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### Viewing cable 06SANJOSE1955, COSTA RICA ON CUBAN TRANSITION: WE,LL DO IT OUR WAY

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
06SANJOSE1955 | 2006-09-01 17:05 | 2011-03-14 17:05 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy San Jose
Appears in these articles: http://www.nacion.com/2011-03-11/Investigacion/NotasDestacadas/Investigacion2710281.aspx http://www.nacion.com/2011-03-11/Investigacion/NotaPrincipal/Investigacion2710282.aspx

`

    VZCZCXYZ0018
    OO RUEHWEB

    DE RUEHSJ #1955/01 2441724
    ZNY CCCCC ZZH
    O 011724Z SEP 06
    FM AMEMBASSY SAN JOSE
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5994
    INFO RUEHZA/WHA CENTRAL AMERICAN COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
    RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO IMMEDIATE 0418
    RUEHME/AMEMBASSY MEXICO IMMEDIATE 3588
    RUEHUB/USINT HAVANA IMMEDIATE 0017

` `

    C O N F I D E N T I A L SAN JOSE 001955

    SIPDIS

    SIPDIS

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/01/2016
    TAGS: PREL PGOV CU CI CS
    SUBJECT: COSTA RICA ON CUBAN TRANSITION: WE,LL DO IT OUR WAY

    REF: A. STATE 139584
         ¶B. WHA-SAN JOSE EMAIL 8/16/06

    Classified By: Ambassador Mark Langdale for reason 1.4 (d)

    ¶1.  (C) SUMMARY:  On August 28, Ambassador and DCM called on
    FM Bruno Stagno to discuss how to further bilateral and
    regional cooperation in support of a democratic transition in
    Cuba.  Stagno was receptive to the suggestion that Arias and
    the GOCR use Costa Rica,s "moral stature" to advocate change
    in Cuba, but with caveats.  He said the GOCR is not convinced
    a genuine transition us underway; Costa Rica has limited
    moral authority with Cuba, anyway; Arias will have to focus
    more on domestic or other pressing international issues (such
    as relations with Nicaragua); and Mexico,s domestic
    political uncertainties have hampered efforts to form a
    contact group with Chile and Costa Rica.  Stagno raised the
    notion of first lifting the U.S. embargo as a catalyst for
    motivating the Cuban "street." The Ambassador made clear that
    this was decidedly not the USG view.  The FM dismissed the
    September 1 SICA meeting as "technical," and thus not the
    venue for crafting a common approach on Cuba.  Neither he nor
    President Arias will attend.  Instead, the UNGA will be an
    "important opportunity" to discuss Cuba.   For his part,
    Arias penned an Op-ed on August 29 which helpfully described
    Cuba as a dictatorship and called for creating the conditions
    for the Cuban people to choose a course for themselves, but
    which unhelpfully urged lifting the embargo and a U.S.
    withdrawal from Guantanamo Bay.  Despite the latter aspect,
    Arias, stance on Cuba has been the most forward-leaning in
    region.  We will encourage him to continue leaning in the
    right direction.  END SUMMARY.

    --------------------------------------------- --
    STAGNO:  LIMITS TO MORAL AUTHORITY
    --------------------------------------------- --

    ¶2.  (C) On August 28, Ambassador and DCM called on FM Bruno
    Stagno to discuss how to further bilateral and regional
    cooperation in support of a democratic transition in Cuba.
    Drawing from refs, the Ambassador stressed the need for
    regional solidarity with the people of Cuba, and applauded
    President Arias, recent statements in support of democracy
    on the island.  The Ambassador also pointed to A/S Shannon,s
    August 23 Washington press conference and DVC with Costa
    Rican media on the issue, and noted that USOAS Ambassador
    Maisto,s visit to San Jose in September would likely touch
    on Cuba-related issues (and other topics).

    ¶3.  (C) Stagno was receptive to the suggestion that Arias and
    the GOCR use Costa Rica,s "moral stature" to advocate change
    in Cuba, but with the following caveats:

    -- The GOCR is not convinced that a genuine transition is
    underway.  The last four weeks could be a "test run,"
    measuring both domestic Cuban and international reaction.
    Even if Fidel,s illness marked the start of a true
    transition, in the GOCR,s view,  Raul Castro, FM Perez-Roque
    and other senior figures in the regime were likely prepared
    to "ride out the storm" for some time.  Stagno agreed that
    the regime was on "unsure footing," however;

    -- The GOCR,s "moral authority" is hobbled because Cuba
    views Costa Rica as "an enemy" and the two countries lack
    full diplomatic relations.  Although the GOCR,s CG in Havana
    is very active, doing what he can with the contacts that he
    has, Costa Rica feels "alone and outgunned" in dealing with
    the regime and reaching out to dissidents.  The public
    Arias-VP Lage contretemps over a possible meeting in Bogot
    during the Uribe inauguration had made matters worse.
    According to Stagno, Arias wanted a "quiet conversation" with
    Castro in which he would stress that "the world had changed"
    and it was therefore time for Castro to "stop sacrificing
    himself" for the sake of the revolution.  When Fidel became
    indisposed, the notion of a meeting with Lage seemed
    appropriate.  Arias never intended to present a "letter" to
    Lage, but once the story appeared in the Costa Rican media,
    the meeting was off;

    -- President Arias is constrained by the need to be perceived
    as primarily a "domestic president," in order to achieve
    other parts of his agenda.  If the GOCR focuses on any
    regional issue, it will be Nicaragua.  As the November
    elections approach, and especially if Ortega remains
    positioned for a possible victory, Costa Rica will have to
    turn its attention in that direction (instead of worrying
    Cuba); and

    -- Although Chile and Mexico could be helpful, efforts to
    form a regional contact group on Cuba with Costa Rica and
    languished because of the domestic political uncertainty in
    Mexico.

    --------------------------------------------- -
    STAGNO:  WHAT ABOUT THE EMBARGO?
    --------------------------------------------- -

    ¶4.  (C) The FM raised the notion of first lifting the U.S.
    embargo as a catalyst for motivating the Cuban "street" to
    voice its opposition to the Raul succession and the regime.
    The Ambassador made clear that this was decidedly not the USG
    view.  The sequence would have to be the reverse; much would
    have to change on the island before the President would
    consider approaching Congress about the embargo.  Referring
    back to A/S Shannon,s public remarks, the Ambassador
    reminded Stagno that a presidential offer to approach
    Congress about the embargo had been on the table (although
    rejected by Fidel) since 2002.  The Ambassador stressed that
    this was not the time to "give" anything to Cuba, but a time
    to "push," using tools such as the Inter-American Democratic
    Charter.  Cuba can be pushed off balance, he concluded.

    ¶5.  (C) Stagno dismissed the September 1 SICA meeting as
    "technical," and thus not a venue for crafting a common
    approach on Cuba.  Neither he nor President Arias will
    attend.  Instead, Stagno will attend the NAM meeting in
    Havana September 13-16 as an observer, before joining Arias
    in New York for UNGA-related events the week of September 17.
     The NAM meeting would offer Stagno a first-hand look at what
    is going on in Cuba, he said, plus provide an opportunity to
    lobby for Costa Rica,s UNSC seat in 2008.  The UNGA, he
    stressed, will be an "important opportunity" to discuss Cuba.
     Stagno added that Perez-Roque,s invitation to attend the
    NAM was a surprising volte-face, given the brouhaha with Lage
    in Bogot.

    ---------------------------------------
    ARIAS:  THE GUANTAMO GAMBIT?
    ---------------------------------------

    ¶6.  (SBU)  Although Stagno never mentioned Guantanamo (or
    hinted that Arias was about to write anything about Cuba),
    the President,s August 29 op-ed in leading daily La Nacion
    called for regional efforts "in every international forum" to
    press for lifting the embargo and  closing Guantanamo Bay and
    returning the base,s territory to Cuba.  These two arguments
    marred what was otherwise an impassioned, articulate
    description of Cuba as ". . . plain and simple, a
    dictatorship," and a call to ". . . creat(e) the conditions
    for the Cuban people to truly choose a course for
    themselves."

    ----------
    COMMENT:
    ----------

    ¶7.  (C) Despite the op-ed (which was 95 percent helpful),
    Arias, stance on Cuba has been the most forward-leaning in
    region.  We will encourage him to continue leaning in the
    right direction; the Ambassador has requested a meeting with
    Arias to clarify what he meant in the op-ed.  Interjecting a
    Guantanamo argument makes no sense (and has found little
    resonance here).  Arias, comments may reflect some tactical
    distancing from the U.S., and we have heard this explanation
    from some contacts here.  Although the president agrees in
    general on the need for democracy in Cuba, he can,t be seen
    as a U.S. lackey, on Cuba or any other issue.  On the other
    hand, Arias, foreign policy objectives in this
    administration already seem to be filtered through the prism
    of the 2008 UNSC race.  If so, potential vote-getting
    legalisms, however far-fetched (such as pushing for USG
    withdrawal from Guantanamo) may increasingly color GOCR
    thinking.
    LANGDALE

`