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### Viewing cable 08ADDISABABA286, ETHIOPIA: ASSISTANT SECRETARY FRAZER AND PRIME

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
08ADDISABABA286 | 2008-02-06 07:07 | 2011-03-14 21:09 | CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN | Embassy Addis Ababa

`

    VZCZCXRO0475
    PP RUEHROV
    DE RUEHDS #0286/01 0370754
    ZNY CCCCC ZZH
    P 060754Z FEB 08 ZDK
    FM AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9435
    INFO RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
    RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
    RHMFISS/CJTF HOA PRIORITY
    RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
    RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
    RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
    RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY

` `

    C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 ADDIS ABABA 000286

    SIPDIS

    NOFORN
    SIPDIS

    DEPARTMENT FOR AF AND AF/E , AND INR/AA
    LONDON, PARIS, ROME FOR AFRICA WATCHER
    CJTF-HOA AND USCENTCOM FOR POLAD

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/01/2018
    TAGS: PREL PBTS PNAT MOPS KPKO ET ER SO SU KE
    SUBJECT: ETHIOPIA: ASSISTANT SECRETARY FRAZER AND PRIME
    MINISTER MELES DISCUSS KENYA, SUDAN, SOMALIA, AND ERITREA

    Classified By: Ambassador Donald Yamamoto for Reasons: 1.4 (B) and (D).

    ¶1.  (C/NF)  SUMMARY.  On January 31, Assistant Secretary
    Frazer met with Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi in a
    broad ranging 100 minute discussion on Kenya, Sudan, Somalia,
    Somaliland, and the Eritrean border.  Also in attendance were
    Ambassador Yamamoto, Ambassador Courville, Sudan S/E
    Williamson, AF/SPG Director Lauren Landis, and notetakers.
    A/S Frazer opened by noting that Kenya is in a dangerous
    position, but that both President Kibaki and Raila Odinga
    have the potential to reach a settlement.  Meles assessed
    that both sides were playing hardball and that the
    international community should place greater pressure on the
    opposition to reign in the violence.  Meles said the key
    challenge in Sudan was to manage the North-South tension to
    avoid a meltdown in 2011.  Regarding Somalia, Meles said that
    his government had developed a three track approach to be
    presented to President Yusuf on Yusuf's return from London.
    First, Meles said he hoped Ethiopian troops would withdraw
    from Somalia by summer to be replaced by African Union and
    newly trained Transitional Federal Government (TFG) forces.
    Second, his government would reach out to the opposition
    within Somalia, and third, his government would reach out to
    the external opposition.  On Somaliland, A/S Frazer and Meles
    agreed that they were not opposed to formal recognition, but
    that the African Union should take the lead.  Meles said that
    Ethiopia would not drop out of the Algiers Peace Accord
    process and that sufficient changes had been made in UNSC
    resolution 1798, but he added that the Eritrea-Ethiopia
    Boundary Commission's (EEBC) "virtual demarcation" decision
    should not be supported by the UN.  Lastly, Meles said the
    United Nation's Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) could
    move in its entirety to Ethiopia if UNMEE was forced out of
    Eritrea.  END SUMMARY.

    --------------------------------
    KENYA IS IN A DANGEROUS POSITION
    --------------------------------

    ¶2.  (C/NF)  The meeting opened with an hour-long tour
    d'horizon on the repercussions of the Kenyan elections.
    Assistant Secretary Frazer began the discussion by noting
    that Kenya is a dangerous situation, and not just as a local
    or national problem, but also an international concern in
    light of the terrorist presence in Kenya that might seek to
    exploit the situation for their benefit.  A/S Frazer said
    that she thinks both Kibaki and Odinga have the potential to
    be reasonable and reach a settlement.  A/S Frazer noted that
    the impact of the violence includes the loss of foreign
    business and investment, as well as the loss of the U.S.
    Peace Corps presence.

    ¶3.  (C/NF) Meles said that he feels that both sides are
    playing hardball, and agreed that the situation is very
    dangerous.   Meles said he was not sure what happened with
    the elections, but feels that Kibaki had been more
    accommodating in the beginning and has hardened his position
    as the situation has developed. A/S Frazer responded that the
    hardening of Kibaki,s position is because of the
    post-election violence.  Kibaki saw Odinga as responsible for
    the violence and felt that he could not trust Odinga, which
    caused him to harden his position.  However, A/S Frazer said
    that Kibaki may be in a better position to bring stability to
    the situation.  Kibaki has the power of the state behind him
    and is the only decision-maker on his side, while Odinga is
    one of five making the decisions.  Odinga is probably the
    most reasonable of the five, but he is constrained by the
    hard-liners within his coalition.  For example, William Ruto
    presents one face to the international community, but then
    turns and uses the radio to incite violence.

    ¶4.  (C/NF) Meles opined that the opposition has been given a
    free ride; all the pressure has been on President Kibaki, not
    the opposition, even though they are responsible for most of
    the violence. This is giving the wrong message to the
    opposition.  Kibaki,s government, even if it has not made
    good decisions, has not incited violence.  A/S Frazer noted
    that it is difficult to have leverage over the opposition,
    since the natural leverage of a government is over another
    government, rather than an opposition group.  The United

    ADDIS ABAB 00000286  002 OF 005

    States is advocating a message of accountability on all
    sides, both government and opposition.  A/S Frazer noted that
    some Kikuyu politicians are beginning to use the Mungiki
    militia to retaliate against the violence carried out by the
    opposition.

    ¶5.  (C/NF) Meles noted that the opposition used the
    perception that the government had stolen the election to
    incite violence, but the main violence and victims of attacks
    were in the rural areas, not the capital.  Meles said that
    "none of us spoke strongly enough against the ethnic
    cleansing" that was taking place in the rural areas.  Now the
    "Kikuyu establishment" is using militias, such as the
    Mungiki, to retaliate in a "payback period."  It has to be
    made clear to the Kikuyu establishment that ethnic cleansing
    is unacceptable as a response to the violence and that they
    cannot "fight fire with fire" or use militias to fight on
    their behalf.

    ¶6.  (C/NF) A/S Frazer responded that the U.S. message is the
    same: ethnic cleansing is unacceptable and all sides must be
    held accountable for the violence.  However, A/S Frazer noted
    that this is difficult because Odinga is an excellent
    communicator and very good at playing the victim and the
    media love the concept of the "good guy" versus the "bad
    guy."  A/S Frazer said that she feels that the situation must
    be resolved quickly, particularly before the U.S. Congress
    and UN Security Council come back into session and begin to
    focus on Kenya, when the challenge will be to fight a battle
    against overreaction.  A/S Frazer emphasized that the U.S.
    focus is on the process led by former UN Secretary-General
    Kofi Annan and that the United States will follow Annan,s
    direction.  Following Annan,s lead will also help keep the
    U.S. Congress from overreacting to the situation.  The key is
    a negotiated political agreement, which will then influence
    the international response.

    ¶7.  (C/NF) A/S Frazer said that it appears that Kibaki is
    trying to consolidate power, while Odinga wants to
    internationalize the conflict and maintain a state of crisis.
     There is a danger that the situation could lead to civil
    war.  A/S Frazer noted that Secretary Rice had recently
    spoken with Annan, and Annan mentioned that he had suggested
    to Kibaki that he bring the military out in a limited way,
    but that Kibaki demurred based on concerns regarding ethnic
    divisions within the military.  If the ethnic divisions
    become more pronounced because of the violence, A/S Frazer
    expressed her concern that it could lead to a coup d,etat.
    The Kikuyu response could lead to civil war, as many Kikuyu
    fundamentally don't believe that the election was stolen and
    are incensed by the violence that the opposition is
    encouraging.

    ¶8.  (C/NF) Unfortunately, Meles responded, the international
    reaction thus far does not inspire moderation.  The EU
    response of cutting off assistance gives the message that
    Kibaki is the "bad guy" and does not push Odinga or his group
    to moderate their positions.  While the military may not
    quit, they will not be monolithically behind Kibaki, which is
    why some Kikuyu are turning to the militia instead.  The
    "single-minded focus on Kibaki" is not productive for a
    peaceful settlement and will only entrench hard-liners on
    both sides.  Meles said that a more balanced approach is
    needed to encourage a peaceful process.

    ¶9.  (C/NF) A/S Frazer said that she personally believes that
    Kibaki could change the dynamics single-handedly overnight
    with a public address that is not defensive but a true
    "Mandela moment."  Until this point, Kibaki has been "stage
    managing" his presidency, but needs to be more substantive in
    his messages to the people.  Kibaki must also control his
    supporters, some of whom have tried to undermine his positive
    efforts towards compromise.  A/S Frazer noted that the
    opposition prefers the term coalition to government of
    national unity, which they already tried in the past and did
    not work.  A/S Frazer also opined that the government could
    improve the situation by lifting the restrictions on the
    media and asked the media to behave responsibly, which could
    have the effect of making the opposition look very small in
    comparison.

    ADDIS ABAB 00000286  003 OF 005

    ¶10.  (C/NF) Meles agreed that Kibaki is not violent by
    nature, but has only been going after the foot soldiers, not
    the organizers of the violence on the Kikuyu side.  Meles
    believes this is because Kibaki can only rely on a "100
    percent Kikuyu institution" that includes the "bosses" that
    have organized the Kikuyu-led violence.  This puts Kibaki
    into a dangerous situation if he reaches out to the
    opposition without guarantees that they will respond
    positively.  A/S Frazer responded by noting that Odinga,s
    heart is not in violence and would be likely to accept a
    compromise.  However, it is not clear what kind of deal he
    might agree to take. But by reaching out, A/S Frazer said,
    Kibaki could place the media pressure on Odinga to agree,
    rather than keep it on himself.

    ¶11.  (C/NF) Meles said that it would be helpful for the
    United States, in coordination with the EU, to speak to both
    the opposition and key Kikuyu figures in clear terms
    regarding accountability for the violence.  Meles said that
    he planned to meet with Kibaki at the AU Summit during an
    IGAD meeting on the margins of the Summit.  Meles emphasized
    Ethiopia's direct stake in the situation in Kenya and that
    Ethiopia "cannot sit idly by" or afford further instability
    in Kenya that could impact the broader region.  While "we
    should not pour oil on fire, we must understand where Kibaki
    is coming from, and that he has to be seen to defend Kikuyu
    interests" and keep his Kikuyu base.  Meles promised to
    follow-up via Ambassador Yamamoto following the IGAD meeting.

    --------------------------------------------- --
    SUDAN TO REMAIN TENSE FOR THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE
    --------------------------------------------- --

    ¶12.  (C/NF)  Meles said that the key challenge in Sudan was
    to manage the tension between the North and South through
    2011 to avoid a meltdown.  Meles was sympathetic to the
    ongoing situation in Sudan, both Darfur and implementation of
    the CPA, but said he thought that the CPA was the more
    complicated issue. He admitted that Ethiopia's primary
    concern was the CPA, particularly given its shared border
    with Sudan, which touches both North and South.  A/S Frazer
    relayed that recent negative rhetoric towards the US from the
    ruling National Congress Party (NCP) is unhelpful,
    specifically talk of declaring the Charge d'Affaires persona
    non grata.  Meles agreed it was unhelpful, but pointed out
    that the government in Khartoum is "not a one man show" and
    he did not think these threats were serious.  Frazer
    continued that she was also extremely concerned about
    information that the Government of Sudan is considering
    kicking out the vital Pacific Architects and Engineers
    contractors responsible for building the peacekeeper building
    camps; without which UNAMID would be crippled.  Meles opined
    that the NCP was posturing a bit and that they would not push
    too far.

    ---------------------------------
    NEW ETHIOPIAN OPTIONS FOR SOMALIA
    ---------------------------------

    ¶13.  (C/NF) On Somalia, Meles said that his government "had
    been reviewing our options," and will present its
    recommendations to President Abdullahi Yusuf when he passes
    through Addis on his return from London.  Meles said that he
    is hoping to withdraw most of our troops, if not all of them,
    by the summer.  Meles was hopeful that additional forces from
    the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) would be on the
    ground by the time of Ethiopia's withdrawal, including the
    remaining Burundian forces and the Nigerian battalion, and
    that the forces from the TFG that had been trained by
    Ethiopia, Uganda, Tanzania, and Rwanda would be able to play
    a greater role in maintaining security.  At this point, the
    Ethiopian forces will withdraw to the Ethiopian side of the
    border, where they would be ready to respond quickly should
    something happen, but the combined TFG and AMISOM forces
    would be responsible for maintaining security.  Meles noted
    that some elements within the TFG were mistakenly counting on
    an indefinite Ethiopian presence and said that he hoped that
    Ethiopia's withdrawal would help those elements within the
    TFG become more flexible.

    ADDIS ABAB 00000286  004 OF 005

    ¶14.  (C/NF) At the same time, Ethiopia will pursue a second
    track of continuing to reach out to the opposition and
    helping to make the TFG "more effective."  Noting the complex
    clan balances in the Mogadishu and Kismaayo areas, Meles said
    that he was encouraging the TFG to form regional governments
    in both areas to help bring greater stability and help
    balance clan sensitivities.  Meles said that he was
    continuing to engage with the Hawiye, particularly the Habir
    Gedir sub-clan, and that he was pleased that Ahmed Abdisalam
    Adan (Hawiye/Habir Gedir/Ayr) had been brought into the new
    TFG Cabinet as one of the Deputy Prime Ministers.  In
    response to a question from A/S Frazer, Meles indicated that
    it may be possible for the TFG to dismiss Mogadishu Mayor
    Mohamed Dheere (Hawiye/Abgal).  However, Meles seemed to be
    more concerned regarding the situation in Kismaayo, where the
    problems were within the Darood clan rather than the Hawiye.
    (Comment: While President Yusuf is from the Darood/Mijerteen
    sub-clan, the Darood presence in Kismaayo is largely from the
    Darood/Marehan sub-clan. End Comment.)

    ¶15.  (C/NF) Meles also noted that his government had been
    reaching out to the external opposition based in Asmara.
    Meles opined that the opposition seemed uncomfortable with
    the current situation and that it was now possible to bring
    the opposition back into a political process.  Saudi Arabia
    could also play a helpful role in persuading some of the
    former members of the Council of Islamic Courts to come back
    into a political process, according to Meles.  At the same
    time, said Meles, there are now divisions within the Shabaab,
    and "Aweys may no longer be in control" of the movement.
    Meles emphasized the importance of isolating the Shabaab,
    building the capacity of the TFG, and reaching out to the
    opposition and key stakeholders.  Meles said that he had
    discussed parts of this strategy with TFG Prime Minister Nur
    "Adde" Hassan Hussein, but that they were waiting to discuss
    the military components with President Yusuf first given his
    sensitivities on military arrangements.

    ¶16.  (C/NF) A/S Frazer responded that this sounded like a
    good plan, but one that required lots of work both with
    AMISOM and the TFG.  A/S Frazer noted that Ugandan President
    Museveni had offered--pending discussions with his officials
    at home--to deploy an additional two battalions under AMISOM
    if the U.S. could provide financial support, which we would
    try to do.  Meles responded that this would be very helpful
    and said that he would speak to Museveni about this
    possibility.  Meles also noted the importance of training an
    effective Somali police force and that he was hoping to train
    more Somali police if financial support could be identified.
    A/S Frazer responded that we would see if we could identify
    any funds to support this effort.

    --------------------------------------
    US IMPROVING RELATIONS WITH SOMALILAND
    --------------------------------------

    ¶17.  (C/NF) Turning to Somaliland, A/S Frazer noted the
    recent visit of Somaliland President Dahir Rayale Kahin to
    Washington.  While some may interpret this visit as a sign
    that the U.S. was on the verge of formal recognition, A/S
    Frazer clarified that the United States was not getting ready
    to recognize Somaliland, but believed that it was important
    to engage with them to ensure regional stability.  At the
    same time, A/S Frazer said that the United States would not
    be opposed to Somaliland independence if it should happen
    within an AU context.  A/S Frazer said that she had raised
    the issue with AU Chairperson Alpha Oumar Konare, who seemed
    to be placing unrealistic conditions for addressing the
    Somaliland issue.  The first was that Somaliland negotiate
    with the government in Mogadishu, either the TFG or its
    successor, regarding its independence, and the second was
    that there be a regional consensus on Somaliland's status,
    neither of which are likely to happen or result in any clear
    decisions.

    ¶18.  (C/NF) Meles said that Ethiopia's position on Somaliland
    was the same as that of the United States, but that the
    political situation within the AU was not yet ripe for
    addressing the Somaliland issue.  Meles said that he met with

    ADDIS ABAB 00000286  005 OF 005

    Rayale upon his return from Washington and urged him to write
    to the AU requesting that they identify a timeframe for a
    discussion on the Somaliland issue.  However, Rayale "messed
    things up" by essentially re-sending his previous letter
    requesting recognition and membership in the AU, rather than
    asking for a timeframe for a discussion on Somaliland.  Meles
    said that, if Somaliland had taken the route that he
    suggested, it would have been likely that the issue could
    have been addressed soon.  However, if the elections for a
    new AU Chairperson take place during the AU Summit, Meles
    said that the next chairperson is unlikely to be as positive
    towards Somaliland as Konare, which will only further delay
    any discussion of Somaliland.

    ¶19.  (C/NF) Meles also noted the complications of the current
    political situation inside Somaliland with the delays in
    preparations for the municipal and presidential elections.
    While avoiding any specifics, Meles said that the clan
    dynamics in Somaliland were out of balance, but that it was
    important to convey to Rayale that he could not rely on
    "outside forces" to tilt the balance in his favor.  Even if
    Ethiopia tried to intervene on Rayale,s behalf, Meles said,
    the effort would fail.

    ---------------------------------------------
    ETHIOPIA TO REMAIN ENGAGED IN ALGIERS PROCESS
    ---------------------------------------------

    ¶20.  (C/NF)  Prime Minister Meles told A/S Frazer and
    Ambassador that Ethiopia would not drop out of the Algiers
    Peace Accord process.  Sufficient changes had been made in
    the UNSC resolution 1798 extending UNMEE operations by six
    months to allow Ethiopia to remain in the process.  Meles
    added that the EEBC's "virtual demarcation" decision of
    November 2006 was not in accordance with the Algiers process
    and should not be supported or affirmed by the U.N.  Meles
    has told the international community in the past that the
    border is symptomatic of deeper bilateral problems between
    Ethiopia and Eritrea and that the way forward is through
    direct dialogue between Eritrea and Ethiopia on the
    fundamental differences that divide the countries and which
    gave rise to the border conflict before demarcation can be
    peacefully implemented.  Without this step, there can be no
    lasting peace between the two countries.

    ¶21.  (C/NF)  A/S Frazer asked what would have been the
    consequences of dropping out of the Algiers Agreement.  Meles
    noted that had Ethiopia dropped out of the Algiers Process,
    it would not have changed Ethiopia's position to remain
    committed to avoiding conflict with Eritrea.  Dropping out
    would have consolidated hard-liners within his own government
    who advocate a tougher line with Eritrea and the U.N., and
    confused the Eritreans.  Meles opined that there has been no
    renewed border war because Eritrean citizens believe Ethiopia
    has no design to take over Eritrea.  This has induced
    Eritreans to flee to Sudan and Ethiopia to escape the harsh
    conditions and mandatory national service in Eritrea.
    Dropping out of the process could have sent a confusing
    message to Eritrea and raised tensions along the border.

    ¶22.  (C/NF) In consultations with the UN Secretary General's
    office, Meles said Ethiopia agreed to welcome and host the
    entire UNMEE force should Eritrea continue with its fuel
    restrictions and limitations on UNMEE operations.  This would
    be for the short term and that over a longer period, Ethiopia
    expected to see UNMEE transition into an observer mission and
    that they could operate entirely from the Ethiopia side.

    ¶23.  (U)  A/S Frazer cleared this cable.
    YAMAMOTO

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