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### Viewing cable 09PARTO40301, U) Secretary Clinton's March 25 Conversation

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
09PARTO40301 | 2009-04-03 17:05 | 2011-02-21 12:12 | CONFIDENTIAL | US Delegation, Secretary
Appears in these articles: http://wikileaks.jornada.com.mx/notas/secretaria-de-estado-pide-a-embajada-evaluacion-de-calderon

`

    VZCZCXRO9333
    OO RUEHCD RUEHGD RUEHHO RUEHMC RUEHNG RUEHNL RUEHRD RUEHRS RUEHTM
    DE RUCNAI #0003/01 0931728
    ZNY CCCCC ZZH
    O 031728Z APR 09
    FM USDEL SECRETARY//MEXICO//
    TO RUEHME/AMEMBASSY MEXICO IMMEDIATE
    INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
    RUEHXC/ALL US CONSULATES IN MEXICO COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
    RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
    RHEFHLC/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
    RUEHSP/AMEMBASSY PORT OF SPAIN PRIORITY
    RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
    RHMFISS/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY

` `

    200714
    2009-04-03 17:28:00
    09PARTO40301
    US Delegation, Secretary
    CONFIDENTIAL

    VZCZCXRO9333
    OO RUEHCD RUEHGD RUEHHO RUEHMC RUEHNG RUEHNL RUEHRD RUEHRS RUEHTM
    DE RUCNAI #0003/01 0931728
    ZNY CCCCC ZZH
    O 031728Z APR 09
    FM USDEL SECRETARY//MEXICO//
    TO RUEHME/AMEMBASSY MEXICO IMMEDIATE
    INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
    RUEHXC/ALL US CONSULATES IN MEXICO COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
    RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
    RHEFHLC/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
    RUEHSP/AMEMBASSY PORT OF SPAIN PRIORITY
    RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
    RHMFISS/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY

    C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 PARTO 040301

    SIPDIS

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/25/2019
    TAGS: OVIP CLINTON HILLARY PREL SNAR MX
    SUBJECT: (U)  Secretary Clinton's March 25 Conversation
    with Mexican President Felipe Calderon

    Ref:  White House 0813 dated 03/21/09

    ¶1.  (U)  Classified by Uzra Zeya, Deputy Executive
    Secretary, S/ES, Department of State.  Reason 1.4 (d).

    ¶2.  (U)  03/25/09, 1 p.m., Mexico City, Mexico

    ¶3.  (U)  Participants

    U.S.
    The Secretary
    Charge Bassett
    A/S Shannon
    Laura Pena, Senior Advisor to the Secretary
    Dan Restrepo, Senior Director, National Security Council

    Mexico
    President Calderon
    Foreign Secretary Espinosa
    Amb. Sarukhan
    U/S Rico
    Presidential Advisor Fernandez de Castro

    ¶4.  (C)  Summary:   During an extremely cordial
    conversation with Secretary Clinton, President Calderon
    emphasized his personal commitment to providing security
    for Mexican citizens, pressed for greater U.S. actions
    against arms trafficking, conveyed concerns about how the
    issue of Cuba will be treated at the upcoming Summit of
    the Americas, and discussed his ideas for global action
    on environmental issues.  Secretary Clinton praised
    Calderon's commitment and leadership, acknowledged U.S.
    co-responsibility for the drug war, and pledged U.S.
    partnership against organized crime.  President Calderon
    encouraged the United States to re-assume its key role in
    the region and expressed his personal admiration for
    Secretary Clinton's leadership.  He closed by expressing
    appreciation for President Obama's decision to visit
    Mexico.  End Summary.

    ¶5.  (C)  President Calderon's aides tried several times
    to interrupt his animated conversation with Secretary
    Clinton,  which lasted 1 hour 45 minutes and included a
    15-minute one-on-one session, but he waved them off time
    after time.  He opened by expressing his admiration for
    Secretary Clinton, confessing that he attended her 1998
    appearance at Davos and submitted the written query,
    "Would you consider running for President?"  Secretary
    Clinton said she was delighted to see him again, and
    conveyed her appreciation for his commitment and courage.
    The United States, she continued, recognized its co-
    responsibility for the current situation, and would stand
    shoulder to shoulder with Mexico until the battle was
    won.  Secretary Clinton added that it was a personal
    priority for her to work on the broad relationship and
    have positive outcomes.

    --------
    SECURITY
    --------

    ¶6.  (C)  President Calderon acknowledged that our agenda
    is broader than security, but turned to that topic as the
    most urgent.  His personal commitment was to leave his
    successor a secure Mexico with credible institutions free
    of the taint of corruption.  To succeed he needed U.S.
    support, and suggested renewing the assault weapons ban.
    He said that there was a clear correlation between the
    lifting of the ban in 2004 and Mexico's current
    situation.  During the six years of the Fox
    administration, Mexican forces captured 3,000 assault
    weapons.  In the last two years, they confiscated 16,000,
    with no end in sight.  The availability of assault
    weaponry had contributed to the cartels' new aggression
    against government forces.  A second factor was cartels'
    expanding interests.  While they still fought for access
    to the U.S. market, they were increasingly seeking to
    control the growing Mexican drug market, as well.  The
    combination of assault weapons and an increased
    imperative for geographic control prompted the dramatic
    increases in violence Mexico had recently witnessed.  The
    third factor was the Mexican government's increased
    pressure on the cartels.

    ¶7.  (C)  Calderon cited the situation in Ciudad Juarez as
    a case in point.  Ciudad Juarez was important to the
    cartels as a launching point into the United States, he
    said, but it was also a growing metropolis with a
    potentially lucrative drug market.  The cartels' battle
    for this territory had driven homicide rates up to record
    levels.  President Calderon said he had made the decision
    to flood the city with federal forces and take over
    security while pressing the city and state governments to
    convert their local police into effective patrolling
    units and to do more against common crime.  In just a
    month, violence in Ciudad Juarez had fallen by 73
    percent, but this progress had to be sustained.

    ¶8.  (C)  Calderon said that a second priority should be
    to cut U.S. drug consumption.  Mexico was working to halt
    the supply -- the United States needed to cut demand.
    This led to the third priority -- cutting money flows to
    the cartels.   Calderon assessed that direct action to
    interdict bulk cash coming from the United States to
    Mexico would also strangle the cartels and their
    operations.  Mapping money flows and sharing that
    information would help both countries interdict cash more
    effectively and shut down the institutions facilitating
    cash transactions.  Mexico, he conceded, would have to do
    more to check inbound travelers and vehicles, ideally
    reaching a near 100 percent inspection rate through non-
    invasive (NIIE) means.  That might not be possible with
    existing technology, he admitted, but deploying more NIIE
    machines along more points of the border would be very
    helpful.

    ¶9.  (C)  Calderon said he appreciated the change in the
    tenor of USG officials' remarks in recent weeks, and
    hoped that trend would continue.  Suggestions by eminent
    U.S. government officials that Mexico was unable to
    govern its territory or risked becoming a failed state
    did incalculable damage, not just to Mexico's image, but
    to its efforts to confront organized crime.  These
    statements caused law enforcement officials to lose hope,
    helped motivate local officials to surrender to
    intimidation, and discouraged citizens from supporting
    the government's efforts.  On the other hand, he opined,
    such statements led criminals to believe the government
    would fail, and gave them renewed confidence to continue
    to confront the forces of order.  Calderon said he needed
    the support of the Mexican people, and he needed them to
    believe the rule of law would triumph.

    ¶10.  (C)  Secretary Clinton responded that her message
    was one of co-responsibility and cooperation.  She was
    personally committed to making sure both countries
    succeed.  The United States would do its share.  In the
    coming weeks, AG Holder and DHS Secretary Napolitano
    would visit Mexico to further this important dialogue.
    The Obama Administration had announced on March 20 a
    series of new measures along the U.S. border to impede
    smuggling or arms and cash into Mexico.  The Secretary
    said she could not be confident that an assault weapons
    ban would be passed by Congress, but she was confident
    the Administration would use every means to aggressively
    enforce existing law.  She offered to share ideas with
    Mexico on demand reduction in both countries.  She
    affirmed the Administration's absolute confidence that
    Calderon would succeed in his efforts, and that the
    United States would be with him every step of the way.

    ¶11.  (C)  President Calderon thanked her, noting that he
    appreciated the announcements made on the 20th, but
    adding that moving the National Guard to the border would
    pose a problem for Mexico.  Turning back to Mexico's
    situation, he  commented that the cartels were more
    aggressive in confronting Mexican institutions than ever
    before.  They were more openly intimidating elected
    officials, and more brutally killing Mexican law
    enforcement personnel.  They had undertaken terrorist-
    like acts, including throwing a grenade into a crowd of
    civilians last September.  Mexico had to face evidence
    that corruption extended to all levels.  The cartels had
    a strong distribution network in the United States,
    Calderon noted, and unchecked they could start to apply
    the same tactics in the United States.  Mexico had to
    face the harsh truth about corruption in the Attorney
    General's office; the United States should be concerned
    that the massive volume of drugs, money, and weapons
    flowing across the border could imply corruption problems
    on the U.S. side, as well.  Calderon said that both
    countries needed to coordinate efforts closely to be
    successful.  The President expressed some frustration
    with the pace of Merida deliveries, while noting his
    appreciation for the partnership the Merida Initiative
    represented.

    ----------
    THE REGION
    ----------

    ¶12.  (C)  President Calderon observed that, while there
    were many sensitivities in Mexico to working too closely
    on security matters with the United States, the nations
    of Central America did not face the same political
    constraints.  Mexico was concerned by the vulnerabilities
    in Guatemala and other Central American nations where
    security, judicial, and even democratic institutions were
    weak and susceptible to corrupt influences.  In
    Guatemala, almost half the security forces had been
    forcibly retired by the prior president, leaving its
    security situation difficult at best.  The United States
    should focus regional Merida assistance on these most
    vulnerable countries.

    ¶13.  (C)  President Calderon then went on to express his
    hope that the United States would re-assert its
    leadership role in the region, using the Summit of the
    Americas as an important opportunity.  The region was
    eager to meet President Obama, and excited to hear his
    vision of U.S. policy towards Latin America.  Calderon
    confessed that a recent meeting with Summit host Prime
    Minister Manning of Trinidad and Tobago had left him
    concerned that Manning would try to force the Cuba issue
    at the Summit.  Calderon said he had advised against
    this, arguing the United States and Cuba needed to work
    out their issues bilaterally first, before the region
    engaged.  Calderon did not think Manning was persuaded,
    describing the leader as seduced by the idea of making
    history with this issue.

    ---------
    THE WORLD
    ---------

    ¶14.  (C)  Secretary Clinton noted U.S. appreciation for
    Mexico's leadership role in the G-20, and especially its
    early call for replenishing the international financial
    institutions.  Calderon pointed out that the Inter-
    American Development Bank was one of those institutions
    that needed replenishing, and should not be overlooked.

    ¶15.  (C)  Calderon continued that he and President Obama
    had many things in common, and one was a "green" agenda.
    Calderon noted this was another personal passion of his.
    The global community set goals for the environment, but
    didn't create mechanisms to make those goals attainable.
    Calderon discussed his ideas for regional "clean energy"
    markets, and for the creation of a "green fund" that
    would provide incentives for nations who successfully
    actualized plans to reduce emissions.  Secretary Clinton
    said that Mexico's vision on the range of issues
    affecting the environment, renewable energy options, and
    climate change was greatly valued, and for that reason
    President Obama wished to invite him to a Major Economies
    Forum on Energy and the Environment in Italy this July
    (reftel).  President Calderon noted that, as Secretary of
    Energy and earlier, as President of the Development Bank
    (Banobras), he had approved wind energy and biogas
    programs across Mexico.  Now those programs were models
    of their kind.  Secretary Clinton told him she was
    pleased to be visiting Mexico's showcase biogas plant in
    Monterrey, drawing a warm smile from the President.

    ----------
    NEXT STEPS
    ----------

    ¶16.  (C)  Calderon summed up the discussion by noting
    that our two countries need a broad strategy to focus on
    security, competitiveness, and the range of bilateral
    issues.  He said that we should build strategic alliances
    in areas like healthcare, where U.S. demand could be met
    by Mexican supply.  Calderon noted he had shared these
    ideas with President Obama, and very much looked forward
    to discussing them further in April.  He reiterated again
    how honored Mexico was to receive the U.S. President.
    Secretary Clinton thanked Calderon for his time and
    leadership, and again pledged her personal commitment to
    concrete results in the relationship.

    CLINTON

`