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### Viewing cable 07ISTANBUL353, A GATHERING OF GULENISTS, WITH A SPLASH OF SCOTCH

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
07ISTANBUL353 | 2007-04-27 14:02 | 2011-03-17 15:03 | CONFIDENTIAL | Consulate Istanbul
Appears in these articles: http://www.taraf.com.tr/haber/abd-belgelerinde-fethullah-gulen.htm

`

    VZCZCXRO9560
    OO RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
    DE RUEHIT #0353/01 1171441
    ZNY CCCCC ZZH
    O 271441Z APR 07
    FM AMCONSUL ISTANBUL
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6933
    INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

` `

    C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ISTANBUL 000353

    SIPDIS

    SIPDIS

    DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/SE

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/20/2017
    TAGS: PGOV PHUM TU
    SUBJECT: A GATHERING OF GULENISTS, WITH A SPLASH OF SCOTCH

    REF: ISTANBUL 209

    Classified By: Consul General Deborah K. Jones for reasons 1.4 (b) and
    (d).

    ¶1.  (C) Summary.  An April 17 gathering of journalists,
    academicians, religious and political leaders either merely
    familiar with, sympathetic to or loyal followers of Fethullah
    Gulen painted a picture of the self-exiled, U.S.-based
    Turkish religious leader as a compassionate and tolerant
    humanitarian committed to reconciliation, both within
    Turkey's various religious and social groups and throughout
    the world at large.  Our sources attributed the evasiveness
    associated with Gulenist visa applicants to a fear that USG
    officials share a prejudice against them similar to what
    they've experienced with the Turkish government.  These
    interlocutors opined that Gulen would have no problem
    returning to Turkey prior to November's parliamentary
    elections if PM Erdogan were to become president (this was
    prior to Thursday's announcement that FM Gul would step into
    that role).  A media glitch may help explain Gulen's rumored
    links to the USG.  End summary.

    THE GUESTS
    ----------

    ¶2.  (C) An eclectic group of Turks knowledgeable of and/or
    sympathetic to religious leader Fethullah Gulen -
    reverentially called "The Hoca" (HO-jah) by his followers -
    joined us for dinner at the CGR April 17.  The guests,
    selected by Nazli Ilicak, herself a rather notorious figure
    in Turkish political life as a Scotch-swilling, Justice and
    Justice and Development Party (AKP) co-founder of
    industrialist pedigree, who was expelled from parliament and
    later exonerated by the European Court of Human Rights,
    included well-known Turkish columnists Mustafa Akyol (Turkish
    Daily News), Fehmi Koru (Yeni Safak), and Ali Bulac (Zaman);
    academics Niyazi Oktem, professor of Sociology at Bilgi
    University, his son, Emre, who teaches law at Galatasaray
    University; Mahmut Kilic, theology instructor at Marmara
    University; sociologist (and daughter of Turkish writer Cemil
    Meric) Umit Meric; and Alparslan Acikgenc, Dean of the
    Faculty of Letters at Fatih University.  Secretary General of
    the Turkish Catholic Episcopal Conference Monsignor Georges
    Marovitch also made the guest list, as did Harun Tokak,
    president of the Journalists and Writers Foundation.

    GULEN THE HUMANIST IMAM
    -----------------------

    ¶3.  (C) Harun Tokak, described by those around the table as
    being "closest" to the Hoca, recounted his attendance as a
    young man in the late 1960's and early 1970's at a mosque in
    Izmir where Gulen served as imam.  Gulen's preaching was
    unique in Tokak's experience for its vibrancy, warmth and
    genuineness.  Though entirely self-educated beyond primary
    school, according to Niyazi Oktem, the young Gulen talked of
    building schools, not mosques.  Inspired by Gulen's genuine
    piety and depth of character, derived from his developing,
    moderate Sufi interpretation of scripture, Tokak moved to Van
    in eastern Turkey where he opened a school that has since
    served as springboard for the hundreds if not thousands of
    schools that have since followed (reftel).  Today, the
    original "Gulenist" school in Van serves over 1000 students.

    GULEN'S THEOLOGICAL BASIS
    -------------------------

    ¶4.  (C) Our guests placed Gulen in sharp contrast to their
    somewhat stereotypical ideas of strict "Arab (read: Saudi
    Salafist) Islam" and squarely within what they deem a
    uniquely "Turkish" Sufi tradition that emphasizes purity of
    the heart and a realization of one's whole self in God.
    Niyazi Oktem and Fehmi Koru joined others in explaining
    Gulen's appeal to followers drawn to his teaching and the man
    himself because the Hoca addressed real spiritual needs, and
    did not simply repeat Diyanet-prescribed scripts.  His
    interpretive approach to the Koran - freed from strict
    adherence to the Arabic text - provided space for individual
    expressions of piety, and for reconciliation with Christians,
    Jews and even non-believers.  One guest, who chose relatively
    late in life to cover, recounted in terms not unfamiliar to
    evangelical Christians how Gulen's preaching and his
    individualized ministry had changed her life and led to a
    deeper faith.  Imam Gulen "retired" from the Diyanet in the
    early 1980s to begin a ministry independent of Turkey's
    official state-sponsored bureau of religion.

    INTERFAITH ACTIVITIES AND MEETING THE POPE
    ------------------------------------------

    ISTANBUL 00000353  002 OF 003

    ¶5.  (C) Monsignor Marovitch spoke enthusiastically and at
    length about his own efforts to promote Gulen's ecumenical
    agenda, including introductions to other faith community
    leaders and ultimately Pope John Paul II.  Marovitch and
    others confirmed the Hoca's early ties to a wealthy
    Jewish-Turkish businessman, Uzayr Garih, found murdered in a
    Muslim cemetery several years ago, who worked with Marovitch
    to link Gulen to a broader audience in the interest of
    interfaith dialogue and world peace.  Marovitch said he'd
    arranged for Gulen to meet the Pope only to find that
    Turkey's Mission to the Vatican had cancelled the
    appointment.  (Note:  This contrasts with earlier accounts
    that Garih, in fact, introduced Gulen to Abe Foxman, who in
    turn introduced him to the Cardinal of New York, who in turn
    introduced him to the Pope.  End note.)  Marovitch said he
    strenuously reclama'd that decision and the audience took
    place, which raised the GOT's ire.  Marovitch attributed
    later suspicions of U.S. government involvement to press
    inaccuracies in reporting that then-U.S. Ambassador to Turkey
    "Abramowitz" - vice "Marovitch" - had arranged the meeting.
    Istanbul's Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew and Armenian
    Patriarch Mesrob also met with Fethullah Gulen, according to
    Niyazi Oktem and other sources.  Gulen subsequently traveled
    to the U.S. for medical treatment in February 1999 and has
    stayed ever since.

    THE "TURKISH NATURE" OF GULENIST SCHOOLS
    ----------------------------------------

    ¶6.  (C) Turkey and its culture feature heavily in the
    Gulenist curriculum, according to Niyazi Oktem.  Harun Tokak
    recounted that a retired but skeptical Turkish military
    general was once persuaded to visit Gulenist schools in
    Central Asia; he came away satisfied the group meant no harm
    to Turkey and was probably a positive.  Our guests in turn
    explained the schools' emphasis on exploring Turkish culture,
    and the historical "melting pot - just like America"
    represented by the Ottoman Empire and its ethnic and cultural
    mix.  Oktem - being "deliberately provocative but accurate,"
    noted that Turks are "more Greek than Arab."  In other words,
    there was nothing to fear.

    ¶7.  (C) Several guests noted that instead of building on the
    reforming and modernizing traditions of the Ottoman period,
    which could serve to guide Turkey in its current situation,
    the Republic's early leaders had chosen to discard
    everything, including the relatively moderate brand of Islam
    practiced during that period.  Their authoritarian approach
    to the "new Turkey" had stifled existing and "natural"
    reforming impulses.  Mustafa Akyol cited, for example, a
    "women's movement" in the late Ottoman period stifled and
    "reformed" by the leaders of the new Republic, who believed
    they needed to prescribe even to the women what they should
    and should not want.  This had led to an artificial society
    and the potential for backlash.  The Gulenist movement was an
    effort to return to Turkey's natural, multi-ethnic, tolerant
    roots, allowing for the spiritual component that has always
    been there.

    FUNDING, FOLLOWERS AND GULEN'S CURRENT STATUS
    ---------------------------------------------

    ¶8.  (C) In response to our questions about funding, numbers
    of adherents, the Gulenist "organization," if any, and the
    Hoca's personal status and possible return to Turkey, we
    heard alternately straightforward and vague replies,
    suggesting some facts may simply be unknown.  Our guests
    estimated Gulen's followers in Turkey to number between two
    and three million, based in part on the 800,000 known
    subscribers to a Gulenist magazine.  The subscription journal
    Sizinti also serves as the primary means of communicating
    theological tenets to the faithful, broadly supplemented by
    the Internet.  Gulen's speeches also are carried in his
    "Zaman" daily newspaper, printed in Turkey and in the U.S. in
     English.  Though vague on amounts, our guests asserted that
    the organization itself holds no stockpiles of funds and that
    schools and other activities generally are financed by
    well-heeled businessmen.  With wicked smiles, some of our
    guests noted rumors widely believed among Turks that the CIA
    was funding the Hoca, whom the U.S. reportedly had set up in
    the first place.  When asked why U.S.-bound visa applicants
    appeared almost uniformly evasive about their intent to
    either visit the Hoca or to attend a Gulenist school, our
    interlocutors responded that the applicants - over whom they
    exercised no control - were simply ignorant of U.S. visa
    procedures and feared that U.S. government officials held
    prejudices against the organization similar to the Turkish
    government's.

    ¶9.  (C) Personal details on Gulen were a bit harder to come
    by aside from the hagiography of his early life; we never

    ISTANBUL 00000353  003 OF 003

    heard a clear answer, for example, regarding his marital
    status.

    WILL HE RETURN?
    ---------------

    ¶10.  (C) We asked why the Hoca remained in the U.S., with so
    many followers here.  Were there security or health concerns?
     Those closest to him said he would have no difficulty
    returning to Turkey following a presumed AKP (and at the
    time, Erdogan) presidential victory in May 2007, and prior to
    November's parliamentary elections, downplaying rumors of
    outstanding criminal charges or threats from ultranationalist
    factions.  That said, health considerations might preclude
    the elderly leader's being "set upon" by thousands of his
    adherents, according to our sources, and so he might choose
    to remain in the U.S.  In this context, some voiced concern
    Gulen might be asked to depart the U.S. for political or
    immigration purposes.  A few appeared to be very conversant
    with his drawn out immigration case and appeals process.
    (Note:  Having originally entered on a "B-2" visa for medical
    treatment in February 1999, Gulen subsequently acquired an
    "R" (nonimmigrant) visa, as a religious leader, but
    reportedly failed to pay income taxes/maintain status.  An
    attempt to get legal permanent resident status through a
    religious worker petition seems to have been rejected by
    USCIS.  His lawyers reportedly are seeking "O" status, which
    would allow him to remain as an individual of outstanding
    ability.  End note.)

    ¶11.  (C) Comment.  This impressive group of academic,
    religious and professional admirers and followers offers a
    portrait of Fethullah Gulen that is light years away from
    secularist perceptions of a scheming crypto-Mullah, plotting
    to turn Turkey into a sharia-based Islamic state little
    different than Iran.  They clearly believe Gulen is a model
    of enlightened Islam, amenable to and compatible with
    present-day Turkish life and the modern world, and perhaps
    even necessary to avoid Turkey's exploitation by radicalized
    elements on both sides.  They attribute Gulen's difficulties
    with Turkey's secular state apparatus to the latter's need to
    "control everything," citing the GOT's aversion to the word
    "ecumenical" in the Greek Orthodox patriarchal title as an
    example of this narrow-mindedness.  Most impressive was the
    example of tolerance and collegiality amongst themselves, a
    clearly diverse group some of whom drank alcohol, others who
    abstained, some who covered, others who did not.  End comment.
    JONES

`