Cable Viewer

Currently released so far... 5534 / 251,287

### Articles

Brazil Sri Lanka United Kingdom Sweden Editorial United States Latin America Egypt Yemen Jordan

### Browse latest releases

2010/11 2010/12 2011/01 2011/02 2011/03
2010/11/28 2010/11/29 2010/11/30
2010/12/01 2010/12/02 2010/12/03 2010/12/04 2010/12/05 2010/12/06 2010/12/07 2010/12/08 2010/12/09 2010/12/10 2010/12/11 2010/12/12 2010/12/13 2010/12/14 2010/12/15 2010/12/16 2010/12/17 2010/12/18 2010/12/19 2010/12/20 2010/12/21 2010/12/22 2010/12/23 2010/12/24 2010/12/25 2010/12/26 2010/12/27 2010/12/28 2010/12/29 2010/12/30
2011/01/01 2011/01/02 2011/01/04 2011/01/05 2011/01/07 2011/01/09 2011/01/10 2011/01/11 2011/01/12 2011/01/13 2011/01/14 2011/01/15 2011/01/16 2011/01/17 2011/01/18 2011/01/19 2011/01/20 2011/01/21 2011/01/22 2011/01/23 2011/01/24 2011/01/25 2011/01/26 2011/01/27 2011/01/28 2011/01/29 2011/01/30 2011/01/31
2011/02/01 2011/02/02 2011/02/03 2011/02/04 2011/02/05 2011/02/06 2011/02/07 2011/02/08 2011/02/09 2011/02/10 2011/02/11 2011/02/12 2011/02/13 2011/02/14 2011/02/15 2011/02/16 2011/02/17 2011/02/18 2011/02/19 2011/02/20 2011/02/21 2011/02/22 2011/02/23 2011/02/24 2011/02/25 2011/02/26 2011/02/27 2011/02/28
2011/03/01 2011/03/02 2011/03/03 2011/03/04 2011/03/05 2011/03/06 2011/03/07 2011/03/08 2011/03/09 2011/03/10 2011/03/11 2011/03/13 2011/03/14 2011/03/15

### Browse by creation date

66 72 73 75 79 86 88 89 90 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10
1966/12
1972/02 1972/08
1973/04
1975/03
1979/08
1986/05
1988/01
1989/12
1990/01 1990/07 1990/08 1990/10
2000/06 2000/09 2000/11
2001/02 2001/03 2001/07 2001/10
2002/02 2002/03 2002/11
2003/03 2003/04 2003/05 2003/06 2003/07 2003/08 2003/09 2003/10 2003/11 2003/12
2004/01 2004/02 2004/03 2004/04 2004/05 2004/06 2004/07 2004/08 2004/09 2004/10 2004/11 2004/12
2005/01 2005/02 2005/03 2005/04 2005/05 2005/06 2005/07 2005/08 2005/09 2005/10 2005/11 2005/12
2006/01 2006/02 2006/03 2006/04 2006/05 2006/06 2006/07 2006/08 2006/09 2006/10 2006/11 2006/12
2007/01 2007/02 2007/03 2007/04 2007/05 2007/06 2007/07 2007/08 2007/09 2007/10 2007/11 2007/12
2008/01 2008/02 2008/03 2008/04 2008/05 2008/06 2008/07 2008/08 2008/09 2008/10 2008/11 2008/12
2009/01 2009/02 2009/03 2009/04 2009/05 2009/06 2009/07 2009/08 2009/09 2009/10 2009/11 2009/12
2010/01 2010/02

### Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z
Embassy Athens Embassy Asuncion Embassy Astana Embassy Asmara Embassy Ashgabat Embassy Ankara Embassy Amman Embassy Algiers Embassy Addis Ababa Embassy Accra Embassy Abuja Embassy Abu Dhabi Embassy Abidjan Consulate Amsterdam American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura Embassy Buenos Aires Embassy Budapest Embassy Bucharest Embassy Brussels Embassy Bridgetown Embassy Bratislava Embassy Brasilia Embassy Bogota Embassy Bishkek Embassy Bern Embassy Berlin Embassy Belgrade Embassy Beirut Embassy Beijing Embassy Banjul Embassy Bangkok Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan Embassy Bamako Embassy Baku Embassy Baghdad Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen Embassy Conakry Embassy Colombo Embassy Chisinau Embassy Caracas Embassy Canberra Embassy Cairo Consulate Curacao Consulate Casablanca Consulate Cape Town
Embassy Dushanbe Embassy Dublin Embassy Doha Embassy Djibouti Embassy Dhaka Embassy Dar Es Salaam Embassy Damascus Embassy Dakar Consulate Dubai
Embassy Freetown
Embassy Guatemala Embassy Gaborone Consulate Guadalajara
Embassy Helsinki Embassy Harare Embassy Hanoi Consulate Hermosillo Consulate Hamburg
Iran RPO Dubai Embassy Islamabad Consulate Istanbul
Embassy Jakarta Consulate Jerusalem Consulate Jeddah
Embassy Kyiv Embassy Kuwait Embassy Kuala Lumpur Embassy Kinshasa Embassy Kigali Embassy Khartoum Embassy Kathmandu Embassy Kampala Embassy Kabul
Embassy Luxembourg Embassy Luanda Embassy London Embassy Ljubljana Embassy Lisbon Embassy Lima Embassy Lilongwe Embassy La Paz Consulate Lagos
Mission USNATO Embassy Muscat Embassy Moscow Embassy Montevideo Embassy Monrovia Embassy Minsk Embassy Mexico Embassy Mbabane Embassy Maputo Embassy Manama Embassy Managua Embassy Malabo Embassy Madrid Consulate Munich Consulate Montreal Consulate Monterrey Consulate Milan
Embassy New Delhi Embassy Nassau Embassy Nairobi Consulate Naples
Embassy Ouagadougou Embassy Ottawa Embassy Oslo
Embassy Pristina Embassy Pretoria Embassy Prague Embassy Port Au Prince Embassy Phnom Penh Embassy Paris Embassy Paramaribo Embassy Panama Consulate Peshawar
Embassy Quito
REO Basrah Embassy Rome Embassy Riyadh Embassy Riga Embassy Reykjavik Embassy Rangoon Embassy Rabat Consulate Rio De Janeiro Consulate Recife
Secretary of State Embassy Stockholm Embassy Sofia Embassy Skopje Embassy Singapore Embassy Seoul Embassy Sarajevo Embassy Santo Domingo Embassy Santiago Embassy Sanaa Embassy San Salvador Embassy San Jose Consulate Strasbourg Consulate Shenyang Consulate Shanghai Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis Embassy Tripoli Embassy Tokyo Embassy The Hague Embassy Tel Aviv Embassy Tehran Embassy Tegucigalpa Embassy Tbilisi Embassy Tashkent Embassy Tallinn
USUN New York USEU Brussels US Mission Geneva US Interests Section Havana US Delegation, Secretary UNVIE Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius Embassy Vienna Embassy Vatican Consulate Vladivostok
Embassy Windhoek Embassy Wellington Embassy Warsaw
Embassy Yerevan Embassy Yaounde
Embassy Zagreb

### Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
AF AJ AU AG AE ASEC AS AM AR AMGT AORC AFIN APER ABUD ATRN AL AEMR ACOA AO AX AMED ADCO AODE AFFAIRS AC ASIG ABLD AA AFU ASUP AROC ATFN AVERY APCS AER ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG AEC APECO AGMT
BE BR BA BL BEXP BTIO BM BK BRUSSELS BX BU BO BH BIDEN BY BG BF BB BC BBSR BMGT BTIU BILAT
CH CA CD CV CVIS CMGT CO CI CU CASC CBW CLINTON CE CJAN CIA CG CF CN CS CAN COUNTER CDG CIS CM CONDOLEEZZA COE CR CY CTM COUNTRY CLEARANCE CPAS CWC CT CKGR CB CACS COM CJUS CARSON CL CODEL COUNTERTERRORISM CACM CDB
DR DA DHS DOE DEA DK DJ DISENGAGEMENT DS DTRA DOD DEAX
ECON EFIN ELAB EU ETRD ENRG EPET EG EAGR EAID ETTC EINV EIND EUN EAIR ER ECIN ECPS EFIS EI EINT EZ EMIN ET EC ECONEFIN ENVR ES ECA ELN EN EFTA EWWT ELTN EXTERNAL EINVETC ENIV EINN ENGR EUR ESA ENERG EK ENGY ETRO ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS ETRDEINVTINTCS ESENV ENVI ELECTIONS ECUN EINVEFIN ECIP EINDETRD EUC EREL
FR FINR FAO FTAA FREEDOM FI FARC FBI FJ FMLN
GA GG GM GV GH GE GT GR GTIP GOI GCC GAZA GZ GANGS GTMO
HU HR HILLARY HA HUMAN HO HYMPSK HURI HK HSTC
IR IS IZ INTERPOL IPR IN IT INRB IAEA IRAJ INRA INRO IO IC ID IIP ITPHUM IV IWC IQ ICTY ISRAELI IRAQI ICRC ICAO IMO IF ILC IEFIN INTELSAT IL IA IBRD IMF INR IRC ITALY ITALIAN
JO JA JOSEPH JP JOHNNIE JUS JAMES
KCOR KN KS KDEM KNNP KSPR KPAL KJUS KFRD KCRM KTIP KZ KPAO KTFN KIPR KPKO KSCA KISL KNUC KMDR KGHG KPLS KE KOLY KWBG KUNR KDRG KAWK KIRF KIRC KU KBIO KHLS KG KACT KGIC KRAD KCOM KMCA KV KHDP KVPR KDEV KWMN KMPI KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KOMC KTLA KCFC KTIA KHIV KPRP KAWC KCIP KCFE KOCI KTDB KMRS KLIG KBCT KICC KGIT KSTC KPAK KNEI KSEP KPOA KFLU KNUP KNNPMNUC KO KTER KSUM KHUM KRFD KBTR KDDG KWWMN KFLO KSAF KBTS KPRV KNPP KNAR KWMM KERG KFIN KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KTBT KCRS KRVC KSTH KREL KNSD KTEX KPAI KHSA KWAC KR KPWR KMIG KSEC KIFR KDEMAF KGCC KPIN
LE LH LY LU LG LI LO LOG LT
MARR MO MOPS MASS MNUC ML MR MZ MCAP MPOS MOPPS MTCRE MX MTCR MAPP MU MY MA MG MASC MCC MEPP MK MTRE MP MIL MDC MAR MEPI MRCRE MI MT MQADHAFI MD MAPS MUCN MASSMNUC MERCOSUR MC
NG NATO NL NI NU NIPP NO NPT NE NS NAR NZ NPG NK NSG NA NT NASA NGO NP NSF NATIONAL
ODIP OIIP OREP OVIP OEXC OPRC OFDP OPDC OECD OTRA OSCE OAS OPIC OPCW OSCI OIE OIC OTR OVP OFFICIALS OSAC
PREL PGOV PTER PINR PSOE PHUM PBTS PARM PK PREF PINS PL PHSA PE PKFK PO PGOF PROP PA PARMS PORG PM PMIL PTERE POL PF PALESTINIAN PY PGGV PNR POV PAK PAO PFOR PHALANAGE PARTY PRGOV PNAT PROV PEL PINF PGOVE POLINT PRL PRAM PMAR PGOVLO PHUMBA PHUS PHUMPREL PG POLITICS PEPR PSI PINT PU POLITICAL PARTIES PBIO PECON POGOV PINL
QA
RW RS RU RP RO RIGHTS RICE ROBERT RF RFE REGION
SP SOCI SENV SNAR SL SW SY SG SU SA SMIG SCUL SO SF SR SZ SN SHUM SYR ST SANC SC SAN SIPRS SK SH SI SNARCS STEINBERG
TU TS TBIO TH TX TRGY TSPA TC TI TIP TR TT TW TERRORISM TO TFIN TD TSPL TZ TPHY TK TNGD TINT TRSY TP
UV US UK UP UN UNSC UNGA USEU UG USUN UY UZ UNO UNMIK UNESCO UE UAE UNEP USTR UNHCR UNDP UNHRC USAID UNCHS UNAUS UNCHC
VT VE VZ VM VTPREL VN
WTRO WA WI WZ WMO WTRQ WHO WWARD WB WBG WEU WHA WTO
XA XF XT XM XY XG XC XH XK XL XZ XW XR XD XE XS
YM YI YE
ZB ZI ZP ZK ZF ZANU ZOELLICK ZR ZU ZA ZO ZJ

### Browse by classification

CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN SECRET SECRET//NOFORN UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

### Community resources

Follow us on Twitter Check our Reddit Twitter this Digg this page Contact us on IRC

courage is contagious

### Viewing cable 10SANSALVADOR37, With ARENA Fractured, Funes is FMLN's Only Rival

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:

- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #10SANSALVADOR37.

Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
10SANSALVADOR37 | 2010-01-26 19:07 | 2010-12-07 21:09 | SECRET | Embassy San Salvador

`

    VZCZCXYZ0000
    RR RUEHWEB

    DE RUEHSN #0037/01 0261915
    ZNY SSSSS ZZH
    R 261914Z JAN 10
    FM AMEMBASSY SAN SALVADOR
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0262
    INFO WHA CENTRAL AMERICAN COLLECTIVE

` `

    SIPDIS

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/01/19
    TAGS: PREL PGOV ECON ES
    SUBJECT: With ARENA Fractured, Funes is FMLN's Only Rival

    REF: 09 SAN SALVADOR 1101; 09 SAN SALVADOR 789; 09 SAN SALVADOR 978
    09 SAN SALVADOR 1033; 09 SAN SALVADOR 1238; 09 SAN SALVADOR 1045

    CLASSIFIED BY: RBlau, CDA, DOS; REASON: 1.4(D)

    ¶1. (C) Summary: Eight months into the Funes presidency, the GOES
    can best be characterized as schizophrenic.  The part of the
    government that Funes controls is moderate, pragmatic, responsibly
    left-of-center and friendly to the USG.  The part he has ceded to
    hard-line elements of the (left-wing) Farabundo Marti National
    Liberation Front (FMLN) is seeking to carry out the Bolivarian,
    Chavista game-plan, including implacable hostility towards the USG.
    Divisions on the right have given the FMLN a dominant position in
    the Legislative Assembly.  However, the FMLN does not have an
    outright majority in the legislature, and it faces strong
    opposition in the popular and independent-minded President Funes.
    Funes's popularity could erode quickly if his administration does
    not start showing visible results in reducing violent crime and
    reviving the economy.  The government's long-run inability to
    tackle crime or produce economic growth, coupled with petty
    infighting and corruption within the country's political parties,
    raises questions about the future of democratic governance in El
    Salvador.  End summary.

    ---------------------------------------

    FUNES-FMLN RELATIONS STRAINED BUT CIVIL

    ---------------------------------------

    ¶2. (S) The FMLN's relationship-of-convenience with Mauricio Funes
    has soured since the March 2009 election.  Early in his tenure,
    Funes surrounded himself with centrist advisors and laid out a
    moderate, pro-U.S. foreign policy - moves FMLN hardliners saw as an
    attempt to distance himself from their influence.  Recognizing
    Funes's popularity and needing his support, the FMLN sought subtle
    ways to challenge Funes's independence.  Starting in September
    2009, FMLN hardliners within Funes's cabinet (most notably Vice
    President and Education Minister Salvador Sanchez Ceren) gave
    anti-American speeches, announced El Salvador's intention to join
    ALBA, and made high-profile visits to Cuba and Venezuela - each
    action carefully choreographed to defy Funes's agenda but with the
    pretense that the officials were acting as FMLN representatives,
    not as members of the Funes government (see reftel A).  Meanwhile,
    Public Security Minister Manuel Melgar has sought to politicize the
    National Civilian Police (PNC) and the FMLN has used its
    "territorial" ministries (Labor, Health, Education and Gobernacion)
    to extend their geographic and bureaucratic hold over the GOES.
    Funes advisors told us the FMLN may have also used their control of
    the Salvadoran intelligence agency to bug phones in the Casa
    Presidencial (see reftel B).  Thus far, however, the two sides
    continue to cooperate on issues of mutual interest, including the
    budget and tax reform passed in December.

    ¶3. (C) While the Funes-FMLN conflict would appear to benefit the
    right, internal divisions there have prevented the (center-right)
    National Republican Alliance (ARENA) from mounting a serious
    opposition.  Since October, thirteen legislative deputies and
    scores of mayors and local party functionaries have left ARENA,
    most of them joining the newly-formed Grand Alliance for National
    Unity (GANA) (see reftel C).  ARENA leaders blame these defections
    on former president Antonio Saca, whom the party expelled from its
    ranks in December 2009.  While not officially a member of any
    party, Saca is widely rumored to be the inspirational and financial
    force behind GANA.

    ¶4. (C) This crisis has not only dashed ARENA's hope of forming a
    majority alliance in the Legislative Assembly, it has also called
    into question the identity of the party, for years considered one
    of the most well-organized and ideologically-unified in Latin
    America.  Still, XXXXXXXXXXXX told
    PolOff that the crisis has galvanized the party's base, which XXXXXXXXXXXX
    says is "angry as hell" at Saca and the GANA "traitors."  According
    to XXXXXXXXXXXX, in February ARENA plans to roll out a Contract with
    America-style publicity campaign that will emphasize "center-right
    pragmatism" and distance the party from President Saca's corrupt
    legacy.  XXXXXXXXXXXX said that ARENA president Alfredo Cristiani has
    instructed party leaders to focus their criticism on the FMLN and
    avoid attacking GANA or President Funes, both of which ARENA views
    as potential allies.  Until the 2012 legislative elections,

    however, ARENA will remain a marginalized force in national
    politics.

    ¶5. (C) Aside from the FMLN and ARENA, the country's other political
    parties are small, weak, and ideologically malleable.  Their only
    real selling points are as coalition partners providing the final
    votes on closely fought legislation.  Neither the FMLN nor ARENA
    can achieve a legislative majority without the support of GANA or
    the (opportunist) National Conciliation Party (PCN).  In recent
    months, the FMLN has teamed with both GANA and the PCN to reshuffle
    the legislature's leadership positions and pass a contentious tax
    increase (see reftels D and E).  Given their strategic positions,
    GANA and the PCN will likely remain major players in legislative
    battles ahead, demanding, as they were rumored to have done in
    their previous votes with the FMLN, political favors and covert
    payments in exchange for their support.

    -----------------------------------------

    Funes's Challenges: Crime and the Economy

    -----------------------------------------

    ¶6. (C) Public security ranks atop most polling on the nation's
    priorities, particularly after a 37 percent increase in homicides
    in 2009.  Despite great efforts, successive administrations have
    failed to make much of a dent in the intractable street-gang
    problem, so Funes's team will need to be both creative and
    ambitious in its approach to make any headway.  So far, they have
    been neither.  Funes's most significant public security reform to
    date has been a temporary deployment of troops to patrol high-crime
    areas (see reftel F) which news reports suggest may have moderately
    reduced crime in those areas since the November 2009 deployment.
    However, the constitution limits such deployments to six months,
    and Funes has yet to propose reforms to the GOES security apparatus
    that would make those gains sustainable.  He has not moved to
    provide the National Civilian Police (PNC) with significant
    increases of badly-needed personnel, equipment and training, nor
    sought institutional changes in PNC culture, that will result in
    more effective law enforcement and crime control.

    ¶7. (C) The other major concern for the GOES is the sluggish
    economy, which continues to feel the effects of the global
    financial crisis and the recession in the U.S.  According to the
    GOES, GDP declined 3.5 percent in 2009 and is projected to grow
    less than 1 percent in 2010 - its worst two-year performance since
    ¶1992.  Unfortunately, Funes has few options available to stimulate
    a recovery: the GOES has limited funds for countercyclical fiscal
    activity, even with President Funes's modest tax increase, and
    dollarization rules out monetary stimulus.  Funes and his economic
    team understand the importance of free-market incentives, but have
    been anemic in their efforts to attract private investment.
    Ultimately, powerful trade and remittance relationships mean that
    the Salvadoran economy will only recover following a sustained
    economic recovery in the U.S.

    -------

    Comment

    -------

    ¶8. (C) GANA's threat to ARENA now appears more serious than it did
    at first.  GANA has poached dozens of ARENA-loyalists in recent
    weeks and has demonstrated through an extravagant convention and a
    subsequent publicity campaign that it has the deep pockets to put
    up a real fight.  Whispers within ARENA also suggest GANA's
    critique of ARENA's elitism has struck a chord among mid-level
    party functionaries, many of whom secretly sympathize with GANA
    despite remaining within ARENA.  ARENA's rebound depends on
    recuperating financing, which it lost when it became an opposition
    party without GOES patronage to hand out.  It still represents the
    only organized force capable of confronting the growing influence
    of the FMLN.

    ¶9. (C) Funes's ego has little chance of rapprochement with the
    hard-line FMLN.  If things continue to deteriorate, we could see an
    open break between the two sides, possibly resulting in a new

    alliance between Funes and an existing party (perhaps the
    center-left Democratic Change (CD)) for the 2012 legislative
    elections.  Funes would then need to shake up his cabinet and seek
    right-of-center allies in the Legislative Assembly to pass his
    agenda.  The FMLN response would be ugly - massive street protests,
    labor strikes, road blockages, threats of violence, legislative
    logjams - and paralyze some government operations and place a
    further drag on the struggling economy.

    ¶10. (C) The GOES's inability to make gains in public security,
    continued anemic growth and the disintegration of the right taken
    together present a challenging road ahead for democracy in El
    Salvador, especially if coupled with a Funes-FMLN split.  Funes's
    persistent high popularity ratings, now well over 80 percent, make
    it too soon to sound the alarm, but democratic institutions are
    vulnerable.  Sanchez Ceren's recent call for sweeping
    constitutional reforms to institute "participatory democracy" is a
    timely reminder that the hard-line FMLN's threat to Salvadoran
    democracy is real.  The Embassy, allied with civil society, will
    continue to engage and support moderates in the GOES while working
    with democratic forces across the political spectrum to strengthen
    Salvadoran constitutional institutions.
    BLAU

`