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### Viewing cable 09MEXICO3195, MEXICO: MORE INTERAGENCY COOPERATION NEEDED ON

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
09MEXICO3195 | 2009-11-10 00:12 | 2011-03-15 12:12 | SECRET//NOFORN | Embassy Mexico
Appears in these articles: http://wikileaks.jornada.com.mx/notas/falta-cooperacion-entre-agencias

`

    VZCZCXRO3884
    RR RUEHCD RUEHGD RUEHHO RUEHMC RUEHNG RUEHNL RUEHRD RUEHRS RUEHTM
    DE RUEHME #3195/01 3140013
    ZNY SSSSS ZZH
    R 100013Z NOV 09
    FM AMEMBASSY MEXICO
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8962
    INFO RUEHXC/ALL US CONSULATES IN MEXICO COLLECTIVE
    RHMFISS/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC
    RUEHC/DEPT OF LABOR WASHINGTON DC
    RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
    RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
    RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
    RHMFISS/HQS USNORTHCOM
    RUEAHLA/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
    RUEABND/DEA HQS WASHINGTON DC
    RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC

` `

    S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 MEXICO 003195

    NOFORN
    SIPDIS

    NSC FOR DAN RESTREPO; DEPT FOR WHA DAS JACOBSON, MEX
    DIRECTOR LEE, D STAFF CUE, AND INR HOHMAN.

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/24/2019
    TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR MX
    SUBJECT: MEXICO: MORE INTERAGENCY COOPERATION NEEDED ON
    INTELLIGENCE ISSUES

    Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Gustavo Delgado.
    Reason: 1.4 (b),(d).

    ¶1. (S/NF) Summary. President Calderon's security strategy
    lacks an effective intelligence apparatus to produce high
    quality information and targeted operations. Embassy
    officers working with the GOM report that Mexico's use of
    strategic and tactical intelligence is fractured, ad hoc, and
    reliant on U.S. support. Despite their myriad inefficiencies
    and deficiencies, Mexican security services broadly recognize
    the need for improvement. Sustained U.S. assistance can help
    shape and fortify the technical capacity of institutions and
    can also create a more reliable, collegial inter-agency
    environment. End Summary.

    GOM Intel Strategy Criticized
    -----------------------------

    ¶2. (C) Recent criticism of President Calderon's security
    strategy cites a poorly utilized and underdeveloped
    intelligence apparatus as a key obstacle to greater
    improvements in the country's security environment.
    Calderon's political opponents from both the Institutional
    Revolutionary Party (PRI) and the Revolutionary Democratic
    Party (PRD) have told Poloff that large-scale joint
    military-police counterdrug deployments, notably Joint
    Operation Chihuahua, have failed to make real gains in the
    war against organized crime due to a reliance on overwhelming
    numerical superiority of troops absent the strategic and
    operational use of intelligence. Critics argue that the more
    effective use of intelligence would help the security
    services better cooperate on counterdrug issues, wrap-up more
    high-level traffickers, and, eventually, curb the country's
    escalating rates of narco-related violence. Emboffs working
    with the GOM in counter-narcotics and intelligence matters
    similarly note that Mexico's use of strategic and tactical
    intelligence is often fractured, ad hoc, and heavily reliant
    on the United States for leads and operations.

    The Players
    -----------

    ¶3. (S/NF) A myriad of GOM agencies have a stake in
    counternarcotics intel issues, including the Secretariats of
    Defense (SEDENA) and Marines (SEMAR), the Mexican National
    Intelligence Center (CISEN), the Public Security Secretariat
    (SSP), which includes the federal police, and the Attorney
    General's Office (PGR). Each has a different intelligence
    mission and varying levels of development and
    professionalism. As Mexico's primary intelligence agency,
    CISEN is the natural choice to be the GOM's coordinator of
    intelligence and analytic efforts. Indeed, it technically
    has the lead on encouraging interagency coordination and is
    developing mechanisms to facilitate such endeavors. For the
    most part, however, CISEN lacks the capacity to effectively
    direct the inter-agency process, particularly when it
    includes such institutional giants as SSP, which
    bureaucratically overshadows CISEN in budget, personnel, and
    other resource issues. CISEN's inability thus far to serve
    as a real leader on intelligence operations and analysis has
    effectively left Mexico without an effective interagency
    coordinator.

    ¶4. (S/NF) SSP is increasingly becoming a major player on the
    intel block. It is exploring ways to take advantage of new
    authorities granted under the Federal Police reform
    legislation passed last year to develop its intelligence
    capabilities. SSP can now directly solicit telephonic
    information from phone companies with a judicial order,
    bypassing the PGR entirely. It is also interested in
    building its own complete telecommunications intercept
    capability, the implementation of which has stalled over the
    past two years because of turf disputes between SSP and the
    Attorney General's Office. Moreover, as the keeper of
    Plataforma Mexico -- the massive new criminal database -- the
    SSP oversees one of the GOM's cornerstone and resource-heavy
    information-sharing projects.

    MEXICO 00003195 002 OF 005

    The Challenges
    --------------

    ¶5. (S/NF) The GOM faces a number of institutional challenges
    to more effectively develop, analyze, and use information for
    intelligence-based operations. One of the most critical of
    these is the lack of trust between and within GOM
    institutions. Emboffs report that SEDENA, for example, has
    well-established intel units that develop targeting packages
    on cartel kingpins. In general, they do not share
    information or analysis with forces on the ground deployed to
    fight counternarcotics, like in Ciudad Juarez. These units
    will share threat information against military components,
    but also see local military commands as often penetrated by
    organized crime. Locally deployed SEDENA forces rarely
    develop or utilize tactical intelligence. In fact, they have
    no true intel units that collect information, nor do they
    have professional intel corps. Military units deployed to
    hotspots operate virtually blind except for anonymous tips.
    Particularly given the fallout from the high-level corruption
    cases uncovered last year, PGR and SSP suffer from similar
    internal suspicions as SEDENA.

    ¶6. (S/NF) Institutions are fiercely protective of their own
    information and equities and are reluctant to share
    information with outsiders, in part because of corruption
    fears, but also because they would rather hoard intelligence
    than allow a rival agency to succeed. They are under
    enormous pressure to produce results. Moreover, bureaucratic
    culture in Mexico is generally risk averse, so intelligence
    entities would rather do nothing than do something wrong.
    Corruption fears are well-founded given the number of
    operations that have been compromised or foiled because of
    leaks. Emboffs note that constructing an effective
    intelligence structure in Mexico's northern border area is
    particularly difficult, as many of the region's security
    forces are compromised. The rivalry between Attorney General
    Medina Mora -- recently replaced by Arturo Chavez Chavez --
    and SSP,s Genaro Garcia Luna dramatically diminished
    cooperation and information-sharing between the two services.
    Leadership and personality conflicts may, in fact, be one of
    the most significant drivers of whether or not agencies set
    themselves up as rivals or allies in sharing important
    information. Some observers see the new federal police and
    PGR reforms as unlikely to resolve the zero sum competition,
    and it is too early to know whether the Chavez appointment
    will mitigate the specific PGR-SSP problem.

    ¶7. (S/NF) There are also some legal and institutional
    unknowns: SSP, which receives the bulk of the GOM's security
    budget, now has the legal backing it needs to allow Garcia
    Luna to move ahead in building a large new intelligence and
    investigative program. With such indigenous capabilities,
    SSP probably would have even less incentive to cooperate with
    PGR. SEDENA, meanwhile, tends to work better with PGR than
    with SSP, but the Army's efforts are still highly limited and
    compartmentalized and it remains to be seen how better
    vetting practices and a stronger SSP will impact those
    relations. Secretary of Defense Galvan Galvan in a recent
    meeting with U.S. officials expressed little interest in
    bolstering cooperation with other agencies. Because of
    internal strife and mistrust in GOM institutions, Mission law
    enforcement agencies say that USG elements tend to work with
    GOM counterparts separately, which may end up indirectly
    contributing to stovepiping.

    Taking Steps to Get Smart
    -------------------------

    ¶8. (S/NF) There is broad recognition among Mexican security
    and intelligence agencies, as well as political leadership,
    that they must do better in developing sources, analyzing
    information, and using it operationally. They also know that
    the effective use of intelligence requires more complete
    collaboration between involved bureaucracies. Despite its
    deficiencies, the GOM does have some intelligence
    capabilities, and Emboffs note that when they are deployed in
    full force, as in Michoacan, they can do good work.

    MEXICO 00003195 003 OF 005

    ¶9. (S/NF) The GOM is working hard to improve communication
    among agencies with a stake in intelligence. CISEN is trying
    to develop mechanisms to facilitate coordination. For
    example, CISEN has established at its Mexico City
    headquarters a fusion center that has representatives from
    every involved agency, including the Finance Secretariat,
    SSP, PGR, SEMAR, SEDENA, and state and local investigators
    when they can be trusted. Mexico is also in the process of
    establishing a series of Tactical Operations Intelligence
    Units (UNITOS) at military bases in each state throughout the
    country. The GOM has established a number of units (reports
    range from 9 to 27) with participation from the Army, Navy,
    SSP, PGR, and CISEN, comprising a command section, tactical
    analysis group, investigations group, operations sector, and
    a cadre of judicial experts. When properly functioning, the
    UNITOs provides a centralizing platform for federal forces to
    work together, share information, and plan operations. It is
    still unclear as to whether these would be short or long term
    units, but if implemented correctly, they might serve as a
    key piece of a revamped GOM intel and operational
    architecture. So far, the UNITOs are plagued by the same
    interagency rivals and mistrust that characterize the broader
    institutional relationships and have not yet reached the
    point of being effective.

    ¶10. (C) The state-level C-4 centers (command, control,
    communications, and coordination) are, at the low end,
    glorified emergency call centers. At the high end, they
    include more professional analytic cells that produce useful
    analysis and planning documents and also have a quick
    response time. The more complete C-4s include
    representatives from national and regional entities, and are
    the nerve centers for day-to-day information flow,
    intelligence, and directing operations in the state. They
    are often also the link to national databases, such as
    Plataforma Mexico. Huge disparities between state C-4s
    exist, but many states are working to move their units from
    merely housing emergency dispatchers to being functional hubs
    of operations and intelligence. The UNITOs often rely on
    information fed from good C-4s, in addition to federal
    databases and platforms.

    ¶11. (C) Plataforma Mexico is another important piece of the
    intel puzzle and continues to expand its presence throughout
    the country. The mega-criminal database has a wide array of
    information-sharing and analytical tools that
    help to track and share information on individuals and
    organized crime cells, vehicles, air movements, and is linked
    with an increasing number of surveillance and security
    cameras. The database is housed at SSP and is being deployed
    to an increasing number of states, with different tiers of
    access that are controlled through the vetting system. Not
    all states have access, mostly because they have yet to
    comply with federal standards in order to be connected, and
    some states with access have complained that the system is
    too slow to be of any use to them. Additionally, Project
    Constanza is PGR's new case tracking system for the judicial
    system, and will include all data related to individual cases
    of persons apprehended and later charged. Some pieces may be
    made available to Plataforma Mexico, and PGR would like to
    have a system for tracking detentions that can be made
    available to police units when apprehending a suspect. The
    Mission is actively engaged in trying to plug E-Trace, ATF's
    powerful arms tracing software, into both systems.

    ¶12. (S/NF) Despite myriad challengece, cooperation with the
    USG on intelligence and counternarcotics issues has never
    been better. Indeed, Embassy experts say that Mexican
    authorities often rely on tips from U.S. law enforcement and
    intelligence organizations, and that many successful captures
    of important cartel figures are often backed by U.S.
    assistance. Mexico has indicated interest in improving its
    collection and use of intelligence with additional U.S. help.
    For example, in early 2009 the director of the National
    Security Information Center came to Mexico to, among other
    things, meet with CISEN Director Valdez (NSIC runs the Merida
    Culture of Lawfulness project but also works in the field of

    MEXICO 00003195 004 OF 005

    intelligence structures in democratic societies). He pitched
    to Valdez a program developed by NSIC to divide a hostile
    zone into a series of quadrants and assign a team to each
    that contains four specialties - interviewers (Humint),
    signals interceptors (Sigint), analysts, and operators - as
    well as an adequate security contingent to keep the members
    secure in their safe area and during movement. The teams
    take up residence in the area, as clandestinely as possible,
    and begin to develop sources and information that is used to
    make arrests. At
    the same time, the team filters raw and semi-processed
    information to the next level, which has a parallel
    structure, but more robust operations capabilities and higher
    level skill sets, especially for analyzing the information.
    The ideas is to develop strategic, as opposed to tactical,
    information that can be used to take apart whole networks.
    Valdez was impressed by the concept, and directed his deputy,
    Gustavo Mohar, to meet with the Embassy's NAS Director to
    discuss its viability in U.S. programming. NAS Director and
    Legatt met with Mohar and suggested that in the training line
    of Merida it would be possible to pursue such a program.

    COMMENT
    -------

    ¶13. (S/NF) Mexico is a long way from developing a
    self-sufficient and expert intelligence apparatus, but the
    creation of a coherent system is critical for the sustained
    success of its anti-organized crime efforts. USG-GOM
    cooperation, while not flawless, has never been better.
    Close collaboration and assistance in training and improving
    Mexican security agencies' ability to produce and use
    intelligence in key counterdrug operations undoubtedly is
    critical and will pay dividends over time. Perhaps the
    greatest challenge to lasting progress on intelligence
    matters is cultivating an environment of trust -- based on
    high standards of security -- among Mexico's law enforcement,
    military, and intelligence agencies to ensure that
    information is appropriately collected, shared, protected,
    and acted upon. Reducing institutional rivalries and
    encouraging agencies to move past the zero-sum mindset that
    one entity's success in catching a high-value target is
    another's loss is also critical to reducing rivalries and
    distrust on intelligence issues. The growing SSP footprint
    on intelligence matters has the potential to seriously impact
    the information-sharing dynamic, a factor that will have to
    be integrated into our assistance programs to ensure that we
    do not exacerbate existing institutional tensions,
    particularly with the PGR. While our Mexican interlocutors
    recognize the need for greater interagency cooperation, they
    are reluctant to address the problem: the solution will
    require sustained U.S. help in fortifying institutions
    against the corruption, inefficiencies and backbiting that
    have bred distrust amongst GOM partners.

    ¶14. (S/NF) The USG can help Mexico develop inter-agency
    capabilities, and there are a number of line items in the
    Merida Initiative that can be employed in this effort. For
    example: the polygraph program properly pushed out to the
    states and consistently applied to special units could help
    produce the core integrity and trust that all good
    intelligence will depend on; the state-level law enforcement
    C-4 coordination centers, when done right, can bring all
    agencies and information together; Plataforma Mexico, the
    core database for law enforcement information-sharing, is
    rolling out across Mexico with new resources in 2009 that
    will enhance its capabilities and accessibility; through law
    enforcement professionalization, we are training
    investigators who will be a key piece of the intelligence
    puzzle as they serve as front-line collectors; we will be
    supporting vetted units -- among the highest yielding
    entities in the GOM for intelligence -- with USD 5 million of
    FY2009 funding. Perhaps most importantly, these programs can
    serve as effective carrots to resolve the entrenched mistrust
    and parochialism of Mexican institutions by ensuring that
    organizations come to the table together when necessary to
    support the GOM's efforts to combat rife corruption within
    its institutions.

    MEXICO 00003195 005 OF 005

    Visit Mexico City's Classified Web Site at
    http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/wha/mexicocity and the North American
    Partnership Blog at http://www.intelink.gov/communities/state/nap /
    PASCUAL

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