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### Viewing cable 06NEWDELHI8387, INDIAN COUNTERTERRORISM EXPERTS URGE GREATER

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
06NEWDELHI8387 | 2006-12-18 06:06 | 2011-02-05 21:09 | SECRET | Embassy New Delhi

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    VZCZCXRO7324
    OO RUEHBC RUEHDBU RUEHDE RUEHDIR RUEHKUK RUEHLH RUEHPW RUEHROV
    DE RUEHNE #8387/01 3520611
    ZNY SSSSS ZZH
    O 180611Z DEC 06
    FM AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1522
    INFO RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE
    RUCNISL/ISLAMIC COLLECTIVE
    RUEHAH/AMEMBASSY ASHGABAT 0584
    RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 4750
    RUEHEK/AMEMBASSY BISHKEK 0607
    RUEHLM/AMEMBASSY COLOMBO 8215
    RUEHKA/AMEMBASSY DHAKA 8276
    RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 0397
    RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 1380
    RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 3855
    RUEHKT/AMEMBASSY KATHMANDU 8924
    RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 2308
    RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 0863
    RUEHNT/AMEMBASSY TASHKENT 0782
    RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 4244
    RUEHCI/AMCONSUL CALCUTTA 7826
    RUEHCG/AMCONSUL CHENNAI 7982
    RUEHKP/AMCONSUL KARACHI 6306
    RUEHLH/AMCONSUL LAHORE 3399
    RUEHBI/AMCONSUL MUMBAI 7183
    RUEHPW/AMCONSUL PESHAWAR 4006
    RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
    RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
    RUEIDN/DNI WASHINGTON DC
    RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI
    RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 3235
    RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 5554
    RHMFISS/HQ USSOCOM MACDILL AFB FL
    RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
    RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI
    RUMICEA/USCENTCOM INTEL CEN MACDILL AFB FL

` `

    S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 NEW DELHI 008387

    SIPDIS

    SIPDIS

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/08/2026
    TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER MOPS KISL PK AF IN
    SUBJECT: INDIAN COUNTERTERRORISM EXPERTS URGE GREATER
    INDO-US COOPERATION, CRITICIZE PAKISTAN

    REF: A. NEW DELHI 8356
    ¶B. NEW DELHI 8250

    NEW DELHI 00008387 001.2 OF 005

    Classified By: PolCouns Ted Osius for Reasons 1.4 (B,D)

    ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: "Stay the course in Afghanistan," urged
    Indian counterterrorism experts in Dec. 7 meetings with
    visiting S/CT Deputy Director Virginia Palmer. Describing a
    need for the Karzai government to extend its writ beyond
    Kabul, for a national identity to improve morale, and for
    greater unity for ethnic groups in Afghanistan, the experts
    suggested bringing moderates into the Afghan government. On
    a consistent theme regarding the perceived Pakistani
    terrorist threat, former GOI officials and analysts described
    the "Pakistan establishment" as the greatest threat to
    security in the region, and suggested that Pakistan is
    "waiting for the U.S. to fail." Acknowledging India's
    shortcomings in the fight against terrorism, the experts
    suggested greater coordination between the U.S. and India via
    counterterrorism committees and more meetings of intelligence
    leaders. Indian commentators and government officials appear
    to share the view that the Pakistani government's "state
    sponsorship of terrorism" in Afghanistan and India would
    cease if only the U.S. would increase pressure on Musharraf.
    END SUMMARY.

    -----------------------------
    Stay the Course in Afghanistan
    -----------------------------

    ¶2. (C) In Dec. 7 meetings, Indian terrorism analysts and
    former GOI officials conveyed to S/CT Deputy Director
    Virginia Palmer that India is concerned that the U.S. will
    pull out of Afghanistan. "The cost of losing Afghanistan is
    too great for India," former Indian High Commissioner in
    Pakistan Gopalaswamy Parthasarathy declared, noting that
    India has a $650 million aid program in the country. OpiningQat either a real
    or perceived failure in Afghanistan would
    be disastrous for the U.S, Parthasarathy said that India
    would be in "deep trouble" if the U.S. walked away from the
    conflict. Palmer emphatically reassured him of the U.S.
    government's commitment to stay the course in Afghanistan.
    When asked if India would consider putting troops on the
    ground in northern Afghanistan, Parthasarathy responded that
    it would depend on "how it's politically played,"
    acknowledging that the idea has some strategic value. The
    Ambassador suggested that a "prosperous, friendly"
    Afghanistan would assert its independence through foreign
    policy and, therefore, become a threat to neighboring
    Pakistan. Concerning ethnic Pashtuns, he articulated that
    they have "shifting loyalties" and noted that, though Osama
    Bin Laden is well-protected, every Pashtun "has his price."
    He stated that the Pashtun region needs more integration and
    development, but cautioned that President Karzai would have
    to help. Parthasarthy advised that Tajiks and Pashtuns
    should not be thrown together in the same battalions in the
    Afghan National Army because they lack ethnic linkages to
    each other. "If you are fighting, you must have a cause to

    NEW DELHI 00008387 002.2 OF 005

    fight," he remarked, adding that Tajiks feel abandoned and
    would benefit from having an all-Tajik battalion, as would
    the Uzbeks. "They have to be brought into the process,"
    asserted Parthasarathy.

    ¶3. (C) Ambassador Parthasarathy suggested that bettering the
    lives of certain groups in Afghanistan would improve the
    situation. He pointed out that a grassroots campaign,
    increasing the quality of life for people working in the
    fields of Afghanistan and giving ownership to local
    governance, would bring about local social commitment.
    Essentially arguing for land reform in the FATA, he argued
    that establishing a Pashtun identity which is not Taliban nor
    religious-oriented would be beneficial, and encouraged the
    U.S. to engage with moderate Pashtun leaders. Constant
    pressure must be brought to bear to bring moderate elements
    into government, the Ambassador reiterated. In summation, he
    declared that the U.S. should first "get out of Iraq," and
    then "get Afghanistan right." Palmer noted U.S. and NATO
    Provincial Reconstruction Team efforts to bring security and
    development to the government of Afghanistan, both in Kabul
    and into the provinces.

    -------------------------
    Pakistan's Got You Fooled
    -------------------------

    ¶4. (C) In a separate meeting, counterterrorism expert Dr.
    Ajai Sahni of the Institute of Conflict Management asserted
    his familiar line that, "the Pakistan establishment is the
    greatest threat to security in the region." He described the
    Taliban as inextricably linked to the "strategic terrorism"
    of Pakistan. Citing the Pakistan army's oath of service and
    government school curriculum, Sahni claimed that Pakistan and
    Osama Bin Laden are "ideologically similar." At the highest
    level, the religious extremists of Pakistan are "exceedingly
    cynical," he said, observing, "they can shove the Sharia
    (Islamic law) to the side if it gets in the way." On
    Musharraf, Sahni stated that the Pakistani leader had done a
    lot of damage, inferring that the U.S. had succumbed to
    Pakistan's unspoken threat that it would "implode" and
    destabilize the region. Separately, A.S. Dulat, former head
    of India's external intelligence agency (RAW), spoke along
    the same lines, claiming that the U.S. had "placed too much
    faith in Musharraf." "If Pakistan wants to stop all this
    (terrorism), they can do it," exclaimed Dulat, adding
    "Musharraf can turn off the tap anytime. If the U.S. puts
    pressure on him, he'll fall in line."

    ¶5. (C) Turning to the Pakistan intelligence agency (ISI),
    Sahni insisted that the organization is a disciplined part of
    the military structure of Pakistan, expounding that it
    answers faithfully to President Musharraf and whomever he
    designates. "ISI is completely integrated within the command
    structure of the Pakistani military," indicated Sahni,
    scoffing at the notion that the ISI has any plausible
    derivability. Dulat implied that the ISI is guilty of
    placating the U.S. government by catching a few known

    NEW DELHI 00008387 003.2 OF 005

    terrorists, but "allowing Osama Bin Laden to go free."
    Raising the Mumbai terrorist attacks, Dulat said he felt
    Pakistan was guilty of taking part, and that they now regret
    it. "The fallout was too big," he said, inferring that
    terrorism has lessened since then as a result. "They are
    trying to make amends," he mused, adding "any step forward
    should be welcomed on both sides."

    ¶6. (C) Raising the GOP's Federally Administered Tribal Areas
    (FATA) strategy, Ambassador Parthasarathy said he thought it
    was doomed as soon as Ali Mohammed Jan Orakzai was named
    governor of the Northwest Frontier Province. Assuring Palmer
    that he had first-hand knowledge of this, he said, "Orakzai
    has a visceral hatred of the U.S. Did you strip-search him
    at JFK or something?"

    ¶7. (S) Pressed to expound upon his view of Pakistan's
    current strategy, Sahni suggested that Pakistan is waiting
    for the U.S. to fail. They expect the U.S. to get tired in
    Iraq, he indicated, and subsequently to leave the region.
    "If you can't handle a small country like Iraq or
    Afghanistan, you will leave the region alone," he theorized.
    "If they are successful in exhausting you," he continued,
    "they will seek to dominate the region themselves."

    ¶8. (S) Former RAW officer B. Raman told Palmer that the
    Mumbai bombing investigation had become more complicated than
    past investigations because the terrorist groups involved had
    changed their tactics to better cover their infiltration
    trail from Pakistan. While the Indian police were able to
    find a direct paper trail of the movement of the perpetrators
    of the 1993 Mumbai bombings through flight manifests from
    Karachi to Dubai to Mumbai, the investigators of the July
    2006 attacks in Mumbai did not have the same evidence. He
    said those involved in the attacks went first through Iran by
    road so there would be no record of their travel from
    Bahawalpur, Pakistan, to Tehran. He said the intelligence
    services had strong evidence, however, of a connection
    between the attack and Lashkar-i-Taiba training camps in
    Bahawalpur.

    ¶9. (S) Raman also said the terrorists had used Bangladesh as
    a final infiltration route into India. He said there was an
    increasing problem of infiltration of Pakistan-based
    terrorist groups into India through the porous border with
    Bangladesh. When Palmer asked if the Bangladeshi government
    had been cooperative in cracking down on these groups, he
    opined that their action had been superficial at best. Even
    though they had arrested several major terrorist leaders, the
    real work still needed to be done to disrupt the groups
    fully. Although much of their support was Pakistan-based,
    there was still an indigenous cadre in Bangladesh. Most of
    all, he noted, the Bangladeshi government has done little
    against the madrassas that foment violence and extremism.
    Ultimately, he said, this is a problem with Bangladeshi
    intelligence because they are unwilling or unable to stop the
    groups' activities.

    NEW DELHI 00008387 004.2 OF 005

    ----------------------------------------
    India's Shortcomings on Counterterrorism
    ----------------------------------------

    ¶10. (C) Dr. Sahni warned that India has fallen short on
    counterterrorism, opining that counterterrorism laws in the
    country are diluted. In addition, he referred to India's
    policing system as the "weakest in the world," reporting that
    there are no qualified police to do forensics, there are only
    two forensic labs, and there is no national database to track
    terrorists. "The judicial system is broken," he added,
    commenting "at the end of the day, you can't punish a
    terrorist in India." He also cited so-called "encounter
    killings," the practice by which suspected criminals are
    killed without trial, as an issue obstructing the fight
    against terror. Ultimately, in Indian policy there is too
    much talking and not enough action, according to Sahni.

    ----------------
    Terrorism Trends
    ----------------

    ¶11. (C) On Indo-U.S. counterterrorism cooperation, Sahni
    suggested that the U.S. and India should work together on
    counterterrorism committees. Dulat also expressed a need for
    greater cooperation between the two countries, arguing that
    the respective intelligence agency heads should meet
    regularly.

    ¶12. (S) Raman talked in general about the international war
    against terrorism and the need to see the issue from a global
    perspective. He noted that India had learned much during its
    long history of fighting insurgencies, including in Kashmir
    and Punjab. He said you cannot beat terrorists, you have to
    make them wither away. He said India had learned that it
    takes many years to win this kind of battle because you can't
    just end it in the short term, unless you use overwhelming
    force to crush the insurgents. As democracies, he said, we
    can't just use that kind of force, so we have to have a
    longer-term view. He urged that the U.S. take a global view
    of the terrorist threat, noting that for example, many of the
    terrorists now emerging in Thailand studied in Pakistani
    madrassas and many Pakistan-based terrorist groups --
    including Lashkar-i-Taiba and Harakat-ul Mujahideen -- are
    now obtaining funding in the Gulf.

    ¶13. (C) Dulat expressed concern about growing contacts
    between the Lashkar-e-Taiba and Wahabi groups among Indian
    expatriates. "There are more than 3 million Indians in the
    Gulf alone," he said, "more than half of whom are Muslim."
    These links and the consequent influence of the Wahabists are
    greater in southern India than in the north, he added. Dulat
    urged the U.S. and India to increase collection efforts on
    these groups and share information gathered.

    -----------------------------------
    COMMENT: Focus Remains on Pakistan
    -----------------------------------

    NEW DELHI 00008387 005.2 OF 005

    ¶14. (C) Indian commentators and government officials appear
    to share the view that government of Pakistan "state
    sponsorship of terrorism" would cease if only the U.S. would
    increase pressure on Musharraf. Anxiety over the U.S.
    commitment to the fight in Afghanistan is also a resounding
    theme we've been hearing for months. Indians seem unwilling
    to take the U.S. (and NATO) at their word on their commitment
    to stay in the conflict zone and stabilize the country. The
    tide of joint counterterrorism efforts, however, seems to be
    turning, with the experts in the field encouraging the U.S.
    and India to cooperate more closely. Post has reported
    (reftels) on meetings with the MEA and MHA, in which they
    told Palmer a new counterterrorism directorate would be
    formed in the MEA to help step up Indo-U.S. coordination on
    fighting terror. END COMMENT.

    ¶15. (U) S/CT Deputy Coordinator for Counter Terrorism
    Virginia Palmer cleared this cable.
    PYATT

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