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### Viewing cable 06BOGOTA144, WHY JANUARY 2006 IS DIFFERENT FROM JANUARY 2005 IN

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
06BOGOTA144 | 2006-01-06 20:08 | 2011-02-23 06:06 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Bogota

`

    This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

` `

    C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 08 BOGOTA 000144

    SIPDIS

    DEPARTMENT ALSO FOR P AND INL FROM AMBASSADOR

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/06/2016
    TAGS: PREL SNAR CO
    SUBJECT: WHY JANUARY 2006 IS DIFFERENT FROM JANUARY 2005 IN
    COLOMBIA

    Classified By: Ambassador William B. Wood.
    Reason 1.4 b and d.

    ---------
    Political
    ---------

    ¶1.  (C)  President Uribe broke the political custom of
    decades by winning the right to run for re-election.  But
    campaign dynamics are complicating some of his policies.
    Absent tragedy, we can look to four-and-a-half more years of
    partnership like the last three-and-a-half years.  In the
    face of Uribe's more than 65 percent approval, opposition
    presidential candidates have only a small chance.  If Uribe
    were not to win on the first round, as he did in 2002, it
    would be seen as a defeat.

    ¶2.  (C)  Less certain are the congressional elections in
    March, which will determine whether Uribe can push through
    many of the reforms left hanging by the failed referendum in
    ¶2003.  There is no established practice of coattails, several
    different factions supporting Uribe oppose each other, and
    the Liberal Party under ex-president Gaviria seems to be
    focused more on an anti-Uribe campaign than a serious effort
    to advance their own candidates.  Relations between Uribe and
    Gaviria have deteriorated dramatically.  We can expect the
    disarray and divisiveness attendant on any hotly contested
    democratic election.

    ¶3.  (C)  One outcome may be a further weakening of the
    Liberal and Conservative Parties, whose machines have
    dominated Colombian politics since the mid-19th century, in
    favor of a broad center-right coalition under Uribe and a
    broad center-left coalition with the upstart Polo
    Democratico, which is aiming primarily to weaken the Liberals
    for the 2010 elections.

    -----
    Drugs
    -----

    ¶4.  (C)  Drug eradication, seizures, air interdiction, arrest
    of money launderers, and extraditions all continued to set
    records.

    ¶5.  (C)  Aerial fumigation topped 140,000 hectares.    We
    lost one U.S. contractor pilot to FARC ground fire, and three
    aircraft during the course of the year.  The government
    asserts that it has passed 30,000 additional hectares in
    manual eradication, a high-cost, high-risk program that
    combines drug eradication with job creation, and finesses the
    bogus health and environmental controversies of aerial
    fumigation.

    ¶6.  (C)  We topped 225 metric tons of finished drugs seized
    in country.  Much of this was attributable to a unique blend
    of DEA, ORA, Colombian military, and Colombian police
    cooperation.

    ¶7.  (C)  JIATF-South advises that the number of "suspicious"
    flights into Colombia -- no flight plan, short hop across the
    border, no clear departure or arrival point -- has been cut
    in half, many of them displaced to Venezuelan airspace.

    ¶8.  (C)  The government took effective control of two major
    money-laundering enterprises this year (Grajales and La
    Rebaja).  Now we have a better idea how to shut down money
    laundering fronts, clean them out, and re-open them quickly
    so that legitimate employees don't lose work and we don't
    face the political costs of putting thousands of workers on
    the street.

    ¶9.  (C)  The Uribe Administration extradited its 300th
    Colombian national for narcotics trafficking this year,
    outstripping any other country.  Equally important, through
    hard work here and by DOJ in Washington with local U.S.
    Attorneys, our operational extradition relationship with the
    MFA, the Ministry of Interior and Justice, and the Supreme
    Court is better than ever.  But high-profile extradition
    cases arising out of the peace process will continue to test
    that relationship (see below).

    ¶10.  (C)  For the first time, U.S. figures indicate that, at
    a given level of purity, the street price of cocaine has
    increased by 19 percent and heroin by 30 percent, in spite of
    reduced demand.  It is not clear how high the current
    operational level can eventually drive the price.  Continued
    counter-drug efficiencies and accelerated shifting of
    counter-drug costs to the Colombians will be a priority in
    ¶2006.   Absent different instructions, we will seek to
    maintain current level of effort, in order to find out just
    how far we can reduce Colombian drug production and
    trafficking at this level of resources, something not yet
    known.

    ¶11.  (C)  We also will continue to focus on better metrics.
    For interdiction, there is some double counting for both
    in-country seizures and for transit zone seizures; both we
    and the Colombians are trying to clean up those numbers.  For
    eradication, for years the flagship metric has been "number
    of hectares eradicated," which has two problems:  (1)
    problems of terrain, cloud cover, and drugger
    counter-measures make our measurements, the best in the
    world, still very imprecise, and (2) the focus on number of
    hectares diverts attention from the other production
    variables, soil productivity, number of plants per hectare,
    and productivity of each plant (i.e., the size and number of
    harvests per year, which depend on the maturity of the
    plants).  The combination has led us at times to spray
    re-plantings -- small plants where the hectarage is large but
    the production small -- rather than smaller plots of mature
    coca plants (plants three times the size, with four harvests
    per year versus one or two).  Better metrics would help us
    target our efforts better, in an environment of short
    resources, danger from ground fire, and political
    controversy.   For instance, spraying in the national parks
    and other protected areas would attack areas with a higher
    concentration of mature, high production plants.

    ----------
    Terrorists
    ----------

    ¶12.  (C)  Although a separate sub-heading in this message,
    for the FARC and the paramilitaries the distinction between
    counter-drug and counter-terror in Colombia is a distinction
    in name only.  Counter-drug success hurts them as much as
    counter-terror success.  Explicitly in the case of the
    paramilitaries, and substantively in the case of the FARC,
    there is now talk here of the "third generation": a drugger
    generation, following the early ideologues and the later
    military organizers.  This relates directly to the peace
    process, which will be able to take older ideologues, current
    foot soldiers, and at least some of the militarists off the
    field.  But many drugger-terrorists will try to use the
    process only to camouflage their activities or reduce the
    penalties they face, and will have to be rooted out by
    military, judicial, and police action.

    ¶13.  (C)  Since 2002, the military has grown from 158,000 to
    260,000 personnel, and the police from 104,000 to 134,000.
    The combined Colombian military-police operating budget has
    grown from USDOLS 2.6 billion to a budgeted USDOLS 4.5
    billion in 2006, to which U.S. assistance will add almost 9
    percent.

    ¶14.  (C) Colombian counter-terror operations continued at an
    unprecedented pace.  The military and the police are going
    all-out to: (1) maintain the Plan Patriota offensive in
    south-central Colombia, (2) improve the defense of isolated
    rural communities, (3) go after high value targets, (4) fill
    in behind demobilizing paramilitaries, and (5) protect the
    elections.  Unrelenting pressure for results by Uribe and new
    MOD Ospina on the police and military may be burning out the
    uniformed services, or at least creating distance between
    them and the senior civilian leadership.  It is also putting
    pressure on us to divert more helicopters from counter-drug
    to counter-terror operations; shortage of Blackhawk
    helicopters is a daily problem.

    ¶15.  (C)  The Plan Patriota offensive kept the FARC under
    growing pressure.  The FARC staged fewer attacks on
    population centers, but doubled the number of electrical
    towers blown up, increased the number of attacks on the oil
    pipelines, and caused more casualties in 2005 than the
    previous year, which may imply that government forces are
    stretched thin or that the FARC is picking its targets more
    carefully.  Although there were better results against high
    value targets from all terrorist organizations this year,
    there continue to be serious problems with military
    organization, operational security, and the
    intelligence-planning-operation sequence.  The government is
    expanding still further the police and military to cover
    demobilized areas.  Although there have been a few attacks
    against politicians, for the most part the election campaign
    has been kept free of overt violence.

    ¶16.  (C)  The FARC, the only terrorist organization not
    involved in at least some sort of peace process, is also
    making a maximum terror effort, which can be expected to
    continue through presidential elections.  But they are weaker
    than before and on the defensive in many areas.  At the same
    time, in spite of increased terrorist activity against rural
    communities, high profile targets, and the police and
    military, the FARC has been toying with the issue of
    humanitarian exchange of hostages.  On January 1, 2006, the
    FARC published a declaration that they would not negotiate a
    hostage exchange with President Uribe.  This makes clear that
    their interest in political maneuvers to complicate the
    election year are more important than their desire to win
    back some of their lost contact and prestige with
    international audiences and civil society.

    ¶17.  (C)  The three U.S. hostages will complete three years
    in captivity on February 13 and remain one of our highest
    priorities.  President Uribe has repeatedly reassured us that
    there will be no deal for hostages that does not include our
    citizens.

    --------------------------------------------- --
    Peace Process with Paramilitaries and Maybe ELN
    --------------------------------------------- --

    ¶18.  (C)  At year-end, some 14,000 paramilitaries have
    demobilized in the group demobilization program, in addition
    to almost 8,000 demobilized deserters from all terrorist
    organizations.  The two-year debate on the Justice and Peace
    law governing the disarmament, demobilization, and
    reinsertion of the paramilitaries ended with signature of the
    law in July.  The government's decision to delay the
    "justice" part of the law until after completion of the
    "peace" part -- demobilizations -- has complicated the
    picture.  Demobilizations continued to produce reduced levels
    of violence and crime against civilians in every zone where
    they have occurred, but there is growing concern that FARC or
    unredeemed "third generation" paramilitaries will move into
    vacated drug fields.

    ¶19.  (C)  When, in August, the government transferred
    paramilitary/drug lord Don Berna to prison, the
    paramilitaries suspended demobilizations for two months.
    Although demobilizations are now back on track, the delay set
    back the deadline for all demobilizations until at least mid
    February.  The episode demonstrated: (1) that the
    paramilitaries did not expect such harsh treatment under the
    law, (2) that the law is close to the edge of the achievable
    with the paramilitaries, and (3) that extradition to the U.S.
    has become the principal issue in the process.
    ¶20.  (C)  Government preparations for prosecution,
    reinsertion, and reparations remain embryonic.  More than a
    half-dozen other countries are lending at least some level of
    assistance to the program, which enjoys endorsements of
    varying intensity from the EU, the OAS, the South American
    Council of Presidents, and others.  Predictably, especially
    in an election year, complaints are already surfacing in the
    implementation of prosecution and reinsertion; we are raising
    these issues with the government and expect them to be a key
    theme in 2006.

    ¶21.  (C)  Starting in December, the government began direct
    "pre-talks" with the 40-year old ELN in Havana.  Another
    round is scheduled for January 11.  We are supporting the
    talks, from a distance.  A peace process with the ELN would
    take another 4000 or so terrorists off the field, legitimize
    the process with the far-right paramilitaries, put more
    pressure on the hold-out FARC, and most importantly, end the
    hundreds of kidnappings attributed to the organization.
    Because the ELN has not traditionally been involved in
    narcotics trafficking, their extradition situation is
    different from that of the FARC or the paramilitaries,
    although as the ELN has become more dependent on the FARC
    they have also developed some drug activity.  The FARC, which
    does not want to be the lone hold out, does not want all the
    government counter-terror effort focused exclusively on them,
    and finds the ELN operationally useful from time to time, is
    being unhelpful.  Interestingly, violence between the ELN and
    the FARC intensified in December in the northern section of
    the country.

    ¶22.  (C)  The government is wary.  The ELN has walked away
    from several major peace initiatives, including a major
    Mexican effort early in 2005.  They profess to be in a hurry,
    so they can come out of the jungle and begin to "consult"
    with legitimate candidates during the elections, with an eye
    toward direct participation in the 2007 local elections.  But
    they refuse to accept the Justice and Peace law that governs
    paramilitary demobilization; we are concerned that any
    further concession they get will have to be given to the
    paramilitaries too.  Although a difficult issue, we hope that
    there will be major progress this year.

    --------------------------------
    Economics, Trade and Development
    --------------------------------

    ¶23.  (C)  2005 was a banner year.  The government already is
    revising growth figures to reflect higher than predicted
    results in the second two quarters.  Real GDP growth for the
    year will likely top 5 percent (3.8 percent was predicted)
    based on a wave of foreign and domestic investment, a
    dramatic increase in exports, greater optimism, and a reduced
    security threat and reduced related costs, all of which was
    spurred still further by the possibility of Uribe's
    re-election.  Continued progress against terrorists would
    generate further growth among small businesses, which still
    face rampant extortion by one or another terror group.
    Anecdotally, we know of no major non-traditional exporter
    that is not expanding capacity.

    ¶24.  (C)  Rural development -- normal and alternative
    development -- continued to lag, in spite of more than $68
    million in U.S. aid, as a result of terrorism, confused and
    in some cases illicit ownership patterns, and a weak
    transportation infrastructure.  But there were also bright
    spots as rural development in formerly drug-ridden Putumayo
    province made unexpected strides.  For instance, a plant to
    process hearts of palm has created hundreds of jobs, linked
    this isolated region to the larger national market and,
    starting in February, will begin exporting to Europe.

    ¶25.  (C)  Production increases not only were reflected in
    improved profits, but also higher employment.  Unemployment
    may fall to near 10 percent in the last quarter of 2005,
    compared to over 15 percent when Uribe took office.  The drop
    is due to job creation, rather than people leaving the formal
    economy.

    ¶26.  (C)  All of this should have given Colombia a solid base
    on which to build the compromises necessary for a free trade
    agreement.  But, as often occurs, potential losers complained
    loudly and potential winners remained quiet, leading the
    Uribe Administration to seek tailor-made concessions in
    agriculture and intellectual property against our advice.  As
    the year closed with an agreement reached with Peru and none
    with Colombia, we believe the Colombian team has finally
    gotten the message and will resume talks in January ready to
    reach agreement.  We urge Washington to help pocket their
    "yes" early.  Once there is an agreed text, we expect the
    "winners" to begin work on ratification even during the
    election campaign.

    ----------------------------------
    Judicial, Social, and Humanitarian
    ----------------------------------

    ¶27.  (C)  The first year of U.S.-style oral accusatory
    criminal trials was a resounding success.  The process moves
    on from Bogota in 2005 to Medellin, Cali, and other
    jurisdictions in 2006, and then countrywide by 2008.  There
    is already talk of extending the oral accusatory system
    beyond criminal cases.  The Justice and Peace law for
    demobilization operates in an oral accusatory framework.

    ¶28.  (C)  Colombia continued to have the largest displaced
    population in the hemisphere and the third largest in the
    world, after Sudan and the Democratic republic of the Congo.
    In addition to the vast human suffering, displacement has put
    a heavy burden on local government for public order and
    social services, has left the rural areas largely in the
    hands of terrorists and narcotics traffickers, and the troops
    who fight them, and inhibits rural development and extension
    of state authority countrywide.  U.S. assistance programs
    provided $31 to displaced families in 2005.  Rising job
    opportunities are absorbing many displaced into the urban
    workforce, but has also put a heavy burden on urban police
    and social services.  Unemployment is approaching 10 percent,
    from above 15 percent in 2002.

    ------------
    Human Rights
    ------------

    ¶29.  (C)  According to the Gallup poll, 79 percent of
    respondents replied that "the Uribe Administration respects
    human rights," the highpoint for the administration.  The
    clamor, especially in rural districts, overwhelmingly is for
    more government presence, not less.  Nevertheless, building
    on the four-decade-long, pervasive four-front conflict with
    terrorists and narcotics traffickers, the tradition of
    accommodation, lack of accountability, do-it-yourself
    justice, and weak institutional presence by the government
    persisted in some areas.

    ¶30.  (C)  Human rights questions have frequently been linked
    to suspicions of government tolerance or collusion with
    brutal paramilitary operations or, following the recent
    massive demobilization of paramilitary "military"
    organizations, with concerns that paramilitaries abandoning
    the battlefield will be allowed to move into criminal
    activities or dirty politics.  Although the latter would
    produce the reduction in violence against civilians we have
    seen over the year or more, it also would spell continued
    trouble for Colombian democracy.  The AUC does not command
    the national structure it once did, the government is keeping
    the pressure on, and the parties are openly debating how best
    to block paramilitary corruption in the elections.  But we
    believe that, on a local basis, individual paramilitary blocs
    can influence individual elections.  We are working the
    problem with the government.

    ¶31.  (C)  We are also working the individual cases that
    continue to complicate otherwise clear improvement in respect
    for human rights here.  Recent cases relating to Cajamarca,
    Guitarilla, and Arauca are before the courts, and suspects
    remain in confinement.  The very recent assassination case of
    Afro-Colombian activist Orlando Valencia is being
    investigated, but no arrests have yet been made.  The
    recurring series of killings, accusations, and
    counter-accusations related to the "peace community" of San
    Jose de Apartado continues to defy all our efforts to get the
    community and the government together to pin down the facts.

    ---------
    Venezuela
    ---------

    ¶32.  (C)  The Uribe Administration has no illusions about the
    Chavez Administration.  It will continue to put
    counter-terror, counter-drug, open borders, and bilateral
    trade issues at the top of its list, and try to manage all
    other aspects of the relationship.  Uribe remains convinced
    that Chavez came off second best in the confrontation over
    the hand-over of FARC leader Granda, but he also remains
    chastened by the success of Chavez' three-week border
    closure.  This will mean that Colombia, already nervous at
    the perception that it is the "best" U.S. friend in the
    region, will continue to try to finesse some issues it should
    take head-on.  It is not Uribe's style to publicly criticize
    Chavez.  But he will defend his interests, and our interests,
    in private, and not shy away from difficult operational
    decisions.  Uribe believes that Chavez, too, would prefer to
    work behind the scenes on areas of disagreement.

    ------
    Others
    ------

    ¶33.  (C)  Uribe continues to believe in a constructive
    approach to his other neighbors.  By and large he has
    confidence in their good intentions and he believes they are
    facing big problems, which he does not want to aggravate.  He
    believes that Peru and Brazil (and Cuba) were helpful in
    reining in Chavez during the Granda affair, and even helped
    force stronger counter-terror promises from him.  He will not
    reject regional support for his peace initiative with the
    ELN, even if from Cuba or Venezuela.

    ¶34.  (C)  Colombia is concerned by the election of Evo
    Morales, especially by the perception that the hemisphere has
    taken another step to the left.  While recognizing Chavez'
    mischief in Bolivia, Uribe is not yet convinced that Morales
    will have the organization, will, or resources to create more
    than a diplomatic problem.  He will play Bolivia one step at
    a time.

    ¶35.  (C)  Colombia is also concerned by apparent breakdown in
    Ecuador, which borders on the principal FARC stronghold and a
    key drug growing and transit corridor.  He had a productive
    relationship with Gutierrez and is trying to have one with
    Palacio.  Uribe doesn't want to rock the boat there, as
    exemplified by his agreement temporarily to suspend drug
    spray flights along the border and to consider the
    possibility of a UN report on the health and environmental
    effects of glyphosate, less than a month after he had ordered
    a maximum effort against coca in Narino province, on the
    border.

    ¶36.  (C)  With the departure of Toledo, Colombia fears that
    it will lose its best ally in the region.  In addition to
    Peru's assistance as head of the Andean Group during the
    Granda affair, Colombia believes that Peru shares the
    experience of both a drug threat and a terror threat.  They
    will be watching Peruvian elections closely.

    ¶37.  (C)  Like everyone else, Colombia is disappointed that
    Lula has not provided the rallying point for sensible reform
    that was hoped.  But Brazil is too big and too important to
    Colombia to be dismissed.  Although bilateral cooperation is
    friendly, Brazil has frequently played to NGO and European
    audiences to criticize Plan Colombia, Uribe's "Democratic
    Security" policy, and the peace process with the
    paramilitaries.  The former ambassador here was identified
    with the center-left opposition to Uribe; the new guy may
    change that.  Beyond that, the Mercosur vs. FTAA dynamic puts
    Colombia in a difficult position; they have tried to finesse
    the problem by being all things to all people but, in the
    end, Uribe is staking Colombia's future on free trade with
    the U.S.

    ¶38.  (C)  Colombia is pleased that, at last, Europe seems to
    be listening.  Led by the Dutch, Swedish, and British,
    European political and practical support for the paramilitary
    peace process is a breakthrough.  The behavior of the
    European "facilitators" in the peace process with the ELN and
    in the budding discussions about humanitarian exchange of
    prisoners with the FARC will be an important litmus test; if
    the Europeans get ahead of the government here, there will be
    fireworks.  Much will also depend on whether the Europeans at
    the Human Rights Commission in March listen to their
    ambassadors in Bogota or not; last year they listened instead
    to the head of the local UN Human Rights Office.

    ¶39.  (C)  Colombia has lost confidence in the UN, which it
    finds to be disorganized and contrary here in country, and
    unilateral in New York and Geneva.  Colombia generally will
    try to keep its head down in UN forums, causing us some
    frustration.  But Colombia has been of assistance regarding
    Iran as a new member of the IAEA Board of Governors.

    ---------
    Bilateral
    ---------

    ¶40.  (C)  Bilateral relations are strong, with an occasional
    hiccup.  As is often the case with others, the Colombians
    believe that we want a lot in exchange for our approximately
    USD 600 million in assistance.  But they also believe that we
    want the best for them and that our importunings are often
    just "tough love."  They have been frustrated in several
    areas:

    --- that our strategic alliance was unable to get them
    special consideration in the free trade negotiations; they

    understand our problems there, but only sort of;

    --- that we have been unable to provide more assistance in
    their most critical military need, Blackhawk helicopters;
    again, they understand our needs in Iraq and Afghanistan, but
    find it hard to believe that U.S. production capabilities are
    limited;

    --- that our law enforcement goals preclude any tactical
    flexibility on extradition for those participating in the
    peace process or for major narcotics traffickers who want to
    turn themselves in; they want to use extradition as the
    ultimate sanction for failure to comply with the peace
    process, and help us get traffickers to the U.S. as part of a
    negotiated deal for less than full prosecution; and

    --- that we have been unable to provide more assistance to
    the reinsertion program for paramilitaries, at a time when
    even the Europeans are signing on.

    ¶41.  (C)  In addition to our overarching counter-drug and
    counter-terror goals, we have a number of specific challenges
    ahead: to free our hostages, to improve implementation of the
    Justice and Peace demobilization law, to protect the
    extradition relationship, to resolve the outstanding human
    rights cases and fix the system so they don't recur, to agree
    and then get ratified and implemented a free trade agreement,
    to help address the tragic humanitarian situation, and to
    support Colombia in a way that enhances its pro-U.S.
    influence in the hemisphere.  Stay tuned.
    WOOD

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