Cable Viewer

Currently released so far... 5947 / 251,287

### Articles

Brazil Sri Lanka United Kingdom Sweden Editorial United States Latin America Egypt Yemen Jordan

### Browse latest releases

2010/11 2010/12 2011/01 2011/02 2011/03
2010/11/28 2010/11/29 2010/11/30
2010/12/01 2010/12/02 2010/12/03 2010/12/04 2010/12/05 2010/12/06 2010/12/07 2010/12/08 2010/12/09 2010/12/10 2010/12/11 2010/12/12 2010/12/13 2010/12/14 2010/12/15 2010/12/16 2010/12/17 2010/12/18 2010/12/19 2010/12/20 2010/12/21 2010/12/22 2010/12/23 2010/12/24 2010/12/25 2010/12/26 2010/12/27 2010/12/28 2010/12/29 2010/12/30
2011/01/01 2011/01/02 2011/01/04 2011/01/05 2011/01/07 2011/01/09 2011/01/10 2011/01/11 2011/01/12 2011/01/13 2011/01/14 2011/01/15 2011/01/16 2011/01/17 2011/01/18 2011/01/19 2011/01/20 2011/01/21 2011/01/22 2011/01/23 2011/01/24 2011/01/25 2011/01/26 2011/01/27 2011/01/28 2011/01/29 2011/01/30 2011/01/31
2011/02/01 2011/02/02 2011/02/03 2011/02/04 2011/02/05 2011/02/06 2011/02/07 2011/02/08 2011/02/09 2011/02/10 2011/02/11 2011/02/12 2011/02/13 2011/02/14 2011/02/15 2011/02/16 2011/02/17 2011/02/18 2011/02/19 2011/02/20 2011/02/21 2011/02/22 2011/02/23 2011/02/24 2011/02/25 2011/02/26 2011/02/27 2011/02/28
2011/03/01 2011/03/02 2011/03/03 2011/03/04 2011/03/05 2011/03/06 2011/03/07 2011/03/08 2011/03/09 2011/03/10 2011/03/11 2011/03/13 2011/03/14 2011/03/15 2011/03/16 2011/03/17 2011/03/18 2011/03/19

### Browse by creation date

66 72 73 75 79 86 88 89 90 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10
1966/12
1972/02 1972/08
1973/04
1975/03
1979/08
1986/05
1988/01
1989/12
1990/01 1990/07 1990/08 1990/10
2000/06 2000/09 2000/11
2001/02 2001/03 2001/07 2001/10
2002/02 2002/03 2002/11 2002/12
2003/02 2003/03 2003/04 2003/05 2003/06 2003/07 2003/08 2003/09 2003/10 2003/11 2003/12
2004/01 2004/02 2004/03 2004/04 2004/05 2004/06 2004/07 2004/08 2004/09 2004/10 2004/11 2004/12
2005/01 2005/02 2005/03 2005/04 2005/05 2005/06 2005/07 2005/08 2005/09 2005/10 2005/11 2005/12
2006/01 2006/02 2006/03 2006/04 2006/05 2006/06 2006/07 2006/08 2006/09 2006/10 2006/11 2006/12
2007/01 2007/02 2007/03 2007/04 2007/05 2007/06 2007/07 2007/08 2007/09 2007/10 2007/11 2007/12
2008/01 2008/02 2008/03 2008/04 2008/05 2008/06 2008/07 2008/08 2008/09 2008/10 2008/11 2008/12
2009/01 2009/02 2009/03 2009/04 2009/05 2009/06 2009/07 2009/08 2009/09 2009/10 2009/11 2009/12
2010/01 2010/02

### Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z
Embassy Athens Embassy Asuncion Embassy Astana Embassy Asmara Embassy Ashgabat Embassy Ankara Embassy Amman Embassy Algiers Embassy Addis Ababa Embassy Accra Embassy Abuja Embassy Abu Dhabi Embassy Abidjan Consulate Amsterdam American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura Embassy Buenos Aires Embassy Budapest Embassy Bucharest Embassy Brussels Embassy Bridgetown Embassy Bratislava Embassy Brasilia Embassy Bogota Embassy Bishkek Embassy Bern Embassy Berlin Embassy Belgrade Embassy Beirut Embassy Beijing Embassy Banjul Embassy Bangkok Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan Embassy Bamako Embassy Baku Embassy Baghdad Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen Embassy Conakry Embassy Colombo Embassy Chisinau Embassy Caracas Embassy Canberra Embassy Cairo Consulate Curacao Consulate Ciudad Juarez Consulate Chennai Consulate Casablanca Consulate Cape Town
Embassy Dushanbe Embassy Dublin Embassy Doha Embassy Djibouti Embassy Dhaka Embassy Dar Es Salaam Embassy Damascus Embassy Dakar Consulate Dubai
Embassy Freetown
Embassy Guatemala Embassy Gaborone Consulate Guadalajara
Embassy Helsinki Embassy Harare Embassy Hanoi Consulate Hermosillo Consulate Hamburg
Iran RPO Dubai Embassy Islamabad Consulate Istanbul
Embassy Jakarta Consulate Jerusalem Consulate Jeddah
Embassy Kyiv Embassy Kuwait Embassy Kuala Lumpur Embassy Kinshasa Embassy Kigali Embassy Khartoum Embassy Kathmandu Embassy Kampala Embassy Kabul
Embassy Luxembourg Embassy Luanda Embassy London Embassy Ljubljana Embassy Lisbon Embassy Lima Embassy Lilongwe Embassy La Paz Consulate Lagos
Mission USNATO Embassy Muscat Embassy Moscow Embassy Montevideo Embassy Monrovia Embassy Minsk Embassy Mexico Embassy Mbabane Embassy Maputo Embassy Manama Embassy Managua Embassy Malabo Embassy Madrid Consulate Munich Consulate Montreal Consulate Monterrey Consulate Milan
Embassy New Delhi Embassy Nassau Embassy Nairobi Consulate Naples
Embassy Ouagadougou Embassy Ottawa Embassy Oslo
Embassy Pristina Embassy Pretoria Embassy Prague Embassy Port Au Prince Embassy Phnom Penh Embassy Paris Embassy Paramaribo Embassy Panama Consulate Peshawar
Embassy Quito
REO Basrah Embassy Rome Embassy Riyadh Embassy Riga Embassy Reykjavik Embassy Rangoon Embassy Rabat Consulate Rio De Janeiro Consulate Recife
Secretary of State Embassy Stockholm Embassy Sofia Embassy Skopje Embassy Singapore Embassy Seoul Embassy Sarajevo Embassy Santo Domingo Embassy Santiago Embassy Sanaa Embassy San Salvador Embassy San Jose Consulate Strasbourg Consulate Shenyang Consulate Shanghai Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis Embassy Tripoli Embassy Tokyo Embassy The Hague Embassy Tel Aviv Embassy Tehran Embassy Tegucigalpa Embassy Tbilisi Embassy Tashkent Embassy Tallinn Consulate Tijuana
USUN New York USEU Brussels US Mission Geneva US Interests Section Havana US Delegation, Secretary UNVIE Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius Embassy Vienna Embassy Vatican Consulate Vladivostok
Embassy Windhoek Embassy Wellington Embassy Warsaw
Embassy Yerevan Embassy Yaounde
Embassy Zagreb

### Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
AR AJ ASEC AE AEMR AF AMGT APER AG AM AS AU AORC AGMT AFIN ABUD ATRN AL APECO ACOA AO AX AMED ADCO AODE AFFAIRS AC ASIG ABLD AA AFU ASUP AROC ATFN AVERY APCS AER ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG AEC ASEAN AID
BU BM BEXP BR BA BRUSSELS BL BK BO BILAT BTIO BH BE BX BIDEN BY BG BF BB BC BBSR BMGT BTIU
CH CU CJAN CMGT CVIS CO CA CE COUNTER CASC CBW CG CLINTON CI CS CDG CIA CACM CDB CD CV CF CN CAN CIS CM CONDOLEEZZA COE CR CY CTM COUNTRY CLEARANCE CPAS CWC CT CKGR CB CACS COM CJUS CARSON CL CODEL COUNTERTERRORISM
DJ DA DEAX DR DHS DOE DEA DK DISENGAGEMENT DS DTRA DOD
EINV ECON ENRG EPET ETRD EAGR ELAB EUN EFIN EU EAID EIND ETTC EG ECPS EWWT ES EXTERNAL EMIN ECIP EINDETRD EN EAIR EZ ER ET EUC EI ELTN EREL ECIN EFIS EINT EC ETC ECONEFIN ENVR ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS ECA ELN EFTA ENIV EINVETC EINN ENGR EUR ESA ENERG EK ENGY ETRO ETRDEINVTINTCS ESENV ENVI ETRDECONWTOCS ECONCS ENNP ELECTIONS ECUN EINVEFIN
FR FJ FINR FAO FTAA FREEDOM FI FARC FBI FMLN
GM GZ GG GTMO GOI GV GH GA GE GT GR GTIP GCC GAZA GANGS GY
HO HURI HILLARY HA HU HR HUMAN HYMPSK HK HSTC
IR IS IZ IN IT INRB IAEA ID IO IV ICTY IQ ICAO INTERPOL IPR IRAJ INRA INRO IC IIP ILC ITPHUM IWC ISRAELI IRAQI ICRC IMO IF IEFIN INTELSAT IL IA IBRD IMF INR IRC ITRA IACI ICJ ITALY ITALIAN
JAMES JA JO JOSEPH JP JOHNNIE JM JUS
KCRM KCOR KDEM KPAO KG KTIP KICC KNNP KV KBCT KPAL KTFN KU KSPR KJUS KHLS KTIA KWBG KMDR KGHG KN KUNR KS KIRF KISL KFRD KIPR KAWC KPWR KCIP KSUM KWAC KMIG KOLY KZ KAWK KSEC KIFR KDRG KDEMAF KFIN KGIC KOMC KGCC KPIN KBIO KHIV KSCA KE KPKO KNUC KPLS KIRC KACT KRAD KCOM KMCA KHDP KFLO KVPR KDEV KWMN KMPI KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KTLA KCFC KPRP KCFE KOCI KTDB KMRS KLIG KGIT KSTC KPAK KNEI KSEP KPOA KFLU KNUP KNNPMNUC KO KTER KHUM KRFD KBTR KDDG KWWMN KSAF KBTS KPRV KNPP KNAR KWMM KERG KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KTBT KCRS KRVC KSTH KREL KNSD KTEX KPAI KHSA KOMS KVIR KR
LY LG LE LH LU LI LO LOG LT LAB
MCAP MO MNUC MARR MASS MPOS MOPS MAR MD MX MZ MY MEPP MA MR ML MIL MTCRE MOPPS MTCR MAPP MU MG MASC MCC MK MTRE MP MDC MEPI MRCRE MI MT MQADHAFI MAPS MUCN MASSMNUC MERCOSUR MC MV
NATO NI NZ NG NU NO NL NIPP NPT NRR NE NS NAR NPG NK NSG NA NT NASA NGO NP NSF NATIONAL
OVIP OTRA OPRC OSCI OTR OVP OREP ODIP OPDC OIIP OFFICIALS OSAC OAS OEXC OFDP OECD OSCE OPIC OPCW OIE OIC
PINR PGOV PBTS PREL PTER PE PO PROP PHUM PBIO PARM PECON PINS PM PHSA PK PREF PL PAK PINT POGOV PINL POL PSOE PKFK PGOF PA PUNE PARMS PORG PMIL PTERE PF PALESTINIAN PY PGGV PNR POV PAO PFOR PHALANAGE PARTY PRGOV PNAT PROV PEL PINF PGOVE POLINT PRL PRAM PMAR PGOVLO PHUMBA PLN PHUS PHUMPREL PG PGOC POLITICS PEPR PSI PU POLITICAL PARTIES
QA
RS RU RO RW REGION RP RIGHTS RICE ROBERT RF RFE
SP SOCI STEINBERG SN SA SY SNAR SMIG SO SENV SCUL SR SF SG SW SU SL SZ SHUM SYR ST SANC SC SAN SIPRS SK SH SI SNARCS SEVN
TI TX TS TU TW TC TERRORISM TPHY TRGY TIP TBIO TSPA TH TR TT TO TFIN TD TSPL TZ TK TNGD TINT TRSY TP
UK UZ UNMIK UN US UG UNSC UP USEU UV UY UNGA UNO USUN UNESCO UNHRC UE UAE UNEP USTR UNHCR UNDP USAID UNCHS UNAUS UNCHC UNDC UNDESCO
VE VZ VT VTPREL VN VM
WI WTRO WTO WA WZ WMO WTRQ WHO WWARD WB WBG WEU WHA
XF XA XG XT XM XR XS XL XK XH XY XC XZ XW XD XE
YI YM YE YMCS
ZP ZR ZI ZU ZB ZF ZK ZANU ZOELLICK ZA ZO ZJ

### Browse by classification

CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN SECRET SECRET//NOFORN UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

### Community resources

Follow us on Twitter Check our Reddit Twitter this Digg this page Contact us on IRC

courage is contagious

### Viewing cable 05THEHAGUE2064, NETHERLANDS: DUTCH THINKING ON ISAF III; FUTURE OF

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:

- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #05THEHAGUE2064.

Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
05THEHAGUE2064 | 2005-07-27 08:08 | 2011-01-17 00:12 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy The Hague

`

    This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

` `

    C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 THE HAGUE 002064

    SIPDIS

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/27/2015
    TAGS: MARR MOPS NL PGOV PREL NATO
    SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS: DUTCH THINKING ON ISAF III; FUTURE OF
    DUTCH NAVY, JSF

    Classified By: Ambassador Cl...

    37388,7/27/2005 8:12,05THEHAGUE2064,"Embassy The
    Hague",CONFIDENTIAL,,"This record is a partial extract of the original
    cable. The full
    text of the original cable is not available.
    ","C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 THE HAGUE 002064
    SIPDIS
    E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/27/2015
    TAGS: MARR MOPS NL PGOV PREL NATO
    SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS: DUTCH THINKING ON ISAF III; FUTURE OF
    DUTCH NAVY, JSF
    Classified By: Ambassador Clifford M. Sobel for reasons 1.4 (b,d).
    ¶1. (C) Summary: Ambassador, DATT and ODC Chief met with Dutch
    CHOD Gen. Dick Berlijn on July 19. Gen. Berlijn reviewed
    Dutch thinking on participation in ISAF III, including a PRT
    consisting initially of 1000 personnel (later to be expanded
    to 1200) deployed most likely to Uruzgan province. Later
    discussions on July 26 with the Acting Director of Operations
    at the Dutch MFA confirmed this preliminary plan. The Dutch
    will host the Canadians and British on August 17-18 to
    follow-up on the force generation conference. Berlijn noted
    that a compromise in Parliament prevented plans for an
    1800-man deployment, as the main opposition party wanted
    personnel available for a potential African mission. Berlijn
    also talked about the possibility of U.S. support -- either
    through proximity to Dutch forces or embedded U.S.
    intelligence personnel -- as potentially helping convince
    Dutch Minister of Defense Henk Kamp and others in the Dutch
    government to deploy to Uruzgan.
    ¶2. (C) Cont. Summary: Gen. Berlijn reviewed changes occurring
    in the Dutch Navy. Quoting Minister Kamp, Berlijn described
    the Dutch Navy as ""demoralized and adrift"". Berlijn
    explained that they need to become expeditionary, relying
    less on their frigates and more on coastal patrol vessels and
    landing platform ships to support land battles. He outlined
    the possibility of selling six ""M"" frigates -- two to Belgium
    and four to Chile -- proceeds from which could potentially
    be used to purchase coastal patrol vessels, landing platform
    dock ships, Tactical Tomahawk, helicopters, and other assets.
    ¶3. (C) Cont. Summary: Berlijn also stated that he was
    interested in finding a way to prioritize the Joint Strike
    Fighter (JSF) program within the Dutch government. He hoped
    to develop a plan to pursue the purchase of an initial,
    ""acceptably safe"" number of 50-60 JSFs in 2006, in order to
    ""depoliticize"" the issue prior to the May 2007 elections. By
    depoliticizing the issue through this initial purchase,
    Berlijn suggested that the Dutch could keep options open
    regarding the total eventual purchase of 80 or more JSFs.
    End Summary.
    --------------
    ISAF Stage III
    --------------
    ¶4. (C) Gen. Berlijn initially briefed on Dutch plans to
    participate in ISAF Stage III. These plans are still by and
    large under discussion within the Dutch government; Dutch FM
    Bot has been negotiating with Parliament over ISAF III for
    several weeks. MajGen Cobelens, MOD Director of Operations,
    drafted the preliminary plan presented to NATO during the
    July 25 force generation conference. According to the Acting
    Director of Operations at the Dutch MFA on July 26, this
    preliminary plan calls for Dutch partnership with the
    Canadians and Brits at the Forward Support Base (FSB) in
    Kandahar beginning in April 2006. The deployment will last
    for eighteen months; command responsibility for the FSB will
    be on a six-month rotation with the Canadians taking the
    first watch. The Dutch will assume command of the FSB in
    November 2006.
    ¶5. (C) According to the Acting Director of Operations at the
    Dutch MFA, the preliminary Dutch plan proposed a Dutch
    Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Uruzgan province.
    The Dutch plan to initially deploy 1000 personnel, ramping up
    to 1200 personnel by the time they assume charge of the
    Kandahar FSB in November 2006. The 1200-person deployment
    will also include approximately 4 Chinooks, 4-6 Apaches, and
    the 4 F-16s currently stationed in Kabul. The Dutch MOD will
    host Canada and the UK on August 17-18 to follow-up on ISAF
    Stage III proposal details. (Note: A read-out from USNATO
    suggests that the United States may be invited to attend the
    meeting as well; according to the Dutch MFA, only the Brits
    and Canadians have thus far been invited. Post will seek
    more information on possible U.S. attendance. End note.)
    ¶6. (C) Gen. Berlijn explained that he was limited to a PRT
    consisting of 1000 personnel due to restrictions set by
    Parliament. Berlijn initially wanted 1800 personnel, but the
    Labor Party (PvdA) demanded that some personnel also be
    available for possible operations in Africa (NFI). A
    compromise within Parliament led to the 1000-person
    restriction to accommodate the Labor Party. (Note: Dutch
    governments prefer to make military deployment decisions
    backed by a parliamentary super-majority, usually to include
    the main opposition party. End note.) While the number of
    personnel in the PRT will eventually increase to 1200, the
    Acting Director of Operations at the Dutch MFA explained that
    this number is a ""maximum"" number set by Parliament that
    cannot be exceeded, and will also include air technicians and
    support for their deployed helicopters and F-16s. Actually,
    the Dutch initial plan calls for a fully operational PRT of
    1568 men; due to the 1200 restriction set by Parliament, the
    Dutch were actively encouraging the Australians to partner
    with them in the PRT.
    ¶7. (C) According to Berlijn, the Dutch had not yet agreed
    internally (as of July 19) on the location of the PRT. While
    the Dutch preliminary plan proposed during the force
    generation conference calls for a PRT deployment in Uruzgan,
    the subject is still open for debate. Berlijn and other
    members of the military staff were strongly recommending that
    the Dutch troops be deployed to Uruzgan province in central
    Afghanistan, where they could, in his view, make a real
    difference in a challenging environment. Others in the
    government, however, wanted the Dutch to deploy to the safer
    province of Nimruz near the Iranian border. Berlijn
    discussed the possibility of U.S. support -- either through
    proximity to Dutch forces or embedding U.S. intelligence
    within Dutch forces -- as potentially helping convince his
    minister and others in the Dutch government that they can and
    should deploy to Uruzgan.
    --------------------
    Future of Dutch Navy
    --------------------
    ¶8. (C) Following a question on the status of potential
    Tactical Tomahawk acquisition, Gen. Berlijn provided an
    extended background explanation on changes occurring in the
    Dutch Navy. According to Berlijn, Dutch Minister of Defense
    Kamp recently described the Dutch Navy as ""demoralized and
    adrift"". Kamp felt that the Navy relied too heavily upon
    their frigates. The Navy needed to reorient and ""focus on
    tasks"", becoming ""expeditionary and more coastal"".
    ¶9. (C) After studying the issue, Berlijn stated that the
    Dutch need to sell some of their frigates and buy more
    coastal patrol vessels (CPVs) and landing platform dock (LPD)
    ships. Berlijn cautioned that convincing Dutch admirals to
    sell their frigates would be very difficult -- ""Getting the
    Admirals to give up their frigates is like getting a fighter
    pilot to give up his fighter"" (Note: Berlijn is a fighter
    pilot.). Berlijn stated that he wants the Navy to support
    land battle and theater ballistic missile defense (TBMD). He
    expressed firm support for a Dutch submarine capability,
    noting that ""the Dutch are in the submarine business"". In
    that respect, he needed to put an end to the current debate
    on submarines within the Dutch government. Berlijn also
    noted that they are looking at a study to improve its oiler
    ship, including its capacity to incorporate more helicopters
    in order to support Dutch troops in the field or for use
    during amphibious deployments.
    ¶10. (C) Berlijn then discussed the possibility of selling six
    ""M"" frigates, which he described as ""very sensitive"" as the
    Dutch are in competition with the Brits in this regard. He
    stated that the Belgians are interested in purchasing two
    frigates; the Chileans have expressed interest in buying the
    other four. (Note: In a conversation with Dutch FM Bot on
    July 21, Bot told ambassador that he was not in favor of
    selling the frigates, but would not/not disagree with Kamp in
    Cabinet. Bot noted, however, that there was resistance in
    the Dutch Navy regarding the sale of the frigates. End
    note.) Berlijn further explained that if the Dutch sold
    these frigates, proceeds could potentially be used to
    purchase coastal patrol vessels, landing platform dock ships,
    Tactical Tomahawk, helicopters, and other assets.
    --------------------
    Joint Strike Fighter
    --------------------
    ¶11. (C) Berlijn then turned discussion to the Joint Strike
    Fighter (JSF), and noted that he was looking for ways to
    prioritize JSF in the Dutch government. He wished to
    ""depoliticize"" the issue prior to the May 2007 elections by
    working to get a commitment from the Dutch government in 2006
    for the purchase of an initial, ""acceptably safe"" number of
    50-60 JSFs. By depoliticizing the issue with this initial
    purchase, he suggested that options remained open to
    eventually buy over 80 JSFs in total. He commented that
    ""even the leftists agree that this is the best fighter we
    could acquire"". Berlijn acknowledged that if the Dutch want
    to keep their aerospace industry alive, they must be actively
    involved with both JSF and the Airbus 380.
    -------------------------------
    Tactical Tomahawks; UAV Project
    -------------------------------
    ¶12. (C) Berlijn noted that the Dutch are still committed to
    the acquisition of Tactical Tomahawks, but it needed to occur
    sequentially following the development and construction of
    coastal patrol vessels. (Note: Selling the six ""M"" frigates
    and replacing them with newly-built corvettes -- thus
    providing work for the Dutch ship-building industry -- may
    yield sufficient parliamentary support for acquisition of
    Tactical Tomahawk, which could be employed on the Dutch
    Navy's new Aegis-equivalent LCF frigates. End note.)
    Berlijn briefly addressed the Dutch unmanned aerial vehicle
    (UAV) project in partnership with the French. According the
    Berlijn, the partnership helps diffuse tensions within the
    Dutch government regarding the perception that the Dutch only
    buy military equipment from the United States. Berlijn
    explained, however, that the program has stalled as the
    French have taken a ""90 degree turn"". The French Defense
    Minister is scheduled to visit the Netherlands in September;
    the UAV project will be on the agenda for discussion.
    SOBEL

`