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### Viewing cable 09BAGHDAD1104, IRANIAN PLANS FOR IRAQ AS U.S. FORCES DRAW DOWN

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
09BAGHDAD1104 | 2009-04-24 16:04 | 2010-12-05 12:12 | SECRET//NOFORN | Embassy Baghdad

`

    VZCZCXRO8615
    PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHDIR RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
    DE RUEHGB #1104/01 1141621
    ZNY SSSSS ZZH
    P 241621Z APR 09
    FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2832
    INFO RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
    RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

` `

    S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 001104

    NOFORN
    SIPDIS

    DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/I AND NEA/IR
    NSC STAFF FOR OLLIVANT AND MAGSAMEN

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/23/2019
    TAGS: PREL PTER PINR PGOV MOPS ECON IR IZ
    SUBJECT: IRANIAN PLANS FOR IRAQ AS U.S. FORCES DRAW DOWN

    REF: A. WHITE HOUSE 853
    ¶B. BAGHDAD 342
    ¶C. BAGHDAD 762
    ¶D. BAGHDAD 383
    ¶E. BASRA 17
    ¶F. BAGHDAD 1103
    ¶G. BAGHDAD 289

    Classified By: Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Patricia A. Butenis for
    reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

    ¶1. (S) SUMMARY: The Iranian response to the drawdown of U.S.
    military forces in Iraq, and Iraq's evolving relationship
    with Iran, will influence the climate for U.S. engagement
    with Iran on our range of interests. The Iranians may see
    the drawdown as an opportunity to strengthen their hand in
    Iraq, akin to the opportunities they perceived after the fall
    of Saddam in 2003. But they appear to have learned that
    their proxy violence and efforts to strong-arm Iraqi
    politicians generated more ill-will than influence. Iraqis
    are now pushing back against malign Iranian influence. The
    GOI cracked down on Iranian-backed militias and signed
    long-term partnership agreements with the United States last
    year, while this year Iraqi voters rewarded nationalist Iraqi
    politicians in the provincial elections. At the same time,
    Iraqis are buying Iranian products, accepting Iranian
    investments, and welcoming Iranian visitors. The political
    relationship between the countries is maturing, although
    still scratchy.

    ¶2. (S)(Summary continued) Iran in 2009 faces more
    constraints in Iraq than it did in 2003. We expect the
    Iranians will respond to the U.S. military drawdown under
    these new constraints with violence targeted more closely at
    the United States, more diplomatic outreach to Iraqi
    politicians, and continued focus on trade and investment.
    Consistent with ref A, our response must be targeted as well:
    a vigorous response to security challenges, regional
    diplomacy to help Iraq integrate with its neighbors and
    internationally, and increased assistance to Iraq to build
    its political and economic capacity to resist malign
    influence from Iran. END SUMMARY.

    ---------------
    New environment
    ---------------

    ¶3. (S) The Quds Force (QF) -- the external operations arm of
    the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) -- has directed
    Iranian policy in Iraq since the fall of Saddam in 2003. The
    IRGC-QF used its leverage with Shi'a political parties such
    as the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq
    (SCIRI) to influence evolving Iraqi domestic politics, while
    providing extensive logistical support and training to the
    Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM) militia and other extremist groups.
    Tripartite discussions between the USG, GOI, and Iranian
    government in Baghdad in 2007 made no immediate breakthroughs
    toward reducing Iranian sponsorship of violence.

    ¶4. (S) The heavy-handed Iranian intervention backfired,
    however, when the violent and undisciplined JAM alienated
    many Iraqis, who also came to resent Iranian political
    interference. In 2007, SCIRI changed its name to the Islamic
    Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI) to distance itself from its
    Iranian and revolutionary origins, while PM Maliki's Da'wa
    party has staked out a nationalist political position. With
    ISCI's backing, Maliki directed Iraqi security forces to
    challenge JAM control of Basra and Sadr City in 2008,
    succeeding with the extensive but quiet assistance of MNF-I.
    This success, along with growing popular distrust of Iran and
    Iranian influence, contributed to Da'wa's strong showing over
    ISCI in January 2009 provincial elections (ref B). Among
    other recent Iranian setbacks in Iraq, the GOI signed the
    Qother recent Iranian setbacks in Iraq, the GOI signed the
    Security Agreement and Strategic Framework Agreement with the
    USG despite Iranian objections.

    ¶5. (S) Dynamics other than the U.S. military drawdown will
    affect Iranian influence in Iraq in coming years. Iraqis
    will continue to accept legitimate Iranian investment and buy
    Iranian electricity and manufactured goods as Iraqi domestic
    production struggles to rebuild. Iranian agricultural produce
    will continue to fill Iraqi markets as Iraqi farmers recover
    from conflict, neglect, and a drought that has limited
    production. The number of Iranian pilgrims and tourists,
    already in the hundreds of thousands annually, will increase
    with improvements in Iraqi security and tourism
    infrastructure. As the Iraqi-Iranian bilateral relationship
    matures with its positive advances and disputes, the

    BAGHDAD 00001104 002 OF 003

    governments will seek to deepen their cooperation on issues
    such as de-mining, petroleum development and border security,
    although disagreements over border demarcation and water
    rights will continue to cause friction (ref G).

    ¶6. (S) Just as Iraq will try to strengthen relations with
    its Arab neighbors and Turkey to balance Iranian influence,
    Iran will maintain regional influence through relations with
    Syria and domestic influence in Iraq through its TV
    broadcasts into Iraq and relations with Shia political
    parties, the Kurds, and in fact any Iraqis who will have
    them. Ultimately, Iraqi nationalism and self-reliance are
    the most effective long-term defenses against Iranian
    domination, and the degree and nature of Iranian influence in
    Iraq will be determined less by the level of U.S. military
    forces in Iraq than by the Iraqi political and economic
    capacity to balance Iranian influence and channel it into
    mutually beneficial areas.

    --------
    Drawdown
    --------

    ¶7. (S/NF) While it initially criticized the Security
    Agreement, intelligence reporting indicates that Iran is
    beginning to take advantage of the new constraints on U.S.
    military forces. Iranian officials have pressured the GOI to
    close the Mujahedin-e Khalq's Camp Ashraf since the GOI
    assumed security responsibility for it on January 1, as well
    as release IRGC-QF officers detained by MNF-I in January 2007
    as MNF-I turns detainees over to the GOI. (Note: MNF-I and
    Embassy intend to hold the officers as long as legally
    possible. End note.) Even as Iran publicly emphasizes
    diplomatic and economic engagement in Iraq (ref C), the
    IRGC-QF continues to support violent extremist groups such as
    Kata'ib Hizbollah (KH), and Iran may have played a role in
    the recent movement of the extremist group Asa'ib Ahl al-Haqq
    (AAH) away from the political reconciliation process. MNF-I
    analysts expect extremists to continue to use increasingly
    deadly weapons supplied by Iran against U.S. forces this year
    as U.S. forces move outside the cities and present targets
    with little risk of collateral damage. MNF-I also expects
    extremists to respond to the drawdown with attacks on U.S.
    forces in an attempt to take credit for the U.S. departure.

    ¶8. (S) Likewise, the Iranian government will continue to
    publicly portray the drawdown as a victory for the Iraqi
    people and defeat for the United States, perhaps placing it
    in the context of other U.S. military disengagements such as
    Lebanon in 1984 and Somalia in 1993. After the Security
    Agreement was approved, Iranian officials portrayed it
    positively, emphasizing the stipulation that Iraq's territory
    will not be used to attack a neighbor and that U.S. forces
    would leave by the end of 2011.

    ¶9. (S) This public posturing may play on fears we've heard
    from Basra to Anbar to Kurdistan that the U.S. drawdown will
    create a vacuum that Iran will attempt to fill. But if Iran
    adopts too high a public profile, it risks further backlash
    because of nationalistic Iraqi pride as well as economic,
    political and cultural grievances. For example, a Shia
    member of the Council of Representatives warned us recently
    of the pernicious effects of Iran on Shia religious doctrine,
    seeking USG support for a media outlet for Iraqi Shi'a
    clerics who will resist Iranian theology (ref D). Contacts of
    REO Basra blame the rising price of housing on Iranian real
    estate; likewise, Iranian agriculture is blamed for
    undercutting local competition (ref E). The GOI is rejecting
    Qundercutting local competition (ref E). The GOI is rejecting
    Iranian claims to reinstate the 1975 Algiers Accord about the
    Shatt al-Arab, and it is blaming Iranian dams for sharply
    cutting water supplies reaching northeast. Maliki and his
    team do not trust the Iranians and their militia games --
    Basra being a prime example, but also Sadr City and AAH.

    ¶10. (S) While some Iraqi fears of Iranian influence are
    exaggerated, IRGC-QF operatives do expect a more permissive
    operating environment as U.S. forces draw down (ref F). At
    the same time, the drawdown will remove some threats the
    Iranians perceive near the Iran-Iraq border. An Iranian
    Unmanned Arial Vehicle (UAV) shot down by U.S. forces in
    February was sent to scout two such targets: Camp Ashraf and
    a U.S. military base. In the absence of such perceived
    threats, and distracted by economic woes and internal
    discord, it is possible that Iran will become less
    preoccupied with security threats from Iraq. However,
    considering Iran's long history of confrontation with Iraq,
    its unease about enduring Iraqi-American cooperation, and its

    BAGHDAD 00001104 003 OF 003

    delegation of Iraq policy to the belligerent anti-American
    IRGC-QF, Iran will likely continue to support extremists in
    Iraq, perhaps building extremist groups into a Lebanese
    Hezbollah-style political-military organization as a hedge
    against a resurgent Iraqi central government.

    ----------------------------
    New challenges, USG response
    ----------------------------

    ¶11. (S) We will continue to assist the Iraqi government in
    developing that capacity through political, diplomatic,
    economic, rule of law, and security cooperation as outlined
    in Embassy and MNF-I's Joint Campaign Plan and the Mission
    Strategic Plan. Among current initiatives: the Local
    Governance Program to strengthen local government
    administrative capacity and civic engagement; assistance for
    Iraqi farmers to develop the agricultural sector; training
    for the Central Bank's Money Laundering Unit to combat
    financial crime; engagement with Iraq's neighbors to
    strengthen its regional integration; and advice for Iraqi
    officials on an information strategy to respond to malign
    Iranian interference in Iraqi affairs. Success in these
    efforts requires a whole-of-government approach, and
    sufficient funding for non-military initiatives is vital.
    (Note: Ref F outlines a USG strategy for maintaining pressure
    on the IRGC-QF in Iraq as U.S. military forces draw down.)

    -------
    Comment
    -------

    ¶12. (S) The view of Iran from Iraq is shaped by complaints
    from Iraqi businessmen about Iranian competition, warnings
    from Iraqis on the street about Iranian expansionism,
    whispers from Iraqi politicians about Iranian influence, and
    the occasional sound of Iranian munitions whistling overhead.
    While none of these need necessarily affect the USG approach
    on engagement with Iran, Iran's response to the drawdown of
    U.S. military forces in Iraq will not improve the climate for
    talks. In fact, elements of the Iranian government opposed to
    engagement with America may use the instigation of violence
    in Iraq as a spoiler. However, the Iraqi government and
    Iraqi people are not as vulnerable as they were in 2003; they
    are increasingly willing and able to defend their own
    interests. Continued strengthening of the Iraqi-American
    partnership will improve their capacity to counter and
    balance Iranian influence, and keeping Iraq informed of our
    progress on engagement with Iran will allay concerns that
    Iraq's national interests are on the table.
    BUTENIS

`