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### Viewing cable 07BAGHDAD63, IRAQ'S SUNNI VP DISCUSSES BAGHDAD SECURITY PLAN,

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
07BAGHDAD63 | 2007-01-07 18:06 | 2010-12-05 12:12 | SECRET | Embassy Baghdad

`

    VZCZCXRO1455
    OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
    DE RUEHGB #0063/01 0071841
    ZNY SSSSS ZZH
    O 071841Z JAN 07
    FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8965
    INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
    RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
    RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE

` `

    S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 000063

    SIPDIS

    SIPDIS

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/06/2017
    TAGS: PREL PGOV IZ
    SUBJECT: IRAQ'S SUNNI VP DISCUSSES BAGHDAD SECURITY PLAN,
    MODERATE FRONT, SADDAM AND IRAN

    REF: A. A) BAGHDAD 0008
    ¶B. B) 2006 BAGHDAD 4652
    ¶C. C) 2006 BAGHDAD 4763

    Classified By: Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

    ¶1. (S) Summary: In a January 4 meeting with Iraq's Sunni Vice
    President Tariq al-Hashemi (Iraqi Islamic Party ) IIP), the
    Ambassador briefed him on the new Baghdad security plan and
    solicited the VP's support. Al-Hashemi welcomed a new plan
    to curb Baghdad violence, requested Shia and Sunni balance
    within the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) manning checkpoints,
    and agreed that an increased number of MNF-I troops are
    needed in order for the plan to succeed. Discussing a
    possible cabinet change, the VP said that Prime Minister
    Maliki has not approached him about changing any of Tawafuq's
    (Sunni Coalition) Ministers or their Deputy Prime Minister.
    Al-Hashemi stressed that before Tawafuq agrees to change its
    Ministers, the Minister of Defense, Abdul Qadir Mohammed
    al-Mufriji, (Sunni ) Independent ) Tawafuq) must be
    replaced with another Tawafuq candidate. The VP criticized
    the way the GOI executed Saddam and expressed concern that
    because of their actions the reconciliation project is now
    "dead." On the moderate front, al-Hashemi said that during
    his recent trip to Sulaymaniyah with President Talabani he
    had agreed to change IIP's conditions (reftel) to a program
    for the coalition to address. However, the VP warned, the PM
    has been unable to convince Dawa to support the coalition.
    The Ambassador and VP discussed how to address the issue of
    GOI officials with close ties to foreign countries, such as
    Iran, with the VP recommending that the GOI "start from
    scratch" and hold new elections. End Summary.

    --------------------------------------------- -------
    The Baghdad Security Plan: Al-Hashemi Offers Support
    --------------------------------------------- -------

    ¶2. (S) The Ambassador outlined the chief components of the
    new Baghdad Security Plan and called on the VP to support the
    PM and this plan. First, Coalition Forces (CF) and Iraqi
    Security Forces (ISF) will pursue anyone who breaks the law.
    There will be no sanctuary anywhere in greater Baghdad, the
    Ambassador emphasized. Second, Baghdad will be divided into
    nine districts overseen by two deputy commanders reporting
    directly to a military commander with full authority
    operating independently of political pressures. Finally, the
    security plan will be accompanied by economic and services
    plan. In order to secure Baghdad, the Ambassador said, the
    Iraqi Army (IA) will bring three extra brigades to Baghdad,
    two from northern Iraq and one from the South, working
    alongside an extra US brigade. The coalition will support by
    bringing more forces into Iraq and committing additional
    forces to be brought in if needed. The details will be
    worked out in the coming days.

    ¶3. (S) The VP responded that National Security Advisor
    Muwafuq Rubai'e had already presented the plan to him. "I
    gave him four pages of comments," the VP said, and also "sent
    a copy to General Casey." He reiterated previous concerns
    about Shia-Sunni balance within the ISF, especially at
    checkpoints. The Deputy Commander in Karkh should be from
    the Ministry of Defense, al-Hashemi stated, and the Deputy
    Commander in Rasafa should be from Ministry of Interior. The
    VP agreed that more forces, both Coalition and Iraqi, would
    be needed to solve Baghdad's security crisis.

    --------------------------------------------- --------------
    Cabinet Reshuffle: Minister of Defense Needs to Be Replaced
    --------------------------------------------- --------------

    ¶4. (C) The Ambassador asked about the proposed cabinet
    change, noting that the PM said Tawafuq wants to change three
    ministries but has not provided any substitutions. The VP
    scoffed, saying that the PM wants those changes, not Tawafuq.
    The PM will not tell us who he wants changed, al-Hashemi
    complained, and is choosing to form a committee to review the
    issue. One of the changes the PM wants to make, he
    continued, is to move Tawafuq's Minister of State for Foreign
    Affairs, Rafi'a al-Issawi, to Minister of Health (MoH). The
    Ambassador noted that this is a great opportunity for
    Tawafuq, since that ministry has been "destroyed" by its
    current Sadrist Minister and al-Issawi will be "a hero" for
    fixing it. The VP commented that there are "too many guns
    and killers" at the MoH and that key people need to be
    removed or else al-Issawi "will be killed" by the Jaysh
    al-Mahdi (JAM) and Moqtada al-Sadr supporters working there.

    ¶5. (C) The VP noted that before Tawafuq agrees to any
    ministerial changes, Minister of Defense Abdul Qadir
    al-Mufriji must be replaced. Tawafuq has sent a clear

    BAGHDAD 00000063 002 OF 003

    message to al-Mufirji, al-Hashemi said, that he should
    resign. "We were forced by the Shia coalition" to place an
    independent Sunni in this position, the VP lamented.
    However, al-Hashemi said, the PM is the boss, the
    Commander-in-Chief, and he is not independent. The Minister
    of Defense makes sectarian issues worse by "simply
    implementing the PM's ideas," al-Hashemi stressed. His
    replacement, therefore, should come from Tawafuq. The
    Ambassador noted that the PM has not decided the extent of
    his cabinet change and that the Minister of Defense might not
    be replaced. Besides, the Ambassador noted, our military
    colleagues say al-Mufriji has a good reputation as an honest
    and non-sectarian minister.

    --------------------------------------------- ------
    Saddam's Execution: Reconciliation "Dead" VP Warns
    --------------------------------------------- ------

    ¶6. (S) Turning to Saddam's execution, the VP stated that
    nobody had consulted with President Talabani, although he
    noted that he had sent Rubaie a letter prior to the
    execution. Al-Hashemi commented that Talabani believed his
    signature was not required because of a legal statute which
    states high tribunal sentences cannot be changed. The
    Ambassador noted he had been told the same thing, and that he
    had recommended that the PM press the Chief Justice for a
    written opinion concurring with this assessment. Al-Hashemi
    said he had also suggested that a judge put in writing his
    opinion that a Presidential decree was unnecessary.

    ¶7. (S) The Ambassador then asked the VP whether the PM or his
    advisors had approached him before the execution. The VP
    said that he had not been consulted, although prior to the
    execution he sent a letter to both the PM and Rubai'e sharing
    concerns raised by Salah ad Din (SaD) officials during a
    December 28 meeting (Ref A). The letter, the VP continued,
    requested three days notice to address security issues in
    SaD, Saddam's home province, and recommended that the GOI
    release Saddam's remains to the SaD Governor for burial.
    According to the VP, Rubai'e responded that it would not be
    possible to provide three days notice since the PM is keeping
    all details "a secret until the last minute." Rubai'e
    further stated, al-Hashemi said, that he would try to give
    notice at least one hour before the event.

    ¶8. (S) In addition to the legal issues and returning Saddam's
    remains to SaD, the VP said he also spoke to the PM about
    rushing through the execution during Eid. According to
    al-Hashemi, the PM responded that it was "your Eid, not
    mine," and noted that the religious leaders had confirmed
    that if Saddam was executed before sunrise it would not occur
    during Eid. (Note: Saddam was executed approximately one
    hour before sunrise on December 30, the day which Sunni
    Muslims began celebrating Eid al-Adha. End Note). The VP
    noted that Saddam was executed "as a Sunni, not as a
    dictator," and called the execution "the revenge of the Dawa
    party." He further commented that reconciliation "was dead"
    because of how the execution occurred.

    ¶9. (S) The Ambassador agreed that many people are upset with
    how the execution occurred. When asked why the USG had
    released Saddam Hussein when the GOI had not resolved some of
    these issues, the Ambassador responded that Iraq had legal
    custody of Saddam, although at GOI's request we had physical
    custody. "We voiced our concerns," the Ambassador said, but
    in the end the PM made the final decision. Based on Saddam's
    execution, the VP suggested that MNF-I encourage the PM to
    postpone the remaining two executions until reconciliation
    has concluded.

    --------------------------------------------- ----------------
    Moderate Front: IIP Relents on Conditions; Dawa will not join
    --------------------------------------------- ----------------

    ¶10. (C) The Ambassador noted that efforts to form a moderate
    front have stalled and asked the VP where IIP stands on their
    list of demands which must be met before joining the
    coalition. The VP replied that while visiting Sulaymaniyah
    with President Talabani, IIP agreed to change their
    conditions (Ref B) to an agenda the moderate front would
    address. In fact, al-Hashemi said, IIP had issued an amended
    statement to this effect and had passed it to Rowsch Shaways
    (former Iraqi Vice President and Deputy Prime Minister )
    Kurd ) KDP) and current Vice President Adil Abdul Mehdi
    (SCIRI). They took the amended statement to the PM,
    al-Hashemi said. The problem, the VP continued, is that the
    PM has been unable to convince Dawa to join the coalition.
    According to the VP, the PM has said that as a political
    party leader he cannot join the coalition, but as the PM he
    could form a group with the Presidency Council (the President

    BAGHDAD 00000063 003 OF 003

    and two VPs) and the Council of Representatives (CoR)
    speaker, Mahmoud Mashadani. The Ambassador responded that it
    would be better if the coalition formed around political bloc
    leaders. There could be constitutional concerns if a new
    alliance between official positions forms, the Ambassador
    cautioned. The VP said that once Abdul Mehdi returns to
    Baghdad he is willing to discuss the issue again.

    --------------------------------------------- -------------
    On Iranian Influence in the GOI: VP suggests new elections
    --------------------------------------------- -------------

    ¶11. (S) On the Iranian detainees, the Ambassador commented
    that President Talabani called these people his "guests," but
    he did not even know who they are, the Ambassador said. The
    VP responded that Iran's activities within Iraq and their
    connections to GOI officials have not been a secret. "I have
    been warning about Iran's influence for some time," he said.
    The VP offered his appreciation for General Caldwell's
    presentation (Ref C), but noted the General only shared
    "things I already knew." The Ambassador asked the VP what
    should be done with GOI leaders who are working with Quds
    Force operatives. The VP replied that the GOI needs "to
    start from scratch," with new elections and needs to
    strengthen a weak central government. While affirming his
    commitment to democracy and rule of law, the VP noted that
    there are "problems" with some of the political partners.
    The VP further commented that Iran's reach extends beyond
    SCIRI, Badr and the Sadrists. He explained his belief that
    CoR Speaker Mahmoud Mashadani (Tawafuq) is also influenced by
    the Iranians and noted that several Sunni insurgent and
    resistance groups have received Iranian support.

    ¶12. (S) Al-Hashemi asked the Ambassador about the GOI's
    actions once MNF-I released the detainees. The Ambassador
    commented that while he shares concerns about Iranian
    influence, the GOI took some positive steps during this
    incident. First, he said, once MNF-I released the detainees,
    the GOI ordered them to leave Iraq and escorted them to the
    Iranian border. Second, the MFA issued a statement
    announcing their departure and stated publicly that "their
    activities had been inconsistent with their diplomatic
    status." Third, the GOI has requested an updated list of
    Iranian diplomats in Iraq so that in the future it will be
    easier to verify diplomatic status. Finally, the GOI is
    sending a delegation to Iran, most likely led by Deputy Prime
    Minister Barham Salih, to discuss the incident and its
    implications. The Ambassador asked why the VP and IIP have
    not made a bigger deal about the issue. The VP responded
    that IIP is more concerned about reconciliation and that he
    fears making a big deal about the Iranians and their ties
    with other GOI leaders will hinder the reconciliation effort.
    KHALILZAD

`