Cable Viewer

Currently released so far... 5559 / 251,287

### Articles

Brazil Sri Lanka United Kingdom Sweden Editorial United States Latin America Egypt Yemen Jordan

### Browse latest releases

2010/11 2010/12 2011/01 2011/02 2011/03
2010/11/28 2010/11/29 2010/11/30
2010/12/01 2010/12/02 2010/12/03 2010/12/04 2010/12/05 2010/12/06 2010/12/07 2010/12/08 2010/12/09 2010/12/10 2010/12/11 2010/12/12 2010/12/13 2010/12/14 2010/12/15 2010/12/16 2010/12/17 2010/12/18 2010/12/19 2010/12/20 2010/12/21 2010/12/22 2010/12/23 2010/12/24 2010/12/25 2010/12/26 2010/12/27 2010/12/28 2010/12/29 2010/12/30
2011/01/01 2011/01/02 2011/01/04 2011/01/05 2011/01/07 2011/01/09 2011/01/10 2011/01/11 2011/01/12 2011/01/13 2011/01/14 2011/01/15 2011/01/16 2011/01/17 2011/01/18 2011/01/19 2011/01/20 2011/01/21 2011/01/22 2011/01/23 2011/01/24 2011/01/25 2011/01/26 2011/01/27 2011/01/28 2011/01/29 2011/01/30 2011/01/31
2011/02/01 2011/02/02 2011/02/03 2011/02/04 2011/02/05 2011/02/06 2011/02/07 2011/02/08 2011/02/09 2011/02/10 2011/02/11 2011/02/12 2011/02/13 2011/02/14 2011/02/15 2011/02/16 2011/02/17 2011/02/18 2011/02/19 2011/02/20 2011/02/21 2011/02/22 2011/02/23 2011/02/24 2011/02/25 2011/02/26 2011/02/27 2011/02/28
2011/03/01 2011/03/02 2011/03/03 2011/03/04 2011/03/05 2011/03/06 2011/03/07 2011/03/08 2011/03/09 2011/03/10 2011/03/11 2011/03/13 2011/03/14 2011/03/15

### Browse by creation date

66 72 73 75 79 86 88 89 90 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10
1966/12
1972/02 1972/08
1973/04
1975/03
1979/08
1986/05
1988/01
1989/12
1990/01 1990/07 1990/08 1990/10
2000/06 2000/09 2000/11
2001/02 2001/03 2001/07 2001/10
2002/02 2002/03 2002/11
2003/03 2003/04 2003/05 2003/06 2003/07 2003/08 2003/09 2003/10 2003/11 2003/12
2004/01 2004/02 2004/03 2004/04 2004/05 2004/06 2004/07 2004/08 2004/09 2004/10 2004/11 2004/12
2005/01 2005/02 2005/03 2005/04 2005/05 2005/06 2005/07 2005/08 2005/09 2005/10 2005/11 2005/12
2006/01 2006/02 2006/03 2006/04 2006/05 2006/06 2006/07 2006/08 2006/09 2006/10 2006/11 2006/12
2007/01 2007/02 2007/03 2007/04 2007/05 2007/06 2007/07 2007/08 2007/09 2007/10 2007/11 2007/12
2008/01 2008/02 2008/03 2008/04 2008/05 2008/06 2008/07 2008/08 2008/09 2008/10 2008/11 2008/12
2009/01 2009/02 2009/03 2009/04 2009/05 2009/06 2009/07 2009/08 2009/09 2009/10 2009/11 2009/12
2010/01 2010/02

### Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z
Embassy Athens Embassy Asuncion Embassy Astana Embassy Asmara Embassy Ashgabat Embassy Ankara Embassy Amman Embassy Algiers Embassy Addis Ababa Embassy Accra Embassy Abuja Embassy Abu Dhabi Embassy Abidjan Consulate Amsterdam American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura Embassy Buenos Aires Embassy Budapest Embassy Bucharest Embassy Brussels Embassy Bridgetown Embassy Bratislava Embassy Brasilia Embassy Bogota Embassy Bishkek Embassy Bern Embassy Berlin Embassy Belgrade Embassy Beirut Embassy Beijing Embassy Banjul Embassy Bangkok Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan Embassy Bamako Embassy Baku Embassy Baghdad Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen Embassy Conakry Embassy Colombo Embassy Chisinau Embassy Caracas Embassy Canberra Embassy Cairo Consulate Curacao Consulate Casablanca Consulate Cape Town
Embassy Dushanbe Embassy Dublin Embassy Doha Embassy Djibouti Embassy Dhaka Embassy Dar Es Salaam Embassy Damascus Embassy Dakar Consulate Dubai
Embassy Freetown
Embassy Guatemala Embassy Gaborone Consulate Guadalajara
Embassy Helsinki Embassy Harare Embassy Hanoi Consulate Hermosillo Consulate Hamburg
Iran RPO Dubai Embassy Islamabad Consulate Istanbul
Embassy Jakarta Consulate Jerusalem Consulate Jeddah
Embassy Kyiv Embassy Kuwait Embassy Kuala Lumpur Embassy Kinshasa Embassy Kigali Embassy Khartoum Embassy Kathmandu Embassy Kampala Embassy Kabul
Embassy Luxembourg Embassy Luanda Embassy London Embassy Ljubljana Embassy Lisbon Embassy Lima Embassy Lilongwe Embassy La Paz Consulate Lagos
Mission USNATO Embassy Muscat Embassy Moscow Embassy Montevideo Embassy Monrovia Embassy Minsk Embassy Mexico Embassy Mbabane Embassy Maputo Embassy Manama Embassy Managua Embassy Malabo Embassy Madrid Consulate Munich Consulate Montreal Consulate Monterrey Consulate Milan
Embassy New Delhi Embassy Nassau Embassy Nairobi Consulate Naples
Embassy Ouagadougou Embassy Ottawa Embassy Oslo
Embassy Pristina Embassy Pretoria Embassy Prague Embassy Port Au Prince Embassy Phnom Penh Embassy Paris Embassy Paramaribo Embassy Panama Consulate Peshawar
Embassy Quito
REO Basrah Embassy Rome Embassy Riyadh Embassy Riga Embassy Reykjavik Embassy Rangoon Embassy Rabat Consulate Rio De Janeiro Consulate Recife
Secretary of State Embassy Stockholm Embassy Sofia Embassy Skopje Embassy Singapore Embassy Seoul Embassy Sarajevo Embassy Santo Domingo Embassy Santiago Embassy Sanaa Embassy San Salvador Embassy San Jose Consulate Strasbourg Consulate Shenyang Consulate Shanghai Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis Embassy Tripoli Embassy Tokyo Embassy The Hague Embassy Tel Aviv Embassy Tehran Embassy Tegucigalpa Embassy Tbilisi Embassy Tashkent Embassy Tallinn
USUN New York USEU Brussels US Mission Geneva US Interests Section Havana US Delegation, Secretary UNVIE Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius Embassy Vienna Embassy Vatican Consulate Vladivostok
Embassy Windhoek Embassy Wellington Embassy Warsaw
Embassy Yerevan Embassy Yaounde
Embassy Zagreb

### Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
AF AJ AU AG AE ASEC AS AM AR AMGT AORC AFIN APER ABUD ATRN AL AEMR ACOA AO AX AMED ADCO AODE AFFAIRS AC ASIG ABLD AA AFU ASUP AROC ATFN AVERY APCS AER ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG AEC APECO AGMT
BE BR BA BL BEXP BTIO BM BK BRUSSELS BX BU BO BH BIDEN BY BG BF BB BC BBSR BMGT BTIU BILAT
CH CA CD CV CVIS CMGT CO CI CU CASC CBW CLINTON CE CJAN CIA CG CF CN CS CAN COUNTER CDG CIS CM CONDOLEEZZA COE CR CY CTM COUNTRY CLEARANCE CPAS CWC CT CKGR CB CACS COM CJUS CARSON CL CODEL COUNTERTERRORISM CACM CDB
DR DA DHS DOE DEA DK DJ DISENGAGEMENT DS DTRA DOD DEAX
ECON EFIN ELAB EU ETRD ENRG EPET EG EAGR EAID ETTC EINV EIND EUN EAIR ER ECIN ECPS EFIS EI EINT EZ EMIN ET EC ETC ECONEFIN ENVR ES ECA ELN EN EFTA EWWT ELTN EXTERNAL EINVETC ENIV EINN ENGR EUR ESA ENERG EK ENGY ETRO ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS ETRDEINVTINTCS ESENV ENVI ELECTIONS ECUN EINVEFIN ECIP EINDETRD EUC EREL
FR FINR FAO FTAA FREEDOM FI FARC FBI FJ FMLN
GA GG GM GV GH GE GT GR GTIP GOI GCC GAZA GZ GANGS GTMO
HU HR HILLARY HA HUMAN HO HYMPSK HURI HK HSTC
IR IS IZ INTERPOL IPR IN IT INRB IAEA IRAJ INRA INRO IO IC ID IIP ILC ITPHUM IV IWC IQ ICTY ISRAELI IRAQI ICRC ICAO IMO IF IEFIN INTELSAT IL IA IBRD IMF INR IRC ITALY ITALIAN
JO JA JOSEPH JP JOHNNIE JUS JAMES
KCOR KN KS KDEM KNNP KSPR KPAL KJUS KFRD KCRM KTIP KZ KPAO KTFN KIPR KPKO KSCA KISL KNUC KMDR KGHG KPLS KE KOLY KWBG KUNR KDRG KAWK KIRF KIRC KU KBIO KHLS KG KACT KGIC KRAD KCOM KMCA KV KHDP KVPR KDEV KWMN KMPI KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KOMC KTLA KCFC KTIA KHIV KPRP KAWC KCIP KCFE KOCI KTDB KMRS KLIG KBCT KICC KGIT KSTC KPAK KNEI KSEP KPOA KFLU KNUP KNNPMNUC KO KTER KSUM KHUM KRFD KBTR KDDG KWWMN KFLO KSAF KBTS KPRV KNPP KNAR KWMM KERG KFIN KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KTBT KCRS KRVC KSTH KREL KNSD KTEX KPAI KHSA KWAC KR KPWR KMIG KSEC KIFR KDEMAF KGCC KPIN
LE LH LY LU LG LI LO LOG LT
MARR MO MOPS MASS MNUC ML MR MZ MCAP MPOS MOPPS MTCRE MX MTCR MAPP MU MY MA MG MASC MCC MEPP MK MTRE MP MIL MDC MAR MEPI MRCRE MI MT MQADHAFI MD MAPS MUCN MASSMNUC MERCOSUR MC
NG NATO NL NI NU NIPP NO NPT NRR NE NS NAR NZ NPG NK NSG NA NT NASA NGO NP NSF NATIONAL
ODIP OIIP OREP OVIP OEXC OPRC OFDP OPDC OECD OTRA OSCE OAS OPIC OPCW OSCI OIE OIC OTR OVP OFFICIALS OSAC
PREL PGOV PTER PINR PSOE PHUM PBTS PARM PK PREF PINS PL PHSA PE PKFK PO PGOF PROP PA PARMS PUNE PORG PM PMIL PTERE POL PF PALESTINIAN PY PGGV PNR POV PAK PAO PFOR PHALANAGE PARTY PRGOV PNAT PROV PEL PINF PGOVE POLINT PRL PRAM PMAR PGOVLO PHUMBA PHUS PHUMPREL PG POLITICS PEPR PSI PINT PU POLITICAL PARTIES PBIO PECON POGOV PINL
QA
RW RS RU RP RO RIGHTS RICE ROBERT RF RFE REGION
SP SOCI SENV SNAR SL SW SY SG SU SA SMIG SCUL SO SF SR SZ SN SHUM SYR ST SANC SC SAN SIPRS SK SH SI SNARCS STEINBERG
TU TS TBIO TH TX TRGY TSPA TC TI TIP TR TT TW TERRORISM TO TFIN TD TSPL TZ TPHY TK TNGD TINT TRSY TP
UV US UK UP UN UNSC UNGA USEU UG USUN UY UZ UNO UNMIK UNESCO UNHRC UE UAE UNEP USTR UNHCR UNDP USAID UNCHS UNAUS UNCHC
VT VE VZ VM VTPREL VN
WTRO WA WI WZ WMO WTRQ WHO WWARD WB WBG WEU WHA WTO
XA XF XT XM XY XG XC XH XK XL XZ XW XR XD XE XS
YM YI YE
ZB ZI ZP ZK ZF ZANU ZOELLICK ZR ZU ZA ZO ZJ

### Browse by classification

CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN SECRET SECRET//NOFORN UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

### Community resources

Follow us on Twitter Check our Reddit Twitter this Digg this page Contact us on IRC

courage is contagious

### Viewing cable 09ISLAMABAD270, CODEL BIDEN'S MEETING WITH COAS KAYANI AND ISI

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:

- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09ISLAMABAD270.

Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
09ISLAMABAD270 | 2009-02-06 15:03 | 2010-11-30 21:09 | SECRET | Embassy Islamabad

`

    VZCZCXRO5005
    OO RUEHLH RUEHPW
    DE RUEHIL #0270/01 0371503
    ZNY SSSSS ZZH
    O 061503Z FEB 09
    FM AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1371
    INFO RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 9783
    RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 9608
    RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 4409
    RUEHKP/AMCONSUL KARACHI PRIORITY 1023
    RUEHLH/AMCONSUL LAHORE PRIORITY 6720
    RUEHPW/AMCONSUL PESHAWAR PRIORITY 5644
    RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
    RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
    RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
    RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
    RUMICEA/USCENTCOM INTEL CEN MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY

` `

    S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ISLAMABAD 000270

    SIPDIS

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/06/2034
    TAGS: PREL PTER MARR PGOV PK
    SUBJECT: CODEL BIDEN'S MEETING WITH COAS KAYANI AND ISI
    PASHA

    Classified By: Anne W. Patterson, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

    ¶1.  (S) Summary:  Senators Biden and Graham met with Chief of
    Army Staff (COAS) Kayani and Director General of ISI LTGen
    Pasha on January 9 to underscore bipartisan support for the
    U.S.-Pakistan relationship.  Senator Biden emphasized the
    need for the American people to see results soon in
    Afghanistan, and he wanted to be sure the U.S. and Pakistan
    had the same enemy as we moved forward.  Senator Biden sought
    Kayani's views about what kind of Afghanistan would represent
    success for Pakistan.

    ¶2.  (S) Kayani said the U.S. and Pakistan were on the same
    page, but there would be tactical differences.  Cooperation
    with U.S. military, with whom he had excellent relations, had
    improved.  Kayani stressed the military's support for
    Pakistan's civilian government.  He described his campaign in
    Bajaur and plans to confront the insurgents in the rest of
    the tribal agencies.  Kayani said he urgently needed help for
    internally displaced persons (IDPs).  Kayani was candid that
    the government has essentially abandoned the Swat valley.
    Senator Graham emphasized the need to prosecute the
    Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) leaders involved in the Mumbai attacks
    and to incorporate the tribal agencies into Pakistan's legal
    system.  End summary.

    ¶3.  (S) Senator Joseph Biden (D-DE) and Senator Lindsey
    Graham (R-SC), accompanied by Ambassador and Senate Foreign
    Relations Committee Staff Director Antony Blinken, met with
    COAS Kayani and DG ISI Pasha January 9 for ninety minutes.
    Senator Biden asked Kayani to describe his view of a stable
    Afghanistan.

    ¶4.  (S) Senator Graham added his presence emphasized
    bipartisan support for Pakistan.  (He had just visited
    Pakistan three weeks ago.)  Senator Graham said he was going
    to support the Biden-Lugar bill, but he needed to convince
    his constituents of the value of investing in schools in
    Pakistan instead of South Carolina.  Pakistan needed to
    prosecute those involved in the Mumbai attacks and be seen as
    a country that observed the rule of law.

    ¶5.  (S) Kayani replied that Pakistan and the US had a
    convergence of interests.  Kayani's goal was a peaceful,
    friendly and stable Afghanistan.  Kayani said he had no
    desire to control Afghanistan.  In fact, he said, anyone who
    wanted  to control Afghanistan was ignorant of history, since
    no one has ever controlled it.  Kayani noted there had been
    confusion about the  policy of "strategic depth" but for him
    "strategic depth" meant a peaceful Afghanistan "on his back."
    But the Pashtuns have to be accommodated, Kayani added.
    Biden asked if Kayani made a distinction between the Pashtuns
    and the Taliban.  Kayani replied that the Taliban were a
    reality, but the Afghan government dominated by the Taliban
    had had a negative effect on Pakistan.

    ¶6.  (S) Kayani recalled he told Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
    Admiral Mullen that the U.S. needed realistic expectations of
    what the Pakistani military could achieve and that these
    expectations had to be clearly articulated.  Kayani described
    his campaign in Bajaur and his plans to confront the
    insurgents in other tribal agencies, but he repeatedly said
    he had capacity problems, particularly regarding equipment.
    Kayani said he needed urgent support for the 150,000 people
    displaced from the fighting.  He said the military had
    undertaken hundreds of sorties in Bajaur, and the population
    of Bajaur was so far supportive of the military efforts.
    Senator Graham mentioned the success of the CERP program in
    Iraq and Afghanistan which had put money in the hands of
    commanders for urgent community needs.

    ¶7.  (S) Kayani recounted the situation in Swat in which the
    provincial government had made accommodations with the
    militants, requiring the army to retake the area repeatedly.
    Kayani also said the population, once it saw the army pull
    out, was far less likely to support it the second time
    around.  The military had to be followed by civilian agencies
    or the local support would diminish.

    ¶8.  (S) Kayani said military efforts needed the political
    support of the civilian government.  He recalled that when

    ISLAMABAD 00000270  002 OF 003

    the Federal Investigative Agency headquarters in Lahore had
    been hit by suicide bombers, the citizens of Lahore had
    demonstrated against the government rather than against the
    suicide bombers.  While the army had sent the message in
    Bajaur that it meant business, there had to be follow-up
    support from the civilian agencies.  Kayani said as his
    campaign moved through the tribal agencies, the army should
    ideally need to use diminishing force.  When they have to
    fight for the same ground repeatedly, it becomes increasingly
    difficult and demoralizing to the troops.

    ¶9.  (S) Senator Biden asked Kayani if he had the capacity and
    could obtain sufficient resources, would he then move against
    Taliban leaders like Baitullah Mehsud, Commander Nazir, and
    the Haqqanis?  Senator Biden asked Kayani if he were prepared
    to move into the Waziristans.
    ¶10.  (S) Kayani replied that Bajaur had been the "hardest nut
    to crack" militarily:  the Pakistani military had undertaken
    an operation in South Waziristan last October, but the army
    had moved out because of the elections.  The Pakistani
    military had also had a fort in the middle of Waziristan
    which had been cut off by militants.  Kayani said he was
    painfully aware that the army had to retake South Waziristan
    since ninety percent of the suicide bombers came from
    Baitullah Mehsud.  "He has to be cut down to size," said
    Kayani.

    ¶11.  (S) But, Kayani said, the Pakistani military could not
    fight everyone at once.  They would have to go after Mehsud
    and Nazir sequentially (a point Pasha confirmed).  Biden said
    it was important to be in agreement on this issue.  Pasha
    said the United States and Pakistan needed to have confidence
    in each other.  Pasha said he was hurt about the inference
    that he did not have a relationship of trust with CIA.  He
    had gone to Washington for a frank talk with CIA Director
    Hayden and he often briefed, and sought the advice of, the
    RAO Chief in Islamabad.  Senator Biden repeated he was not
    going to revisit the past.  Pasha replied that there was no
    reason for ISI to be protecting "these people" and he had no
    interest in saving them.

    ¶12.  (S) Senator Biden said he needed to know that the
    situation had changed.  Senator Biden said he understood that
    the Pakistani military lacked capacity, but would the
    situation change if they had additional resources?  It was
    important to know if we had the same enemy:  the U.S. needed
    to be able to make an objective assessment of Pakistan's part
    of the bargain.
    Graham added that "General Musharraf had cut deals, but those
    deals didn't work out."

    ¶13.  (S) Kayani repeated there had been considerable
    cooperation on the technical level with U.S. forces.  But
    this did not mean that there would not be differences of
    opinion on tactics.  On Afghanistan, Kayani stressed )
    "past, present, and future" -- we are on the same page.

    ¶14.  (S) Regarding LeT, Kayani said Pakistan would not allow
    small groups to dictate state policy.  Pakistan had not
    waited for evidence and they had moved immediately.  The
    information they had now was based on confessions.  Pakistan
    needed Indian cooperation to move the investigation forward.
    Kayani also insisted that any information available about
    upcoming attacks be shared with Pakistan.  He understood that
    information about the attack had been provided to India but
    not to Pakistan.  He said repeated discussion about "the next
    attack and all bets were off" only provided an incentive for
    another attack.  Biden said that what was important was
    Pakistan's action against LeT and similar organizations.
    Senator Biden said he would share what he had heard with
    Admiral Mullen and emphasized the need for results.

    ¶15.  (S) General Kayani said he appreciated the Senators'
    frank response.  He repeated his need for help with IDPs.
    Senator Biden said the system of reimbursement through
    Coalition Support Funds would be reexamined.  Kayani said
    that the military had only received about $300 million of the
    $1 billion ostensibly reimbursed for military expenses.  He
    was not implying that the money had been stolen, but had been
    used for general budget support.

    ISLAMABAD 00000270  003 OF 003

    ¶16.  CODEL Biden has cleared this message.
    PATTERSON

`