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### Viewing cable 05SANJOSE1746, BORDER DISPUTE WITH NICARAGUA THREATENS TO FLARE

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
05SANJOSE1746 | 2005-08-04 14:02 | 2011-03-08 16:04 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy San Jose

Appears in these articles:
http://www.nacion.com/2011-03-07/Investigacion/NotasDestacadas/Investigacion2704388.aspx
http://www.nacion.com/2011-03-07/Investigacion/NotaPrincipal/Investigacion2704402.aspx
http://www.nacion.com/2011-03-07/Investigacion/NotasSecundarias/Investigacion2704436.aspx
http://www.nacion.com/2011-03-07/Investigacion/NotasSecundarias/Investigacion2705536.aspx

`

    This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

` `

    C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SAN JOSE 001746

    SIPDIS

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/03/2015
    TAGS: PBTS PREL PINR ETRD CS NU
    SUBJECT: BORDER DISPUTE WITH NICARAGUA THREATENS TO FLARE
    UP AGAIN; COSTA RICA SEEKS ARBITRATION

    REF: A. 02 SAN JOSE 2260
         ¶B. 02 SAN JOSE 2589
         ¶C. 02 SAN JOSE 2818

    Classified By: Charge Frederick J. Kaplan for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D).

    SUMMARY
    -------

    ¶1.  (C) In an August 1 meeting with Charge and acting DCM,
    Foreign Minister Roberto Tovar said that the dispute over the
    navigational rights of Costa Rican police on the San Juan
    River threatens again to disrupt relations between Costa Rica
    and Nicaragua.  Tovar noted that the three-year "truce" on
    the matter was about to expire and that Costa Rica, to
    preserve its rights, would have to either bring a case before
    the International Court of Justice (ICJ) or convince
    Nicaragua to agree to arbitration of the matter.  The GOCR,
    Tovar said, far preferred the latter course, which it
    regarded as "less confrontational."  Tovar asked that the USG
    help persuade Nicaragua that an arbitrated resolution of the
    issue was in the interest of both parties.  End Summary.

    IMPLICATIONS FOR CAFTA-DR
    -------------------------

    ¶2.  (C)  Foreign Minister Roberto Tovar called Charge to his
    office on August 1 to discuss, he said, "Nicaragua and
    CAFTA."  Charge was accompanied by acting DCM and Tovar by
    Costa Rican Ambassador to the OAS Javier Sancho.  Tovar
    explained the relationship between the Costa Rican-Nicaraguan
    border dispute and the U.S.-Central American-Dominican
    Republic Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR) in the following
    manner:  If Costa Rica asserts its rights to have its police
    navigate the San Juan River, the Nicaraguan National Assembly
    is liable to retaliate by slapping a 35 percent tariff on
    Costa Rican goods, a violation of CAFTA-DR (assuming that
    both countries ratify the treaty).  Relations between
    Nicaraguan President Bolanos and Costa Rican President
    Pacheco and between Nicaraguan Foreign Minister Norman
    Caldera and Tovar are excellent, and Tovar wants to use the
    existing good will in the executive branches of the two
    governments to find a face-saving and permanent solution to
    the San Juan problem.

    COSTA RICAN VERSION OF HISTORY
    ------------------------------

    ¶3.  (U)  Tovar traced the history of the issue to the 1858
    Treaty of Canas-Jerez.  The treaty granted to Costa Rica the
    territory that now constitutes the northwestern portion of
    the country and to Nicaragua sovereignty over the San Juan
    River (both banks).  Approximately 80 miles of the
    192-mile-long Nicaragua-Costa Rica boundary runs along the
    right bank of the San Juan from the Caribbean Sea upstream to
    a point three miles below Castillo Viejo.  The treaty grants
    to Costa Rica perpetual free navigation "with the object of
    trade."  Disagreements soon arose because Nicaragua contended
    that Costa Ricans could navigate the San Juan only to move
    merchandise, while the Costa Ricans claimed also the right to
    commercial travel of people.  In 1888, according to an
    arbitral award of U.S. President Grover Cleveland, Costa Rica
    could not put warships on the river but could deploy revenue
    service cutters "for the protection of commerce."

    ¶4.  (SBU)  Today, Tovar said, the GOCR has a need to use the
    river for the transport of its local police, who usually
    carry side arms.  They are not carrying out a law enforcement
    function on the river, which is admittedly Nicaraguan
    territory, but are simply using river boats as a form of
    transportation from post to post.  (There are few roads in
    the area.)   Nicaragua, however, requires Costa Rica to
    request authorization, which Costa Rica believes it doesn't
    need.  Costa Rica was prepared to take the matter to the
    International Court of Justice (ICJ), but on October 23,
    2001, then-Nicaraguan President Aleman filed a motion with
    the ICJ alleging that the court lacked jurisdiction over
    disputes involving treaties signed by the GON before 1901.
    The GOCR had one year to answer the motion.  If it failed to
    do so, it would forfeit the case.

    ¶5.  (C)  In August and September 2002, Tovar and Caldera
    began working together to find a way to avoid a court battle.
     Because of the difficulty of devising a permanent solution
    in a short amount of time, the GOCR proposed a "truce," which
    preserved the right of Costa Rica to seek ICJ intervention,
    but only after three years.  During this period, the GOCR and
    GON intended on their own to work out their differences
    regarding the San Juan River.  Negotiations were hard fought,
    and the agreement went through 40 drafts but was finally
    signed by the GOCR and GON on September 26, 2002.

    TOVAR SEES NO CHANCE FOR NEGOTIATED SOLUTION
    --------------------------------------------

    ¶6.  (C)  It soon became clear, according to Tovar, that a
    "political solution" to the San Juan dispute was impossible.
    If there is one thing that all Nicaraguans agree on, Tovar
    said, whether they are Sandanistas or Somozistas, it is that
    ceding anything to Costa Rica with regard to the San Juan is
    treason.  At the same time, Costa Ricans cannot accept the
    status quo.  Therefore, having a third party decide, Tovar
    believes, is the only way out.  Tovar worries, however, that
    a full-blown court case in the ICJ would inflame passions in
    both countries and ultimately leave one country embittered.
    He believes the mere filing of a Costa Rican petition in the
    ICJ would provoke a highly nationalistic Nicaraguan National
    Assembly and affect nearly USD 300 million in trade between
    the two countries.

    ¶7.  (C)  Tovar's solution to the problem is arbitration,
    which he deems "less confrontational" than going to court.
    He thinks the arbitration could be conducted in the ICJ
    itself or perhaps the Permanent Court of Arbitration.  He did
    not warm to Charge's suggestion of the OAS, which he seemed
    to think insufficiently authoritative.  The problem now is
    convincing the GON.  Tovar said he was sending Ambassador
    Sancho to Managua in ten days to broach the subject with
    Nicaraguan MFA adviser Mauricio Herdocia whom both Tovar and
    Sancho believe is solid and completely trusted by Minister
    Caldera.

    CALL FOR U.S. HELP
    ------------------

    ¶8.  (C)  Tovar asked that the USG use its influence with the
    GON to help persuade the GON of the wisdom of an arbitrated
    resolution of the issue.  The alternative is the
    "total-warfare" atmosphere of the courtroom, which will not
    serve the interests of either country.  Tovar harked back to
    CAFTA-DR, noting the intention of the parties of the treaty
    to break down barriers between member countries and to avoid
    conflict.  Charge responded that he would report fully to
    Washington.

    COMMENT
    -------

    ¶9.  (U)  Tovar is not the only one in Costa Rica worrying
    about the San Juan.  During a breakfast with tourism industry
    leaders on July 27, Oscar Arias, the front-runner in the
    February 2006 presidential election, said: "I hope I'm
    mistaken, but there seems to be a very big possibility that
    this controversy (San Juan) will re-emerge.  I hope that
    relations between the two countries don't deteriorate.  I'm
    going to pray that they don't.  I would like our differences
    not to increase so that it does not become necessary for
    either party to resort to international agencies to sort out
    this small conflict."

    ¶10.  (C)  Costa Rica and Nicaragua squandered most of the
    three years allotted for finding a negotiated solution to the
    San Juan controversy.  Only in the last few months have there
    been quiet, low-key, and almost casual discussions between
    the countries about the San Juan.  The first serious strategy
    meeting on the subject in the Costa Rican MFA since the
    agreement of 2002 was the very morning of our August 1
    meeting and included Tovar, Sancho, and MFA advisers Sergio
    Ugalde and Arnoldo Brenes.  Their decision was essentially to
    wash their hands, say it's impossible and too late to
    negotiate, and the matter needs to be turned over to someone
    else (an arbitrator).  Three years ago (reftels), Tovar was
    singing a different tune.  We were skeptical then, and,
    unfortunately, time has proved us right - - negotiations have
    gone nowhere, in part because they never got started.
    KAPLAN

`