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### Viewing cable 02ANKARA9058, WOLFOWITZ AND GROSSMAN PRESS TURKS FOR SUPPORT ON

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
02ANKARA9058 | 2002-12-20 08:08 | 2011-03-18 15:03 | SECRET | Embassy Ankara
Appears in these articles: http://www.taraf.com.tr/haber/amerika-nin-gul-le-savas-pazarligi.htm

`

    This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

` `

    S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 07 ANKARA 009058

    SIPDIS

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/09/2012
    TAGS: PREL MARR MOPS TU
    SUBJECT: WOLFOWITZ AND GROSSMAN PRESS TURKS FOR SUPPORT ON
    IRAQ

    (U) Classified by Ambassador W. Robert Pearson, reasons 1.5,
    b/d.

    Summary
    -------
    1 . (S) On December 3, Deputy Secretary of Defense Wolfowitz
    and Under Secretary of State Grossman met with new Turkish PM
    Gul, an interagency group chaired by MFA Under Secretary
    Ziyal, Turkish Deputy Chief of Defense General Buyukanit
    (DCHOD), leader of the opposition Baykal, and MND Gonul.  At
    each meeting DepSecDef emphasized the urgency for clarity on
    what role Turkey is prepared to play in possible military
    actions in Iraq.  Specifically, DepSecDef noted that without
    the imminent resumption of military-to-military talks, site
    surveys of Turkish facilities, and site preparations, the
    "Northern Option" would soon be out of the question.
    DepSecDef noted the USG needed an answer by December 6 and
    outlined the significant assistance package the USG was
    prepared to provide should Turkey decide to become a full
    partner.  GOT officials reiterated their redlines for an Iraq
    operation and highlighted the potential risks to Turkey and
    its economy.  Gul agreed to resume military-to-military
    planning and to allow the U.S. to conduct site surveys of
    Turkish military facilities.  However, he pleaded for
    additional time on the more fundamental decisions concerning
    Turkey's possible contributions, including site preparations,
    troop lists, role of coalition forces, and Turkish
    participation in the Northern Option.  The GOT took the
    opportunity to underscore the importance of Turkey's
    relationship with the EU and Cyprus.

    Turkish Prime Minister Gul
    --------------------------

    ¶2. (S) After congratulating Gul on his recent formation of a
    new government, DepSecDef stated he and U/S Grossman were
    sent by President Bush to Ankara to discuss Turkey's
    potential contribution to preparations for possible military
    action against Iraq.  Fully recognizing that PM Gul has been
    in office only a very short time, DepSecDef underscored the
    "real urgency" for a decision on the role Turkey would be
    willing to play.

    ¶3. (S) Noting that Turkey and the United States have had
    good, detailed discussions on the matter since last July,
    DepSecDef reminded Gul that President Bush has made no
    decision on whether to go to war with Iraq.  The USG is
    making efforts to resolve this crisis peacefully, but the
    President is determined to have Iraq disarmed of its weapons
    of mass destruction, "voluntarily if possible, but, if
    necessary, by force."  The US, DepSecDef added, is asking
    Turkey to be involved in the planning and preparation for the
    use of force against Iraq.  The only chance for a peaceful
    outcome is to build a determined show of force.  Military
    force is the underpinning of our diplomacy.

    ¶4. (S) Repeating what the USG has told Ankara it needs from
    Turkey, DepSecDef reviewed several key requests:

    - Resumption of military-to-military planning talks;
    - Permission to conduct site surveys and begin site
    preparation of specified Turkish military facilities;
    - Turkish participation in the development of the Northern
    Option;
    - Acceptance of proposed troop lists, including the role of
    possible coalition forces such as the United Kingdom;
    - Removal of constraints on Operation Northern Watch;
    - Approval of overflight rights; and,
    - Support, if necessary, against terrorists in Northern Iraq.
     (DepSecDef noted the presence of several hundred suspected
    terrorists in Khurmal.)

    ¶5. (S) DepSecDef reemphasized the need to get an answer from
    Turkey as the time is approaching when planning will have to
    switch from preparing for both a Northern Option and a
    Southern Option, to solely pursuing a Southern Option.  He
    added that if the US acts militarily against Saddam Hussein,
    it would do so with a significant number of other countries.
    DepSecDef reiterated that Turkey's red lines on military
    action against Iraq were also U.S. red lines:

    --The territorial integrity of Iraq would be preserved;
    --There would be no independent Kurdish state;
    --The rights and welfare of the Turkoman people would be
    protected;
    --Iraqi national control of Kirkuk and Mosul would be
    retained; and,
    --Iraqi national control of the nation's oil would be
    retained.

    ¶6. (S) Turkey, DepSecDef stated, has much to gain by
    participating in a military action against Iraq.  The
    conflict would be less risky, shorter in duration, and less
    economically damaging to Turkey's and the region's economies.
     The potential for creation of a vacuum in northern Iraq
    would be less likely.  The conflict's aftermath would be
    easier to manage.  DepSecDef stated that the United States is
    very aware of Turkey's concerns about the economic risks such
    military action could generate.  For that reason, POTUS is
    ready to work with Congress to provide a substantial
    assistance package for Turkey.  If the US and Turkey go to
    war against Iraq, this package would include:

    - $2 billion/yr for two years of some mix of Foreign Military
    Financing (FMF) and Economic Support Funds (ESF), the latter
    being synchronized with World Bank and IMF disbursements;
    - $1 billion in oil to be donated by other nations; and,
    - Up to $500 million in local procurement by U.S. defense
    forces.

    ¶7. (S) If Turkey commits fully, but war proves unnecessary,
    the President is ready to ask Congress for $250 million in
    FY04 assistance and hopes to augment that amount with another
    $105 million.  That would be $175 million in FMF, $175
    million in ESF, and $5 million in International Military
    Education and Training funding (IMET). Complementing this
    would be closer cooperation on missile defense, greater
    access to excess defense articles, and improvements to
    facilities at Incirlik and Konya military bases.

    ¶10. (S) DepSecDef warned that if Turkey declines this
    request, a war against Iraq could last longer, making it
    costlier and less certain about events in northern Iraq.
    DepSecDef emphasized the U.S. need for clarity from Turkey on
    its role in order to plan appropriately.  If not, planning
    must focus solely on the Southern Option without Turkey.
    DepSecDef asked for a decision by the end of the week,
    December 6.

    ¶11. (S) PM Gul exclaimed "by the end of the week?!"  He
    followed up by stating Turkey and the US have been strategic
    partners for decades, and Turkey wants to continue and to
    deepen that relationship.  However, the government had just
    received its confidence vote, and it has only received two
    briefings on this matter. "We have followed this issue but,
    of course, it's different when you are in office," Gul added.
     Moreover, many pressing issues are on the government's
    agenda, including the approaching EU Copenhagen Summit and
    Cyprus.

    ¶12. (S) Gul acknowledged that Iraq is led by a bad regime
    that has caused great suffering.  He conceded that Iraq's
    weapons of mass destruction are dangerous to Turkey and the
    entire region.  "We know that war is not good.  It is to be
    avoided, but we understand your points."  He added that
    Turkey has historical roots in Iraq and that Turkish security
    is directly affected by events in northern Iraq.

    ¶13. (S) "To give a political decision, we need some time,
    frankly speaking," Gul stated.  Time is needed to shape
    public opinion.  Gul repeated twice again that Turkey can say
    yes to the requests, but the government needs more time to
    update itself on the situation, must go to parliament, and
    must shape public opinion.  He stated that Turkey's fragile
    economy is an issue with millions of unemployed.  Military
    action against Iraq could damage progress underway in
    economic reform.  He emphasized, "We will cooperate, we will
    cooperate, but we need time to study as the new Foreign
    Minister knows little and the new Defense Minister knows
    little."

    ¶14. (S) Under Secretary of Foreign Affairs Ugur Ziyal
    intervened making two key assertions:  First, the offer
    DepSecDef reviewed was not commensurate with the risks and
    costs Turkey is being asked to bear.  Second, Turkey is
    entering a decisive phase in its relationship with Europe due
    to the approaching EU summit and current state of Cyprus
    settlement negotiations.  "If we do not pass these two
    hurdles (attaining a date for EU accession negotiations and a
    resolution of Cyprus), the devastation will preclude our
    ability to participate in an attack on Iraq.  We cannot give
    you an answer before December 12, the date of the Copenhagen
    Summit."  Ziyal added he had not briefed the Prime Minister
    on the terrorist danger present in Khurmal, but if the issue
    is terrorism, Turkey will of course be with the US.  PM Gul
    interjected, "We will fight with you against all types of
    terrorism."

    ¶15. (S) DepSecDef stated the most urgent priority now is the
    need to resume planning talks, to initiate site surveys, and
    then to do site preparations.  The next major decision point
    will be deploying troops to prepare for war.  The ultimate
    decision point would be the decision to go to war.  If
    diplomacy is going to be effective, we need to move forward,
    he added.  Ziyal noted that the resumption of
    military-to-military planning and site surveys could go
    forward without parliamentary approval, after which the Prime
    Minister agreed the military-to-military planning talks can
    go forward.

    ¶16. (S) Ambassador Grossman stated that POTUS is putting much
    effort forward to support Turkey's desire to get a date for
    accession negotiations from the European Union -- "You can
    count on us to press this line all through December 12."
    Momentum is developing toward this goal due to progress in
    Turkey's democratic reforms and progress in the Cyprus
    negotiations.  Grossman urged the new Turkish government to
    make a concrete commitment to the UN Secretary General's
    Cyprus plan as a basis for agreement.  Doing so would
    positively affect Turkey's prospects to attain a date certain
    from the EU for accession negotiations.

    ¶17. (S) PM Gul responded that his government is talking to
    Turkish Cypriot President Denktash.  He emphasized that
    Turkey will inevitably join the EU, "That is our mentality."
    When Turkey joins, he asserted, the EU will become more of a
    world player.  Turkey's membership would send a message to
    the Muslim world that being democratic is attractive.

    ¶18. (S) DepSecDef added that it is "an incredible strategic
    opportunity for the EU and I hope it doesn't blow it."  But
    in practical terms, EU accession and Cyprus are tied.
    Progress on the latter would be a huge step forward toward
    the former.  It would enable the US to be even more helpful
    to Turkey.  Closing the meeting, DepSecDef responded to
    Ziyal's criticism of the assistance package, stating that
    "the numbers may not be big to you, but they are big to our
    government.  They represent a major Presidential commitment."
     He urged the Turkish government not to go public with these
    figures. The public line should be simply that: The United
    States is ready to assist Turkey.

    Roundtable Discussion at MFA
    ----------------------------

    ¶19. (S) Ziyal then hosted DepSecDef and Grossman at an
    hour-long interagency meeting at the Ministry of Foreign
    Affairs.  The meeting focused on the Turks' proposal for a
    bilateral standby fund intended to sustain market confidence
    in Turkey's economy in the event of war with Iraq.  DepSecDef
    agreed to explore the merits of the proposal.  Following
    Ziyal's recap of DepSecDef's earlier meeting with PM Gul,
    they discussed the Prime Minister's agreement to re-start
    mil-mil planning talks and to permit site surveys of Turkey's
    military facilities.  U/S Grossman had a long, follow-on
    discussion with the MFA representatives about Cyprus.  He
    argued that now is the best time to resolve Cyprus -- before
    the EU decides on Cyprus accession December 12-13 -- and that
    the GOT should simply sign the first two pages of the UN plan.

    ¶20. (S) Bilateral Standby Fund:  Ziyal opened the meeting by
    asking Treasury U/S Oztrak to report on his assessment of the
    economic consequences Turkey would face in the event of war
    with Iraq.  Oztrak estimated the impact of an Iraq operation
    in terms of the financing gap for 2003:  $47 billion best
    case (short war) to $58 billion worst case (long war).  A
    war, he predicted, would cause oil and natural gas price
    rises, export decline, and loss of tourism and oil pipeline
    revenues.  Psychological effects would lead to decreased
    consumer spending, loss of tax revenues, and increased
    government spending for social security and refugees.
    Interest rates would rise 10% and the lira's exchange rate
    against the dollar would fall by 28%.  Post-conflict
    uncertainty would have a substantial impact on the economy.
    Oztrak also mentioned indirect costs to Turkey such as an
    economic slowdown in Europe which could dampen Turkey's
    export trade.  He then boiled the factors down to three:
    losses in revenue, increased expenditures, and limits on
    access to financial markets.

    ¶21. (S) Both Oztrak and Ziyal argued for "early and
    substantial" US financial support in the form of a "standby"
    arrangement, mentioning a figure of $20 billion.  This, they
    said, would be the best way to positively influence the
    perception of the markets that the US would "not let Turkey
    go down the drain" and that the Turkish economy would "stay
    afloat."  Turkey would be allowed to draw on these standby
    funds only to the degree it needed them -- less in the best
    case and more in the worse cases.  Oztrak accepted Ambassador
    Pearson's point that the Turks' analysis had not factored in
    any of the possible medium- to longer-term benefits DepSecDef
    had outlined, such as an upturn in trade relations with Iraq
    and other neighbors as well as increased tourism in a more
    stable region.  Oztrak also confirmed to U/S Grossman that
    Turkey much preferred that the USG control the escrow account
    rather than negotiate a new IMF standby, which "would have
    too many conditionalities."

    ¶22. (S) DepSecDef said the Turkish "standby" approach might
    be an alternative to the President's package he had outlined
    to the PM.  We could not do both. The problem was how to
    devise a mechanism to mitigate negative market effects and
    create a fund Turkey could draw on only as needed.
    DepSecDef agreed with Ziyal's suggestion to open a "third
    channel" (in addition to the existing political and military
    ones) of economic experts to discuss the feasibility of the
    Turkish approach.  Ziyal urged the US to begin its
    consultations with Capital Hill on an aid package for Turkey
    even as the economic experts talk, in order not to lose time.

    ¶23. (S) Site Surveys and Military-to-Military Planning Talks:
     Ziyal recapped the decisions reached in the PM's meeting:
    "yes" to site surveys, and re-starting the mil-mil
    discussions.  The PM understood the need to "impress" Saddam
    visibly through overt cooperation.  Although Turkey
    understood the urgency the US attached to a political
    decision on furthering such cooperation, including stationing
    US and possibly other coalition (possibly British) troops in
    Turkey, Ziyal said that would be impossible before the
    December 12 Copenhagen EU Summit.  The Parliament would have
    to debate and approve any influx of foreign troops into
    Turkey.

    ¶24. (S) DepSecDef underscored the need to allow site
    preparation teams into Turkey.  They would send a strong
    signal to Saddam about the seriousness of the coalition's
    resolve.  The US was prepared to spend $200-300 million on
    needed construction.  LTG Casey said this could involve up to
    6,000 engineers and logisticians.  TGS Deputy J3 MG Kalyoncu
    said the GOT would have to study the "legal" aspects of
    bringing in such large numbers of "foreign groups."

    ¶25. (S) The Growing Coalition:  In response to Ziyal's query
    about the composition of the coalition, DeSecDef responded
    that he knew of at least 23 NATO members and aspirants who
    would be with us either unconditionally (16) or under another
    UNSCR (7).  He thought France and Russia would also come
    around.  In the Gulf region, most countries were committed
    privately while saying otherwise publicly.  In response to
    Ziyal's question, he admitted Egypt's and Saudi Arabia's
    positions were less clear, but he thought they would end up
    supporting any operation.

    ¶26. (S) DepSecDef warned again that further delay in Turkish
    decision-making could sideline the Northern Option.  Planning
    for the South was already far advanced.  While the site prep
    teams could not actually start before mid-January, we need to
    know now--before they start--that Turkey would indeed allow
    US and possibly other coalition troops to come to Turkey.
    The big decision on actual use of force could come later.

    ¶27. (S) Finally, D/US for the Mideast Tuygan called attention
    to the upcoming (13-15 Dec.) Iraqi Opposition conference in
    London.  The Group of Six had become too powerful, to the
    exclusion of the Turkomen.  Turkey insisted that the Turkomen
    be included in the core group.  Ziyal later emphasized that
    this is a critical concern for Turkey.

    DCHOD Buyukanit
    ---------------

    ¶28. (S) USG Request for Military Support:  DCHOD stated the
    TGS was very familiar with US military requirements as well
    as with the discussion DepSecDef had earlier that day with PM
    Gul.  The TGS will deliver a detailed brief on Iraq to the
    new government on 9 Dec. 02.  The purpose of the TGS briefing
    will be to help the government reach necessary political
    decisions.

    ¶29. (S) DepSecDef proposed that potentially three sets of
    decisions are needed:  (1) The first decision set, needed
    now, is to resume mil-to-mil planning talks, and to
    immediately initiate site surveys that would be followed by
    site preparations beginning early to mid January 03.  (2) The
    second decision concerns acceptance of foreign troops on
    Turkish soil, recognizing that the earliest likely troop
    deployment would be 4-6 weeks from now. (3) The final
    decision would be to use force, should the President of the
    United States decide to do so (a decision he has not yet
    made).  DepSecDef expressed appreciation that the Turkish PM
    recognized the USG need for a timely response and personally
    gave earlier that day his approval for immediately resuming
    mil-to-mil planning and initiating site surveys.

    ¶30. (S) DCHOD asked what role NATO could play in an Iraqi
    operation, emphasizing that it would be very helpful for
    Turkey to have some NATO cover.  DepSecDef replied that NATO
    mechanisms could in principle be used for infrastructure
    improvements as well as potential Article 5 scenarios if
    conflict made it necessary to defend Turkey.  Ambassador
    Pearson added that NATO's Prague Summit statement supporting
    UNSCR 1441 could be useful in providing a NATO "umbrella" for
    Turkish site surveys and site preparations.  TGS Dep J3
    emphasized that a parliamentary decision would be needed for
    any troop deployments, whether they were engineers conducting
    site preparations or combat troops.

    ¶31. (S) Turkey is Prepared to Deploy to Northern Iraq:  DCHOD
    stated that the Turkish military has almost completed
    preparations to prevent immigration and to control IDPs
    inside Iraq, should military operations be required.  In the
    event that Turkish forces deploy to Northern Iraq, the DCHOD
    asked the USG to emphasize to Iraqi groups that Turkish
    forces were not there as an occupying force.  DepSecDef
    responded that the best way to convince the northern Iraqi
    groups was to integrate all forces into a coordinated
    coalition that could both manage the IDP challenges and exert
    pressure on Baghdad.  DepSecDef again reiterated the value of
    a two-front war to expedite successful operations; he also
    noted that the potential role for UK forces was not "in"
    northern Iraq, but deploying "through" northern Iraq.

    ¶32. (S) NATO Command Structure Review:  DCHOD related that
    the TGS was "not happy" with a recently received draft NATO
    command structure document (MC324).  The draft did not
    include any criteria by which to justify or rationalize the
    NATO HQ structures and their proposed locations.  It gave an
    appearance of taking a "sudden decision" without proper
    criteria.  DepSecDef agreed that criteria needed to be
    included and that USG was equally frustrated with the timing
    of the document.

    Parliamentary Opposition CHP Leader Baykal
    ------------------------------------------

    ¶33. (C) In his meeting with CHP and opposition leader Baykal,
    DepSecDef highlighted US support for Turkey's EU candidacy
    and for a definite accession negotiations date for Turkey to
    be granted during the EU Copenhagen summit.  He reiterated
    the USG view that the UN proposal for a Cyprus settlement
    represents a way to a rapid solution and that turkey should
    accept as the basis for further negotiations.  On Iraq,
    DepSecDef underscored that:
    - The US is working with a coalition of nations;
    - The only way to hope for a peaceful resolution is to
    demonstrate a credible threat of force;
    - We recognize Turkey's economic vulnerabilities;
    - All nations will benefit if Iraq becomes a free, open and
    prosperous country; and,
    - If war proves necessary, a strong coalition, including
    Turkey, is critical to ensuring that the conflict is short
    and to reducing its costs and risks.
    ¶27. (C) EU accession: Baykal regretted that an earlier
    Turkish government (read: his rival Ecevit) had failed to
    grasp the opportunity to join the EU at the same time as
    Greece.  As a result, Turkey now works at a disadvantage
    compared to Greece.  But CHP is committed to pursuing
    Turkey's EU candidacy and, in this regard, will support
    efforts to this end by the AK government.  A "date for a
    date" from Copenhagen is not enough.  We all need to know
    whether Turkey is a European or Middle Eastern country.  If
    Turkey is rebuffed by the EU and at the same time is forced
    to cooperate with the US in an Iraq operation, especially in
    northern Iraq, then the country could become destabilized.
    If Turkey feels it is accepted as European, it can raise the
    level of its cooperation with the US; in any event, relations
    with the US are the pillar of Turkey's foreign policy.

    ¶28.  (C) Cyprus: while supporting a fair and peaceful
    solution, Baykal expressed reservations whether a solution is
    possible in a short time and asserted CHP's dissatisfaction
    with the UN paper.  First, a solution has to start from the
    post-'74 bizonality in which each community is homogeneous.
    Second, the paper would have Cyprus revert to a pre-'74
    arrangement.  One-third of the Greek Cypriots would move back
    to the north, which would thus have two ethnic groups,
    whereas the Greek Cypriot south would remain homogeneous,
    thereby creating a disequilibrium which would lead to loss of
    political equality over the next 20 years.  CHP economic guru
    Dervis added that mixing the populations too fast would risk
    an incident, e.g., a killing, which would toss 10 years of
    good will out the window instantly.  Third, Baykal continued,
    the proposed boundary lines are a problem.

    ¶29. (C) Iraq: reiterating his preference for a peaceful
    diplomatic solution, Baykal called for the elimination of WMD
    from the region around Turkey and expressed his desire for a
    democratic, peaceful regime in Baghdad  He acknowledged how
    critically important the Iraq question is for the US. And he
    noted that sometimes it is impossible for a country like
    Turkey to decide its own preferences in the face of the
    strategic interests of a country like the US.  If
    intervention is inescapable, then:
    - It should be carried out under international legitimacy
    with a clear legal basis;
    - The burden on Turkey, both financial and refugee, must be
    eliminated to avoid the damage done to Turkey's economic,
    social and political fabric under the economic and refugee
    impact of the Gulf War;
    - It is essential to maintain the territorial integrity of
    Iraq (and in this regard Baykal wants a clear picture of how
    Turkey's concerns about Kurdish independence movements will
    be met); and
    - Any solution must take into account the interests of the
    Turkomen who face Saddam Hussein's efforts to eliminate their
    identity and homeland in and around Kirkuk.

    MOD Gonul
    ---------

    ¶30. (S) DEPSECDEF's meeting with the new AK Party Minister
    of Defense was largely unsubstantive.  Not only is Turkey's
    Defense Ministry restricted also exclusively to defense
    procurement issues, but Gonul admitted he had not yet been
    briefed on Iraq.  DEPSECDEF outlined the nature of our close
    and transparent consultations to date, stressing that joint
    military planning is our best chance for peace.  Saddam would
    only change his mind about obeying UNSCRs if he is convinced
    the only alternative is his removal by force.  He would be
    convinced by actions, not words. Gonul agreed on the need to
    be firm on UNSCR 1441.  He asserted that Saddam had thus far
    complied with 1441 and urged the US to await the inspection
    reports before deciding on a military option.  A Turkish
    decision to cooperate, especially if it offered troops, would
    be a huge decision.  DYP Chairman Ciller had lost many votes
    by implying she would commit Turkish troops if she became PM.
     That said, Gonul said Turkey would cooperate with the US, as
    it always had, but he hoped it would not be in a crisis.

    31.(S) DEPSECDEF cautioned against "over-scaring" the Turkish
    people about a possible Iraq operation.  Economic problems
    largely spring from psychological reasons.  Any war could be
    over relatively quickly and result in some substantial
    benefits for Turkey.  The government should begin
    accentuating the positive.
    ¶32. (U) This cable has been cleared by DepSecDef Wolfowitz
    and U/S Grossman.
    PEARSON

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