Cable Viewer

Currently released so far... 5909 / 251,287

### Articles

Brazil Sri Lanka United Kingdom Sweden Editorial United States Latin America Egypt Yemen Jordan

### Browse latest releases

2010/11 2010/12 2011/01 2011/02 2011/03
2010/11/28 2010/11/29 2010/11/30
2010/12/01 2010/12/02 2010/12/03 2010/12/04 2010/12/05 2010/12/06 2010/12/07 2010/12/08 2010/12/09 2010/12/10 2010/12/11 2010/12/12 2010/12/13 2010/12/14 2010/12/15 2010/12/16 2010/12/17 2010/12/18 2010/12/19 2010/12/20 2010/12/21 2010/12/22 2010/12/23 2010/12/24 2010/12/25 2010/12/26 2010/12/27 2010/12/28 2010/12/29 2010/12/30
2011/01/01 2011/01/02 2011/01/04 2011/01/05 2011/01/07 2011/01/09 2011/01/10 2011/01/11 2011/01/12 2011/01/13 2011/01/14 2011/01/15 2011/01/16 2011/01/17 2011/01/18 2011/01/19 2011/01/20 2011/01/21 2011/01/22 2011/01/23 2011/01/24 2011/01/25 2011/01/26 2011/01/27 2011/01/28 2011/01/29 2011/01/30 2011/01/31
2011/02/01 2011/02/02 2011/02/03 2011/02/04 2011/02/05 2011/02/06 2011/02/07 2011/02/08 2011/02/09 2011/02/10 2011/02/11 2011/02/12 2011/02/13 2011/02/14 2011/02/15 2011/02/16 2011/02/17 2011/02/18 2011/02/19 2011/02/20 2011/02/21 2011/02/22 2011/02/23 2011/02/24 2011/02/25 2011/02/26 2011/02/27 2011/02/28
2011/03/01 2011/03/02 2011/03/03 2011/03/04 2011/03/05 2011/03/06 2011/03/07 2011/03/08 2011/03/09 2011/03/10 2011/03/11 2011/03/13 2011/03/14 2011/03/15 2011/03/16 2011/03/17

### Browse by creation date

66 72 73 75 79 86 88 89 90 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10
1966/12
1972/02 1972/08
1973/04
1975/03
1979/08
1986/05
1988/01
1989/12
1990/01 1990/07 1990/08 1990/10
2000/06 2000/09 2000/11
2001/02 2001/03 2001/07 2001/10
2002/02 2002/03 2002/11
2003/02 2003/03 2003/04 2003/05 2003/06 2003/07 2003/08 2003/09 2003/10 2003/11 2003/12
2004/01 2004/02 2004/03 2004/04 2004/05 2004/06 2004/07 2004/08 2004/09 2004/10 2004/11 2004/12
2005/01 2005/02 2005/03 2005/04 2005/05 2005/06 2005/07 2005/08 2005/09 2005/10 2005/11 2005/12
2006/01 2006/02 2006/03 2006/04 2006/05 2006/06 2006/07 2006/08 2006/09 2006/10 2006/11 2006/12
2007/01 2007/02 2007/03 2007/04 2007/05 2007/06 2007/07 2007/08 2007/09 2007/10 2007/11 2007/12
2008/01 2008/02 2008/03 2008/04 2008/05 2008/06 2008/07 2008/08 2008/09 2008/10 2008/11 2008/12
2009/01 2009/02 2009/03 2009/04 2009/05 2009/06 2009/07 2009/08 2009/09 2009/10 2009/11 2009/12
2010/01 2010/02

### Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z
Embassy Athens Embassy Asuncion Embassy Astana Embassy Asmara Embassy Ashgabat Embassy Ankara Embassy Amman Embassy Algiers Embassy Addis Ababa Embassy Accra Embassy Abuja Embassy Abu Dhabi Embassy Abidjan Consulate Amsterdam American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura Embassy Buenos Aires Embassy Budapest Embassy Bucharest Embassy Brussels Embassy Bridgetown Embassy Bratislava Embassy Brasilia Embassy Bogota Embassy Bishkek Embassy Bern Embassy Berlin Embassy Belgrade Embassy Beirut Embassy Beijing Embassy Banjul Embassy Bangkok Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan Embassy Bamako Embassy Baku Embassy Baghdad Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen Embassy Conakry Embassy Colombo Embassy Chisinau Embassy Caracas Embassy Canberra Embassy Cairo Consulate Curacao Consulate Ciudad Juarez Consulate Chennai Consulate Casablanca Consulate Cape Town
Embassy Dushanbe Embassy Dublin Embassy Doha Embassy Djibouti Embassy Dhaka Embassy Dar Es Salaam Embassy Damascus Embassy Dakar Consulate Dubai
Embassy Freetown
Embassy Guatemala Embassy Gaborone Consulate Guadalajara
Embassy Helsinki Embassy Harare Embassy Hanoi Consulate Hermosillo Consulate Hamburg
Iran RPO Dubai Embassy Islamabad Consulate Istanbul
Embassy Jakarta Consulate Jerusalem Consulate Jeddah
Embassy Kyiv Embassy Kuwait Embassy Kuala Lumpur Embassy Kinshasa Embassy Kigali Embassy Khartoum Embassy Kathmandu Embassy Kampala Embassy Kabul
Embassy Luxembourg Embassy Luanda Embassy London Embassy Ljubljana Embassy Lisbon Embassy Lima Embassy Lilongwe Embassy La Paz Consulate Lagos
Mission USNATO Embassy Muscat Embassy Moscow Embassy Montevideo Embassy Monrovia Embassy Minsk Embassy Mexico Embassy Mbabane Embassy Maputo Embassy Manama Embassy Managua Embassy Malabo Embassy Madrid Consulate Munich Consulate Montreal Consulate Monterrey Consulate Milan
Embassy New Delhi Embassy Nassau Embassy Nairobi Consulate Naples
Embassy Ouagadougou Embassy Ottawa Embassy Oslo
Embassy Pristina Embassy Pretoria Embassy Prague Embassy Port Au Prince Embassy Phnom Penh Embassy Paris Embassy Paramaribo Embassy Panama Consulate Peshawar
Embassy Quito
REO Basrah Embassy Rome Embassy Riyadh Embassy Riga Embassy Reykjavik Embassy Rangoon Embassy Rabat Consulate Rio De Janeiro Consulate Recife
Secretary of State Embassy Stockholm Embassy Sofia Embassy Skopje Embassy Singapore Embassy Seoul Embassy Sarajevo Embassy Santo Domingo Embassy Santiago Embassy Sanaa Embassy San Salvador Embassy San Jose Consulate Strasbourg Consulate Shenyang Consulate Shanghai Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis Embassy Tripoli Embassy Tokyo Embassy The Hague Embassy Tel Aviv Embassy Tehran Embassy Tegucigalpa Embassy Tbilisi Embassy Tashkent Embassy Tallinn Consulate Tijuana
USUN New York USEU Brussels US Mission Geneva US Interests Section Havana US Delegation, Secretary UNVIE Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius Embassy Vienna Embassy Vatican Consulate Vladivostok
Embassy Windhoek Embassy Wellington Embassy Warsaw
Embassy Yerevan Embassy Yaounde
Embassy Zagreb

### Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
AF AE ASEC AORC AJ AM AR AEMR AMGT APER AG AS AU AGMT AFIN ABUD ATRN AL APECO ACOA AO AX AMED ADCO AODE AFFAIRS AC ASIG ABLD AA AFU ASUP AROC ATFN AVERY APCS AER ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG AEC ASEAN AID
BR BIDEN BO BA BU BM BEXP BRUSSELS BL BK BILAT BTIO BH BE BX BY BG BF BB BC BBSR BMGT BTIU
CH CO CI COUNTERTERRORISM CA CY CVIS CMGT CASC CS CU CJAN CE COUNTER CBW CG CLINTON CDG CIA CACM CDB CD CV CF CN CAN CIS CM CONDOLEEZZA COE CR CTM COUNTRY CLEARANCE CPAS CWC CT CKGR CB CACS COM CJUS CARSON CL CODEL
DOD DJ DA DEAX DR DHS DOE DEA DK DISENGAGEMENT DS DTRA
EINVEFIN ES ELAB EU ECON ETTC EFIN EAID ENRG EWWT ETRD EUN EC EG EINV EXTERNAL ER ECIN EPET EMIN EAGR EIND ECPS ECIP EINDETRD EN EAIR EZ ET EUC EI ELTN EREL EFIS EINT ETC ECONEFIN ENVR ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS ECA ELN EFTA ENIV EINVETC EINN ENGR EUR ESA ENERG EK ENGY ETRO ETRDEINVTINTCS ESENV ENVI ETRDECONWTOCS ECONCS ENNP ELECTIONS ECUN
FR FARC FJ FINR FAO FTAA FREEDOM FI FBI FMLN
GG GM GOI GT GZ GTMO GV GH GA GE GR GTIP GCC GAZA GANGS GY
HO HURI HILLARY HA HU HR HUMAN HYMPSK HK HSTC
IR IS IMO IZ IN INTERPOL IT INRB IAEA ID IO IV ICTY IQ ICAO IPR IRAJ INRA INRO IC IIP ILC ITPHUM IWC ISRAELI IRAQI ICRC IF IEFIN INTELSAT IL IA IBRD IMF INR IRC ITRA IACI ICJ ITALY ITALIAN
JO JA JOSEPH JAMES JP JOHNNIE JM JUS
KTFN KNNP KWBG KPAL KDEM KPKO KSCA KCRM KR KWMN KN KU KV KJUS KE KISL KCOR KPAO KG KTIP KICC KBCT KSPR KHLS KTIA KMDR KGHG KUNR KS KIRF KFRD KIPR KAWC KPWR KCIP KSUM KWAC KMIG KOLY KZ KAWK KSEC KIFR KDRG KDEMAF KFIN KGIC KOMC KGCC KPIN KBIO KHIV KNUC KPLS KIRC KACT KRAD KCOM KMCA KHDP KVPR KDEV KMPI KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KTLA KCFC KPRP KCFE KOCI KTDB KMRS KLIG KGIT KSTC KPAK KNEI KSEP KPOA KFLU KNUP KNNPMNUC KO KTER KHUM KRFD KBTR KDDG KWWMN KFLO KSAF KBTS KPRV KNPP KNAR KWMM KERG KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KTBT KCRS KRVC KSTH KREL KNSD KTEX KPAI KHSA KOMS KVIR
LY LG LE LH LU LI LO LOG LT LAB
MARR MOPS MTCRE MNUC MY MX MASS MCAP MO MPOS MAR MD MZ MEPP MA MR ML MIL MOPPS MTCR MAPP MU MG MASC MCC MK MTRE MP MDC MEPI MRCRE MI MT MQADHAFI MAPS MUCN MASSMNUC MERCOSUR MC MV
NATO NL NI NZ NG NU NO NIPP NPT NRR NE NS NAR NPG NK NSG NA NT NASA NGO NP NSF NATIONAL
OVIP OTRA OPRC OSCI OTR OVP OREP ODIP OPDC OIIP OFFICIALS OSAC OAS OEXC OFDP OECD OSCE OPIC OPCW OIE OIC
PGOV PREL PHUM PTER PK PARM PINR PINS PSI PA PE PO PINT PL PBTS PHSA PSOE PU POL POLITICAL PARTIES PROP PBIO PECON PM PREF PAK POGOV PINL PKFK PGOF PUNE PARMS PORG PMIL PTERE PF PALESTINIAN PY PGGV PNR POV PAO PFOR PHALANAGE PARTY PRGOV PNAT PROV PEL PINF PGOVE POLINT PRL PRAM PMAR PGOVLO PHUMBA PHUS PHUMPREL PG PLN PGOC POLITICS PEPR
QA
RS RU RW RO REGION RP RIGHTS RICE ROBERT RF RFE
SNAR SP SOCI SA SMIG SY SU SCUL SR SENV STEINBERG SN SO SF SG SW SL SZ SHUM SYR ST SANC SC SAN SIPRS SK SH SI SNARCS
TU TSPA TRGY TI TX TS TW TC TERRORISM TPHY TIP TBIO TH TR TT TO TFIN TD TSPL TZ TK TNGD TINT TRSY TP
UK UNGA UN UP UY UNESCO UNO UZ UNMIK US UG UNSC USEU UV USUN UNHRC UE UAE UNEP USTR UNHCR UNDP USAID UNCHS UNAUS UNCHC UNDC UNDESCO
VT VE VZ VTPREL VN VM
WI WTRO WTO WA WZ WMO WTRQ WHO WWARD WB WBG WEU WHA
XY XW XF XA XG XT XM XR XS XL XK XH XC XZ XD XE
YI YM YE YMCS
ZP ZR ZI ZU ZB ZF ZK ZANU ZOELLICK ZA ZO ZJ

### Browse by classification

CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN SECRET SECRET//NOFORN UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

### Community resources

Follow us on Twitter Check our Reddit Twitter this Digg this page Contact us on IRC

courage is contagious

### Viewing cable 10BOGOTA13, Peace Commissioner Lays Out Way Ahead on FARC, ELN

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:

- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #10BOGOTA13.

Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
10BOGOTA13 | 2010-01-07 13:01 | 2010-12-08 21:09 | SECRET//NOFORN | Embassy Bogota

`

    VZCZCXYZ0001
    RR RUEHWEB

    DE RUEHBO #0013/01 0071344
    ZNY SSSSS ZZH
    R 071344Z JAN 10
    FM AMEMBASSY BOGOTA
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1914
    INFO RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
    RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
    RHMFISS/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC
    RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0032
    RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
    RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA
    RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
    RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS
    RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 0008
    RUEHNY/AMEMBASSY OSLO 0010
    RUEHPE/AMEMBASSY LIMA
    RUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO
    RUEHSM/AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM 0001
    RUEHUB/USINT HAVANA 0003
    RUEHZP/AMEMBASSY PANAMA

` `

    S E C R E T BOGOTA 000013

    SIPDIS
    NOFORN

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 2035/01/07
    TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER SNAR PARM ECON CO
    SUBJECT: Peace Commissioner Lays Out Way Ahead on FARC, ELN

    REF: 09 BOGOTA 3281

    CLASSIFIED BY: William R. Brownfield, Ambassador; REASON: 1.4(B), (D)

    Summary

    -------

    ¶1. (S/NF) Colombian High Commissioner for Peace Frank Pearl told
    the Ambassador January 5 that his office is preparing "roadmaps"
    for the next Administration on how best to pursue peace agreements
    with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and National
    Liberation Army (ELN). Pearl acknowledged that the GOC had
    communicated with both groups in order to develop the road maps and
    build confidence. Both groups have expressed minimum conditions
    for a peace process that is supported by the GOC, the military, the
    private sector, and the international community. In the short
    term, Pearl plans to focus on the humanitarian release of FARC
    hostages and a secret meeting between the GOC and ELN with an aim
    to revitalizing the stalled peace talks. Wild cards include
    President Uribe's possible reelection, support from Venezuelan
    President Chavez, and the FARC's acquisition of "game-changing"
    weaponry such as man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS). End
    summary.

    Roadmaps for Peace

    ------------------

    ¶2. (S/NF) At a breakfast hosted by the Ambassador on January 5,
    Peace Commissioner Frank Pearl disclosed that when he took office
    in February last year, he assessed that there was not enough time
    left in the Uribe Administration (which ends August 7, 2010) for
    either the FARC or ELN to conclude a peace agreement with the GOC.
    He said his office had instead been focused on developing
    communication channels and building confidence with both terrorist
    organizations. Responses from these contacts, he continued, had
    informed the development of "roadmaps" that define both a desired
    end-state and the process to get there. The International
    Organization for Migration (IOM), supported by USAID, was drafting
    many of the documents. Pearl planned to present these fleshed out
    plans to the president-elect (or to President Uribe if he is
    reelected) in June to help guide the next Administration.

    ¶3. (S/NF) From the FARC, Pearl had seen little interest in
    initiating peace talks. FARC Supreme Leader Alfonso Cano was still
    consolidating his authority and proving his mettle as a military
    commander. It would have been impossible for Cano, he surmised, to
    have broached peace talks so soon after taking the reins of the
    FARC in May 2008. Still, Pearl noted that the deaths of three
    Secretariat members in 2008 had resulted in replacements that were
    more educated, intellectual, and aware of the international context
    of the conflict. This, coupled with an analysis of recent FARC
    communiques, suggested that the organization was open to a
    political solution to the conflict. He said other sources had
    signaled that the FARC's preferred end-state is the transition to a
    series of social networks (presumably comprised of demobilized
    fronts) that interface with a political party. Pearl admitted that
    such a solution was years away, but that having a notion of the
    other side's goals and objectives at the outset was important.

    ¶4. (S/NF) In the short term, Pearl said the GOC would continue to
    pursue the humanitarian release of two military hostages and the
    remains of a third held by the FARC. He said FARC interlocutor
    Piedad Cordoba told him December 24 that release was imminent but

    on December 29 reported that the FARC had rejected a facilitation
    role by Brazil and had counter-offered with Argentina or Sweden.
    The Ambassador counseled that the GOC cultivate the International
    Commission of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the Catholic Church as
    interlocutors for the humanitarian release rather than depend
    solely on the Chavez-linked Senator Cordoba.

    ¶5. (S/NF) Pearl contrasted the FARC's situation with that of the
    ELN, which had developed a comprehensive basic framework agreement
    during talks that stalled in early 2008. He said the ELN's Central
    Command (COCE) had indicated interest in reviving those talks under
    appropriate conditions (ref). Pearl commented that the ELN process
    had been facilitated initially by Cuban government officials expert
    in peace talks, resulting in a substantive but incomplete peace
    proposal. The Commissioner confided that he had offered the COCE a
    secret, one- or two-day meeting as a confidence-building exercise.
    He said the COCE is considering the offer but is stuck on the
    meeting location: Colombia (difficult for the ELN), Venezuela
    (difficult for the GOC), or Norway (a logistical nightmare but
    still a possibility). If successful, Pearl contemplated having two
    or three such meetings before the end of the current Uribe
    Administration. The Ambassador reminded Pearl that the Embassy had
    contracted a U.S.-based academic familiar with the process to
    consult on ways for the USG to be supportive of GOC efforts with
    the ELN. Pearl was grateful for USAID assistance in drafting white
    papers that outlined the ELN negotiating positions.

    Common Ground

    -------------

    ¶6. (S/NF) Pearl said that both guerrilla groups had responded
    through sensitive channels with the same four minimum conditions
    for a peace agreement. First, the GOC must be willing to give its
    unambiguous and unanimous support for the agreement. Signing a
    peace agreement, Pearl emphasized, was just the beginning of the
    process and the terrorist groups have, because of historical
    precedent, a deep distrust of the GOC's good faith. Second, the
    military must be included in the process, a reminder that the
    Colombian Army opposed and worked against civilian-led peace talks
    in the 1980s and 1990s. Third, both groups seek participation by
    the private sector, which they view as the true power behind
    Colombian politics. Fourth, the ELN and FARC want some form of
    international accompaniment for the process. Pearl foresees a
    positive role for the international community once the process has
    reached a sufficient level of maturity. International well-wishers
    coming in too early, he stressed, could aggravate the delicate
    process. Regarding a U.S. role, he said that both groups were
    interested in an agreement with the United States over illegal drug
    cultivation, which they viewed as a social problem.

    Wild Cards: Reelection and Venezuela

    -------------------------------------

    ¶7. (S/NF) Pearl said there were two schools of thought about the
    impact of an Uribe third term on negotiations. Some believed that
    the third term would only exacerbate the tensions between Uribe and
    Chavez, which could play to the FARC's advantage. Others thought
    that the reelection would cause the FARC to despair at four more
    years of Uribe's Democratic Security policy and to consider
    negotiations. Ambassador Brownfield added that Venezuela's
    political and material support to the FARC could be a game-changer,
    especially if Venezuela were to give the FARC portable
    surface-to-air missiles (MANPADS). Pearl agreed that such weapons
    could upset the strategic balance of the conflict.

    COMMENT

    -------

    ¶8. (S/NF) Pearl's presentation was structured, logical, and
    rehearsed. He clearly wanted to control our expectations over what
    could be accomplished in the short run. That said, it is a
    realistic plan given that Colombians will be seized with choosing
    (or reelecting) a president for much of 2010. We should continue
    our support of the GOC as it develops these initiatives, being
    careful not to get too far out in front. End comment.
    BROWNFIELD

    EPET @ EL P

`