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### Viewing cable 09NAIROBI1057, SOMALIA - TFG PRIME MINISTER WORRIED ABOUT RIVAL

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
09NAIROBI1057 | 2009-05-28 15:03 | 2010-12-08 21:09 | SECRET | Embassy Nairobi

`

    VZCZCXRO5046
    RR RUEHDE RUEHROV RUEHTRO
    DE RUEHNR #1057/01 1481535
    ZNY SSSSS ZZH
    R 281535Z MAY 09
    FM AMEMBASSY NAIROBI
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 9645
    INFO RUCNSOM/SOMALIA COLLECTIVE
    RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
    RUEKDIA/DIA WASHDC
    RHMFISS/CJTF HOA

` `

    S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 NAIROBI 001057

    SIPDIS

    DEPT FOR AF/E

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/28/2019
    TAGS: PGOV PTER PREL MOPS EAID SO
    SUBJECT: SOMALIA - TFG PRIME MINISTER WORRIED ABOUT RIVAL
    ORGANIZATION, ANXIOUS FOR USG HELP

    REF: NAIROBI 1037

    Classified By: Somalia Unit Counselor Bob Patterson. Reasons: 1.4 (b,d
    ).

    ¶1. (S/NF) Summary: In a brief Nairobi airport meeting May
    28, TFG Prime Minister Sharmarke worried about the influence
    of rival organization Ahlu Sunnah Wal Jama'a and the failure
    of talks in Mogadishu and Addis Ababa to result in an
    agreement to cooperate. Sharmarke confirmed that
    communications and logistics problems had undercut the TFG's
    initially successful counter-attack in Mogadishu on May 22,
    and requested radios and military advice to prevent a
    recurrence of the problems. The Prime Minister repeatedly
    confirmed the TFG's willingness to accept any negative
    publicity that might result from a U.S. military strike on
    terrorists or their training camps in Somalia should such
    strikes occur. The TFG, said Sharmarke, was looking for
    money to pay security force salaries for June. In a
    subsequent meeting with UNPOS Deputy Charles Petrie, the
    Prime Minister asked assistance in getting the Government of
    Iraq to make good on its pledge of USD 5 million in aid to
    his government. The Prime Minister was grateful for the
    Secretary's May 27 telephone call to President Sheikh Sharif,
    which he had listened in on and which "really bolstered our
    spirits." Sharmarke was briefly in Nairobi en route to
    Tripoli at the invitation of Qadhafi. End summary.

    Lessons of May 22 Counter-Attack
    --------------------------------

    ¶2. (C) During a brief stopover in Nairobi May 28 while en
    route to Libya, a relaxed TFG Prime Minister Omar Sharmarke
    told Somalia Unit officers that his government's troops had
    fared well in the initial stages of their counterattack
    against insurgents in Mogadishu on May 22. After taking
    significant parts of Mogadishu (reftel), TFG troops had been
    forced to retreat, however, when its Uganda-trained
    contingent found itself near the Industrial Road area and far
    in advance of other TFG units. Inaccurate information passed
    by cellphone, the troops' only means of communication, caused
    the Uganda-trained soldiers to believe they had been cut off
    from other TFG soldiers, and they beat a hasty retreat,
    Sharmarke said. The May 22 counteroffensive, although
    ultimately unsuccessful, showed that security force their
    considerable weaknesses: communications, logistics, and
    battlefield command. Sharmarke requested USG assistance in
    procuring walkie talkies and other battlefield communications
    equipment and any training that could be provided the TFG's
    field commanders. He welcome the suggestion that experienced
    Rwandan or Ugandan trainers be detailed, if possible, to
    Mogadishu to lead intensive courses.

    Praise for IGAD Communique
    --------------------------

    ¶3. (C) Sharmarke was philosophical about progress al-Shabaab
    and other insurgents had made against the TFG in recent
    weeks. The TFG, he maintained, was keeping the door open to
    "reasonable guys," while al-Shabaab's reliance on foreigners
    was costing it support among Somalis. Sharmarke praised the
    May 20 IGAD ministerial communique's call for control of
    Somali airports and ports, and alleged that it had triggered
    al-Shabaab's efforts, via incursions into Medina to win
    control of Mogadishu airport.

    Foreigners Fighting
    -------------------

    ¶4. (S/NF) Sharmarke joined other Somalis in alleging
    significant foreign involvement in al-Shabaab's efforts. A
    "Pakistani general" was coordinating the attacks on the TFG
    in Mogadishu, he said. Also present was an alleged al-Qaida
    operative he was able to identify only as "al-Libi."
    Sharmarke noted that he was keeping indirect tabs on Muhtar
    Robow, but no one in the TFG, to his knowledge, had had
    contact since Robow's resignation as al-Shabaab spokesman.
    Sharmarke described considerable stress between Hisbul Islam
    and al-Shabaab, with Hassan Dahir Aweys allegedly "shocked"
    by al-Shabaab's "lack of a strategy other than fighting."

    ASWJ Negotiations Faltering
    ---------------------------

    ¶5. (C) The TFG's negotiations with Ahlu Sunnah Wal Jama'a
    (ASWJ) had produced no results to date, according to
    Sharmarke. He described the Somalia central region

    NAIROBI 00001057 002 OF 002

    representatives they had been in contact with as "determined
    to make gains quickly on the ground," so that those gains
    could be parlayed into an improved negotiating position with
    the TFG. Although the TFG had provided some money to ASWJ,
    all assistance was now stalled, with some in the TFG worried
    that TFG cash was feeding a potential rival. ASWJ continued
    to push for high-profile ministerial positions and to stall
    on active cooperation with the TFG. Sharmarke was not
    certain what pressure the Government of Ethiopia could exert
    on ASWJ, but he several times urged the USG to do what it
    could to bring ASWJ around.

    Money Needs
    -----------

    ¶6. (C) The Prime Minister promised an accounting shortly of
    the USD 500 thousand provided by the USG. He as very grateful
    for USG efforts to supply TFG forces with larger-caliber
    ammunition and weapons. The TFG had subsidized allies in
    Hiraan and Jowhar, as well as having provided stipends to an
    unspecified number of "al-Shabaab defectors." His government
    believed it was safer if the technicals that belonged to
    mercurial warlords Mohammed Dheere and Indha Adde were safely
    in TFG control, and negotiations were now under way to that
    end. Sharmarke estimated the total number of technicals at
    18, in addition to one APC. He noted that their purchase
    would place significant additional strain on the TFG's
    finances and asked continued USG support. (In a subsequent
    brief conversation with UNPOS Deputy Charles Petrie,
    Sharmarke urged UN and USG intercession with Iraq to speed
    the delivery of an alleged USD 5 million that the Baghdad
    government had pledged to the TFG.)

    Support for Kinetic Strikes
    ---------------------------

    ¶7. (S/NF) Sharmarke recalled that he had called Somalia Unit
    on May 16 to urge that the USG "take out" if possible
    participants in an al-Shabaab - Hisbul Islam conclave near
    Afgoye. That phone call, he re-affirmed, had been made with
    the express consent of President Sheikh Sharif, who also
    believed with Sharmarke that and USG strikes on known
    terrorists or their training camps was necessary. Asked if
    the TFG could weather the fallout from such a strike or
    strikes and their potential collateral damage Sharmarke,
    without hesitation said, "yes." "These people," he said, "are
    out to destroy our way of life."

    Travel Plans
    ------------

    ¶8. (C) Sharmarke was en route to Libya at the invitation of
    Qadhafi and in place of President Sharif, whom Ambassador
    Ranneberger, in a May 26 telephone call, had strongly
    discouraged from leaving Mogadishu during this stressful time.

    Comment
    -------

    ¶9. (C) Sharmarke, like President Sharif in our recent
    telephone contacts with him, was calm and convinced that the
    TFG could prevail against its enemies. He philosophically
    acknowledged the many basic problems confronting his
    government, from forging an alliance with ASWJ to ironing out
    command and control and logistical problems in its fragile
    security forces. His dismissive comments about al-Shabaab's
    reported increasing reliance on foreign fighters, ironically,
    mirror al-Shabaab's accusations that the TFG is over-reliant
    on the foreign fighters of AMISOM as it haltingly tries to
    increase its hold on Mogadishu.
    RANNEBERGER

`