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### Viewing cable 05MADRID1626, SPAIN: SCENESETTER FOR SECRETARY RUMSFELD'S

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
05MADRID1626 | 2005-04-27 06:06 | 2010-12-08 21:09 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Madrid

`

    This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

` `

    C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MADRID 001626

    SIPDIS

    STATE FOR EUR/WE, EUR/RPM AND WHA/AND
    DEFENSE FOR OSD/ISP (P. GRAFF)

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/26/2015
    TAGS: PREL PGOV MOPS PTER SP
    SUBJECT: SPAIN: SCENESETTER FOR SECRETARY RUMSFELD'S
    MEETING WITH DEFENSE MINISTER BONO

    REF: MADRID 1604

    Classified By: Charge d'Affaires J. Robert Manzanares,
    reasons 1.4(b) and (d).

    -------
    SUMMARY
    -------

    ¶1. (C) The Zapatero government believes it has taken
    significant steps to put relations with the U.S. back on
    track, such as agreeing to lead both a PRT and an FSB in
    western Afghanistan. Military-to-military relations between
    Spain and the U.S. have remained strong over the past 14
    months despite the change in government, as has bilateral
    cooperation against terrorism. Spain continues to provide
    U.S. forces full access to its naval base at Rota and its air
    base at Moron, as well as providing blanket flight clearances
    for U.S. forces moving to and from Iraq and Afghanistan.
    Defense Minister Bono will acknowledge that the U.S. and
    Spain still have differences over issues such as Venezuela
    but will ask that the U.S. focus on areas of cooperation, and
    not only on areas of disagreement. Your meeting with Bono
    can be an opportunity to send a clear message to the Spanish
    government that while the U.S. appreciates Spain's
    cooperation in Afghanistan and other areas, the U.S. remains
    concerned about Spanish actions that negatively affect our
    interests, such as Zapatero's Venezuela policy. End Summary.

    --------------------
    MILITARY COOPERATION
    --------------------

    ¶2. (C) Military to military relations between Spain and the
    U.S. remain very strong despite the change to a Socialist
    government; the Zapatero government has continued to provide
    broad access for U.S. forces at Rota Naval Base and Moron Air
    Base. There are currently over 2500 active duty U.S.
    military stationed at the two bases, the vast majority at
    Rota. Including U.S. civilians and dependents, the American
    presence at the Spanish bases tops 5,000. Zapatero has also
    left untouched Spain's practice of providing blanket flight
    clearances for U.S. military aircraft, including in support
    of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Spanish military
    is still smarting from its ignominious withdrawal from Iraq
    and, largely as a result of the Iraq withdrawal, is
    displeased with the Socialist government. The Spanish armed
    forces strongly support close relations with the U.S. and
    consider Zapatero's distancing from the U.S. a profound
    error.

    -----------------------------
    COUNTER-TERRORISM COOPERATION
    -----------------------------

    ¶3. (C) A critical element in our bilateral relationship is
    our high level of cooperation on law enforcement and
    counter-terrorism issues. Spain remains an active front in
    the War on Terror. Investigations since the 3/11 attack have
    confirmed suspicions that there is a large pool of Islamic
    extremists throughout the country, including one cell that
    plotted attacks against Spain's High Court and other targets
    during the latter half of 2004. ETA also continues to carry
    out small-scale bombings, though it has been greatly weakened
    in the last year by arrests of key leaders in Spain and
    France. Spanish authorities arrested 117 suspected Islamic
    terrorists during 2004, routinely sharing with USG officials
    information derived from those arrests. Attorney General
    Gonzales and Minister of Justice Aguilar issued a joint
    statement on March 11, 2005 committing the USG and GOS to
    closer cooperation on counter-terrorism investigations.

    -----------------------------
    ISSUES BONO WILL LIKELY RAISE
    -----------------------------

    Venezuela
    ---------

    ¶4. (C) While he hopes Venezuela will not be the focus of
    your meeting with him, Bono will come prepared to discuss
    Spain's outreach to Venezuela, including its planned sale of
    military ships and planes. Bono has told us the reason Spain
    is selling the ships to Venezuela is to save ailing
    state-owned shipyard Izar (reftel). This is probably partly
    true -- it is also clear President Zapatero believes he can
    influence Chavez and restrain his anti-democratic tendencies
    by engaging him. Nonetheless, Bono will point out that the
    sale amounts to USD 1.7 billion in equipment and will provide
    Izar with 600 jobs over a 4-5 year period. He will also
    insist that neither the ships nor the planes will have
    offensive capability, and that Chavez has agreed not to use
    the equipment for offensive purposes.

    ¶5. (C) Embassy and other USG officials have made clear many
    times to high-level GOS officials (including to President
    Zapatero himself by Deputy Secretary of State Zoellick) that
    the U.S. believes the sale would bolster Chavez' military
    capabilities and thus his capacity to cause instability in
    the region, and would also lend him political credibility
    when he is taking steps to curb democracy in his own country.
    In addition, we have told Spanish officials that given that
    Spain-U.S. relations were slowly improving, now was not the
    time to make a major military sale to Venezuela.

    S-80 Submarine Program
    ----------------------

    ¶6. (C) The Spanish Navy plans to procure 4 new diesel
    submarines of Spanish design, called the S-80A. Izar will be
    the prime contractor for the vessel's construction. Izar has
    put out for competition a contract to assist in the building
    of the sub's combat system. Two American companies, Raytheon
    and Lockheed Martin, are competing with each other and
    against a French and German company for the $115 million
    deal. The Spanish government has been mulling the
    competitors' submissions for nearly a year and has yet to
    reach a decision. The Spanish Navy has made clear its
    support for a U.S. solution for the combat system, arguing a
    U.S. system will provide critical interoperability with the
    U.S. Navy. The Zapatero government, however, has told us
    they have received significant pressure from the French
    government to award the contract to the French competitor.
    Embassy has advocated tirelessly on behalf of the U.S.
    companies.

    Tomahawk Missile
    ----------------

    ¶7. (C) Bono has said that if the U.S. government releases
    the Tomahawk missile to Spain, Spain will purchase the
    missile. We understand the release of the missile has
    cleared a number of hurdles in Washington. He may well
    express the Spanish government's interest in purchasing the
    Tomahawk missile to you and his hope that the release will be
    approved.

    -------------------------------------
    BACKGROUND: SOCIALISTS REMAIN POPULAR
    -------------------------------------

    ¶8. (C) One year after taking over the presidency, President
    Zapatero enjoys an approval rating of over 60 percent and,
    barring a major setback, is likely to remain in power for at
    least one term (until 2008). The Socialist Party (PSOE) as a
    whole also gets much higher marks today than the PP
    opposition. Zapatero's withdrawal of Spanish troops from
    Iraq was wildly popular with the Spanish public and the
    social agenda he has pushed appeals to Spain's center-left
    electorate (gay rights, curbing the power of the Catholic
    Church, better relations with regional governments in
    Catalonia and the Basque Region) further broadening the
    Socialists' appeal. Aznar and the PP, meanwhile, remain
    unapologetic for their handling of the 3/11 bombings and
    declined to sideline leaders discredited by their actions in
    the wake of the bombings, further eroding their public
    support. Zapatero's main internal challenge is an effort by
    the Basque Regional Government (comprised of moderate Basque
    nationalists opposed to ETA violence) to increase its
    autonomy from Spain's central government. This is a
    potential powder keg since most other regions of Spain
    strongly oppose increasing the Basque Region's already
    considerable independence, unless they too are given greater
    independence.

    ------------------------
    RECENT POSITIVE GESTURES
    ------------------------
    ¶9. (C) Since November 2004, Spanish officials at all levels
    have made clear their desire to restore strong bilateral
    ties, with the Foreign Ministry's Director General for
    Foreign Policy (under secretary equivalent) telling us
    bluntly, "We want back in." In response, we've told our
    Spanish contacts that we are prepared to move forward on
    issues of bilateral importance and that unambiguous, positive
    steps by Spain would be the best signal to the USG that they
    too were ready to move forward. Spain subsequently agreed to
    USG requests that it lead a Provincial Reconstruction Team
    and a Forward Support Base in western Afghanistan as part of
    NATO's mission in that country, issued positive statements
    regarding the Iraq elections, and contributed $20 million to
    the Iraq elections fund. Spain also continues to disburse
    $300 million in assistance to Iraq pledged during the 2003
    Iraq Donors Conference in Madrid, and has agreed to train
    Iraqi security forces in Spain. We fully expect Minister
    Bono to highlight these moves to you as evidence that Spain
    has taken significant steps to demonstrate its interest in
    improving relations with the U.S.

    ¶10. (C) The USG has welcomed these steps, while making clear
    that we remain troubled by mixed signals from Spain, such
    as that sent by Spain's policy of engagement with Hugo
    Chavez. We also want Spain to lift its caveats on the
    deployment of Spanish NATO officers to participate in NATO
    missions, and lift the caveats on its national forces'
    actions in Afghanistan.

    ¶11. (C) Some in the Spanish government, including Bono, have
    expressed the belief that Spain is getting little in return
    for these positive steps. Bono has said that at times it
    appears the U.S. focuses only the on the problems in
    U.S.-Spain relations, not the positives (reftel).

    --------------------------------
    COMMENT: SENDING A CLEAR MESSAGE
    --------------------------------

    ¶12. (C) The USG will not re-establish with the Zapatero
    government the deep and close relationship we had with the
    Aznar administration. Nonetheless, the U.S. has key
    interests in Spain we are working hard to promote and secure,
    not the least of which are continued access to Spanish
    military bases (including flight clearances) and
    counterterrorism cooperation. Spanish officials -- including
    Zapatero and Bono -- have expressed surprise that their
    Venezuela policy could derail recent improvements in
    U.S.-Spain relations. This is despite that fact that this
    embassy and various U.S. officials, including Deputy
    Secretary Zoellick, have told the Spanish that engaging

    SIPDIS
    Chavez and selling him military hardware could hurt relations
    at this sensitive time. Bono and others have also said they
    feel that the U.S. does not sufficiently recognize the
    positive steps Spain has taken to improve relations with the
    U.S. Your meeting with Bono can be an opportunity to make
    clear that while the U.S. appreciates Spain's cooperation in
    Afghanistan, the full access Spain has granted U.S. forces to
    its military bases, its continued monetary contributions to
    Iraq reconstruction and other positive steps, the U.S.
    remains concerned about Spanish actions that negatively
    affect our interests, such as Zapatero's Venezuela policy.

    MANZANARES

`