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### Viewing cable 07BAKU522, AZERBAIJAN ENERGY MINISTER LIKES BP BUT WANTS MORE

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
07BAKU522 | 2007-04-27 13:01 | 2010-12-15 21:09 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Baku

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    VZCZCXRO9501
    PP RUEHAG RUEHDBU RUEHROV
    DE RUEHKB #0522/01 1171351
    ZNY CCCCC ZZH
    P 271351Z APR 07
    FM AMEMBASSY BAKU
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2916
    INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
    RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES  PRIORITY
    RHMFISS/CDR USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
    RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
    RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHDC
    RUEKDIA/DIA WASHDC
    RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC

` `

    Friday, 27 April 2007, 13:51
    C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAKU 000522
    SIPDIS
    SIPDIS
    EO 12958 DECL: 07/25/2027
    TAGS ENRG, PREL, PGOV, AJ
    SUBJECT: AZERBAIJAN ENERGY MINISTER LIKES BP BUT WANTS MORE
    LEVERAGE
    REF: BAKU 463
    Classified By: Ambassador Anne E. Derse, Reasons 1.4 (b,d)
    ¶1. (C) SUMMARY. In an April 18 conversation with the Ambassador, Energy and Industry Minister Natiq Aliyev said that GOAJ would continue its close cooperation with BP, and that in principle the GOAJ supported BP plans for ACG PSA extension and ACG deep gas. The GOAJ also wants BP as Shah Deniz operator to accelerate Phase Two production and to work with SOCAR to develop other fields. He said that the GOAJ cannot commit gas that “belongs to BP,” and any specific public commitments or comments about future levels of Azerbaijani gas production should be made and supported by both BP and the GOAJ. The GOAJ needs some type of “lever” over BP to ensure that it lives up to its production commitments. He suspected BP was purposefully dragging its feet on Shah Deniz Phase Two development due to ambiguity about transit costs and the ultimate market for this gas. END SUMMARY
    ¶2. (C) On April 18 the Ambassador met with Energy and Industry Minister Natiq Aliyev to discuss future Azerbaijani gas production. EnergyOff was notetaker.
    ¶3. (C) The Ambassador told Aliyev that she had talked with President Aliyev recently on energy matters (reftel). She said that in her April 16 discussion with President Aliyev, he said the GOAJ “cannot commit gas that it does not own,” and that GOAJ gas production o/a 2012 depends largely on BP as the Shah Deniz consortium operator. She told Energy Minister Aliyev that DAS Bryza was meeting with Hungarian Prime Minister Gyurcsany on April 20 to discuss, inter alia, the Nabucco pipeline, amidst Hungarian concerns that Azerbaijan would not be able to supply sufficient gas to get it started. Prior to this meeting in Budapest, the Ambassador wanted to ensure that the USG knew and accurately reflected the message the GOAJ wanted to put out concerning its willingness and ability to supply gas for Nabucco, and President Aliyev had suggested she confer with the Energy and Industry Minister.
    ¶4. (C) Energy and Industry Minister Aliyev said that he had just met with visiting BP Production and Exploration Head Andy Inglis, whom he told that the GOAJ was ready to accelerate gas production efforts within the EU Commission framework. Aliyev said the GOAJ wanted to show its desire to participate in commercially viable gas projects, such as TGI, Nabucco, and transiting gas from Kazakhstan and/or Turkmenistan. However, for much if not most of the GOAJ’s gas production, “we depend on BP.” When the Ambassador pointed out that there was the possibility that the GOAJ would “lose out” on securing gas contracts with European consumers unless they could reassure them that Azerbaijan was willing and able to supply gas, the Energy Minister stressed that the GOAJ is ready and willing to coordinate and cooperate with European customers, but the GOAJ has no ability to fulfill BP’s obligations. “We can’t answer Europe (re availability of gas) without BP,” Aliyev stressed. For this reason, the GOAJ was unwilling to publicly commit to supply “20 bcm o/a 2012” without support from BP. “It would be naive for Azerbaijan to commit 5 to 10 bcm to Nabucco without “some type of lever” over BP, Aliyev said.
    ¶5. (C) Aliyev also said that the GOAJ had no power to compel BP to produce gas on schedule, and that BP has no strong obligation to implement the GOAJ’s annual production program, which was designed based on BP gas production estimates. He complained that “BP has no responsibility for fulfilling production quotas; under the PSA there is no recourse for non-performance.” There had been a delay of “three to four years” with BTC, and with Shah Deniz, Azerbaijan was committed to deliver gas to Turkey in 2006, but hadn’t been able to because of production delays. “We must have strong cooperation with BP,” but Aliyev said he didn’t know “how to ensure that BP fulfills its obligations - we can’t punish them or make claims against them.” BP provides gas production estimates to the GOAJ, but “these aren’t obligations, and BP can change them anytime.”
    ¶6. (C) Aliyev said that this year BP had projected that Shah Deniz would produce 5.6 bcm, but now they say “no more than” three bcm, “which means probably around two bcm.” “If we had gotten the promised 5.6 bcm, the GOAJ could have provided gas to Georgia this last winter without any problem... and now
    BAKU 00000522 002 OF 003
    they are saying that there will be a second Shah Deniz well producing in May, but I don’t believe them.” Aliyev did grudgingly admit that offshore deep-sea gas production was “difficult,” and that BP was being “careful - we can’t push them too much.”
    ¶7. (C) The Ambassador agreed with Aliyev that it was a difficult situation, given the GOAJ’s strong desire to accelerate production and export gas to Europe. In response to the Ambassador saying that it was important for the GOAJ to state publicly its policy goal regarding Azerbaijan’s willingness and ability to export this gas to Europe, Aliyev said that he thought that SOCAR and BP should make a joint declaration, “because without BP, Azerbaijan’s commitment means nothing.” SOCAR and BP should be working together on Shah Deniz and ACG Deep Gas, with BP making production estimates and the GOAJ approving them.
    BP AND GOAJ COOPERATION
    -----------------------
    ¶8. (C) Energy Minister Aliyev said that BP has large proposals for oil and gas projects in Azerbaijan. It has upgraded its estimates of oil reserves at the ACG field from an original estimate of 2.4 billion barrels to 9 billion barrels. As such, BP claims that at the end of the current PSA (2024), only 60-70 percent of the field’s recoverable production could have been extracted, with two billion barrels left in the ground. Aliyev said the GOAJ agrees in principle to extending the PSA, but “now is not 1994,” and the terms will change. The GOAJ will calculate to ensure that it preserves its equities.
    ¶9. (C) Minister Aliyev said that in general, the GOAJ was willing to cooperate with BP on ACG PSA extension, on ACG Deep Gas, and on accelerating production for Shah Deniz Phase Two (SD2). He also said that the GOAJ was ready to continue cooperating with BP on other SOCAR exploration blocks. (COMMENT: This statement has not been reflected by public pronouncements from SOCAR, which instead has expressed a desire to increase its control in exploring remaining offshore fields.)
    BP RELUCTANT ON SD2?
    --------------------
    ¶10. (C) Aliyev said that given the high price of gas if nothing else, the GOAJ should accelerate gas production as much as it could. With SD2 production beginning o/a 2012, overall Shah Deniz production would be 16 to 20 bcm. He said that he thought it unlikely that SD2 production could be accelerated earlier than 2011-2012, although to an extent this depended on capital expenditure levels. He said SD2 development is going to take a lot of capital expenditure, and he thought that BP doesn’t think that there is an existing transportation option for SD2 gas. The existing system delivers only to Erzerum, and the Turkish market is very limited. Before committing to SD2 development, BP needs to see the details of transit/transport and a market for SD2 gas beyond Turkey, i.e. Greece, Italy, the Balkans. The existing Turkey-Greece pipeline capacity is only three to five bcm, which in BP’s eyes is insufficient. BP doesn’t see a delivery system for SD2 gas and doesn’t see terms and conditions of transit. Nabucco is a project on paper only at this point, and overall there are “too many unknowns” relating to export of SD2 gas to make a commercial decision. As such, Aliyev said he thought BP is seeking to delay decisions on SD2 development until more factors, such as commercial transit fees, were known.
    SD2 MARKETING
    -------------
    ¶11. (C) In response to the Ambassador’s question about SD2 marketing, Aliyev said that he thinks this issue would be solved between Statoil and SOCAR, because “it is not easy to be a seller, and Statoil has experience - if SOCAR wants to sell, first they have to learn how.” He thought that SOCAR was currently not ready to market SD2 gas, but that “there was time” for them to learn. Aliyev went on to say that it was “too early” to worry about SD2 marketing. He mused that perhaps there could be a “rotation system” for SD2 gas sales, with the marketer changing among SD Consortium partners every two years.
    BAKU 00000522 003 OF 003
    ¶12. (C) When the Ambassador tried clarifying with the Energy Minister what the USG and GOAJ can say publicly about future Azerbaijani gas exports, Aliyev said that one could say (as did the President recently) that exploration has shown that SD has 1.2 trillion cubic meters of recoverable reserves, and that Azerbaijan is committed to providing as much gas as possible as soon as possible to Europe (Baku-based energy insiders were puzzled by President Aliyev’s recent statement on SD capacity, as it exceeded current SD recoverable reserve estimates). The GOAJ does not want to prematurely commit itself, but SD2 production will allow exports through Turkey.  What is possible now are statements of political intent, which the GOAJ has made and is making, Aliyev said; BP should also publicly “sign on” to these expressions of intent.
    ¶13. (C) In response to the Ambassador’s comment that the GOAJ needs to send a clear and strong signal to Europe that Azerbaijan’s will and intention are strong, Aliyev said that Shah Deniz production combined with other GOAJ gas production, to include new discoveries, is enough to supply gas to Europe, without gas from Kazakhstan or Turkmenistan. But BP as operator must commit to this goal too. For its part, the GOAJ is willing to move forward with BP on ACG Deep Gas, on accelerating SD2 production, and on exploring other GOAJ options. But BP programs and commitments must be approved and controlled “on a high level” by BP and the GOAJ together. Aliyev said that it was in the strategic interest of the GOAJ to deliver gas to Europe, and that in this regard there had to be strong cooperation among SOCAR, BP and the GOAJ. BP Production and Exploration Head Andy Inglis would be returning to Azerbaijan in June to continue discussions with SOCAR on a range of issues, to include PSA extension, accelerated SD production, and ACG Deep Gas. The Energy Ministry was not involved with BP-SOCAR negotiations.
    NEED FOR TRANSIT REGIME
    ----------------------
    ¶14. (C) Aliyev said that before making any decisions about gas sales, all parties involved must know the relevant information about delivery through Turkey, to include Turkish transit information, so that all involved costs are known. The Ambassador pointed out that time was a factor, as European customers had to make decisions soon for long-term gas contracts. Aliyev said that the President has not yet authorized transit talks with Turkey (COMMENT: We are following up with the GOAJ on their desired timeline for transit talks with Turkey). He asked that the USG to “push the Turks” towards beginning transit talks with Azerbaijan. As a first step, the Minister said that BP has to forward a letter to the President about terms and conditions that need to be negotiated, saying that an Intergovernmental Agreement with Turkey is needed.
    ¶15. (C) COMMENT: The Energy Minister strongly underscored the GOAJ position that Azerbaijan is ready to provide as much gas possible as soon as possible to Europe, and repeated the GOAJ talking point heard from SOCAR and President Aliyev that statements about specific volumes of future gas production must be made in conjunction with BP. Embassy will follow up with BP to ascertain concerning the status and nature of its discussions with SOCAR and the GOAJ. END COMMENT. DERSE

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