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### Viewing cable 09BEIJING2964, DEPUTY SECRETARY STEINBERG'S XXXXXXXXXXXX MEETING WITH XXXXXXXXXXXX

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
09BEIJING2964 | 2009-10-26 00:12 | 2010-11-29 21:09 | SECRET | Embassy Beijing
Appears in these articles: www.spiegel.de

`

    VZCZCXRO0656
    OO RUEHCN RUEHGH RUEHVC
    DE RUEHBJ #2964/01 2990023
    ZNY SSSSS ZZH
    O 260023Z OCT 09
    FM AMEMBASSY BEIJING
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6591
    INFO RUEHOO/CHINA POSTS COLLECTIVE
    RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
    RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
    RHMFISS/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI
    RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
    RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC

` `

    S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 BEIJING 002964

    SIPDIS

    PACOM FOR FPA PICCUTA

    E.O. 12958: decl: 09/29/2029
    TAGS: OVIP STEINBERG JAMES PREL MNUC SN CH KN
    SUBJECT: DEPUTY SECRETARY STEINBERG'S XXXXXXXXXXXX MEETING WITH XXXXXXXXXXXX

    Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Aubrey Carlson. Reasons 1.4
    (b/d).

    ¶1. (SBU)xxxxx

    ¶2. (SBU) Participants:

    U.S.
    ----
    The Deputy Secretary
    Amb. Jon M. Huntsman, Jr., Embassy Beijing
    Joseph Donovan, EAP Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of
    State
    Rear Admiral Charles Leidig, Joint Chiefs of Staff
    Amb. Joseph DeTrani, Mission Manager for North Korea, DNI
    Amb. xxxxx
    Derek Mitchell, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of
    Defense
    RDML Bradley Gerhrke, U.S. Defense Attache in Beijing
    Pamela Park, Special Assistant to the Deputy Secretary
    Ryan Hass, Embassy Political Officer (notetaker)
    James Brown, Interpreter

    China
    ------
    XXXXXXXXXXXX

    ¶3. (S) SUMMARY: XXXXXXXXXXXX Deputy Secretary Steinberg stressed that the U.S. remains committed to the Six-Party process and to
    the verifiable denuclearization of North Korea. The Deputy
    Secretary emphasized the importance of continued, close
    contact with the XXXXXXXXXXXX on North Korea and stressed that the
    U.S. would not compromise its relations with China or other
    Six-Party Talks partners in pursuit of bilateral contact with
    the DPRK. The Deputy Secretary noted that the U.S. was not
    willing make concessions to entice North Korea to abide by
    its previous commitments. Ambassador DeTrani assessed that
    the DPRK was ready to return to multilateral talks on its
    nuclear program, but that it had not made a strategic
    decision to abandon nuclear weapons. XXXXXXXXXXXX encouraged the
    U.S. to engage in direct contact with the DPRK, which he felt
    could spur the DPRK to return to the Six-Party Talks. xxxxx
    speculated that DPRK leader Kim Jong-Il's deteriorating
    health and his desire to cement a legacy provided an
    opportunity for the resolution of the nuclear issue. In
    order to protect the gains that had been made and also to
    advance the Six-Party Talks, XXXXXXXXXXXX asserted, all parties had
    to remain committed to the September 2005 joint statement on
    denuclearization. XXXXXXXXXXXX reiterated China's commitment to
    implementation of UNSC Resolution 1874 and offered a read-out
    following Premier Wen Jiabao's October 4-6 visit to
    Pyongyang. End Summary.

    Positive U.S.-China Relations
    -----------------------------

    ¶4. (S) Deputy Secretary Steinberg met with XXXXXXXXXXXX for a
    fifty-minute discussion on North Korea. XXXXXXXXXXXX noted that
    the Deputy Secretary would have an opportunity to meet with a
    number of Chinese leaders during his visit, which spoke of
    the importance that China attached to its relationship with
    the U.S., as well as the respect that Chinese leaders held
    for the Deputy Secretary. XXXXXXXXXXXX commented that the Deputy
    Secretary's visit occurred on the heels of President Obama
    and President Hu's September 22 meeting in New York. The two
    Presidents had reached consensus on key issues in the
    bilateral relationship, and now it was each side's
    responsibility to work together to implement that consensus.
    XXXXXXXXXXXX described himself as an outsider to U.S.-China
    relations, and even as an outsider he had met the Deputy
    Secretary three times over the past year, a fact that XXXXXXXXXXXX
    said spoke volumes about the positive development of
    U.S.-China relations.

    U.s. Is the missing element
    ---------------------------

    ¶5. (S)XXXXXXXXXXXX raised "The Red Cliff," a John Woo-directed

    Beijing 00002964 002 of 005

    movie about the Battle of Red Cliffs 1,801 years ago along
    the banks of the Yangtze River, as a metaphor for the current
    diplomatic situation with North Korea. At that time in
    China, three states were in conflict. Two overmatched
    southern states had joined forces to fight the
    numerically-superior northern state. The two southern states
    planned to use fire as a weapon to defeat the northern state,
    but in order to do so, the southern states required an
    easterly wind. The battle ensued in November, when the
    prevailing winds normally came from the west. During the
    battle, an easterly wind arrived, which enabled the southern
    forces to use fire as a weapon to defeat the superior
    northern forces. This story was an aphorism, XXXXXXXXXXXX
    suggested. In the story, the southern forces had all of the
    elements in place except for the crucial one -- the east wind
    ("dong feng"). The same was true with the Six-Party Talks.
    There have been positive interactions among the parties to
    the Talks, and the U.S. and China saw eye-to-eye on issues.
    There was only one missing element: only the U.S. could
    bring the east wind, XXXXXXXXXXXX declared.

    XXXXXXXXXXXX rationale behind high-level visits to dprk
    --------------------------------------------- -

    ¶6. (S)XXXXXXXXXXXX explained that XXXXXXXXXXXX President
    Hu's Special Envoy, and Premier Wen Jiabao would pay a visit
    October 4-6. The purpose of these visits was to persuade
    North Korea to return to the Six-Party Talks. North Korea's
    "supreme leader" called all of the shots. China sometimes
    had sharp debates with North Korea at the working-level, but
    when big matters were raised to the "supreme leader" for a
    decision, they were often easier to resolve. That was why
    China had sent XXXXXXXXXXXX and would send
    Premier Wen to Pyongyang in rapid succession, according to
    XXXXXXXXXXXX.

    ¶7. (S) XXXXXXXXXXXX explained that his visits to Pyongyang had left
    him with a clear impression that bilateral contact with the
    U.S. was the issue most on the minds of North Korean leaders.
    It was possible to revive the Six-Party Talks, but only if
    the U.S. would engage North Korea. XXXXXXXXXXXX observed that the U.S. was at times capable of taking diplomatic initiative, and at
    other times was cautious in its diplomatic approach. In this
    instance, the U.S. had been overly cautious. China hoped the
    U.S. would initiate contact with North Korea, which XXXXXXXXXXXX
    stressed was crucial to re-convening the Six-Party Talks and
    to the larger goal of denuclearization of the Korean
    Peninsula.

    Chinese assessment of kim jong-il
    ---------------------------------

    ¶8. (S) XXXXXXXXXXXX allowed that DPRK leader Kim Jong-Il might have some realistic ideas, and stated that Kim Jong-Il wanted to
    engage the U.S. soon. Kim had been impressed by President
    Clinton's visit, and had come away from his meeting with
    President Clinton with an understanding that there were areas
    for discussion with the United States. XXXXXXXXXXXX stressed his
    personal feeling that if the U.S. made substantive contact
    with North Korea, then positive progress on the nuclear issue
    was within reach. The U.S. and China should not put off
    resolution of North Korea's nuclear issue indefinitely, XXXXXXXXXXXX stressed.

    ¶9. (S)XXXXXXXXXXXX stated that he had read a statement after
    President Clinton's visit that suggested that Kim Jong-Il was
    in good health, and speculated that the medical experts that
    accompanied President Clinton to Pyongyang might have arrived
    at a different conclusion. XXXXXXXXXXXX suggested that Kim Jong-Il
    would like to resolve outstanding issues in the near future
    because his health might not permit him to put off decisions
    for too long. This dynamic created a favorable moment for
    resolving the nuclear issue; it was important for the U.S.
    and China to seize this moment and bring North Korea back to
    the path of consultations and negotiations, XXXXXXXXXXXX stressed.

    U.s.-prc shared assessment on North Korea
    -----------------------------------------

    ¶10. (S) The Deputy Secretary expressed appreciation for XXXXXXXXXXXX insights on North Korea and for China's decision to send senior representatives to North Korea to press for the early
    resumption of the Six-Party Talks. The U.S. and China shared

    Beijing 00002964 003 of 005

    common goals and a common assessment of the path forward on
    North Korea. Both countries had the confidence to send
    parallel messages to North Korea, and when we were able to
    engage North Korea at high levels, it reinforced shared
    U.S.-Chinese objectives. Regarding U.S.-DPRK contacts, the
    Deputy Secretary suggested, China already understood from
    Ambassador Bosworth's September 3 visit and our ongoing
    bilateral contacts that the U.S. was prepared to have direct
    contact with North Korea as a way to bring North Korea back
    to the Six-Party Talks.

    Learning the right historical lessons
    -------------------------------------

    ¶11. (S) The Deputy Secretary noted that some people carried
    history forward through their own experiences. It was
    important that the U.S. and China drew from their shared
    history of dealing with North Korea to determine the best way
    forward. The Deputy Secretary noted that the chief obstacle
    to progress at the end of the Bush Administration had not
    been a lack of U.S.-DPRK contact. In fact, the frequency of
    direct contact became a source of criticism, with some
    observers suggesting that the U.S. had too much direct
    contact with North Korea and not enough coordination with
    Six-Party partners.

    ¶12. (S) The Deputy Secretary observed that North Korea had
    established a pattern of provocation followed by conciliation
    to ameliorate pressure from the international community
    resulting from its actions. It was imperative to break this
    pattern, which was counter-productive to shared U.S.-Chinese
    goals on North Korea.

    Key elements to current approach
    --------------------------------

    ¶13. (S) The Deputy Secretary asked XXXXXXXXXXXX what missing
    element, or "easterly wind," would lead to a change in North
    Korea's behavior and produce a different outcome than during
    the 1980s and 1990s. The Deputy Secretary offered three
    elements that could affect North Korea's decision-making.

    ¶14. (S) The first element was the unified position on North
    Korea among the Six-Party Talks partners. The U.S. wanted to
    ensure that if it proceeded to bilateral contact with North
    Korea, such contact would not undermine in any way the strong
    unity of approach among Six-Party Talks partners.

    ¶15. (S) The second key element was the strong unity of action
    among Six-Party Talks partners, particularly in
    implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1874. It
    would be important for Six-Party Talks participants to
    continue full implementation of this resolution, the Deputy
    Secretary stressed.

    ¶16. (S) The third key element would be to articulate clearly
    to North Korea precisely what steps the Six-Party Talks
    partners expected the DPRK to take to irreversibly
    denuclearize, while also making clear exactly what benefits
    the DPRK would derive from such actions. The Deputy
    Secretary acknowledged that significant work had already been
    undertaken in this regard, but much more work was needed to
    establish a specific, common understanding among Six-Party
    Talks participants.

    ¶17. (S) The Deputy Secretary acknowledged that although he
    was not certain whether these three elements would be enough
    to convince North Korea at a strategic level to decide it was
    better off without nuclear weapons, the U.S. was willing to
    test the proposition. The U.S. was prepared to have
    bilateral contact with North Korea to determine whether a
    different outcome was possible now that the Six-Party Talks
    participants held a clear, unified position.

    U.S. Caution on bilateral u.s.-dprk contacts
    --------------------------------------------

    ¶18. (S) The U.S. "caution" in re-engaging with North Korea
    stemmed from its interest in ensuring that any contact would
    be done on the clear basis that bilateral contact was not
    about managing North Korea's nuclear program, but rather
    about taking concrete measures to dismantle it, the Deputy
    Secretary stated. North Korea had recently sent several
    positive signals, including through xxxxx and State

    Beijing 00002964 004 of 005

    XXXXXXXXXXXX meetings, North Korean public comments that
    walked back its previous rejection of the Six-Party Talks,
    hints that there could be a new formation for international
    talks on denuclearization, and statements that North Korea
    understood the goal was denuclearization. Premier Wen
    Jiabao's October visit would present another opportunity to
    convey to North Korea that the Six-Party Talks partners
    shared a common position.

    ¶19. (S) On the current status of U.S.-DPRK bilateral talks,
    the Deputy Secretary explained that there had been exchanges
    in recent days through the New York channel on modalities for
    bilateral contacts. The U.S. wanted to ensure that if direct
    engagement occurred, the DPRK would participate at a high
    level. This would be the only way to determine whether North
    Korea was serious about engagement. While the U.S. was
    prepared to have bilateral contact with North Korea, it was
    not willing to engage in extended bilateral negotiations in
    which an agreement would be reached outside of the Six-Party
    Talks framework. The only way to ensure an effective
    solution was to guarantee that all of the Six-Party Talks
    partners' interests were brought into play, the Deputy
    Secretary said, while also noting that Six-Party Talks
    partners' interests were similar, but not identical.

    Key question: kim jong-il's calculus
    ------------------------------------

    ¶20. (S) The Deputy Secretary suggested that the key questions
    concerned Kim Jong-Il's motivations, specifically how he
    viewed his interests, and how much emphasis he placed on
    reaching a solution to the nuclear issue and normalization of
    relations with the U.S. as part of his legacy. The Deputy
    Secretary emphasized the need for continued, close dialogue
    with China.

    Dprk not clearly committed to denuclearization
    --------------------------------------

    ¶21. (S) Ambassador DeTrani said that the U.S. assessed,
    largely as a result of XXXXXXXXXXXX seemingly successful efforts, that the DPRK was ready to return to multilateral talks on its nuclear program. The U.S. further assessed that North Korea at a strategic level
    had not committed to the goal of complete, verifiable,
    irreversible denuclearization. North Korea wanted to be
    accepted as a nuclear state with ICBM capabilities. The
    DPRK's September 3 letter to the UN was indicative of this
    point. In the letter, the DPRK acknowledged that it had
    reprocessed spent fuel rods and extracted plutonium that was
    being weaponized, and after six years of denial, admitted to
    possessing a uranium enrichment program. A key question
    would be whether North Korea would negotiate while UNSC
    Resolution 1874 sanctions were still in place, Ambassador
    DeTrani noted.

    ¶22. (S) Ambassador DeTrani observed that North Korea had
    established a pattern of walking away from negotiations as a
    sign of displeasure, such as its 13-month hiatus from the
    Six-Party Talks after the U.S. had suggested it possessed an
    HEU program and its similarly long absence in protest of
    reports of money laundering through a Macau bank (BDA). In
    both of these instances, the Six-Party Talks partners had
    conceded something, after which the DPRK returned to the
    Talks. The U.S. intelligence community assessed that if the
    Six-Party Talks partners did not concede something, the DPRK
    would be reluctant to move the Six-Party process forward.
    Ambassador DeTrani emphasized the shared U.S.-China objective
    in achieving progress in the Six-Party Talks building upon
    the September 2005 joint statement that XXXXXXXXXXXX was so
    instrumental in crafting.

    China committed to 6-party talks, denuclearization
    --------------------------------------------- -----

    ¶23. (S) The Six-Party Talks, on the whole, "have been
    positive," XXXXXXXXXXXX declared. XXXXXXXXXXXX recounted that he had told North Korean counterparts on numerous occasions that the
    Six-Party Talks enabled the U.S. and North Korea to feel
    comfortable with bilateral engagement. China supported
    U.S.-DPRK bilateral engagement, and such contact would not
    affect U.S.-China relations, XXXXXXXXXXXX assured, allowing that other Six-Party Talks partners might not share the same view.

    Beijing 00002964 005 of 005

    ¶24. (S) XXXXXXXXXXXX affirmed that China was committed to getting
    North Korea back to the negotiating table. In order to
    protect the gains that had been made and to advance the
    Six-Party Talks, all parties had to remain committed to the
    September 2005 joint statement on North Korea's
    denuclearization. XXXXXXXXXXXX allowed that in light of the
    current situation, it might be necessary to refine the
    statement, but nonetheless, the September 2005 statement had
    to serve as the starting point.

    ¶25. (S) On North Korean denuclearization, XXXXXXXXXXXX agreed with the U.S. assessment that it would be difficult to obtain
    North Korea's commitment. The U.S. should inform North Korea
    that improved U.S.-DPRK relations depended upon verifiable
    steps toward denuclearization. XXXXXXXXXXXX agreed with the U.S.
    assessment that North Korea had not made a strategic decision
    to forego its nuclear weapons program. North Korea was
    looking in particular at its relations with the U.S. and was
    not moved by Chinese representations of what steps the U.S.
    would be willing to take. North Korea often insisted that it
    was an independent country and did not like having China as a
    go-between with the U.S., according to XXXXXXXXXXXX.

    China urges bilateral, multilateral combination
    --------------------------------------------- ---

    ¶26. (S) XXXXXXXXXXXX proposed that Six-Party Talks partners
    consider using bilateral mechanisms within the Six-Party
    Talks framework to improve relations with North Korea.
    Through a combination of bilateral and multilateral channels,
    it might be possible to persuade North Korea to abandon its
    nuclear program. Because the opportunity to persuade North
    Korea still existed, China would continue making vigorous
    efforts in this pursuit. XXXXXXXXXXXX stressed that the Chinese
    government was serious about UNSC Resolution 1874
    implementation, adding that there had not been any change in
    China's policy.

    ¶27. (S) The Deputy Secretary agreed with XXXXXXXXXXXX basic
    conclusions, expressed appreciation for XXXXXXXXXXXXxxxx leadership on the North Korea issue, and reiterated the U.S. interest in
    continued close contact with China. xxxxx offered to
    provide a briefing for the U.S. immediately following Premier
    Wen Jiabao's October 4-6 visit to Pyongyang.

    ¶28. (U) The Deputy Secretary cleared this message.
    Huntsman
    huntsman

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