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### Viewing cable 04THEHAGUE1833, DUTCH PM BALKENENDE ON CHINA, TURKEY, AND THE

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
04THEHAGUE1833 | 2004-07-20 17:05 | 2011-01-25 19:07 | SECRET | Embassy The Hague

`

    This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

` `

    S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 THE HAGUE 001833

    SIPDIS

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/20/2014
    TAGS: PREL CH TK IS NL
    SUBJECT: DUTCH PM BALKENENDE ON CHINA, TURKEY, AND THE
    MIDDLE EAST

    Classified By: AMBASSADOR CLIFFORD SOBEL for Reasons 1/4 (B...

    18933

    2004-07-20

    04THEHAGUE1833

    Embassy The Hague

    SECRET

    S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 THE HAGUE 001833

    SIPDIS

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/20/2014
    TAGS: PREL CH TK IS NL
    SUBJECT: DUTCH PM BALKENENDE ON CHINA, TURKEY, AND THE
    MIDDLE EAST

    Classified By: AMBASSADOR CLIFFORD SOBEL for Reasons 1/4 (B) and (D).

    ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Prime Minister Balkenende told Ambassador
    Sobel on July 20 the EU has not yet reached consensus on
    lifting the China Arms Embargo before the December EU-China
    summit. While strong voices in the EU are pushing for a
    quick (but not unconditional) lift, others now appear less
    convinced and a final decision has not yet been made. On
    Turkey, Balkenende reiterated that a deal is a deal and the
    EU's decision will depend on the European Commission's
    October report, the drafting of which the Dutch are following
    closely. Ambassador Sobel urged the EU to maintain pressure
    on Arafat and the Palestinians to make needed reforms, and
    noted that the Forum for the Future proposed at the G-8
    summit provided a good venue for EU-U.S. cooperation on the
    region. Ambassador Sobel also raised Sudan briefly and noted
    standing requests for additional security for the Embassy.
    END SUMMARY.

    ¶2. (C) Ambassador Sobel met with Dutch Prime Minister Jan
    Pieter Balkenende on July 20 to discuss the Dutch EU
    Presidency and related issues prior to the Dutch cabinet
    going on vacation. Balkenende noted that he would be taking
    the traditional long Dutch vacation in August, but would
    remain in the Netherlands in case Presidency business
    required his involvement. During the nearly one-hour
    discussion, Balkenende and the Ambassador discussed the China
    Arms Embargo, Turkish accession to the EU, and the Middle
    East. Balkenende was accompanied by his chief foreign policy
    advisor, Rob Swartbol; POLCOUNS (notetaker) accompanied
    Ambassador Sobel.

    CHINA ARMS EMBARGO: MORE THAN ONE OPTION?
    ------------------------------------------

    ¶3. (C) Ambassador Sobel stressed that the China Arms Embargo
    was quickly rising to the top of the U.S.-EU agenda. Chinese
    backsliding on human rights over the past two years was
    deeply troubling, as was the continued Chinese threat to
    regional stability. Lifting the arms embargo before seeing
    real progress in these areas, he stressed, ran counter to the
    Dutch step by step approach, would be counterproductive in
    terms of influencing Chinese behavior. The Chinese were
    still refusing to allow the UN's special rapporteur on
    torture, van Boven, to visit despite having earlier agreed to
    do so, he noted. (Balkenende suggested that the Chinese
    might have problems with van Boven himself, rather than with
    his office, noting that the Spanish had also had problems
    with van Boven.) The Code of Conduct, he added, was not an
    adequate substitute for the embargo, and we strongly doubted
    the EU's ability to put stronger mechanisms in place. The
    U.S. was looking to the Dutch, as EU president, to make sure
    that the U.S. was not surprised by developments in this
    area.

    ¶4. (S) In response, Balkenende said that the China Arms
    Embargo was a sensitive and evolving issue within the EU. At
    one point, there seemed to be a strong consensus for a quick
    lift, he said, but now other tendencies could be emerging.
    Even Chirac, Balkenende added, now was less adamant about
    lifting the embargo than in the past. (Balkenende noted that
    Chirac had earlier tried at the last minute to insert
    language on lifting the embargo into a Council statement, but
    had backed down when challenged.) He stressed that all
    views would be taken into account before making a decision,
    and denied that the EU was prepared to lift the embargo
    without any conditions. China would have to take some
    steps (NFI) to merit a decision to lift, he stated. That
    said, the desire to strengthen EU-China ties in the near term
    was very strong within the EU. The arms embargo was one
    instrument the EU could use to influence the relationship,
    but not the only one.

    ¶5. (C) Ambassador Sobel reiterated the need for transparency
    and good communication as the issue developed. The Irish, he
    pointed out, had not worked actively as president to develop
    a consensus position, and the issue had naturally moved to
    the next presidency without a resolution. Swartbol
    intervened to note that while various tendencies did exist
    within the EU, the strongest tendency at this point was to
    lift the embargo, possibly as early as the fall.

    TURKEY: ONCE AGAIN, YES......BUT
    --------------------------------

    ¶6. (C) Turning to Turkey, Ambassador Sobel took note of
    Balkenende's recent positive public statements and asked
    where the issue currently stood. Balkendende observed that
    the exact wording of the European Commission's October report
    would be critical. The report, he predicted, would probably
    state neither that Turkey had met all the Copenhagen criteria
    fully, nor that it had failed to meet them; most likely, the
    report would be positive but identify work remaining to be
    done. In that case, he continued, the two realistic options
    for the EU were either: A) to set a date for accession
    negotiations, but make it conditional on achieving progress
    in remaining areas, or B) to ask Turkey to take certain
    specific steps with the clear understanding that a date would
    be set as soon as they are accomplished.

    7 (C) Balkenende reiterated that the EU must not rewrite the
    rules to help or hinder Turkey's bid for accession -- a deal
    is a deal. Talk of offering the Turks a privileged
    partnership or other substitute (as the French and others,
    including Christian Democrats in the European Parliament, had
    hinted), he stressed, would not be acceptable. At the same
    time, Balkenende made clear that negotiations on accession
    would probably last for at several years, and that the Turks,
    in his view, understood this as well. The Turks' interests
    would be taken into account in the EU's decision, he said,
    but the decision must also be sustainable domestically
    throughout the EU. A big part of the EU's public relations
    work, therefore, would be to convince skeptical national
    parliaments and populations that agreeing to begin
    negotiations would not lead to a flood of Turkish immigrants
    or other undesirable outcomes. Balkenende predicted that
    Chirac would ultimately side with Germany despite domestic
    French opposition in order to preserve his relationship with
    Schroeder.

    ¶8. (S) Balkenende made clear that U.S. sensitivities would be
    taken into account as the EU made its decision, and that the
    USG position was well known. He urged the USG, however, not
    to give opponents to Turkish accession more fuel by making
    public statements that appeared provocative in the European
    context; for domestic reasons, Chirac and other European
    leaders would feel compelled to respond to US statements on
    the issue. Ambassador Sobel stressed that the USG would be
    following the issue closely and urged that we be kept
    informed. Swartbol noted that the Commission had just
    started the process of drafting its report. He strongly
    suggested that the Dutch (and he personally) would be able to
    follow and perhaps influence the drafting process, albeit
    behind the scenes.

    MIDDLE EAST: KEEPING EU PRESSURE ON ARAFAT;
    FORUM FOR THE FUTURE
    --------------------------------------------- -

    ¶9. (C) Ambassador Sobel stressed that developments in the
    Middle East made it imperative to keep pressure on Yasser
    Arafat to reform. The situation is developing quickly, and
    the EU's special relationship with the Palestinians could a
    useful force for bringing about needed changes. On the
    Broader Middle East/North Africa initiative, Ambassador Sobel
    highlighted the Forum for the Future announced at the G-8
    Sea Island summit.

    SUDAN AND SECURITY
    ------------------

    ¶10. (C) In closing, Ambassador briefly raised the crisis in
    Sudan and urged the EU to free up funding quickly to support
    the AU peacekeeping force. He also noted that the Embassy
    had requested additional security measures two years ago
    which it had not yet received. Balkenende promised to bring
    up the matter personally with the minister of interior.
    RUSSEL

`