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### Viewing cable 10BERLIN138, MAXIMIZING GERMANY'S CONTRIBUTION TO THE TRAINING

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
10BERLIN138 | 2010-02-01 10:10 | 2011-01-25 00:12 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Berlin

`

    VZCZCXRO2850
    OO RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHPW RUEHROV RUEHSL RUEHSR
    DE RUEHRL #0138/01 0321034
    ZNY CCCCC ZZH
    O 011034Z FEB 10
    FM AMEMBASSY BERLIN
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6432
    INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
    RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
    RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 1737
    RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
    RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
    RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
    RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
    RHMFISS/CDRUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GE PRIORITY

` `

    C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BERLIN 000138

    SIPDIS

    FOR SECRETARY CLINTON

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/29/2020
    TAGS: PREL MARR MOPS NATO GM AF
    SUBJECT: MAXIMIZING GERMANY'S CONTRIBUTION TO THE TRAINING
    OF AFGHAN NATIONAL SECURITY ...

    246466

    2010-02-01

    10BERLIN138

    Embassy Berlin

    CONFIDENTIAL

    C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BERLIN 000138
    SIPDIS FOR SECRETARY CLINTON
    E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/29/2020

    TAGS: PREL MARR MOPS NATO GM AF

    SUBJECT: MAXIMIZING GERMANY'S CONTRIBUTION TO THE TRAINING OF AFGHAN NATIONAL SECURITY FORCES
    Classified By: AMBASSADOR PHILIP D. MURPHY. REASONS: 1.4 (B) AND (D).

    Dear Madam Secretary,
    (SBU) I have just returned from a five-day trip to northern
    Afghanistan and Kabul at the invitation of the German Armed
    Forces and wanted to share with you some of my impressions.
    (C) First and foremost, I came away deeply impressed with the
    dedication, professionalism and competence of the German
    soldiers I met in Afghanistan. Without exception, all of
    them strongly believe in GEN McChrystal's counterinsurgency
    strategy and see its emphasis on protection of the population
    and partnering with Afghan security forces as absolutely
    the right way ahead. While the U.S. and German militaries
    might have had their differences in the past about the right
    strategy in Afghanistan, that is no longer the case today.
    (C) The Bundeswehr will probably never be able to do
    partnering at the ratio and intensity that U.S. forces do,
    but as the German commander for Region North assured me, it
    is ready to deploy beefed-up embedded mentoring teams to
    operate in the field with the Afghan National Army (ANA).
    The Bundeswehr has made great strides over the past couple of
    years, eliminating many of its previous caveats and becoming
    more offensively-minded. Its command of the quick reaction
    force (QRF) for the northern region -- a unit which I had the
    pleasure of inspecting during my trip -- has helped
    facilitate this process. The current Bundeswehr is a far cry
    from the static, defensively oriented territorial army of 20
    years ago.
    (C) Chancellor Merkel's January 26 announcement that she
    would seek only a 500-troop increase in the German contingent
    (along with an additional 350-troop reserve) was
    disappointing. The decision to go with a much lower number
    (Defense Minster zu Guttenberg had recommended an increase of
    1,500 troops) was driven by the Chancellor's desire to
    maintain broad parliamentary support for the ISAF mandate in
    the face of overwhelming public opposition to the deployment.
    However, we should not write off the Germans as a military
    contributor and assume they can only contribute to the new
    ISAF strategy by providing garrison trainers. We will hold
    them to their commitment to restructure their forces so that
    the number of Bundeswehr soldiers training and operating with
    the ANA in the field will increase from the current 280 to
    1,400. The Afghanistan deployment has been a
    transformational process for the Bundeswehr and we should
    encourage the continuation of this positive trend. While
    recognizing the Germans' perceptions of their limitations, we
    must also be careful not to go too far in the other direction
    and have overly low expectations of them.
    (C) During my talks to German soldiers of all ranks, I was
    struck by their frustration about the unwillingness of German
    politicians to be honest about the nature of the German
    military engagement in northern Afghanistan -- i.e., that it
    does not involve just guarding aid workers and digging wells,
    but also combat against hard-core insurgents. They
    complained that while the Bundeswehr and the Afghanistan
    deployment had evolved over time, the politicians remained
    stuck in an old mind-set that sees the German public as
    simply incapable of accepting German soldiers being involved
    in anything but purely defensive military operations. They
    thought that support for the mission would actually increase
    if the German government were more open and honest about what
    was really going on and what was at stake. They pointed out
    that while German public opposition to the deployment is high
    (60-70% favor immediate withdrawal), it is not deeply felt,
    with other issues like the economy and unemployment ranking
    much higher on the list of concerns.
    (C) My own assessment is that the German public is much more
    resilient on this issue than the politicians give them credit
    for. Who would have imagined in 2001 that Germany would
    still be in Afghanistan eight years later despite the loss of
    35 soldiers and police officers? Many would have predicted
    that a tragedy like last fall's German-ordered air strike in
    Kunduz, in which dozens of innocent Afghan civilians may have
    been killed, would have led to angry demonstrations in
    Germany, demanding immediate withdrawal of the Bundeswehr.
    But in fact, the opposite occurred. Support for the mission
    BERLIN 00000138 002 OF 002
    actually increased temporarily as most Germans rallied around
    the German commander who took the difficult decision to order
    the bombing against the two hijacked fuel tankers. While we
    obviously must defer to the German government on how to
    handle these issues domestically, we should not take at face
    value traditional German assertions about the impossibility
    of Bundeswehr involvement in military operations.
    (C) I was equally impressed with the German civilian police
    trainers that I met at the German police training facility in
    Mazar-e Sharif, which is being expanded to train up to 600
    police at a time. They are extremely competent and
    committed. The good news is that the old debate between
    Germany and the United States about how to train police is
    over. Germany has embraced the U.S. Focused District
    Development (FDD) police training program and has plans to
    implement it in 50 districts throughout the north by 2012.
    Part of Merkel's January 26 announcement included a planned
    increase in civilian police trainers from 123 to 200 for FDD
    and other bilateral training programs. Unlike military
    deployments, sending police trainers requires no
    parliamentary mandate and is not politically controversial.
    (C) The less good news is that while German police mentoring
    teams (PMTs) also include military police, Germany views
    police training overall as a purely civilian government
    activity that can only be done by active-duty police
    officers. As a result, German PMTs cannot include
    contractors, operate in conflict areas or partner with Afghan
    police in doing operations beyond normal law enforcement.
    The further German PMTs move away from German bases, the
    higher the requirements will be for Bundeswehr force
    protection and medical support, which is already in short
    supply. Merkel touts that Germany will train 5,000 Afghan
    police per year, but most of that will be garrison training,
    not the mentoring and partnering that GEN McChrystal believes
    is critical to getting Afghan security forces up to speed
    quickly. Even for garrison training, Germany's ability to
    send significantly more police officers is limited because
    there is no excess capacity within either the Federal Police
    or the 16 state police forces to draw from. The program
    depends on volunteers who agree to serve even though in most
    cases it is not career-enhancing. We continue to push here
    in Berlin for the government to find some way to deploy more
    police trainers, but this is likely to be a lengthy process.
    (C) All the German military leaders and officials I met with
    welcomed the planned deployment of a brigade of U.S. police
    trainers and a battalion of air assets in the north of
    Afghanistan, realizing that both are urgently needed to fill
    long-standing shortfalls. The fact that the U.S. forces will
    come under the tactical control of the German regional
    commander has reassured the Germans that the U.S. has no
    intention of taking over the north. As we go forward, we
    will want to make sure that all of our actions in the north
    are fully coordinated so that we do not inadvertently
    undermine Germany's sense of ownership of the region. This
    is essential for keeping Germany fully engaged in Afghanistan
    and the Bundeswehr on its positive trajectory to becoming a
    fully capable, expeditionary force.
    (C) Over the next several weeks, in the lead-up to the
    Bundestag debate and vote on the government's proposal for a
    troop increase, I will be engaging with government ministers,
    parliamentarians from all parties and the media to relay the
    conclusions of my trip and to underscore the importance of
    Germany stepping up its efforts on the training of Afghan
    national security forces. As I saw for myself in
    Afghanistan, there is a compelling case for the U.S. strategy
    and approach and I am confident that, in the end, we will be
    able to get a strong and meaningful increase in Germany's
    contribution to our common mission.
    Murphy

`