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### Viewing cable 08SANJOSE629, COSTA RICA COZYING UP TO CUBA?

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
08SANJOSE629 | 2008-07-30 19:07 | 2011-03-14 17:05 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy San Jose
Appears in these articles: http://www.nacion.com/2011-03-11/Investigacion/NotasDestacadas/Investigacion2710281.aspx http://www.nacion.com/2011-03-11/Investigacion/NotaPrincipal/Investigacion2710282.aspx

`

    VZCZCXYZ0000
    PP RUEHWEB

    DE RUEHSJ #0629/01 2121948
    ZNY CCCCC ZZH
    P 301948Z JUL 08
    FM AMEMBASSY SAN JOSE
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9965
    INFO RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
    RUEHZA/WHA CENTRAL AMERICAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
    RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS PRIORITY 1128
    RUEHUB/USINT HAVANA PRIORITY 0046

` `

    C O N F I D E N T I A L SAN JOSE 000629

    SIPDIS

    DEPARTMENT FOR WHA, WHA/CEN AND WHA/CCA

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/30/2018
    TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR CS CU
    SUBJECT: COSTA RICA COZYING UP TO CUBA?

    REF: A. SAN JOSE 432
         ¶B. 06 SAN JOSE 1841
         ¶C. 07 SAN JOSE 1106
         ¶D. SAN JOSE 129

    Classified By: DCM Peter M. Brennan for reason 1.4(d).

    -------
    SUMMARY
    -------

    ¶1. (C) The Arias administration may be contemplating
    re-establishing diplomatic ties with Cuba.  A vocal embargo
    opponent in the legislature (a member of President Arias' own
    party) seems to have Arias' ear on the issue, arguing that
    normalized relations would help open Cuba to democracy.
    FonMin Stagno has signaled to local diplomats that a change
    is being considered.  The GOCR Consul in Havana emailed a
    local Cuba-watcher a month ago that ties were "getting
    closer."  A leading editorial writer told us July 24 that he
    is convinced a change is in the wind (and overdue, in his
    view).

    ¶2. (C) The chatter here has been sporadic but persistent:  an
    opening with Cuba, explained as a move to force the Castro
    regime to democratize faster, might be just the sort of
    sweeping international gesture Arias is looking for in the
    last half of his administration.  Such a move would burnish
    his credentials with the international (and Costa Rican)
    intellectual left; allow him to respond to critics who say he
    has been too close to the U.S. during the bruising two-year
    fight to ratify and implement CAFTA; and place him back on
    the global stage.  On the other hand, a drastic reversal in
    Cuba policy might be a tough sell domestically, given Arias'
    record of vocal criticism of the regime in Havana.  Talk of a
    Cuba gambit has quieted over the last two weeks, perhaps
    because of our recent and widespread soundings on the issue,
    but there is still a hum in the background.  Given the Arias'
    administration's penchant for dramatic, no-notice foreign
    policy moves (moving the GOCR Embassy from Jerusalem to Tel
    Aviv, recognizing China, establishing relations with the
    Palestinian "state," etc.), if a change towards Cuba comes,
    it may be sudden.

    END SUMMARY.

    ----------------
    WHAT'S THE BUZZ?
    ----------------

    ¶3. (C) There has been some political and media buzz about
    possible GOCR overtures to Cuba over the last 2-3 months,
    coinciding with Fidel's failing health and fade from power.
    During a luncheon with Poloffs in early June, legislator
    Federico Tinoco (PLN), strongly pro-US and one of the May 21
    Cuban Solidarity Day speakers (Ref A), (but also strongly
    anti-embargo), floated the idea of a Costa Rican opening to
    Cuba.  Tinoco intimated that he was shopping the idea
    informally around San Jose and in the GOCR.  His rationale:
    1) All other countries in Latin America had relations with
    Cuba and Costa Rica was a lone holdout; 2) Now that Costa
    Rica had opened relations with China (to very little domestic
    or international hue and cry), why not open up to Cuba?; 3)
    Costa Rica already had fairly extensive informal relations
    with Cuba, including some 10,000 Cubans in the country (news
    to us); and 4) Costa Rica's re-establishing relations would
    help further democracy in Cuba.  Tinoco maintained that the
    idea was more to help the Cuban people than to challenge U.S.
    policy.

    ¶4. (C) Tinoco's musing reminded us of an earlier conversation
    in May with Elaine White, former advisor to the Minister and
    then Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs during the Pacheco
    administration (1998-2002).  She told us that during her
    tenure at the MFA, GOCR foreign policy rested on three sacred
    pillars:  1) recognition of Taiwan, 2) maintaining an embassy
    in Jerusalem, and 3) not having ties with Cuba.  White noted
    that Arias and Stagno had already reversed the first two
    (Refs B-C).  She added that the GOCR could not use "human
    rights" as the reason for distancing itself from Cuba, having
    recognized the PRC despite the latter's abysmal human rights
    record, and she pondered whether that would pave the way for
    a return to full GOCR-Cuban diplomatic relations.

    ¶5. (SBU) On June 24, during an MFA overview briefing to
    senior members of the diplomatic corps, Stagno answered a
    point-blank question about relations with Cuba from the
    Russian Ambassador by saying that the GOCR was open to talk
    to the Cubans and did so from time to time, but that nothing
    "formal" was in the works.

    ------------------------------
    THE CUBA WATCHERS ARE WATCHING
    ------------------------------

    ¶6. (C) With Tinoco's and White's reasoning on our minds, and
    the Cuba buzz continuing in the background, we canvassed some
    contacts in and outside of government.  Adriana Nunez,
    Cuban-born and -exiled PLN faction press chief in the
    legislature, who has had her finger on the pulse of Cuban
    issues here, told us on July 15 that the GOCR Consul in
    Havana, Jose Maria Penebad, visited San Jose about a month
    before for medical reasons but stayed on for consultations
    with the MFA.  After his return to Havana, Penebad wrote
    Nunez from his personal email account to tell her that ties
    were "getting closer."  Nunez believes the GOCR would make
    such a move sooner rather than later, with the uneventful
    opening to China the likely turning point in the Arias Team's
    thinking.  She said that President Arias had never had much
    of an internal "discourse" on Cuba, except to say that he
    would not re-engage with Cuba while Fidel was in power.  With
    Raul now in control, Arias may have an out, according to
    Nunez.

    ¶7. (C) Nunez said that several of Arias' advisors have been
    encouraging him to re-establish full ties and that the MFA
    may have been deliberating doing so since late 2007.  She
    based this on a couple of indicators.  First, after the Cuban
    consul in San Jose vocally criticized Arias during last
    year's CAFTA debate and October referendum, Havana replaced
    the consul.  Second, toward the end of last year, a group of
    legislators took an official complaint they prepared
    regarding a Cuban political prisoner to the MFA to forward to
    Geneva.  When the "denuncia" made its way
    "upstairs" to the FonMin's desk, it was stopped and the MFA
    said it could not get involved.  Nunez took this as a sign
    that the MFA did not want to be seen by Havana as
    participating in the complaint.  She also noted that earlier
    this year the GOCR announced it was going to "shortly"
    establish diplomatic relations with a Caribbean country and a
    country in the Middle East.  (NOTE:  Aside from the quirky
    recognition of the "state" of Palestine, Ref D, there have
    been no new diplomatic ties established by the GOCR thus far
    in 2008.)

    ¶8. (C) According to Nunez, Arias would most likely couch a
    re-establishment of ties in terms of contributing to the
    opening of Cuban democracy; showing solidarity with the other
    Latin American countries; and expanding the benefits of
    cultural/educational/professional exchanges.  Costa Rica
    already benefits from large numbers of Cuban doctors, many of
    whom work in the Costa Rican national health system.  Though
    Arias is known for his large ego and his role as a
    peace-broker, both Nunez and think-tank member Constantino
    Urcuyo doubted that Arias would try to insert himself as a
    mediator between the U.S. and Havana, in regards to the
    embargo, for example.  Urcuyo said Arias' motivation would be
    something "more simple," possibly -- as Nunez and Urcuyo both
    indicated -- another attempt to re-burnish his credentials
    with Costa Rican leftists. (COMMENT: Urcuyo also mused on the
    possible impact of the GOCR's Petrocaribe membership (septel)
    on ties with Cuba.  Would Chavez push San Jose closer to
    Havana?  END COMMENT.)  Nunez believes that the GOCR will
    strike quickly whenever it changes policy towards Cuba.  She
    bases this (with justification) on the Arias administration's
    surprise announcements about the embassy in Israel and
    recognition of China.

    -----------------------------
    BACKING OFF THE BUZZ, FOR NOW
    -----------------------------

    ¶9. (C) The Cuba buzz has quieted recently, but has not died
    altogether.  In mid-July, French Ambassador Jean-Paul Monchau
    told the DCM that he had asked Stagno directly about the GOCR
    normalizing relations with Cuba.  Stagno admitted they had
    been working on it, telling Monchau that the GOCR had cooled
    to the idea after the Cubans "insulted" the Europeans and
    started going after dissidents again.  On July 21, we asked
    legislator Evita Arguedas (Independent, married to a Cuban
    exile) whether she had heard anything definite about a
    normalization of relations.  She told us she had also heard
    chatter, but nothing definitive.  She did not discount the
    idea, however, and stated that "where there is talk, there is
    a reason."
    ¶10. (C) Other leading legislators including PLN faction Chief
    Oscar Nunez and PUSC faction chief Lorena Vasquez told us
    they have heard nothing from the Executive on changes
    vis-a-vis Cuba, but both acknowledged the Arias
    administration would not necessarily inform or consult the
    legislature in advance, based on the China example.  Both
    also opined that it might be a tough sell for Arias
    domestically, given the Costa Rican people's strong support
    of human rights and (as Vasquez put it) general dislike for
    Cubans.  Ever the PLN loyalist, Oscar Nunez was confident the
    Costa Rican people would follow Arias' lead in the end.  "If
    they trust him on anything, it is on foreign policy," he
    said.

    ¶11. (C) On July 22, we followed up with Adriana Nunez who had
    asked Rodrigo Arias, Minister of the Presidency, by email if
    the GOCR was planning to re-establish ties.  According to
    Nunez, Arias responded that it was "within the realm of
    possibilities" but he indicated that the matter had been
    "paralyzed" for now due to "other problems."  (COMMENT:  We
    assume this refers to the local scandal involving possible
    unethical government use of BCIE funds, which has been
    occupying a great deal of space in the local press, and
    perhaps the new membership in Petrocaribe.  END
    COMMENT.)

    ¶12. (C) At the MFA, both Antonio Alarcon, Stagno's Chief of
    Staff, and Alejandro Solano, Deputy Director of Foreign
    Policy, had heard nothing about a prospective change in Cuba
    policy.  Neither could foresee relations being normalized in
    the next two years, and Alarcon also noted the possible
    political difficulties in selling a change in policy to the
    Costa Rican public.  However, recalling the way the China
    decision was handled, Alarcon promised there would be "no
    surprises" to the USG should the GOCR open to Cuba; the MFA
    would let us know in advance.

    ¶13. (C) In a long, private conversation with us on July 18,
    Tinoco himself seemed to have backed off.  At first he did
    not want to talk about the issue (convincing us that he had
    indeed been pushing for relations with Cuba).  He then
    reprised his early arguments about Latin American solidarity,
    the moderate reaction to establishing ties to China, and the
    hoped-for positive Costa Rican influence on the regime.
    Pushing back firmly, we noted that Cuba is not China, and
    that Costa Rica is not like all other Latin American
    countries: Havana would turn full Costa Rican relations into
    an endorsement and a reward, long before appropriate and
    sufficient democratic changes had been made.  We added that
    even the EU had established benchmarks for improved behavior
    by the regime.  We concluded that an opening to Cuba by Arias
    now, with Petrocaribe in the works and following the
    president's critical comments about the U.S. in Iraq and the
    lack of USG assistance and attention to the region, might be
    hard to explain to Washington.  We also cautioned Tinoco not
    to expect wholesale, immediate changes in USG Cuba policy
    should a Democratic administration be elected in November.

    -------
    COMMENT
    -------

    ¶14. (C) We have not heard the last word on this.
    Paraphrasing legislator Evita Arguedas, where there is this
    much smoke, there is probably a little fire.  On July 24,
    Armando Gonzalez, editorial page chief of leading daily "La
    Nacion" told us that he is convinced a change remains in the
    wind (and is long overdue).  At an appropriate moment,
    establishing full diplomatic ties with Cuba might be just the
    sort of sweeping international gesture Arias seeks in the
    last half of his administration, to place him back on the
    world stage, burnish his leftist credentials and allow him to
    show some distance from Washington.  It would make more sense
    for him to postpone such a significant policy
    shift until after CAFTA implementation in October and the
    U.S. elections in November, but he may be tempted to move
    sooner.
    BRENNAN

`