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### Viewing cable 10CAIRO181, Scenesetter for Admiral Mullen

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
10CAIRO181 | 2010-02-09 15:03 | 2011-02-16 21:09 | SECRET//NOFORN | Embassy Cairo

`

    VZCZCXYZ0002
    OO RUEHWEB

    DE RUEHEG #0181/01 0401511
    ZNY SSSSS ZZH
    O R 091511Z FEB 10
    FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0204
    INFO RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
    RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
    RHMFISS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
    RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO
    RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC

` `

    S E C R E T CAIRO 000181

    SIPDIS
    NOFORN

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/02/09
    TAGS: PREL MASS PARM ETTC EG
    SUBJECT: Scenesetter for Admiral Mullen

    CLASSIFIED BY: Margaret Scobey, Ambassador, DOS, EXO; REASON: 1.4(B),
    (D)

    ¶1. (S/NF) Key Points:

    -- Since your last visit, the U.S. and Egypt initiated a
    senior-level Strategic Dialogue that built upon the improved
    bilateral atmosphere following President Obama's June 2009 speech
    in Cairo. We have seen improved cooperation in multilateral fora,
    in addition to close cooperation on regional issues including
    Arab-Israeli peace and Sudan.

    -- While the U.S.-Egypt military relationship remains strong, the
    Egyptian military has been resistant to our efforts to adjust its
    focus to reflect new regional and transnational threats.

    -- While Egyptian leadership continues to view Iran as the greatest
    strategic threat to the Middle East, the Israeli-Palestinian
    conflict and Sudanese instability are immediate concerns for Egypt.

    -- Egypt has increased counter smuggling efforts, including the
    construction of a subterranean steel wall along the Egypt-Gaza
    border that has provoked intense domestic and regional criticism of
    perceived complicity in the Israeli blockade of Gaza.

    ----------------------------

    Renewed Cooperation

    ----------------------------

    ¶2. (C) Admiral Mullen, welcome back to Egypt. Building upon the
    optimism generated by a new U.S. administration and President
    Obama's well-received June 4 speech in Cairo, we resumed in June
    our Strategic Dialogue and set in place a new framework for regular
    bilateral meetings with the Egyptians to explore areas for
    cooperation and coordination, including examining our respective
    assessments of strategic threats such as Iran. The most recent
    meeting was hosted by Under Secretary Burns in December in
    Washington. We are exploring other ways to translate this sense of
    goodwill into concrete action, including a renewed focus in our
    bilateral assistance programs on human capacity development and
    strengthening Egypt's ability to compete in education, science, and
    technology.

    ¶3. (S/NF) Our goal remains to widen our military cooperation
    discussion beyond the annual flow of Foreign Military Financing
    (FMF). At the end of 2009, we conducted our two premier bilateral
    military events - the annual Military Cooperation Committee (MCC)
    meeting and the Bright Star military exercise. During the MCC,
    Egypt agreed to implement specific measures to improve their
    ability to protect U.S. technology. During Bright Star, the
    Egyptians canceled several joint-operations that would have
    broadened the exercise's scope. We are working hard to ensure that
    Bright Star 2011 will involve full-spectrum operations. Tantawi
    and his senior leaders recognize and appreciate increased
    engagement with the U.S. military, which provides us an opportunity
    to highlight for them the need to sharpen and focus the Egyptian
    military's mission to reflect new regional threats. Egypt's offer
    to train Iraqi and Afghan military officials provides an
    opportunity for the Egyptian military to play a greater role in
    supporting regional security. Egypt also has plans to significantly
    increase its peace-keeping presence in Africa, including a new
    deployment to the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and we hope to
    support their efforts through Egypt's inclusion in the Global Peace
    Operations Initiative. We have requested meetings for you with
    President Mubarak, MinDef Field Marshall Tantawi, CoS LTG Anan, and
    EGIS Chief MGen (ret) Soliman.

    ---------------------

    Regional Security

    ---------------------

    ¶4. (S/NF) President Mubarak sees Iran as Egypt's -- and the
    region's -- primary strategic threat. Egypt's already dangerous
    neighborhood, he believes, has only become more so since the fall
    of Saddam, who, as nasty as he was, nevertheless stood as a wall
    against Iran. He now sees Tehran's hand moving with ease throughout
    the region, "from the Gulf to Morocco." The immediate threat to
    Egypt comes from Iranian conspiracies with Hamas (which he sees as
    the "brother" of his own most dangerous internal political threat,
    the Muslim Brotherhood) to stir up unrest in Gaza, but he is also
    concerned about Iranian machinations in Sudan and their efforts to
    create havoc elsewhere in the region, including in Yemen, Lebanon,
    and even the Sinai, via Hezbollah. While Tehran's nuclear threat is
    also a cause for concern, Mubarak is more urgently seized with what
    he sees as the rise of Iranian surrogates (Hamas and Hezbollah) and
    Iranian attempts to dominate the Middle East.

    ¶5. (S/NF) The Egyptians have stepped up their cooperation with the
    Iraqis considerably, primarily through establishment of a "joint
    committee" which covers the full range of economic, social,
    military and political bilateral development. In November 2009, the
    Egyptians returned an ambassador to Baghdad. MOD is also
    requesting USG approval to sell Iraq 140 M1A1 tanks manufactured in
    Egypt under a co-production agreement. On Afghanistan, the GOE has
    agreed to explore expanding its scope and breadth of programs
    there, including in the areas of education, women's empowerment
    and communications. Egypt has operated a military field hospital
    at Bagram since 2003 with approximately 60 personnel.

    ¶6. (S/NF) Egypt's top priority in Africa is the future of Sudan.
    The GOE would like to maintain Sudanese unity because it believes a
    break-up will increase refugee flows into Egypt and threaten
    Egypt's access to Nile waters. However, the GOE is hedging its
    bets by providing South Sudan with development assistance including
    building and staffing medical clinics, helping to clear aquatic
    plants from the White Nile and building power stations and a
    university. Egypt is the fifth-largest peace keeping contributor in
    the world, with the majority of its troops deployed to southern
    Sudan and Darfur. They have also agreed to deploy a large
    contingent to the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

    ¶7. (S/NF) Egypt continues to support our efforts to resume
    negotiations between the Israelis and Palestinians and maintains a
    regular dialogue with all sides. Egyptian sponsored negotiations on
    Palestinian reconciliation are ongoing. Egypt's objectives are to
    avoid another Gaza crisis while eroding Hamas' power and ultimately
    returning the Palestinian Authority to Gaza.

    --------------------------------------------- -----

    Mil-Mil Cooperation: Counter Smuggling

    --------------------------------------------- -----

    ¶8. (S/NF) President Mubarak and military leaders view our
    military assistance program as a cornerstone of our mil-mil
    relationship and consider the USD 1.3 billion in annual FMF as
    untouchable compensation for making peace with Israel.
    Decision-making within MOD rests almost solely with Defense
    Minister Tantawi. In office since 1991, he consistently resists
    change to the level and direction of FMF funding and is therefore
    one of our chief impediments to transforming our security
    relationship. Nevertheless, he retains President Mubarak's
    support. You should encourage Tantawi to place greater emphasis on
    countering asymmetric threats rather than focusing almost
    exclusively on conventional force.

    ¶9. (S/NF) Egypt continues to use a wide range of military,
    security, intelligence, and diplomatic efforts to combat the flow
    of arms to Gaza. The effectiveness of these efforts is difficult to
    assess, and our visibility into these programs is limited. However,
    Egypt has reported success in identifying and intercepting arms
    smuggling networks from Sudan to Cairo, as well as interdicting
    illicit funds destined for Gaza. Israeli officials have also
    reported some satisfaction with increased Egyptian efforts. MOD is
    also participating in a USG-financed project - led by EGIS - to
    install 15 x-ray scanners along the vehicular entrances to the
    Sinai to search for arms and explosives.

    ¶10. (S/NF) Tantawi continues to resist U.S. offers of additional
    counter smuggling assistance. Sovereignty concerns are likely
    driving his hesitation, along with concerns that FMF funds may be
    directed away from more high-profile programs like M1A1 tanks and
    aircraft. You should encourage Tantawi to focus more U.S.
    assistance on border security, especially along the remote
    Egypt-Sudan border. You should also remind Tantawi that no single
    technology can stop smuggling. Success will depend on how well
    Egypt uses all available tools and resources to identity and
    disrupt smuggling networks. He will likely reply that BTADS -
    currently on-hold because of security concerns - and the
    subterranean steel wall MOD has begun to install along the
    Egypt-Gaza border, will provide a sufficient counter-smuggling
    capability.

    ¶11. (S/NF) Tantawi will likely express concerns over releasability
    issues and frustration with Egypt's inability to procure restricted
    weapons systems. However, concerns over Egypt's end-use
    performance, especially in Congress, continue. You should stress
    that decisions to release advanced weapons systems are made on a
    country-by-country basis, but continued cooperation to improve
    Egypt's protection of American technology and signing a CISMOA
    would be welcome steps in our dialogue on releasability.

    --------------------------------------

    Internal Politics and Economics

    --------------------------------------

    ¶12. (C) We continue to promote democratic reform in Egypt,
    including the expansion of political freedom and pluralism, and
    respect for human rights. While Egypt has made some limited gains
    over the last several years, such as on freedom of the press,
    progress overall has been slow. We continue to press the GOE to
    replace the State of Emergency, in place almost continuously since
    1967, with counterterrorism legislation that protects civil
    liberties. Designed to target violent Islamist extremist groups,
    the GOE has also used the Emergency Law to target political
    activity by the Muslim Brotherhood, bloggers and labor
    demonstrators. The Interior Ministry suppresses political
    opposition through arrests, harassment and intimidation.

    ¶13. (C) The GoE remains skeptical of our role in democracy
    promotion, arguing that any efforts to open up will result in
    empowering the Muslim Brotherhood, which currently holds 86 seats
    -- as independents -- in Egypt's 454-seat parliament. Elections
    for the upper house of the parliament, or the Shura Council, are to
    be held in June 2010 and elections for the lower house of
    parliament or the People's Assembly are now scheduled for October
    ¶2010. Presidential elections will be held in 2011. It is still
    unclear whether President Mubarak, in power for over 25 years, will
    decide to run again. Some believe that he is grooming his son,
    Gamal Mubarak, to succeed him as President.

    ¶14. (SBU) Economic reform is ongoing although Egypt still suffers
    from widespread poverty affecting 35-40% of the population.
    Egyptian-U.S. trade more than doubled between 2005 and 2008, before
    slumping in 2009 amidst the global economic crisis. Bilateral trade
    volume was roughly $7.5 billion in 2009, and the U.S. exports to

    Egypt more than twice as much as it imports. Egyptian banks
    operate very conservatively and have been spared involvement in
    risky financial products, but the effects of the global economic
    crisis on Egypt are beginning to be felt. As the global credit
    crunch worsens, Egypt remains vulnerable as exports, Suez Canal
    revenues, tourism, and remittances - its largest sources of revenue
    -- are all down and will likely to continue to fall.
    SCOBEY

`