Cable Viewer

Currently released so far... 5746 / 251,287

### Articles

Brazil Sri Lanka United Kingdom Sweden Editorial United States Latin America Egypt Yemen Jordan

### Browse latest releases

2010/11 2010/12 2011/01 2011/02 2011/03
2010/11/28 2010/11/29 2010/11/30
2010/12/01 2010/12/02 2010/12/03 2010/12/04 2010/12/05 2010/12/06 2010/12/07 2010/12/08 2010/12/09 2010/12/10 2010/12/11 2010/12/12 2010/12/13 2010/12/14 2010/12/15 2010/12/16 2010/12/17 2010/12/18 2010/12/19 2010/12/20 2010/12/21 2010/12/22 2010/12/23 2010/12/24 2010/12/25 2010/12/26 2010/12/27 2010/12/28 2010/12/29 2010/12/30
2011/01/01 2011/01/02 2011/01/04 2011/01/05 2011/01/07 2011/01/09 2011/01/10 2011/01/11 2011/01/12 2011/01/13 2011/01/14 2011/01/15 2011/01/16 2011/01/17 2011/01/18 2011/01/19 2011/01/20 2011/01/21 2011/01/22 2011/01/23 2011/01/24 2011/01/25 2011/01/26 2011/01/27 2011/01/28 2011/01/29 2011/01/30 2011/01/31
2011/02/01 2011/02/02 2011/02/03 2011/02/04 2011/02/05 2011/02/06 2011/02/07 2011/02/08 2011/02/09 2011/02/10 2011/02/11 2011/02/12 2011/02/13 2011/02/14 2011/02/15 2011/02/16 2011/02/17 2011/02/18 2011/02/19 2011/02/20 2011/02/21 2011/02/22 2011/02/23 2011/02/24 2011/02/25 2011/02/26 2011/02/27 2011/02/28
2011/03/01 2011/03/02 2011/03/03 2011/03/04 2011/03/05 2011/03/06 2011/03/07 2011/03/08 2011/03/09 2011/03/10 2011/03/11 2011/03/13 2011/03/14 2011/03/15 2011/03/16

### Browse by creation date

66 72 73 75 79 86 88 89 90 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10
1966/12
1972/02 1972/08
1973/04
1975/03
1979/08
1986/05
1988/01
1989/12
1990/01 1990/07 1990/08 1990/10
2000/06 2000/09 2000/11
2001/02 2001/03 2001/07 2001/10
2002/02 2002/03 2002/11
2003/02 2003/03 2003/04 2003/05 2003/06 2003/07 2003/08 2003/09 2003/10 2003/11 2003/12
2004/01 2004/02 2004/03 2004/04 2004/05 2004/06 2004/07 2004/08 2004/09 2004/10 2004/11 2004/12
2005/01 2005/02 2005/03 2005/04 2005/05 2005/06 2005/07 2005/08 2005/09 2005/10 2005/11 2005/12
2006/01 2006/02 2006/03 2006/04 2006/05 2006/06 2006/07 2006/08 2006/09 2006/10 2006/11 2006/12
2007/01 2007/02 2007/03 2007/04 2007/05 2007/06 2007/07 2007/08 2007/09 2007/10 2007/11 2007/12
2008/01 2008/02 2008/03 2008/04 2008/05 2008/06 2008/07 2008/08 2008/09 2008/10 2008/11 2008/12
2009/01 2009/02 2009/03 2009/04 2009/05 2009/06 2009/07 2009/08 2009/09 2009/10 2009/11 2009/12
2010/01 2010/02

### Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z
Embassy Athens Embassy Asuncion Embassy Astana Embassy Asmara Embassy Ashgabat Embassy Ankara Embassy Amman Embassy Algiers Embassy Addis Ababa Embassy Accra Embassy Abuja Embassy Abu Dhabi Embassy Abidjan Consulate Amsterdam American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura Embassy Buenos Aires Embassy Budapest Embassy Bucharest Embassy Brussels Embassy Bridgetown Embassy Bratislava Embassy Brasilia Embassy Bogota Embassy Bishkek Embassy Bern Embassy Berlin Embassy Belgrade Embassy Beirut Embassy Beijing Embassy Banjul Embassy Bangkok Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan Embassy Bamako Embassy Baku Embassy Baghdad Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen Embassy Conakry Embassy Colombo Embassy Chisinau Embassy Caracas Embassy Canberra Embassy Cairo Consulate Curacao Consulate Ciudad Juarez Consulate Chennai Consulate Casablanca Consulate Cape Town
Embassy Dushanbe Embassy Dublin Embassy Doha Embassy Djibouti Embassy Dhaka Embassy Dar Es Salaam Embassy Damascus Embassy Dakar Consulate Dubai
Embassy Freetown
Embassy Guatemala Embassy Gaborone Consulate Guadalajara
Embassy Helsinki Embassy Harare Embassy Hanoi Consulate Hermosillo Consulate Hamburg
Iran RPO Dubai Embassy Islamabad Consulate Istanbul
Embassy Jakarta Consulate Jerusalem Consulate Jeddah
Embassy Kyiv Embassy Kuwait Embassy Kuala Lumpur Embassy Kinshasa Embassy Kigali Embassy Khartoum Embassy Kathmandu Embassy Kampala Embassy Kabul
Embassy Luxembourg Embassy Luanda Embassy London Embassy Ljubljana Embassy Lisbon Embassy Lima Embassy Lilongwe Embassy La Paz Consulate Lagos
Mission USNATO Embassy Muscat Embassy Moscow Embassy Montevideo Embassy Monrovia Embassy Minsk Embassy Mexico Embassy Mbabane Embassy Maputo Embassy Manama Embassy Managua Embassy Malabo Embassy Madrid Consulate Munich Consulate Montreal Consulate Monterrey Consulate Milan
Embassy New Delhi Embassy Nassau Embassy Nairobi Consulate Naples
Embassy Ouagadougou Embassy Ottawa Embassy Oslo
Embassy Pristina Embassy Pretoria Embassy Prague Embassy Port Au Prince Embassy Phnom Penh Embassy Paris Embassy Paramaribo Embassy Panama Consulate Peshawar
Embassy Quito
REO Basrah Embassy Rome Embassy Riyadh Embassy Riga Embassy Reykjavik Embassy Rangoon Embassy Rabat Consulate Rio De Janeiro Consulate Recife
Secretary of State Embassy Stockholm Embassy Sofia Embassy Skopje Embassy Singapore Embassy Seoul Embassy Sarajevo Embassy Santo Domingo Embassy Santiago Embassy Sanaa Embassy San Salvador Embassy San Jose Consulate Strasbourg Consulate Shenyang Consulate Shanghai Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis Embassy Tripoli Embassy Tokyo Embassy The Hague Embassy Tel Aviv Embassy Tehran Embassy Tegucigalpa Embassy Tbilisi Embassy Tashkent Embassy Tallinn Consulate Tijuana
USUN New York USEU Brussels US Mission Geneva US Interests Section Havana US Delegation, Secretary UNVIE Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius Embassy Vienna Embassy Vatican Consulate Vladivostok
Embassy Windhoek Embassy Wellington Embassy Warsaw
Embassy Yerevan Embassy Yaounde
Embassy Zagreb

### Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
AF AJ AU AG AE ASEC AS AM AR AMGT AORC AFIN APER ABUD ATRN AL AEMR ACOA AO AX AMED ADCO AODE AFFAIRS AC ASIG ABLD AA AFU ASUP AROC ATFN AVERY APCS AER ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG AEC APECO ASEAN AID AGMT
BE BR BA BL BEXP BTIO BM BK BRUSSELS BX BU BO BH BIDEN BY BG BF BB BC BBSR BMGT BTIU BILAT
CH CA CD CV CVIS CMGT CO CI CU CASC CBW CLINTON CE CS CJAN CIA CG CF CN CAN COUNTER CDG CIS CM CONDOLEEZZA COE CR CY CTM COUNTRY CLEARANCE CPAS CWC CT CKGR CB CACS COM CJUS CARSON CL CODEL COUNTERTERRORISM CACM CDB
DR DA DHS DOE DEA DK DJ DISENGAGEMENT DS DTRA DOD DEAX
EAGR ETRD ECON EFIN ELAB EU ENRG EPET EG EAID ETTC EINV EIND EUN EAIR ER ECIN ECPS EFIS EI EINT EZ EMIN ET EC ETC ECONEFIN ENVR ES ECA ELN EN EFTA EWWT ENIV ELTN EXTERNAL EINVETC EINN ENGR EUR ESA ENERG EK ENGY ETRO ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS ETRDEINVTINTCS ESENV ENVI ECONCS ETRDECONWTOCS ENNP ELECTIONS ECUN EINVEFIN ECIP EINDETRD EUC EREL
FR FINR FAO FTAA FREEDOM FI FARC FBI FJ FMLN
GA GG GM GV GH GE GT GR GTIP GOI GCC GAZA GZ GANGS GTMO
HU HR HILLARY HA HUMAN HO HYMPSK HURI HK HSTC
IR IS IZ INTERPOL IPR IN IT INRB IAEA IRAJ INRA INRO IO IC ID IIP ILC ITPHUM IV IWC IQ ICTY ISRAELI IRAQI ICRC ICAO IMO IF IEFIN INTELSAT IL IA IBRD IMF INR IRC ITRA ITALY ITALIAN
JO JA JOSEPH JP JOHNNIE JM JUS JAMES
KCOR KN KS KDEM KNNP KSPR KPAL KJUS KFRD KCRM KTIP KZ KPAO KTFN KIPR KPKO KSCA KISL KNUC KMDR KGHG KPLS KE KOLY KWBG KUNR KDRG KAWK KIRF KIRC KU KBIO KHLS KG KACT KGIC KRAD KCOM KMCA KV KHDP KSUM KVPR KDEV KWMN KMPI KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KOMC KTLA KCFC KTIA KHIV KPRP KAWC KCIP KCFE KOCI KTDB KMRS KLIG KBCT KICC KGIT KSTC KPAK KNEI KSEP KPOA KFLU KNUP KNNPMNUC KO KTER KHUM KRFD KBTR KDDG KWWMN KFLO KSAF KBTS KPRV KNPP KNAR KWMM KERG KFIN KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KTBT KCRS KRVC KSTH KREL KNSD KTEX KPAI KHSA KOMS KWAC KR KPWR KMIG KSEC KIFR KDEMAF KGCC KPIN
LE LH LY LU LG LI LO LOG LT LAB
MARR MO MOPS MASS MNUC ML MR MZ MCAP MPOS MOPPS MTCRE MX MTCR MAPP MU MY MA MG MASC MCC MEPP MK MTRE MP MIL MDC MAR MEPI MRCRE MI MT MQADHAFI MD MAPS MUCN MASSMNUC MERCOSUR MC MV
NG NATO NL NI NU NIPP NO NPT NRR NE NS NAR NZ NPG NK NSG NA NT NASA NGO NP NSF NATIONAL
ODIP OIIP OREP OVIP OEXC OPRC OFDP OPDC OECD OTRA OSCE OAS OPIC OPCW OSCI OIE OIC OTR OVP OFFICIALS OSAC
PREL PGOV PTER PINR PSOE PHUM PBTS PARM PK PREF PINS PL PHSA PE PKFK PO PGOF PROP PA PARMS PUNE PORG PM PMIL PTERE POL PF PALESTINIAN PY PGGV PNR POV PAK PAO PFOR PHALANAGE PARTY PRGOV PNAT PROV PEL PINF PGOVE POLINT PRL PRAM PMAR PGOVLO PHUMBA PHUS PHUMPREL PG PGOC POLITICS PEPR PSI PINT PU POLITICAL PARTIES PBIO PECON POGOV PINL
QA
RW RS RU RP RO RIGHTS RICE ROBERT RF RFE REGION
SP SOCI SENV SNAR SL SW SY SG SU SA SMIG SCUL SO SF SR SZ SN SHUM SYR ST SANC SC SAN SIPRS SK SH SI SNARCS STEINBERG
TU TS TBIO TH TX TRGY TSPA TC TI TIP TR TT TW TERRORISM TO TFIN TD TSPL TZ TPHY TK TNGD TINT TRSY TP
UV US UK UP UN UNSC UNGA USEU UG USUN UY UZ UNO UNMIK UNESCO UNHRC UE UAE UNEP USTR UNHCR UNDP USAID UNCHS UNAUS UNCHC UNDC UNDESCO
VT VE VZ VM VTPREL VN
WTRO WA WI WZ WMO WTRQ WHO WWARD WB WBG WEU WHA WTO
XA XF XT XM XY XG XC XH XK XL XZ XW XR XD XE XS
YM YI YE YMCS
ZB ZI ZP ZK ZF ZANU ZOELLICK ZR ZU ZA ZO ZJ

### Browse by classification

CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN SECRET SECRET//NOFORN UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

### Community resources

Follow us on Twitter Check our Reddit Twitter this Digg this page Contact us on IRC

courage is contagious

### Viewing cable 09ISLAMABAD1438, NSA JONES' JUNE 25 MEETING WITH PRESIDENT ZARDARI

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:

- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09ISLAMABAD1438.

Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
09ISLAMABAD1438 | 2009-06-30 10:10 | 2010-11-30 21:09 | SECRET | Embassy Islamabad

`

    VZCZCXRO2235
    PP RUEHLH RUEHPW
    DE RUEHIL #1438/01 1811045
    ZNY SSSSS ZZH
    P 301045Z JUN 09
    FM AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3504
    INFO RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
    RHMFISS/DISA CENTRAL COMMAND MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
    RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
    RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
    RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0583
    RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0813
    RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 5183
    RUEHKP/AMCONSUL KARACHI 1930
    RUEHLH/AMCONSUL LAHORE 7532
    RUEHPW/AMCONSUL PESHAWAR 6480

` `

    S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ISLAMABAD 001438

    SIPDIS

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/26/2019
    TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER PHUM EAID PK
    SUBJECT: NSA JONES' JUNE 25 MEETING WITH PRESIDENT ZARDARI

    Classified By: Anne W. Patterson for reasons 1.4 (b,d)

    ¶1. (C) Summary: In their June 25 meeting in Islamabad,
    National Security Advisor General James Jones and President
    Zardari discussed: Pakistan's military offensive against
    extremists; GOP capacity to fight terrorism; the nature of
    extremism in Pakistan; drones; Iran; Afghanistan; Zardari's
    conversation with Indian PM Singh in Russia; and the positive
    trend of U. S. Pakistan relations.
    End Summary.

    ¶2. (C) National Security Advisor General James Jones,
    Ambassador, and delegation from the National Security Council
    met President Zardari and a GOP delegation at the Presidency
    on June 25. Pakistan's military campaign in Malakand and
    Waziristan had been positively noted in the U.S., said Jones,
    which welcomed the display of resolve. The trendline in
    relations between the U.S. and Pakistan was positive, said
    Jones. Zardari rejoined that the most important component of
    the relationship was the goodwill expressed by the USG toward
    Pakistan; his own tenure in office (ten months) was short and
    his popularity not high, but goodwill from America was
    central to his and Pakistan's future.

    ¶3. (C) Pakistan was united, said Zardari: the people have
    the will to support the military in its campaign to stop the
    taliban/extremists operating in the country. He cautioned
    that the fight against militant extremism would be a long
    one, lasting not months but many, many years and that lack of
    vigilance on the GOP's part would be devastating. As
    confident as he was of the military's resolve -- this time
    -- to fight Pakistani militancy, he was equally convinced
    that any failure to maintain pressure on the militants after
    showing such resolve would have grave consequences.

    ¶4. (S) President Zardari thanked the U.S. for its assistance
    while stating he needed "a battalion of helicopters" to fight
    the extremists now, and in the future. He also made repeated
    pleas for drones to be "put in Pakistan's hands" so that
    Pakistan would own the issue and drone attacks (including
    collateral damage) would not provoke anti-americanism.
    Zardari said the technology behind them was not cutting-edge
    and said he has raised the issue with the Chairman of the
    Joint Chiefs of Staff.

    ¶5. (C) Journalist Bob Woodward (traveling with the NSA Jones
    delegation) joined the meeting later and asked Zardari why he
    had sharpened his attack on the extremists in the last six
    months. "Organization," replied Zardari, who noted he had
    been in office a short time and had used the first four
    months to prepare. Pointing to the death of his
    father-in-law Zulfikar Bhutto and assassination of his wife,
    Benazir, Zardari said he had been confronting extremism (or
    the ideology from which it was birthed) for more than thirty
    years. His wife had been targeted for assassination as early
    as 1988, when she was viewed as a symbol of feminism and all
    that it represented. The Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) of
    which he was the head (like the Bhuttos before him) had
    always been ousted from power by the military, said Zardari,
    which previously had been aligned with fundamentalism.

    ¶6. (C) Jones asked Zardari how he viewed relations in the
    region and told Zardari President Obama's own policy toward
    Iran would have to be reexamined given events unfolding
    there. Whatever had happened during the election, Iranian
    leadership could not pretend nothing had occurred and return
    as if there had been no shift.

    ¶7. (C) Zardari noted that several tri-lateral forums had
    been created in the region with the ostensible purpose of
    supporting Afghanistan. He counseled that the USG must
    "cooperate with Turkey, and Iran," acknowledging at the same
    time that the GOP too was perplexed and disappointed by what
    had happened in Iran. As to Afghanistan, he said all
    countries had to be encouraged -- even if (as in the case of
    Russia), only to be urged not to meddle. Zardari accused
    India of providing the precursor chemicals necessary to
    produce heroine, which he said was funding the taliban in
    Afghanistan.

    ¶8. (C) Asked by NSA Jones, what was the best that could be
    hoped for in Afghanistan, Zardari spoke of substituting
    hybrid corn for poppies, even if at a subsidized price, to

    ISLAMABAD 00001438 002 OF 002

    wean farmers from the opium trade. He said China might be
    interested or persuaded to invest in the venture. Zardari's
    vision was to use that corn for ethanol production; he
    welcomed the indication of interest shown by National
    Geographic CEO John Fahey, and invited him to return to
    Pakistan for a briefing on the concept.

    ¶9. (C) More broadly, Zardari praised the industriousness of
    the Pashtun people. Currently they were "very good warriors,"
    but they were also natural entrepreneurs and the hardest
    working people of Pakistan. If their entrepreneurial power
    could be unleashed, the problems "in the Pashtun belt" would
    largely be resolved.

    ¶10. (C) Over the medium term, Pakistan had to built its
    economy so that is could pay its own expenses to combat
    extremism, added Zardari, who thought this possible if
    exports could be increased three-fold. (He said he would
    raise the issue with National Security Council Senior
    Director Lipton in his upcoming visit to Pakistan.) He
    thanked the USG for all it was doing to aid Pakistan and
    asked for more financial assistance.

    ¶11. (C) Zardari signaled that there had been some progress
    in his talks with Indian PM Singh in Russia, even though he
    had noted earlier that India's military capacity was ten-fold
    Pakistan's. He regretted not being able to meet Singh at the
    upcoming Sharm el-Sheikh summit but, he said, "unfortunately,
    PM Gilani had already announced he would be going to Sharm"
    (sic). In his meeting with Singh, said Zardari, he had
    underscored that "there could not be a better political
    moment" to improve relations across the board. India was a
    mature democracy and an ancient nation, said Zardari. "Singh
    is an excellent economist," he said, but Zardari was not
    convinced the Indian Prime Minister understood the
    constraints under which Zardari was operating. Helping Singh
    to understand them was of import, hinted Zardari. NSC Senior
    Director Don Camp said the Indian perspective was to question
    GOP activism and to ask what it had done to quash terrorist
    organizations. NSA Jones reminded Zardari how important it
    was to ensure there was not another Mumbai-style attack.
    Zardari reiterated that Singh was unaware of what it took to
    "change the mind-set of Pakistan's "establishment," given
    Pakistan's short history of fragile democratic regimes
    toppled by the military.

    ¶12. (U) NSA Jones has cleared this cable.

    PATTERSON

`