

    ¶3. (C) NEA A/S Welch, accompanied by DCM, met with FM
    Moratinos, Director General for the Mediterranean, Magreb and
    Near Orient Fidel Sendagorta, and Policy Planning Director
    Andres Ortega on October 23 to discuss a wide range of issues
    including the Middle East Peace Process (MEPP), the Magreb,
    and Western Sahara, Syria, Lebanon, Iran, Iraq and
    Mauritania. Moratinos' staff had warned in advance that
    scheduling issues would allow only a brief meeting, but
    Moratinos, effusive in his welcome, devoted 45 minutes to
    reviewing multilateral issues. Sendagorta, accompanied by his
    Deputy Director Alberto Ucelay, hosted Welch for a two-hour
    lunch meeting at the MFA. Ortega, accompanied by two other
    members of President Zapatero's policy planning team, met
    with Welch at the Moncloa Presidential Complex. Ortega was
    more in "receive mode" but asked many thoughtful questions
    about U.S. policy developments, eager to take advantage of
    the discussion. Welch also conducted a well-attended press
    roundtable that resulted in several articles in the local
    press and coverage by the wire services.

    -------------
    PEACE PROCESS
    -------------

    ¶4. (C) A/S Welch shared information about next steps in
    the peace process and appealed for European regional
    cooperation in support of Quartet principles to create, "a
    reality both sides can't back away from." FM Moratinos
    agreed that the Arab community had not fulfilled its
    potential to positively influence the situation and that it
    was important to avoid a vacuum while a new Israel government
    was being formed. In response to A/S Welch's point that Abu
    Mazen needed to, "play it smartly," Moratinos said that the
    EU wanted to engage with Arab states to encourage them to
    explore new options; reconciliation efforts by Egypt could be
    constructive. Welch noted that it was becoming difficult to
    gauge the level of seriousness of the many proposals floating
    around and it was essential to maintain coordination through
    the Quartet Process to keep the focus on results. Moratinos
    offered to help with keeping the process on track and said,
    "after her next trip, tell Secretary Rice to call me so I can
    reinforce her points." In response to Sendagorta's question
    about the formation of a new Israeli government and its
    impact on the process, Welch said that it was important to
    show progress in the new year, e.g., slowdown in settlement
    construction, fewer roadblocks, improved security, and
    enhanced economic activity. He noted that is was important
    to query the new Israeli government privately, without hard

    MADRID 00001132 002.2 OF 005

    stances that would force its hand. During the November
    Quartet meeting, the Parties should address the structure and
    goals of the full peace process, with a focus on expected
    results by the end of the year. There should be no public
    characterization of positions. Policy Planning Director
    Ortega said that President Zapatero planned to travel to the
    Middle East in the near future to push for solutions,
    although he could not offer details on a possible itinerary.

    ---------
    SYRIA
    ---------

    ¶5. (C) On Syria, Moratinos said, "we call it as we see it,
    despite France thinking that we are too optimistic." When
    Welch commented that we agreed with the results-based
    approach contained in the EU letter to Syria, Moratinos said,
    "I have taken risks reaching out to the Syrians, but I know
    the personalities and the issues." He continued, "Syria
    wants to be part of the West, rather than aligning with Iran
    they want to be welcomed in Paris, and moreover, we need them
    to conclude any comprehensive peace plan." "Walid
    (al-Muallem) wants to normalize with the U.S.," Moratinos
    emphasized. The other factor Moratinos noted was that
    drawing Syria closer to the West would serve to marginalize
    Iranian efforts to exert influence. A/S Welch remarked on
    the Moratinos/EU letter on Lebanon that was sent to Syria,
    spelling out benchmarks for improved behavior. He emphasized
    that if Syria seeks further engagement with the international
    community, it must take specific, demonstrable actions.

    ¶6. (C) Sendagorta claimed that Moratinos, engagement with
    Syria paying off; others in the EU have come around to
    Spain's position. Welch amplified his point, saying that
    while the U.S. agrees with an approach based on quantifiable
    results, a fuller assessment of Syrian actions is needed,
    particularly with regard to Lebanon and foreign fighter
    flows. Sendagorta thought that Syria would be more careful
    in the future, given the dramatic, positive evolution of
    situation in Iraq. He agreed foreign fighters can do the
    Syrians lots of harm. Sendagorta added that Spain worried
    for safety of its UNIFIL troops. In response to Welch's query
    whether Spain talked to Syrians regarding border camps,
    Sendagorta said "not recently," but that in July 2008 Spain
    had secured a commitment from Syrian President al-Asad.
    Welch said that Syria needed to hear more on this issue from
    the international community. Overall, Sendagorta summarized,
    Spain thinks Syria will move in constructive ways in the next
    few months, in contrast to Iran. Welch reiterated to all
    Spanish interlocutors that a vigilant UNIFIL was essential to
    prevent Hizballah from reasserting itself and that Syria
    shouldn't be allowed to dabble to gain concessions without
    implementing real reform.

    -------
    IRAN
    -------

    ¶7. (C) In response to Sendagorta's question, Welch said
    there was no decision on opening an US Interests Section in
    Iran. An Interests Section idea, especially if it was
    empowered to issue visas, could be useful, but it must also
    serve a broader purpose. Welch appealed for more effective
    political approach/policy on Iran; the EU must be tougher on
    Iran if our approach of calibrated response was to work.
    Welch reviewed Iran's counterproductive efforts in Syria,
    Lebanon and Iraq with all his interlocutors. He asked the
    Spanish to consider if there are any creative options to add
    to a coordinated set of incentives and disincentives for the
    Iranian regime. He also called for more coordinated
    financial actions, and ensuring that Iran would not benefit
    from any new international financial instruments, e.g.,
    excluding Iran from bank deposit protections.

    -------
    IRAQ
    -------

    ¶8. (C) On Iraq, Sendagorta said GOS officials, most likely
    Deputy Secretary-equivalent Angel Lossada, would visit soon
    and Welch welcomed efforts to help integrate Iraq into the
    international community, adding that a Moratinos visit would
    be helpful. Sendagorta said Spain was ready to start a new
    chapter in Iraq, focusing on commercial activity and CT
    cooperation, issues that they had discussed with Iraq's
    ambassador to Spain. Ortega also said that while it was
    difficult for the PSOE administration, Spain would engage

    MADRID 00001132 003.2 OF 005

    with Iraq, in a non-military way, if it could protect its
    personnel and address security concerns. Spain wants to do
    its part to stabilize Iraq within the current political
    context. Welch briefed on the pending Iraq SOFA, which needs
    to be concluded before year's end, and explained that Russian
    FM Lavrov's public remarks that Russia might consider renewal
    of UN Iraq mandate were unhelpful because they served to
    reduce pressure on Iraqi leaders to deal with SOFA issue.
    The UN mandate was not ideal since it limited Iraqi
    sovereignty and had negative financial implications. He
    explained that the US SOFA was very forward leaning, aimed at
    giving Iraq jurisdiction and room to maneuver. Welch also
    noted that political involvement by Spain had its own merit
    and might help protect against Iranian intrusions in Iraqi
    domestic politics. Alberto Ucelay asked to be kept informed
    of the date of the upcoming Iraq Neighbors Conference, as it
    might be the logical point to arrange a Lossada visit to
    Baghdad.

    ------------------------
    MAGREB & WESTERN SAHARA
    ------------------------

    ¶9. (C) With regard to the Magreb, Welch described the recent
    Libya settlement that would take the US-Libya bilateral
    relationship to a new level, in addition to increasingly
    strong cooperation with Algeria and Morocco. Recognizing
    Spain's efforts, he said that given worrisome trends toward
    violent extremism in the Magreb, it was ever more important
    to encourage broader political reconciliation and foster
    significant improvements in intra-Magreb cooperation. Welch
    and Moratinos recapped counter-terrorism and stabilization
    efforts in the Magreb. Moratinos said Spain believed former
    Ambassador Ross could be an effective UNSYG Special
    Representative on Western Sahara and that, "we are telling
    the Moroccans to give him support." He acknowledged Moroccan
    unhappiness with the dismissal of Van Walsum and said that
    Ross would need to facilitate communications and build trust
    among all parties to the negotiations. Moratinos suggested a
    coordination meeting including Spain, France, Algeria,
    Morocco and the U.S. on the margins of the NATO ministerial.
    Welch replied that Secretary Rice had attempted a similar
    meeting during her trip to the region but the Moroccans and
    Algerians did not respond positively; timing would be a
    factor for another attempt during the NATO Ministerial.

    ¶10. (C) Welch and Sendagorta reviewed Moratinos' idea of
    arranging meetings of for Secretary Rice and her French and
    Spanish counterparts with Morocco and Algeria to breath life
    into Western Sahara issue. Welch encouraged the Spanish to
    develop the initiative for further consideration. Ortega
    related Spain's view that the Manhasset process itself was
    critically important, apart from whether or not there were
    any near-term chances of achieving an accord. While Spain
    would officially support a referendum, a referendum would
    only be useful it validated a solution rather than calling
    for end results. Ortega suggested that the Algerians could
    be moved forward in their thinking by engaging them
    indirectly through the Union for the Mediterranean mechanism.
    In addition, he agreed with Welch that the Western Sahara
    dispute would not be solved while the border was closed. If
    Morocco and Algeria could integrate their tourism sectors and
    enhance economic ties, it would build a foundation of trust
    that would facilitate other discussions. However, Ortega
    admitted that the Barcelona Process had never been able to
    impact the intra-Magreb or Morocco-Algeria dynamics.

    -------------
    MAURITANIA
    -------------

    ¶11. (C) According to Sendagorta, Spain views Mauritania as
    part of the Magreb, in contrast to the US and France who
    manage the relationship within an African context. Asking
    Welch to convey Spanish views that Mauritania was a fragile
    country and therefore, a target for al-Qaeda, Sendagorta
    argued that since its military gave the country form, we must
    work with the military to accomplish our goals. Spain's
    priorities were counter-terrorism, immigration, and to a
    lesser extent, fishing rights, and Sendagorta urged a quick
    solution that would prevent a political vacuum or armed
    conflict. He opined that it would be ideal if the military
    stepped back and allowed a "Turkish model" to emerge. Spain
    doesn't want a failed state a few miles from its territory in
    the Canary Islands.

    ¶12. (C) In response to Welch's points on the need to

    MADRID 00001132 004.2 OF 005

    reinforce the democratic process, Sendagorta clarified that
    Spain was not weak on democracy, but wanted to find the right
    balance to bring long term solutions. Sendagorta claimed
    France was coming around to Spain's views on this matter.
    Given ongoing consultations in Mauritania regarding the
    presidential powers and the parliament's role, Sendagorta
    believed an agreement was possible by year end. Also, Spain
    thought there should be movement to liberate the ex-president
    without putting him back in power. Spain's Ambassador in
    Mauritania reported the ex-president was well treated and the
    Parliament was still operational; hence there was a measure
    of freedom of expression. Sendagorta said Spain wants to
    engage with USG officials, especially the AF bureau, on the
    issue of Mauritania with USG officials. Welch encouraged
    additional cooperation, since the US and Spain have different
    approaches, and reinforced that point with Ortega as well.

    -------------------------
    MULTILATERAL COORDINATION
    -------------------------

    ¶13. (C) Sendagorta said the GOS was impressed with USG
    administration's management of many interconnecting foreign
    policy issues in the second Bush term. Welch reiterated our
    desire for European cooperation across the board. Sendagorta
    said the EU working toward an integrated approach to foreign
    policy, despite many difficulties as decreasing sovereignty
    among EU countries engendered competition among them, leading
    to uncoordinated foreign policy initiatives (as Welch had
    noted during his presentation on the MEPP).

    -------
    COMMENT
    -------

    ¶14. (C) Sendagorta's insights on the competition among EU
    countries to gain some sort of foreign policy prestige
    certainly applies to Spain's efforts to position itself as a
    key player in the Middle East. Spain has already announced
    that it plans to initiate a major Middle East initiative
    during its January-June 2010 EU Presidency. Apart from
    Foreign Minister Moratino's long-term personal interest in
    the issues, Spain also views itself as the most influential
    Mediterranean country, serving as the primary link beween
    Africa and Europe based on geography, population flows and
    history. With Spain actively campaigning for support to have
    Barcelona designated as the headquarters of the Union for the
    Mediterranean, it is seeking broad support for its candidacy.
    Spain emphasizes to Muslim countries that, given the
    history of Andalusia, it can serve as an important bridge
    culture and it has a unique understanding of Islam that
    allows "strong fraternal ties." For example, King Juan
    Carlos offered to host the Saudi-sponsored 2008 World Muslim
    League Inter-Faith Conference. King Juan Carlos and Spanish
    officials make regular swings through the Middle East to
    promote commercial ties and investment opportunities.
    Moreover, Spain "markets" itself to Gulf countries and other
    states with funds to invest as the natural link to Latin
    America, claiming that it has the special understanding and
    technical skills necessary to successfully expand commercial
    ties in Latin America. Apart from Spain's quest for foreign
    policy prestige and commercial opportunities, it also
    recognizes the potential challenges and opportunities of
    increasing Muslim immigration to Spain, from the Magreb and
    other regions as well.

    -------------
    SENDAGORTA BIO
    -------------

    ¶15. (U) Fidel Sendagorta is a new contact for the Embassy
    since he took over his portfolio in August 2008. This was
    our first opportunity to hold an extended meeting with him.
    His unclassified biographic information follows:

    Sendagorta was born in 1956. He has a degree in Law. He
    joined the Spanish Diplomatic Corps in 1984 and served in the
    embassies in Japan (1984), Cuba (1988), and Morocco (Cultural
    Counselor in 1996). Between 1993-96, Sendagorta was Advisor
    to the Secretary of State for International Cooperation and
    Latin America, and to the Foreign Affairs Minister. In
    1999, as Counselor in the Spanish Permanent Representation to
    the EU, he coordinated planning for the April 2002 EuroMed
    Summit held in Valencia. In 2002 he served as MFA's Deputy
    Director General of the Policy Planning and Analysis Bureau.
    In October 2007 he was appointed Special Ambassador for
    Mediterranean Affairs. In August 2008, he was appointed

    MADRID 00001132 005.2 OF 005

    Director General for the Mediterranean, Magreb and Near
    Orient.

    ¶16. (C) Sendagorta was thoughtful in his comments on issues
    in his portfolio, and did not present an ideological view.
    He seemed to be trying to creater a better dialogue with us
    on Middle Eastern issues, given strains in the past.

    ¶17. (U) Assistant Secretary Welch cleared this cable.

    AGUIRRE

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