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### Viewing cable 09STATE97244, POTUS EUROPEAN-BASED MISSILE DEFENSE DECISION

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
09STATE97244 | 2009-09-18 18:06 | 2010-12-30 21:09 | SECRET | Secretary of State

`

    VZCZCXRO9420
    OO RUEHSL
    DE RUEHC #7244/01 2611830
    ZNY SSSSS ZZH
    O 181809Z SEP 09
    FM SECSTATE WASHDC
    TO ALL NATO POST COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
    RUEHAD/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI IMMEDIATE 5058
    RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING IMMEDIATE 0411
    RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA IMMEDIATE 5262
    RUEHDO/AMEMBASSY DOHA IMMEDIATE 1316
    RUEHKU/AMEMBASSY KUWAIT IMMEDIATE 6900
    RUEHMK/AMEMBASSY MANAMA IMMEDIATE 6732
    RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 3906
    RUEHMS/AMEMBASSY MUSCAT IMMEDIATE 1189
    RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI IMMEDIATE 6829
    RUEHRH/AMEMBASSY RIYADH IMMEDIATE 3392
    RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL IMMEDIATE 1910
    RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 9385
    RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO IMMEDIATE 0531
    INFO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
    RHMFISS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
    RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE

` `

    S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 06 STATE 097244

    SIPDIS

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/15/2014
    TAGS: EZ MARR PREL
    SUBJECT: POTUS EUROPEAN-BASED MISSILE DEFENSE DECISION
    (SECOND CORRECTED COPY OF STATE 96519)

    REF: A. STATE 96519 B. STATE 96550

    Classified By: T U/S Ellen O. Tauscher for Reasons 1.4 a,b,and d.

    ¶1. (U) (CORRECTED COPY FOR THE RECORD. NO ACTION REQUESTED.
    THIS CORRECTED COPY HAS A REPLACEMENT SIXTH TICK IN THE
    RUSSIA TALKING POINTS IN PARAGRAPH 6. PLEASE DISREGARD THE
    SIXTH TICK IN THE RUSSIA TALKING POINTS IN THE EARLIER
    TRANSMISSIONS OF THIS CABLE. SEE REFTELS.) This is an ACTION
    REQUEST. Please see paragraph 3. ALL MATERIALS IN THIS
    CABLE ARE TO BE EMBARGOED FROM DELIVERY TO HOST GOVERNMENTS
    UNTIL 25 MINUTES PRIOR TO A PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT RELEASED
    ON SEPTEMBER 17, 2009 AT 9:55 A.M. (EASTERN DAYLIGHT TIME -
    WASHINGTON, D.C.).

    ¶2. (SBU) BACKGROUND: The White House is expected to announce
    a Presidential decision at approximately 9:55
    a.m.(Washington, D.C.) on September 17 regarding a U.S.
    European-based BMD adaptive regional architecture, which is
    significantly different from the Bush Administration's plan
    to deploy 10 ground-based interceptors in Poland and a BMD
    tracking radar in the Czech Republic. END BACKGROUND.

    ¶3. (SBU) ACTION REQUEST: Addressee Posts are instructed to
    deliver the talking points to Host Governments in paragraph 4
    on Thursday, September 17, as a non-paper, but no earlier
    than 9:30 a.m. (Easter Daylight Time - Washington, D.C.).
    USNATO, Embassies in NATO Capitals (except for Embassies
    Warsaw and Prague), Embassy Tokyo, Embassy Moscow, and
    Embassies in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) States
    (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab
    Emirates) are instructed also to deliver the tailored talking
    points for NATO, Japan, Russia, and the GCC States in
    paragraphs 5-8. Action Request addressees should attempt to
    provide pre-notifications immediately prior to the public
    announcement of the Presidential decision but not before 9:30
    a.m. EDT; with the different time zones involved, Washington
    recognizes that some notifications may not occur until after
    the White House public announcement. Posts may draw upon the
    Questions and Answers to be provided reftel for use with Host
    Governments on an "if asked" basis, or as Posts determine is
    appropriate. The Questions and Answers in reftel may be
    drawn upon by Posts but should not/not be handed over to Host
    Governments. Materials for public diplomacy (e.g., Fact
    Sheet, Questions and Answers, and POTUS Statement) will be
    provided to Posts septel. Posts please notify the Department
    regarding date of delivery, recipients, and reaction, if any.
    END ACTION REQUEST.

    ¶4. (U) BEGIN TEXT OF TALKING POINTS:

    U.S. MISSILE DEFENSE POLICY - EUROPEAN DECISION

    - The White House announced that the President has approved
    Secretary Gates and the Joint Chiefs of Staff's unanimous
    recommendation for improved missile defenses in Europe
    against the threat from Iran to our forces and families
    deployed to the region and to our Allies.

    - Iran already has hundreds of ballistic missiles that can
    threaten its neighbors in the Middle East, Turkey, and the
    Caucasus and it is actively developing and testing ballistic
    missiles that can reach more and more of Europe.
    -- Our concern regarding Iranian missile capabilities is
    further increased by the fact that our Intelligence Community
    continues to assess that Iran, at a minimum, is keeping open
    the option to develop nuclear weapons.

    - The new "Phased, Adaptive Approach" recommended by
    Secretary Gates updates and revises the previous program for
    missile defense in Europe based on two key findings of the
    DoD review:

    STATE 00097244 002 OF 006

    -- First, the threat from Iran's regional ballistic missiles
    has developed more rapidly than previously expected. At the
    same time, the threat from potential Iranian intercontinental
    ballistic missiles (ICBMs) has been slower to develop than we
    previously expected.
    -- Second, our missile defense capabilities and technologies
    have advanced significantly. Improved interceptor
    capabilities, such as the currently deployed Standard
    Missile-3 (SM-3) interceptor and advanced variants that are
    already in development, permit a more flexible and capable
    architecture.

    - Therefore, the President has approved a Phased, Adaptive
    Approach that is responsive to the current threat, but also
    can incorporate new technologies quickly and cost-effectively
    to adapt as the threat and our technologies continue to
    change. It will unfold in phases:
    -- The first phase will speed protection of U.S. deployed
    forces, civilians, and families and our Allies in Europe
    against the current threat from Iran by deploying proven
    systems by 2011 ) about six or seven years earlier than the
    previous program.
    -- Subsequent phases will add advanced variant sea- and
    land-based versions of the SM-3 and cover additional
    territory in Europe should the Iranian threat expand.
    -- In the fourth and final phase we will anticipate
    augmenting our existing capabilities to defend the United
    States against potential advances in Iran's ICBM capability
    with advanced versions of the SM-3. This would be a similar
    capability to that provided in the program of record.

    - This improved approach removes the need for a Ground Based
    Interceptor field in Poland and features a distributed
    interceptor and sensor architecture that does not require the
    single large, fixed radar originally planned to be located in
    the Czech Republic.
    -- Under the new approach, land- and sea-based missile
    defense interceptors and sensors offer some flexibility to be
    redeployed as the regional ballistic missile threat dictates.
    This distributed network approach also will increase the
    survivability of the system and provide more opportunities
    for collaboration with Allies and partners.
    -- We are beginning consultations with Poland, the Czech
    Republic, and other Allies on the new approach, and will work
    with our NATO Allies on determining locations for the sensors
    and interceptors, and on integrating the Phased, Adaptive
    Approach with their missile defense capabilities and with the
    emerging NATO command and control network.

    - Strong missile defenses will strengthen our efforts to find
    a solution that brings Iran into compliance with its
    international obligations: the more we can diminish the
    coercive value of Iran's missiles, the less Iran stands to
    gain by continuing to develop these destabilizing
    capabilities.

    - This set of recommendations comes from an ongoing
    Congressionally-mandated review that is taking a
    comprehensive examination of our global approach to missile
    defense and is consistent with the Defense Department's
    budget choices for fiscal year 2010:
    -- For example, we added additional funding to field more
    systems such as Aegis BMD ships and SM-3 interceptors.

    END TEXT OF TALKING POINTS.

    ¶5. (S/REL NATO) BEGIN TEXT OF TALKING POINTS FOR USNATO AND
    EMBASSIES IN NATO CAPITALS (TALKING POINTS BELOW SHOULD BE
    USED FOR ALL NATO CAPITALS EXCEPT FOR POLAND AND THE CZECH
    REPUBLIC; WARSAW AND PRAGUE WILL RECEIVE SEPARATE TAILORED
    TALKING POINTS TO BE DELIVERED ON SEPTEMBER 17 BY THE
    FLOURNOY-TAUSCHER DELEGATION):

    GENERAL

    - NATO leaders have all agreed that ballistic missile
    proliferation poses an increasing threat to Allies' forces,

    STATE 00097244 003 OF 006

    territory, and populations.

    - As a result, NATO has noted the significant contribution to
    Alliance security by those Allies who possess, or are
    acquiring, missile defense capabilities.

    - At the 2008 Summit, NATO leaders agreed to consider options
    for a NATO missile defense system that would cover all
    remaining areas of Allied populations and territory. To
    date, those efforts have focused on missile defense systems
    to protect deployed forces from shorter-range ballistic
    missile threats.

    - At the 2009 NATO summit, Heads of State and Government
    tasked experts to examine the potential expansion of the
    ALTBMD program ) which is designed to be the command and
    control "backbone" for theater missile defense for deployed
    forces.

    - The United States now proposes a "Phased Adaptive
    Approach," which will reinforce and strengthen on-going NATO
    efforts. Specifically, we believe that the Phased Adaptive
    Approach is fully supportive of the decision to pursue
    options for a complementary NATO-wide multi-layered BMD
    architecture, which currently is envisioned to use NATO's
    command and control backbone architecture. This is a
    flexible and cost-effective approach that leverages proven
    technologies against a known threat.

    - Most importantly, the Phased Adaptive Approach is designed
    to work in concert with Allied efforts to provide protection
    against ballistic missile attack for all NATO Allies,
    reflecting the Alliance principle of indivisibility of
    security.

    - The Phased Adaptive Approach will provide our most proven
    and operational missile defense capabilities in the
    near-term, defending Allied territory sooner against the
    current Iranian threat.

    - U.S. missile defense efforts will of course be fully
    interoperable with those of NATO.

    - We propose that -- subsequent to Alliance discussions and
    follow-on briefings in greater detail -- the Alliance examine
    how we can integrate the U.S. Phased Adaptive Approach with
    NATO missile defense. This can be discussed further at the
    upcoming defense ministerial in Bratislava.

    - The Phased Adaptive Approach would serve to greatly
    strengthen NATO's missile defense capabilities in the face of
    a growing threat to Alliance security.

    - We look forward to engaging the Alliance in political and
    technical discussions in the weeks ahead.

    FINANCING (if raised)
    - We will work closely with Allies to examine broader
    resourcing requirements for defense of Allied forces,
    territories and populations, including the integration of our
    Phased Adaptive Approach.

    ROLE FOR NATO MEMBERS
    - We have already consulted with the two Allies that had
    agreed to host missile defense assets under the previous
    plan. I want to reiterate that we are deeply appreciative of
    their readiness to take difficult political decisions to
    respond to the need to better protect allied territories and
    populations against the threat of ballistic missiles.

    - We intend to engage in active consultations at NATO on the
    best way forward.

    - The "Phased Adaptive Approach" is flexible and could be
    integrated into a NATO territorial missile defense system.
    There will be a requirement for Allies to host the sensors
    and interceptors to be included in the Phased Adaptive

    STATE 00097244 004 OF 006

    Approach. There are many possibilities, and we look forward
    to continuing our NATO consultations.

    - If pressed: At this time, I would prefer not to get into
    specific issues related to potential Host Nations. We have
    many options in this flexible architecture ) sea- and
    land-based, northern and southern Europe. We intend to
    engage soon at NATO with Allies on those questions.

    - We expect that Allied national systems or current NATO
    systems will be able to integrate well with the overall
    phased approach.

    - Allied contributions can be interoperable with the Phased
    Approach missile defense architecture to ensure they form a
    cost-effective and comprehensive architecture.

    GROUND BASED INTERCEPTORS
    - If needed: The U.S. will continue to develop the GBI
    technology for CONUS defense because domestically it remains
    a cost-effective option. However, we have no plans to pursue
    GBIs in Europe given the promise and track record of SM-3
    technology.

    END TEXT OF TALKING POINTS FOR NATO.

    ¶6. (C/REL RUSSIA) BEGIN TEXT OF TALKING POINTS FOR RUSSIA:

    - The President's missile defense in Europe decision will
    publicly be announced at 10:00 a.m. Washington, D.C. time.
    The National Security Advisor, General Jones, will be
    delivering a similar message to Ambassador Kislyak before the
    announcement.

    - The decision is the result of a long review process; new
    information on the Iranian ballistic missile program drove
    the decision.

    - Iran has made more progress on short-range and medium-range
    ballistic missiles, and less progress on ICBMs than
    anticipated. Now the threat is greater to the Middle East and
    to Europe, with a less immediate threat to the United States.

    - We do not plan to deploy GBIs in Poland and we will not
    base the European Mid-Course radar in the Czech Republic.
    Instead, there will be an adaptive, phased approach.

    - We believe that Iran plans to deploy hundreds of these
    short-range and medium-range ballistic missiles. Our old
    plan was designed to intercept only small numbers of ICBMs.

    - We continue to assess that Iran, at a minimum, is keeping
    open the option to develop nuclear weapons. Tehran could
    choose at any time to restart its nuclear weapons program
    and, eventually, arm its missiles with nuclear warheads.

    - The new plan for European missile defense is better
    designed to protect Europe from this Iranian threat that is
    emerging. We intend to deploy the SM-3 interceptor which is
    what we are deploying in the Middle East as well. SM-3s do
    not have the capability to threaten Russian ICBMs.

    - In the first stages of deployment, we also are seeking to
    place these interceptors closer to Iran (from what I
    understand, this is exactly the idea that President Putin
    proposed to President Bush during their July 2007 meeting at
    Kennebunkport, Maine).

    - The new plan calls for radars and detection systems to be
    deployed closer to Iran. These radars will not have the
    capacity to track Russian ICBMs.

    - With this decision behind us, we now want to move
    aggressively to launch serious cooperation on missile defense
    with Russia.

    - As the President said during his meeting with President

    STATE 00097244 005 OF 006

    Medvedev in April, we want to begin by standing up the Joint
    Data Exchange Center (JDEC). The hope is to share data from
    our respective early-warning systems.

    END TEXT OF TALKING POINTS FOR RUSSIA.

    ¶7. (C/REL JAPAN) BEGIN TEXT OF TALKING POINTS FOR JAPAN:

    - The U.S. greatly appreciates Japan's partnership in BMD; we
    remain deeply committed to strengthening regional BMD
    capabilities including operational cooperation, joint
    research, and co-development.

    - Recent North Korean provocations serve as a reminder of the
    importance of our cooperative missile defense efforts, which
    help underpin a strong U.S.-Japan Alliance and contribute to
    regional stability.

    - We remain committed to an effective defense of the U.S. and
    our Allies against rogue ballistic missile threats, including
    North Korea and, if it continues down its current path, Iran.

    - As you are aware, the BMD Review has undertaken a
    comprehensive examination of our approach to missile
    defenses, including an in-depth look at our approach to
    European missile defense and in other regions around the
    world.
    -- USG discussions with the MOD and MOFA over the last
    several months made clear that you have particular interest
    in the European missile defense analysis -- we understand
    these strategic decisions have an impact in the Asia-Pacific
    region and want to make sure you are fully informed of our
    results.
    -- Throughout the review process the U.S. recognized and
    factored in Japanese concerns/equities especially those
    related to our on-going discussions with the Russian
    Federation.

    - Although the BMD Review report is not due to Congress until
    this January, we have already reached some important
    conclusions. We have decided to move forward with discussing
    results now so we do not delay deploying improved defenses
    for ourselves or our allies.

    OTHER CONSULTATIONS

    - We would like to explain the President's decision to you
    before our public announcement and before we speak with
    Russia. We are discussing this new European approach with
    Poland, the Czech Republic, and NATO, as we speak.
    -- As a close and trusted ally, we consider it important to
    share this information with you. However, in light of past
    problems with information security, we must insist that you
    take every precaution to ensure that this information will
    not be leaked. Any leaks would have significant implications
    for our European missile defense approach, and would be
    damaging to our bilateral relationship. Should there be a
    security breach elsewhere, it is important that our
    governments not officially confirm leaked information if it
    appears in the media before official release by the U.S.
    Government.

    THE PHASED ADAPTIVE APPROACH

    - As you have seen, the new plan for European missile defense
    will use the SM-3 interceptor, both land- and sea-based,
    rather than GBIs included in the previous program.

    - In many ways, your leadership and partnership in the
    development of the SM-3 and in operational coordination have
    been critical to our development of this new approach to
    Europe. Just as we have cooperatively deployed proven and
    transportable missile defenses to help defend against
    ballistic missile threats in the Asia-Pacific region, we will
    deploy those same technologies and capabilities in Europe.

    STATE 00097244 006 OF 006

    - At this time, the new European approach is based on
    U.S.-owned SM-3s. However, we will want to look at future
    missile defense opportunities with NATO and our European
    allies that could include potential sales of a number of
    missile defense capabilities. We would very much like to
    work with Japan to make strategic decisions about whether and
    how our jointly developed missile (i.e., the SM-3 Block IIA)
    could be part of that future, and perhaps part of a future
    networked global system of regional missile defense
    architectures.

    - We look forward to continuing our strong partnership on
    missile defense and growing our cooperative activities.

    BMD FOR JAPAN AND EAST ASIA

    - As mentioned previously, the phased approach in Europe is
    in many ways similar to the approach we have taken with you.
    We believe that our current approach in the Asia- Pacific
    region is sound and forms a model that we can draw upon
    elsewhere. Naturally, we will re-engage with you soon on the
    full findings of our BMD Review.

    IF ASKED ABOUT BURDEN SHARING AT NATO:

    - As you well know, this type of approach creates
    opportunities for participation ) for example, in command
    and control, sensors, and interceptors ) and enhanced
    cooperation, similar to the type that we already enjoy. We
    look forward to engaging with NATO soon about how our new
    approach contributes to common defenses and how we can share
    responsibilities in that effort.

    END TEXT OF TALKING POINTS FOR JAPAN.

    ¶8. (U) BEGIN TEXT OF TALKING POINTS FOR GULF COOPERATION
    COUNCIL STATES (BAHRAIN, KUWAIT, OMAN, QATAR, SAUDI ARABIA,
    UNITED ARAB EMIRATES):

    - The USG has adopted a phased adaptive approach for the
    ballistic missile defense (BMD) of Europe. The approach in
    Europe complements the emerging BMD architecture in the Gulf,
    which is currently defending against potential Iranian air
    and missile threats to our partners and U.S. forces in the
    Gulf region.
    -- We are working to optimize limited assets to ensure that
    programs in Europe will not be executed at the expense of our
    friends and commitment to the defense of the Gulf Cooperation
    Council.
    -- BMD programs in Europe will not require a diversion of
    U.S. assets from the Gulf.

    - The United States has deployed BMD systems to the Middle
    East to protect against the Iranian missile threat, including
    AEGIS BMD presence in the Persian Gulf and two PATRIOT
    batteries each in Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, and the UAE.
    -- These U.S. systems complement the indigenous BMD systems
    in the region including PAC-II capability in Saudi Arabia and
    Kuwait, and Shared Early Warning capability with the UAE.
    -- The USG is exploring the possibility of providing
    additional BMD coverage to Gulf Cooperation Council nations
    if the circumstances warrant.
    -- The USG will continue to work with its Gulf partners to
    develop regional, integrated air and missile defense systems.

    END TEXT OF TALKING POINTS FOR GCC STATES.
    CLINTON

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