Cable Viewer

Currently released so far... 5939 / 251,287

### Articles

Brazil Sri Lanka United Kingdom Sweden Editorial United States Latin America Egypt Yemen Jordan

### Browse latest releases

2010/11 2010/12 2011/01 2011/02 2011/03
2010/11/28 2010/11/29 2010/11/30
2010/12/01 2010/12/02 2010/12/03 2010/12/04 2010/12/05 2010/12/06 2010/12/07 2010/12/08 2010/12/09 2010/12/10 2010/12/11 2010/12/12 2010/12/13 2010/12/14 2010/12/15 2010/12/16 2010/12/17 2010/12/18 2010/12/19 2010/12/20 2010/12/21 2010/12/22 2010/12/23 2010/12/24 2010/12/25 2010/12/26 2010/12/27 2010/12/28 2010/12/29 2010/12/30
2011/01/01 2011/01/02 2011/01/04 2011/01/05 2011/01/07 2011/01/09 2011/01/10 2011/01/11 2011/01/12 2011/01/13 2011/01/14 2011/01/15 2011/01/16 2011/01/17 2011/01/18 2011/01/19 2011/01/20 2011/01/21 2011/01/22 2011/01/23 2011/01/24 2011/01/25 2011/01/26 2011/01/27 2011/01/28 2011/01/29 2011/01/30 2011/01/31
2011/02/01 2011/02/02 2011/02/03 2011/02/04 2011/02/05 2011/02/06 2011/02/07 2011/02/08 2011/02/09 2011/02/10 2011/02/11 2011/02/12 2011/02/13 2011/02/14 2011/02/15 2011/02/16 2011/02/17 2011/02/18 2011/02/19 2011/02/20 2011/02/21 2011/02/22 2011/02/23 2011/02/24 2011/02/25 2011/02/26 2011/02/27 2011/02/28
2011/03/01 2011/03/02 2011/03/03 2011/03/04 2011/03/05 2011/03/06 2011/03/07 2011/03/08 2011/03/09 2011/03/10 2011/03/11 2011/03/13 2011/03/14 2011/03/15 2011/03/16 2011/03/17 2011/03/18 2011/03/19

### Browse by creation date

66 72 73 75 79 86 88 89 90 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10
1966/12
1972/02 1972/08
1973/04
1975/03
1979/08
1986/05
1988/01
1989/12
1990/01 1990/07 1990/08 1990/10
2000/06 2000/09 2000/11
2001/02 2001/03 2001/07 2001/10
2002/02 2002/03 2002/11 2002/12
2003/02 2003/03 2003/04 2003/05 2003/06 2003/07 2003/08 2003/09 2003/10 2003/11 2003/12
2004/01 2004/02 2004/03 2004/04 2004/05 2004/06 2004/07 2004/08 2004/09 2004/10 2004/11 2004/12
2005/01 2005/02 2005/03 2005/04 2005/05 2005/06 2005/07 2005/08 2005/09 2005/10 2005/11 2005/12
2006/01 2006/02 2006/03 2006/04 2006/05 2006/06 2006/07 2006/08 2006/09 2006/10 2006/11 2006/12
2007/01 2007/02 2007/03 2007/04 2007/05 2007/06 2007/07 2007/08 2007/09 2007/10 2007/11 2007/12
2008/01 2008/02 2008/03 2008/04 2008/05 2008/06 2008/07 2008/08 2008/09 2008/10 2008/11 2008/12
2009/01 2009/02 2009/03 2009/04 2009/05 2009/06 2009/07 2009/08 2009/09 2009/10 2009/11 2009/12
2010/01 2010/02

### Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z
Embassy Athens Embassy Asuncion Embassy Astana Embassy Asmara Embassy Ashgabat Embassy Ankara Embassy Amman Embassy Algiers Embassy Addis Ababa Embassy Accra Embassy Abuja Embassy Abu Dhabi Embassy Abidjan Consulate Amsterdam American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura Embassy Buenos Aires Embassy Budapest Embassy Bucharest Embassy Brussels Embassy Bridgetown Embassy Bratislava Embassy Brasilia Embassy Bogota Embassy Bishkek Embassy Bern Embassy Berlin Embassy Belgrade Embassy Beirut Embassy Beijing Embassy Banjul Embassy Bangkok Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan Embassy Bamako Embassy Baku Embassy Baghdad Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen Embassy Conakry Embassy Colombo Embassy Chisinau Embassy Caracas Embassy Canberra Embassy Cairo Consulate Curacao Consulate Ciudad Juarez Consulate Chennai Consulate Casablanca Consulate Cape Town
Embassy Dushanbe Embassy Dublin Embassy Doha Embassy Djibouti Embassy Dhaka Embassy Dar Es Salaam Embassy Damascus Embassy Dakar Consulate Dubai
Embassy Freetown
Embassy Guatemala Embassy Gaborone Consulate Guadalajara
Embassy Helsinki Embassy Harare Embassy Hanoi Consulate Hermosillo Consulate Hamburg
Iran RPO Dubai Embassy Islamabad Consulate Istanbul
Embassy Jakarta Consulate Jerusalem Consulate Jeddah
Embassy Kyiv Embassy Kuwait Embassy Kuala Lumpur Embassy Kinshasa Embassy Kigali Embassy Khartoum Embassy Kathmandu Embassy Kampala Embassy Kabul
Embassy Luxembourg Embassy Luanda Embassy London Embassy Ljubljana Embassy Lisbon Embassy Lima Embassy Lilongwe Embassy La Paz Consulate Lagos
Mission USNATO Embassy Muscat Embassy Moscow Embassy Montevideo Embassy Monrovia Embassy Minsk Embassy Mexico Embassy Mbabane Embassy Maputo Embassy Manama Embassy Managua Embassy Malabo Embassy Madrid Consulate Munich Consulate Montreal Consulate Monterrey Consulate Milan
Embassy New Delhi Embassy Nassau Embassy Nairobi Consulate Naples
Embassy Ouagadougou Embassy Ottawa Embassy Oslo
Embassy Pristina Embassy Pretoria Embassy Prague Embassy Port Au Prince Embassy Phnom Penh Embassy Paris Embassy Paramaribo Embassy Panama Consulate Peshawar
Embassy Quito
REO Basrah Embassy Rome Embassy Riyadh Embassy Riga Embassy Reykjavik Embassy Rangoon Embassy Rabat Consulate Rio De Janeiro Consulate Recife
Secretary of State Embassy Stockholm Embassy Sofia Embassy Skopje Embassy Singapore Embassy Seoul Embassy Sarajevo Embassy Santo Domingo Embassy Santiago Embassy Sanaa Embassy San Salvador Embassy San Jose Consulate Strasbourg Consulate Shenyang Consulate Shanghai Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis Embassy Tripoli Embassy Tokyo Embassy The Hague Embassy Tel Aviv Embassy Tehran Embassy Tegucigalpa Embassy Tbilisi Embassy Tashkent Embassy Tallinn Consulate Tijuana
USUN New York USEU Brussels US Mission Geneva US Interests Section Havana US Delegation, Secretary UNVIE Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius Embassy Vienna Embassy Vatican Consulate Vladivostok
Embassy Windhoek Embassy Wellington Embassy Warsaw
Embassy Yerevan Embassy Yaounde
Embassy Zagreb

### Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
AR AJ ASEC AE AEMR AF AMGT APER AG AM AS AU AORC AGMT AFIN ABUD ATRN AL APECO ACOA AO AX AMED ADCO AODE AFFAIRS AC ASIG ABLD AA AFU ASUP AROC ATFN AVERY APCS AER ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG AEC ASEAN AID
BU BM BEXP BR BA BRUSSELS BL BK BO BILAT BTIO BH BE BX BIDEN BY BG BF BB BC BBSR BMGT BTIU
CH CU CJAN CMGT CVIS CO CA CE COUNTER CASC CBW CG CLINTON CI CS CDG CIA CACM CDB CD CV CF CN CAN CIS CM CONDOLEEZZA COE CR CY CTM COUNTRY CLEARANCE CPAS CWC CT CKGR CB CACS COM CJUS CARSON CL CODEL COUNTERTERRORISM
DJ DA DEAX DR DHS DOE DEA DK DISENGAGEMENT DS DTRA DOD
EINV ECON ENRG EPET ETRD EAGR ELAB EUN EFIN EU EAID EIND ETTC EG ECPS EWWT ES EXTERNAL EMIN ECIP EINDETRD EN EAIR EZ ER ET EUC EI ELTN EREL ECIN EFIS EINT EC ETC ECONEFIN ENVR ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS ECA ELN EFTA ENIV EINVETC EINN ENGR EUR ESA ENERG EK ENGY ETRO ETRDEINVTINTCS ESENV ENVI ETRDECONWTOCS ECONCS ENNP ELECTIONS ECUN EINVEFIN
FR FJ FINR FAO FTAA FREEDOM FI FARC FBI FMLN
GM GZ GG GTMO GOI GV GH GA GE GT GR GTIP GCC GAZA GANGS GY
HO HURI HILLARY HA HU HR HUMAN HYMPSK HK HSTC
IR IS IZ IN IT INRB IAEA ID IO IV ICTY IQ ICAO INTERPOL IPR IRAJ INRA INRO IC IIP ILC ITPHUM IWC ISRAELI IRAQI ICRC IMO IF IEFIN INTELSAT IL IA IBRD IMF INR IRC ITRA IACI ICJ ITALY ITALIAN
JAMES JA JO JOSEPH JP JOHNNIE JM JUS
KCRM KCOR KDEM KPAO KG KTIP KICC KNNP KV KBCT KPAL KTFN KU KSPR KJUS KHLS KTIA KWBG KMDR KGHG KN KUNR KS KIRF KISL KFRD KIPR KAWC KPWR KCIP KSUM KWAC KMIG KOLY KZ KAWK KSEC KIFR KDRG KDEMAF KFIN KGIC KOMC KGCC KPIN KBIO KHIV KSCA KE KPKO KNUC KPLS KIRC KACT KRAD KCOM KMCA KHDP KVPR KDEV KWMN KMPI KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KTLA KCFC KPRP KCFE KOCI KTDB KMRS KLIG KGIT KSTC KPAK KNEI KSEP KPOA KFLU KNUP KNNPMNUC KO KTER KHUM KRFD KBTR KDDG KWWMN KFLO KSAF KBTS KPRV KNPP KNAR KWMM KERG KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KTBT KCRS KRVC KSTH KREL KNSD KTEX KPAI KHSA KOMS KVIR KR
LY LG LE LH LU LI LO LOG LT LAB
MCAP MO MNUC MARR MASS MPOS MOPS MAR MD MX MZ MY MEPP MA MR ML MIL MTCRE MOPPS MTCR MAPP MU MG MASC MCC MK MTRE MP MDC MEPI MRCRE MI MT MQADHAFI MAPS MUCN MASSMNUC MERCOSUR MC MV
NATO NI NZ NG NU NO NL NIPP NPT NRR NE NS NAR NPG NK NSG NA NT NASA NGO NP NSF NATIONAL
OVIP OTRA OPRC OSCI OTR OVP OREP ODIP OPDC OIIP OFFICIALS OSAC OAS OEXC OFDP OECD OSCE OPIC OPCW OIE OIC
PINR PGOV PBTS PREL PTER PE PO PROP PHUM PBIO PARM PECON PINS PM PHSA PK PREF PL PAK PINT POGOV PINL POL PSOE PKFK PGOF PA PUNE PARMS PORG PMIL PTERE PF PALESTINIAN PY PGGV PNR POV PAO PFOR PHALANAGE PARTY PRGOV PNAT PROV PEL PINF PGOVE POLINT PRL PRAM PMAR PGOVLO PHUMBA PLN PHUS PHUMPREL PG PGOC POLITICS PEPR PSI PU POLITICAL PARTIES
QA
RS RU RO RW REGION RP RIGHTS RICE ROBERT RF RFE
SP SOCI STEINBERG SN SA SY SNAR SMIG SO SENV SCUL SR SF SG SW SU SL SZ SHUM SYR ST SANC SC SAN SIPRS SK SH SI SNARCS
TI TX TS TU TW TC TERRORISM TPHY TRGY TIP TBIO TSPA TH TR TT TO TFIN TD TSPL TZ TK TNGD TINT TRSY TP
UK UZ UNMIK UN US UG UNSC UP USEU UV UY UNGA UNO USUN UNESCO UNHRC UE UAE UNEP USTR UNHCR UNDP USAID UNCHS UNAUS UNCHC UNDC UNDESCO
VE VZ VT VTPREL VN VM
WI WTRO WTO WA WZ WMO WTRQ WHO WWARD WB WBG WEU WHA
XF XA XG XT XM XR XS XL XK XH XY XC XZ XW XD XE
YI YM YE YMCS
ZP ZR ZI ZU ZB ZF ZK ZANU ZOELLICK ZA ZO ZJ

### Browse by classification

CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN SECRET SECRET//NOFORN UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

### Community resources

Follow us on Twitter Check our Reddit Twitter this Digg this page Contact us on IRC

courage is contagious

### Viewing cable 05BOGOTA7402, U/S BURNS MEETS WITH PRESIDENT URIBE

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:

- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #05BOGOTA7402.

Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
05BOGOTA7402 | 2005-08-04 22:10 | 2010-12-08 21:09 | SECRET | Embassy Bogota

`

    This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

` `

    S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 BOGOTA 007402

    SIPDIS

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/27/2015
    TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR MOPS PHUM SNAR CO
    SUBJECT: U/S BURNS MEETS WITH PRESIDENT URIBE

    REF: SECSTATE 134796

    Classified By: Ambassador William B. Wood; reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

    ¶1. (U) July 26, 2005, 4:00-5:30 pm, Casa de Narino, Bogota

    ¶2. (U) Participants:

    U.S.
    ---

    ¶R. Nicholas Burns, U/S for Political Affairs
    Ambassador William B. Wood
    Cynthia Echeverria, P Special Assistant
    Jeffrey DeLaurentis, Polcouns (notetaker)
    Luis Guio, Interpreter

    Colombia
    --------

    Alvaro Uribe Velez, President
    Camilo Ospina, Minister of Defense
    Acting Foreign Minister Camilo Reyes
    Presidential Communications Director Jaime Bermudez
    Francisco Gonzalez, MFA (notetaker)

    -------
    Summary
    -------

    ¶3. (S) During a warm, productive and candid meeting, U/S Burns told President Uribe that President Bush would deliver a message of strong, continued support in Crawford on August 4, in particular regarding GOC counter-narcotics and counter-terrorism efforts. At the same time, noting differing views among some members of Congress, Burns pressed for more progress on several long-standing human rights
    cases, including on San Jose de Apartado and Mapiripan, to strengthen the human rights certification, and urged Uribe to rigorously and energetically implement the new justice and peace law. He cautioned that, unless addressed, these negative perceptions could affect ongoing U.S. support for Colombia. He called on the President to make a public, renewed commitment to expeditiously adjudicate the human rights cases in question, and to do everything under his  executive powers to accelerate progress. He also urged the GOC to respond to concerns that the justice and peace law impededextraditions. He encouraged Uribe to visit Washington en route to the UNGA to make his case directly to the Congress on both issues. Uribe assured U/S Burns that his government remained committed to protecting human rights and that implementation of the new law would be accelerated and rigorous. He had already urged the Prosecutor General to make a public statement on GOC efforts to complete its
    investigation on San Jose de Apartado. On counter-narcotics efforts, Uribe said he was looking for new ways to encourage families to abandon growing illicit drugs and engage them in crop substitution programs. Burns encouraged newly-appointed Minister of Defense Ospina to also visit Washington soon for discussions at DOD and State. Ospina quipped that he was Secretary Rumsfeld's deputy in Colombia, "coordinating his SIPDIS third front of the war on terrorism." Burns thanked Uribe for GOC efforts to secure the release of the three U.S. hostages. While acknowledging that the French had launched a
    new campaign to pressure him to negotiate the release of Colombian-French hostage Ingrid Bentancourt, Uribe was emphatic that he would make no deal that did not include the three Americans. On Venezuela, Uribe was particularly candid. He called Chavez a mix of someone with imperial sentiments and drunk with socialism. He said Chavez has
    dreams of an hemispheric television station and a unified oil company, and was looking to create a new coalition to confront the U.S. He urged the U.S. to reach out to those in the hemisphere Chavez believes are his friends. Uribe, in resignation, lamented that, given Chavez's efforts to create a "new socialism," his total domination over Venezuelan institutions, the lack of opposition and checks and balances, and the prospects of hyper-inflation, political unrest was probably inevitable. End Summary.

    --------------------------------------------- ---------------
    IDB and Colombian Ambassador to the U.S. Luis Alberto Moreno
    --------------------------------------------- ---------------

    ¶4. (C) Uribe arrived a few minutes late, explaining that he had just finished a telephone call with the president of Guyana, lobbying for Ambassador Moreno's candidacy for president of the IDB. The election was the following day and Moreno needed one more country to secure a win in the first round of voting. Uribe was convinced that if voting went into a second round, Brazil and Venezuela would form a coalition on behalf of the Brazilian candidate. U/S Burns said the U.S. was fully behind Moreno and had lobbied extensively as well (reftel). Uribe stressed that he would do a terrific job at the IBD but it would be extremely difficult to find a suitable replacement for him as ambassador to the U.S. In the middle of the meeting, Uribe took a call from his counterpart from Ecuador who pledged to support Moreno. President Palacio told Uribe that Chavez had called him earlier in the day asking Ecuador to support the Brazilian candidate.

    -------------------------
    U.S. Support for Colombia
    -------------------------

    ¶5. (C) Uribe expressed appreciation for U/S Burn's visit as well as for ongoing support from the U.S., including the Congress and theembassy. "With the difficulties we face on a daily basis, U.S. assistance has been critical and I have no words to express my gratitude." U/S Burns underscored that the GOC had made tremendous progress fighting drugs and terrorism under Uribe's leadership, and U.S. support would continue as a result. Uribe acknowledged that the numbers of kidnappings, homicides, and drugs eradicated or seized
    remained high in absolute terms, but the numbers were decreasing in relative terms and the trend lines were good. That said, while the reduction in coca production was positive, he wanted to make an even greater effort in 2005 to achieve an even steeper decline. We are winning the war, he said, but have not won yet and need to stay the course. The Ambassador noted that 100,000 hectares of cocaine had been sprayed in 2005 so far, putting us 25 percent ahead of last year when total hectares sprayed reached 135,000. U/S Burns noted that the Afghans in comparison had destroyed only 216 and a half hectares thus far. Our aim is to destroy drugs, said Uribe, and the GOC was also ready to provide Afghanistan technical assistance and experience.

    ¶6. (C) Uribe reviewed GOC strategy for fighting narcotraffickers. This included using aerial and manual eradication, extradition, and crop substitution (i.e. alternative development initiatives). The GOC had the
    political will to make adjustments to be even more effective. For instance, this year GOC officials had accelerated manual eradication to complement aerial efforts. So far, they had eradicated 11,000 hectares with prospects to achieve 30,000 hectares by the end of the year.

    ¶7. (C) Uribe said he wanted to reward communities who assisted military and police forces discover illicit drug storage facilities hidden in the jungle. He was also looking at ways to encourage families to abandon growing illicit drugs and engage them in a program of crop substitution. (Note: Uribe reportedly made ad hoc comments during a town hall discussion last weekend in the department of Meta that
    the GOC would buy illegal crops of coca directly from farmers in exchange for a promise from them to never grow coca again. This has met with criticism from the Colombian Congress and presidential candidates. GOC officials subsequently clarified Uribe's remarks by saying the GOC would pay for information from farmers about the production and storage of cocaine.) Uribe understood the idea was controversial but believed it could provide results. The Ambassador responded that a reward for information that helped locate and seize
    drugs was a solid proposal but purchasing drugs from growers
    was another matter. The UN was already prepared to publicly criticize the idea. He told Uribe the USG would think about innovative ways to encourage small farmers to abandon growing illicit drugs and come back with some proposals. Perhaps a credible non-governmental organization could help. U/S Burns said he would also alert the President and Secretary that this was on Uribe's mind.

    --------------------------------------------- ----------
    August 4 Meeting at Crawford/Split View from Washington
    --------------------------------------------- ----------

    ¶8. (C) U/S Burns said the President was looking forward to the meeting in Crawford and he had come to Colombia, in part, to discuss how to ensure a positive result. Uribe would hear a message of strong, continued support from President Bush, in particular regarding GOC counter-narcotic and counter-terrorism efforts. Uribe repeated that he wanted even better results.
    ¶9. (C) Burns noted that the view was different from some on Capitol Hill and in the human rights community. Concern over the lack of progress on several prominent, longstanding human rights cases, coupled with a perception that the new Law on Justice and Peace governing AUC demobilizations was too lenient, was raising questions about GOC commitment to improving human rights in the country. Burns cautioned that these negative perceptions in the Congress could affect ongoing U.S. support for the successor to Plan Colombia. He suggested Uribe arrive in Crawford with a sense of his strategy over the next five to six years for Plan Colombia follow on. Beyond the concerns on human rights and the law, the budget for foreign assistance would be leaner in coming years. Multi-year commitments would not be possible. The
    case for ongoing support at similar levels would have to be made annually.

    --------------------------------------
    Concern about Progress on Human Rights
    --------------------------------------

    ¶10. (C) Burns reiterated the concern of some that the GOC was not acting quickly and concretely enough in adjudicating outstanding human rights cases, in particular regarding Mapiripan, now seven years old, Arauca, and the February massacre in San Jose de Apartado. He recommended Uribe authorize a public statement that the GOC would make a renewed effort to act quickly in successfully bringing these cases to conclusion. While recognizing that several were being adjudicated in the courts, Burns also urged Uribe do everything under his executive powers and discretion to accelerate progress. The Secretary still had to certify to Congress on the human rights situation and had already delayed it in the hopes further progress could be reported. Without a credible certification, there was a danger that
    some members of Congress would attach additional restrictions
    to future aid to Colombia. The Department needed "to see in your statements and actions a renewed determination and commitment to address these cases," he said.

    ¶11. (C) Uribe said he understood the situation. He was confident the new Fiscal (Prosecutor General) would do everything he could to accelerate the ongoing investigations. He had already asked the outgoing Fiscal to make a public statement in the next few days on the status of the GOC investigation on San Jose de Apartado. He also defended his Administration's record, noting that the number of such  incidents had been dramatically reduced under his presidency and that the GOC response had been thoroughly transparent. He again committed to call the Prosecutor General to ensure a statement on San Jose de Apartado was released before Crawford.

    -------------------------
    Law for Justice and Peace
    -------------------------

    ¶12. (C) Uribe told the U/S that he had met with Spanish judge Balthazar Garzon and other leaders for three hours during his recent visit in Spain to discuss the law. Garzon had said the law was too lenient because there was no balance between the gravity of the crime and the length of the sentence. Uribe agreed but told Garzon it was the price of a peace process. It had to be compared to previous demobilization
    laws in Colombia which had no justice component, and laws dealing with other peace processes around the world. For the first time, the GOC secured approval of a law for peace with justice, he insisted. There was no pardon for atrocities; the concept of justice and reparations was on the books in Colombia for the first time. Uribe also insisted that the law would apply to all illegal armed groups who wanted to demobilize. He stressed that many complained the law was too
    tough for the guerrillas and too weak for the paramilitaries. The guerrillas continued to insist they would accept only amnesty and no jail time. In his view, the law struck a balance equally applicable to all illegal armed groups. At the same time, he acknowledged that compromises had to be made. The investigatory scheme set out in the law was satisfactory to get to the truth, but in a country which used
    to average over 30,000 assassinations a year, to investigate
    everything was an unrealistic dream.
    ¶13. (C) U/S Burns said he had met with human rights NGOs earlier in the day. Many were critical of the law and believed it endorsed impunity. He had responded that the U.S. supported the law, and was convinced it would be effective with rigorous and energetic implementation. The GOC had to ensure the law was aggressively applied. Uribe agreed and per U.S. suggestions, would demand that the law's implementation be accelerated and rigorous. He had already
    communicated this to Peace Commissioner Luis Carlos Restrepo. Ambassador also suggested that, as the GOC defines the process, it make its decisions public. The GOC had to be pro-active in explaining how it intended to implement the law. Critics were filling the void while the GOC remained silent. For example, a local NGO told U/S Burns there would be no meaningful investigation under the law. You can answer this, said the Ambassador. U/S Burns also encouraged Uribe
    to come to Washington on his way to the UNGA in mid-September
    to make his case to the Congress. Uribe agreed.

    ¶14. (C) U/S Burns said the impact on extraditions was another concern on the law. It would be useful for the GOC to respond to NGO assertions that law impeded extraditions. Uribe insisted that it did not/not impede extraditions and the GOC would continue extraditing criminals to the U.S. He acknowledged, however, that there would be some instances when he would delay extraditions, in particular for
    paramilitary "ringleaders," as a lever for their future behavior. U/S Burns insisted that the U.S. wanted to see anyone who violated U.S. law or harmed U.S. citizens remain subject to extradition.

    -----------------------
    MOD Visit to Washington
    -----------------------

    ¶15. (C) U/S Burns said the U.S. was ready to discuss enhanced mil-to-mil relations when GOC officials were ready. He encouraged newly-appointed Minister of Defense Camilo Ospina to visit Washington soon for discussions at DoD and State. Ospina readily agreed and Burns said he would take back Ospina's interest to Secretary Rumsfeld. (Note: In a subsequent conversation with the Ambassador, Ospina said
    Colombia wants the deepest possible defense relationship, but
    that there continued to be a dispute within the government as
    to timing. In general, the GOC is of the view that nothing
    important should happen before the Constitutional Court on
    re-election, mid- to late-September. President Uribe and
    Ospina expect to have their thinking sorted out before the
    meeting with President Bush in Crawford.)

    ---------------------------------
    U.S. Hostages/Humanitarian Accord
    ---------------------------------

    ¶16. (C) U/S Burns thanked President Uribe for ongoing GOC efforts to secure the release of the three U.S. hostages held by the FARC for over two years. Anything more the GOC could do would be greatly appreciated. Burns said the U.S. would continue to rely on the GOC's guidance and wisdom and was prepared to help in any way. Uribe responded that the GOC continued to work closely with the Embassy. If there were any military operation the U.S. believed should be undertaken to secure the hostages' release, his forces would "stand shoulder to shoulder with the U.S." in carrying it out.

    ¶17. (C) Uribe said he was scheduled to meet the mother of Colombian-French hostage Ingrid Betancourt later in the day. French Prime Minister Dominique De Villepan was pushing him hard to negotiate Betancourt's release as part of a humanitarian exchange. He stated emphatically that he would not go forward with any deal that did not include the three Americans. Uribe stressed that he would refuse any exchange that included GOC-held FARC members guilty of crimes under the Colombian Constitution. He would also insist that FARC
    prisoners released as part of an humanitarian exchange be immediately deported to France with GOF guarantees that they
    did not return to Colombia and re-join FARC ranks. Uribe promised to keep Ambassador Wood apprised of all details on any negotiations that could affect the U.S. hostages. He also predicted that the FARC would be more inclined to negotiate seriously now for such an exchange if the
    Constitutional Court approved presidential re-election. However, the FARC would wait until a new government was in place if re-election was shot down by the court.

    ---------
    Venezuela
    ---------
    ¶18. (C) U/S Burns told Uribe that the Secretary appreciated
    hearing his views on how to handle Chavez during her April
    visit. She was determined not to make Chavez into something
    bigger by responding to every jab. President Bush was also
    focused on Venezuela and looked forward to a discussion at
    Crawford. The U.S. had no ministerial contact with the GOV
    at this point and welcomed Uribe's insights.

    ¶19. (S) Uribe noted that Chavez had been quieter in the last two months and had, for example, agreed to extradite FARC leader Chiguiro to Colombia without a formal GOC request. Nonetheless, he did not trust Chavez. He never talked to him alone; he always brought along Foreign Minister Barco or some other witness. On GOV links to the FARC, Uribe said Chavez has told him that he does not protect the guerrillas but could not deny that some in his political organization supported them. Uribe complained that Chavez had little opposition now. There was no balance of power within the government. All decisions were ultimately made by him. Uribe stressed that Chavez had an effective stump speech: he claims to be distributing the country's oil wealth through subsidies to the populace while previous governments stole it. This was a powerful message and hard to contradict. Uribe also expressed surprise that the Venezuelan business community was not more jittery, given Chavez's efforts to create a "new socialism." The Venezuelan economy could also move into hyper-inflation, he predicted. Already, inflation had increased to 17-20%, compared to 5% in Colombia.

    ¶20. (S) According to Uribe, Chavez was a mix of someone with
    imperial sentiments, drunk with socialism. He believed that Chavez, with presumed support from President Lula, hoped to create a new coalition to confront the U.S. He has may dreams, said Uribe, including a hemispheric television station (Telesur) and the unification of oil companies on the continent into a regional "petrosur." He encouraged the U.S. to improve relations with Uruguay and others in the region  Chavez believed were his supporters.

    ¶21. (S) Finally, Uribe said he was becoming more and more resigned to the notion that, given the current situation in Venezuela, political unrest was inevitable.
    DRUCKER

`