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### Viewing cable 09SANJOSE714, COSTA RICA: PAC PARTY PROFILE - CONTINUITY OR CHANGE?

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
09SANJOSE714 | 2009-08-21 11:11 | 2011-03-17 18:06 | UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY | Embassy San Jose

Appears in these articles:
http://www.nacion.com/2011-03-17/Investigacion/NotasSecundarias/Investigacion2712620.aspx
http://www.nacion.com/2011-03-17/Investigacion/NotasSecundarias/Investigacion2712631.aspx
http://www.nacion.com/2011-03-17/Investigacion/NotasSecundarias/Investigacion2712622.aspx
http://www.nacion.com/2011-03-17/Investigacion/NotasSecundarias/Investigacion2712633.aspx

`

    VZCZCXYZ0000
    RR RUEHWEB

    DE RUEHSJ #0714/01 2331147
    ZNR UUUUU ZZH
    R 211147Z AUG 09
    FM AMEMBASSY SAN JOSE
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1145
    INFO RUEHZA/WHA CENTRAL AMERICAN COLLECTIVE
    RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
    RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
    RHMFIUU/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
    RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
    RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC

` `

    UNCLAS SAN JOSE 000714

    SIPDIS
    SENSITIVE

    DEPT FOR WHA/CEN, INR

    E.O. 12958: N/A
    TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR KDEM CS
    SUBJECT:  COSTA RICA: PAC PARTY PROFILE - CONTINUITY OR CHANGE?

    REF: SAN JOSE 624

    ¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY: Charge d'Affaires Brennan met on August 18 with
    the main opposition contender for Costa Rica's presidency in the
    February 2010 elections, Otton Solis.  Solis, from the Citizen
    Action Party (PAC), is now running for president for the third time,
    after a weak turnout for the party's primary in May 2009.  PAC is
    Costa Rica's main opposition party, with the second most seats in
    the National Assembly and a base of support among the urban lower
    and middle classes.  If Solis is able to pull out a victory, he
    plans to increase spending on social programs and agricultural
    subsidies, while curbing benefits to multinational corporations and
    increasing taxes on the business sector.  However, PAC and Solis are
    currently far behind in the polls, and Solis could be headed for yet
    another defeat.  If PAC does go on to a third consecutive defeat,
    the party could emerge with a new and pragmatic leadership for the
    2014 elections.  END SUMMARY.

    -----------------------------------
    "NOT LOOKING FOR A ROAD TO CARACAS"
    -----------------------------------

    ¶2. (SBU) Despite a sometimes combative relationship with the
    Embassy, in particular during the 2007 CAFTA debate, Solis expressed
    his desire for closer ties to the U.S. at the Charge's residence on
    August 19.  Solis went to pains to distance himself from Hugo Chavez
    and "the leftists" in Latin America.  Instead, he insisted that the
    PAC is a centrist party, which "is much closer in thought to the
    Obama administration than the current Costa Rican government."
    Solis highlighted his past interaction with Democratic members of
    Congress, stating that PAC "has a clear trail to Washington, and
    doesn't want a path to Caracas."

    ¶3. (SBU) Solis also said that, if elected, while he might try to
    rework some portions of the CAFTA-DR agreement (on agriculture, for
    instance), he was not interested in withdrawing from the treaty as
    whole.  Solis admitted that public security was one of Costa Rica's
    major challenges, and called for more training and better pay for
    police officers.  He said he was open to continued security
    cooperation with the U.S., as long as it did not lead to
    militarization in Costa Rica.  While he refused to label his party,
    Solis is trying to position PAC as a social-democratic party with a
    strict anti-corruption focus.  However, many experts believe that
    his shot at the presidency might have already passed him by.

    ----------------
    PAC'S BEGINNINGS
    ----------------

    ¶4. (U) After over 50 years of two-party hegemony, the PAC was formed
    in December 2000, reflecting the frustration of voters with
    corruption in the National Liberation Party (PLN) and the Christian
    Social Unity Party (PUSC).  PAC and its founder, Solis, burst onto
    the political scene with a new style and message.  Although Solis
    was not a particularly charismatic figure, he embodied voter outrage
    against corruption in the wake of a number of public corruption
    scandals.  Solis tried to emphasize public ethics and transparency
    in government and promised a more efficient government.

    ¶5. (SBU) In the 2002 elections, Solis finished in third place with
    26 percent of the popular vote, an impressive showing only 14 months
    after PAC was founded.  PAC's rise formed a different dynamic in the
    Legislative Assembly, as it won 14 out of the 57 seats.  In 2003,
    after one year in the Assembly, six PAC legislators defected, citing
    disagreement with the party's inflexible ethics code (under which
    Solis requires that PAC legislators reject public funding for
    official travel and prohibits them from using diplomatic passports,
    hiring more than two staffers, using official license plates for
    vehicles, or taking more than 15 days of annual leave).  This
    severely weakened the party, leaving it with only eight seats in the
    Assembly.

    -------------
    2006 ELECTION
    -------------

    ¶6. (U) In 2006, Solis was able to increase his political influence,
    in part by focusing on an anti-CAFTA message.  Solis nearly won the
    presidential election (losing by only 1.12 percent) against PLN
    candidate Oscar Arias.  Meanwhile, PAC became the second largest
    party in the Assembly with 17 seats.  PAC was able to attract the
    votes of the "Anti-Arias" opposition from lower and middle class
    urban areas.  With the crumbling of PUSC (which only won 5 seats),
    PAC became the major opposition party.  However, in a sign that
    voters were more pro-Solis (or anti-Arias) than supportive of the
    party as a whole, PAC's National Assembly ticket only won 25 percent
    of the vote (compared to Solis' 40 percent).

    ---------
    PAC TODAY
    ---------

    ¶7. (SBU) During its second term in the Assembly (2006-2010), the PAC
    faction has been trapped by the inflexibility of its ethics
    principles, the rigidness of Solis' political control over the
    party, and its demand for excessive oversight of government.  PAC
    has obstructed passage of a number of bills by presenting hundreds
    of motions (essentially filibustering the bills).  These factors and
    PAC's continued opposition to CAFTA implementing legislation even
    after a public referendum approved the agreement, have caused a
    decline in general PAC popularity over the past three years.

    ¶8. (SBU) Although PAC is still the main opposition political party,
    it showed continued signs of decline after its first-ever primaries
    in May 2009 (Reftel).  PAC held a "closed" primary, in which less
    than twenty-five thousand party members voted.  Solis handily won
    the election with 71 percent, followed by former PAC Secretary
    General Epsy Cambpell and businessman Roman Macaya.  PAC failed to
    properly mobilize voters in the primary, including refusing to
    provide transport to the polls, a common practice in Costa Rica.
    This was due, again, to PAC's strict ethics code and Solis' quest to
    keep money out of politics.

    ¶9. (SBU) Solis continues to receive high marks among voters for his
    honesty, though his inflexibility as a leader has recently become
    more obvious.  In the run-up to the primary, Campbell and Macaya
    defied him by entering the race and forcing a primary for the first
    time in the history of PAC.

    ¶10. (SBU) Although the primary campaign revealed weaknesses within
    the party and particularly with Solis' leadership, it also might
    have strengthened the party as a whole.  Some political analysts
    told us they saw PAC's primary as the first real step in a
    transformational process that PAC was undergoing from a
    one-man-movement to a new and modern political party.

    ---------------------------------------------
    COMMENT: PAC'S FUTURE - CONTINUITY OR CHANGE?
    ---------------------------------------------

    ¶11. (SBU) Polls published in mid-August showed Solis trailing PLN
    candidate Laura Chinchilla (Reftel) by almost 15 percent.  In the
    upcoming 2010 election PAC could further consolidate its position as
    the country's second political force, particularly given PUSC's
    continued low standing under party caudillo Rafael Angel Calderon.
    However, pushing ahead for an out-and-out victory over PLN should
    prove difficult.  Though Solis is personally respected by many Costa
    Ricans, the man and his message seem a bit haggard after two
    presidential defeats (and another defeat in the CAFTA referendum).
    Solis must find a way to reconnect with the public, but also will
    need to work on basic issues such as voter mobilization, grass-roots
    organization, and the fundraising required for such activities, to
    have any chance of winning the presidency.
    ¶12. (SBU) If Solis can somehow scrape together a victory, there
    remain numerous questions on how he would actually govern.  One of
    our most pressing concerns is how Solis would manage our ongoing
    bilateral security programs.  One of Solis' colleagues, PAC
    Assemblyman Olivier Perez, has told us that a PAC-led government
    would want a Costa Rican shiprider (authorized from our Bilateral
    Maritime Agreement) on every U.S. vessel that might detain ships in
    Costa Rican waters.  This would be logistically impossible, and is
    not technically required by current agreements.  Regardless, we
    would expect a Solis-led government to undertake a thorough review
    of Costa Rica's security cooperation with the U.S.  While we would
    not anticipate any major changes under such a review, some aspects
    of our security engagement, such as with the shiprider issue, might
    face challenges.

    ¶13. (SBU) If, instead, Solis loses again in next year's elections,
    PAC would probably be forced to move past Solis and seek new
    leadership.  It is in this respect that this year's primary could
    serve as a useful stepping stone, as it opened up the party to the
    prospect of younger leadership, including Campbell and Macaya.  PAC
    also might be forced to re-think the party's identity and focus, or
    at least re-calibrate to better address voter priorities.  The party
    that Solis started has in fact come a long way in its eight years of
    existence; the next challenge might be where it can go once Solis
    himself has left the stage.

`