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### Viewing cable 07TELAVIV1733, MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIRECTOR YADLIN COMMENTS ON

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
07TELAVIV1733 | 2007-06-13 16:04 | 2010-12-19 21:09 | SECRET | Embassy Tel Aviv

`

    VZCZCXRO4198
    OO RUEHROV
    DE RUEHTV #1733/01 1641638
    ZNY SSSSS ZZH
    O 131638Z JUN 07
    FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1629
    INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
    RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
    RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY

` `

    S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 TEL AVIV 001733

    SIPDIS

    SIPDIS

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/13/2017
    TAGS: PREL PTER MOPS KWBG LE SY IS
    SUBJECT: MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIRECTOR YADLIN COMMENTS ON
    GAZA, SYRIA AND LEBANON

    Classified By: Ambassador Richard H. Jones, Reason 1.4 (b) (d)

    ¶1. (S) Summary. During a June 12 meeting with the
    Ambassador, IDI Director MG Amos Yadlin said that Gaza was
    "number four" on his list of threats, preceded by Iran,
    Syria, and Hizballah in that order. Yadlin said the IDI has
    been predicting armed confrontation in Gaza between Hamas and
    Fatah since Hamas won the January 2006 legislative council
    elections. Yadlin felt that the Hamas military wing had
    initiated the current escalation with the tacit consent of
    external Hamas leader Khalid Mishal, adding that he did not
    believe there had been a premeditated political-level
    decision by Hamas to wipe out Fatah in Gaza. Yadlin
    dismissed Fatah's capabilities in Gaza, saying Hamas could
    have taken over there any time it wanted for the past year,
    but he agreed that Fatah remained strong in the West Bank.
    Although not necessarily reflecting a GOI consensus view,
    Yadlin said Israel would be "happy" if Hamas took over Gaza
    because the IDF could then deal with Gaza as a hostile state.
    He dismissed the significance of an Iranian role in a
    Hamas-controlled Gaza "as long as they don't have a port."
    Regarding predictions of war with Syria this summer, Yadlin
    recalled the lead-up to the 1967 war, which he said was
    provoked by the Soviet Ambassador in Israel. Both Israel and
    Syria are in a state of high alert, so war could happen
    easily even though neither side is seeking it. Yadlin
    suggested that the Asad regime would probably not survive a
    war, but added that Israel was no longer concerned with
    maintaining that "evil" regime. On Lebanon, Yadlin felt that
    the fighting in the Nahr Al-Barid camp was a positive
    development for Israel since it had "embarrassed" Hizballah,
    adding that IDI had information that the Fatah Al-Islam
    terrorist group was planning to attack UNIFIL before it
    blundered into its confrontation with the LAF. End Summary.

    Gaza Fighting Not Israel's Main Problem
    ---------------------------------------

    ¶2. (S) The Ambassador, accompanied by Pol Couns and DATT,
    called on IDI Director Major General Amos Yadlin June 12.
    Noting reports of fierce fighting between Hamas and Fatah in
    Gaza that day, the Ambassador asked for Yadlin's assessment.
    Yadlin described Gaza as "not Israel's main problem," noting
    that it ranked fourth in his hierarchy of threats, behind
    Iran, Syria, and Hizballah. Yadlin described Gaza as
    "hopeless for now," commenting that the Palestinians had to
    realize that Hamas offered no solution. IDI analysts, he
    said, had predicted a confrontation in Gaza since Hamas won
    the Palestinian Legislative Council elections in January
    ¶2006. Yadlin commented that Palestinian President Mahmoud
    Abbas and Hamas Prime Minister Ismail Haniyeh had become
    personally close despite their ideological differences, but
    neither leader had control over those forces under them.

    ¶3. (S) Yadlin explained that both Fatah and Hamas contained
    many factions. The Hamas military wing had been frustrated
    since the signing of the Mecca Agreement in January, but
    there were also many armed groups in Gaza that were not under
    the control of either party. Yadlin cited the example of the
    Dughmush clan, which had shifted from Fatah to the Popular
    Resistance Committees to Hamas before becoming an armed
    entity opposed to all of them. After May 15, the Hamas
    military wing had sought to export the fighting to Sderot by
    launching waves of Qassam rockets. One week later, as a
    result of IDF retaliation, they realized the price was too
    high and reduced the Qassam attacks.

    ¶4. (S) In response to the Ambassador's question, Yadlin said
    he did not think that day's Hamas attacks on Fatah security
    forces were part of a premeditated effort to wipe out Fatah
    in Gaza. Instead, they probably represented an initiative of
    the military wing with the tacit consent of Khalid Mishal in
    Damascus. Mishal was still considering the costs and
    benefits of the fighting, but the situation had become so
    tense that any incident could lead to street fighting without
    any political decision.

    Gaza and West Bank Separating
    -----------------------------

    ¶5. (S) The Ambassador asked Yadlin for his assessment of
    reports that Fatah forces had been ordered not to fight back.
    Yadlin said Mohammed Dahlan had 500 men and the Presidential
    Guard had 1,500 more. They understand that the balance of
    power favors Hamas, which "can take over Gaza any time it
    wants to." Yadlin said he would be surprised if Fatah
    fights, and even more surprised if they win. As far as he
    was concerned, this had been the case for the past year. The
    situation was different in the West Bank, however, where
    Fatah remained relatively strong and had even started to

    TEL AVIV 00001733 002 OF 002

    kidnap Hamas activists. Yadlin agreed that Tawfiq Tirawi had
    a power base in the West Bank, but he added that Fatah was
    not cohesive.

    ¶6. (S) The Ambassador commented that if Fatah decided it has
    lost Gaza, there would be calls for Abbas to set up a
    separate regime in the West Bank. While not necessarily
    reflecting a consensus GOI view, Yadlin commented that such a
    development would please Israel since it would enable the IDF
    to treat Gaza as a hostile country rather than having to deal
    with Hamas as a non-state actor. He added that Israel could
    work with a Fatah regime in the West Bank. The Ambassador
    asked Yadlin if he worried about a Hamas-controlled Gaza
    giving Iran a new opening. Yadlin replied that Iran was
    already present in Gaza, but Israel could handle the
    situation "as long as Gaza does not have a port (sea or air)."

    War with Syria "Could Happen Easily"
    ------------------------------------

    ¶7. (S) Noting Israeli press speculation, the Ambassador
    asked Yadlin if he expected war with Syria this summer.
    Recalling the 1967 war, Yadlin commented that it had started
    as a result of the Soviet Ambassador in Israel reporting on
    non-existing Israeli preparations to attack Syria. Something
    similar was happening again, he said, with the Russians
    telling the Syrians that Israel planned to attack them,
    possibly in concert with a U.S. attack on Iran. Yadlin
    stated that since last summer's war in Lebanon, Syria had
    engaged in a "frenzy of preparations" for a confrontation
    with Israel. The Syrian regime was also showing greater
    self-confidence. Some Syrian leaders appeared to believe
    that Syria could take on Israel military, but others were
    more cautious. The fact that both sides were on high alert
    meant that a war could happen easily, even though neither
    side is seeking one. In response to a question, Yadlin said
    he did not think the Asad regime would survive a war, but he
    added that preserving that "evil" regime should not be a
    matter of concern.

    Fighting in Nahr al-Barid Positive for Israel
    ---------------------------------------------

    ¶8. (S) The Ambassador asked Yadlin for his views on the
    fighting in the Nahr al-Barid refugee camp in northern
    Lebanon. Although Yadlin was called to another meeting and
    did not have time to elaborate, he answered that the fighting
    was positive for Israel because it had embarrassed Hizballah,
    which had been unable to adopt a clear-cut position on the
    Lebanese Army's action, and because the Fatah al-Islam
    terrorist organization had been planning to attack UNIFIL and
    then Israel before it blundered into its current
    confrontation with the LAF. He also agreed that the
    confrontation was strengthening the LAF, in fact and in the
    eyes of the Lebanese people, which was also good.

    ¶9. (S) Comment: Yadlin's relatively relaxed attitude toward
    the deteriorating security situation in Gaza represents a
    shift in IDF thinking from last fall, when the Southern
    Command supported a major ground operation into Gaza to
    remove the growing threat from Hamas. While many media
    commentators continue to make that argument, Yadlin's view
    appears to be more in synch with that of Chief of General
    Staff Ashkenazi, who also believes that the more serious
    threat to Israel currently comes from the north.

    ********************************************* ********************
    Visit Embassy Tel Aviv's Classified Website:
    http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/telaviv

    You can also access this site through the State Department's
    Classified SIPRNET website.
    ********************************************* ********************
    JONES

`