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### Viewing cable 06BOGOTA4983, FARC/ELN: TERRORIST TAKEDOWNS REFLECT USG-GOC

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
06BOGOTA4983 | 2006-06-05 15:03 | 2011-03-02 12:12 | SECRET | Embassy Bogota
Appears in these articles: http://www.elespectador.com/wikileaks

`

    VZCZCXYZ0019
    RR RUEHWEB

    DE RUEHBO #4983/01 1561553
    ZNY SSSSS ZZH
    R 051553Z JUN 06
    FM AMEMBASSY BOGOTA
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5629
    INFO RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 7781
    RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ JUN LIMA 3846
    RUEHZP/AMEMBASSY PANAMA 9200
    RUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO 4484
    RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
    RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC//USDP ADMIN/CHAIRS//
    RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC

` `

    S E C R E T BOGOTA 004983

    SIPDIS

    SIPDIS

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/24/2016
    TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER CO
    SUBJECT: FARC/ELN: TERRORIST TAKEDOWNS REFLECT USG-GOC
    INTEL COOPERATION

    Classified By: Ambassador William B. Wood
    Reasons: 1.4(a), (b), (d)

    -------
    Summary
    -------

    ¶1. (S)  The GOC captured or killed 29 key midlevel operatives
    of the country's main guerilla insurgencies, the
    Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the
    National Liberation Army (ELN), from September 2005 through
    April 2006.  Takedowns were concentrated among three groups
    -- front commanders, finance officers, and explosives experts
    -- who are vital to guerilla activities and difficult to
    replace.  The operations were guided by intelligence packages
    assembled with heavy USG support.  Continued cooperation
    between USG and GOC intelligence units aims to chip away at
    the guerillas' middle management, as one element in a
    concerted set of strategies to weaken these organizations
    over time.  End Summary.

    ------------------------
    29 Key Operatives Netted
    ------------------------

    ¶2. (S)  A review of 29 takedowns of key FARC and ELN
    operatives from September 2005 through April 2006 gives a
    flavor of the impact of U.S. intelligence assistance in the
    GOC's fight against the two guerilla insurgencies.  The
    operations in question were guided by joint USG and GOC
    intelligence work and executed by GOC security entities of
    the armed forces (COLAR and COLNAV), police (Dijin and
    DIPOL), and DAS (FBI equivalent).  The strategic targets
    comprising 18 members of the FARC and 11 of the ELN included:

    - two members of the ELN's National Directorate (DINAL),
    including the leader of a special commando unit orchestrating
    kidnapppings;

    - three front commanders and two deputy front commanders of
    the FARC;

    - four commanders and three deputy commanders of the ELN;

    - four financial officers (three FARC and one ELN);

    - five FARC explosives experts; and

    - two urban militia leaders, one from each insurgent group.

    ¶3. (S)  Of these, five were killed in combat during capture
    attempts and 24 were taken alive.  The latter are potentially
    valuable sources of further intelligence for future
    operations.  Since targets are usually accompanied by
    protective details, there is a multiplier effect of roughly
    5x on headcount totals.  Because these operations were guided
    primarily by leads from human sources, most of the 29 were
    nabbed in populous areas in Cundinamarca and Antioquia
    departments or along the Caribbean coast, where sources can
    operate undetected and GOC law enforcement has greater
    leverage.  These operations are thus distinct from those
    aimed at HVTs in the jungle, which are typically guided by
    signal or image intelligence and executed by military ambush
    in remote areas of guerilla control.

    --------------------
    Impact on FARC & ELN
    --------------------

    ¶4. (S)  About half of those netted were front commanders.
    These are vital links in the chain of command, implementing
    instructions from top echelons to individual fronts and
    controlling regional and tactical operations.  Ideologically,
    too, front leaders are vital bridges to inculcate the troops.
     Front commanders often represent campaign experience of 15
    years or more.  Analysts claim guerilla groups are feeling
    the pinch at this upper middle level due to battle casualties
    and shorter tenures within the ranks of possible replacements
    one level down.

    ¶5. (S)  Finance officers make up another valuable set of
    targets.  They act as intermediaries in the coca trade,

    establish front companies, launder money, and procure weapons
    from across borders.  This group is a highly trusted elite,
    with authority over cash and arms and trusted business
    contacts.  Further, they often are caught carrying
    coordinates of caches of money and arms.  In deep terrain
    they are specially protected, but their town visits to
    conduct transactions make them vulnerable to capture in urban
    operations.

    ¶6. (S)  Losses of explosives experts, too, are very tough on
    the guerillas.  Master bomb makers take a long time to groom,
    with high casualty rates as an occupational hazard; they are
    difficult to replace.  Explosives are a FARC weapon of
    choice.  Bomb specialists are often nabbed in towns in the
    process of preparing specific actions; hence their takedowns
    may have the most immediate impact of averting imminent
    attacks.  Finally, captures of militia leaders help to
    preempt the guerillas' progress in urban areas where
    historically they have had little traction but where they are
    aspiring to expand networks.

    ----------------------------
    U.S. - Colombian Cooperation
    ----------------------------

    ¶7. (S)  The USG has worked closely with GOC intelligence
    units in capacity building, and the two sides continue to
    cooperate in planning specific operations.  Of the 29 cases
    discussed above, about 30% were carried out by the GOC
    independently, while 70% were conducted with USG assistance.
    Typically GOC entities in the field collect raw data,
    filtered and prioritized by the USG into operational
    packages, which the GOC in turn executes.  This cooperation
    has yielded a quantum increase in the volume of actions
    undertaken, as well as higher-quality vetting of prospective
    actions and tighter operational planning.  The main drawback
    is a perceived GOC dependency on U.S. support, no longer in
    terms of skills but rather in motivational drive and sense of
    urgency, which still derives from U.S. pushing.  The
    appointment of CamiloOspina as Minister of Defense earlier
    this year has been a positive development in this regard: he
    is a strong supporter of intelligence work and a catalyst for
    increasing the volume of intel-guided activity.
    WOOD

`