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### Viewing cable 09LAPAZ96, BOLIVIA'S REFERENDUM: MARGIN OF VICTORY MATTERS

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
09LAPAZ96 | 2009-01-23 13:01 | 2010-11-30 21:09 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy La Paz

`

    VZCZCXYZ0000
    PP RUEHWEB

    DE RUEHLP #0096/01 0231326
    ZNY CCCCC ZZH
    P 231326Z JAN 09
    FM AMEMBASSY LA PAZ
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9793
    INFO RUEHAC/AMEMBASSY ASUNCION 8742
    RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA 6115
    RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 0078
    RUEHBU/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES 7298
    RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 4344
    RUEHCP/AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN 0330
    RUEHPE/AMEMBASSY LIMA 4679
    RUEHMN/AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO 6085
    RUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO 6963
    RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO 1731
    RUEHUB/USINT HAVANA 1617
    RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC
    RHMFISS/HQ USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
    RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
    RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
    RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC

` `

    SIPDIS

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/21/2019

    TAGS: PGOV KDEM PREL PHUM PINR ENVR BL
    SUBJECT: BOLIVIA'S REFERENDUM: MARGIN OF VICTORY MATTERS

    REF: A. 08 LAPAZ 2606

    ¶B. LA PAZ 6

    ¶C. LA PAZ 11

    ¶D. LA PAZ 62

    ¶E. LA PAZ 90

    Classified By: A/EcoPol Chief Joe Relk for reasons 1.4 (b, d)

    ¶1. (C) Summary:  With the January 25 constitutional

    referendum rapidly approaching, all signs point to victory

    for President Morales and his ruling Movement Toward

    Socialism (MAS) party.  Although the opposition has made

    inroads into the MAS lead, most national polls point to

    between 54 and 60 percent support for the proposed

    constitution (with one government poll showing 66 percent),

    and the MAS appears set to leverage its considerable rural

    base to victory.  After a series of national news articles

    raised questions about significant fraud in the August 2008

    recall referendum, the National Electoral Court has taken

    pains to advertise the electoral rolls as secure.  However, a

    recent poll shows less than half of the public shares the

    court's confidence, and the opposition believes significant

    electoral fraud is likely.  While cheating seems unnecessary

    to secure victory for the MAS, padding their lead would give

    the party leverage in congressional negotiations regarding

    legislation implementing hundreds of vague constitutional

    clauses.  Opposition leaders continue to fear the MAS will

    use any stalemate in these negotiations to close congress and

    institute rule by decree.  At both the national and regional

    levels, the margin of victory matters.  A landslide for the

    MAS nationally, or large victories for the opposition in the

    eastern departments, could spark more conflict.  End summary.

    - - - - - - - - - - - - -

    MAS Victory Seems Assured

    - - - - - - - - - - - - -

    ¶2. (C) With the January 25 constitutional referendum rapidly

    approaching, all signs point to victory for President Morales

    and his ruling Movement Toward Socialism (MAS) party.

    Although the opposition has made inroads into their lead,

    causing the MAS to tone down its rhetoric, national polls

    point to between 54 and 60 percent support for the proposed

    constitution.  (One government poll shows the "yes" vote

    winning by 66 percent.)  However, many polls downplay or

    ignore the MAS' rural base.  Almost as importantly, the MAS

    seems prepared to take at least five of the nine departments,

    including La Paz, Potosi, Oruro, Cochabamba, and Pando, with

    Beni a distinct possibility.  If the MAS can win at levels

    similar to their August 2008 referendum victory (i.e. 67

    percent or more) and can make inroads into the "Media Luna"

    or eastern half of the country, they will have much more

    leverage in upcoming congressional negotiations over

    implementing legislation.

    - - - - - -

    Polling Data

    - - - - - -

    ¶3. (C) Polling data has varied widely over the past two

    weeks, due to a combination of a tightening race and polling

    methodologies (i.e. city vs. rural).  Recent national polls

    by Gallup and Apoyo within the last week show approval for

    the constitution with a much slimmer lead than many expected,

    ahead only 48 to 42 percent and 49 to 43 percent,

    respectively.  Ipsos and Mori both conducted polls of capital

    cities and both found the "yes" vote ahead, with Ipsos

    showing a 59 to 35 percent lead and Mori reporting 60 to 40

    percent.  However, our contacts tell us all these polls

    partially or totally ignored the rural vote, where the MAS

    has much of its base.  A poll by Observatorio de Gestion

    Publica, publicized by government-friendly Radio Patria

    Nueva, marked the constitution's lead at 66 percent, versus

    31 percent against.  Some estimate a six percent "bump" when

    the rural vote is included.

    ¶4. (U) Polls showing a breakdown

    by city or region indicate

    the constitution will easily win in at least four

    departments: La Paz, Potosi, Oruro, and Cochabamba, likely

    with at least 70 percent support in each.  The MAS has a

    distinct chance to capture both Pando and Beni as well.  In

    Pando, the Observatorio poll shows Pando department split

    evenly, and the Ipsos poll shows the capital city of Cobija

    supporting the constitution by a ratio of 64 to 36.  Polling

    data for Beni has been more scattershot, but although its

    capital city of Trinidad is firmly against the constitution,

    by as much as 88 percent, the larger city of Riberalta is

    leaning for approval of the constitution.  The Observatorio

    poll shows Beni evenly split as a department.

    - - - - - - - - - - - - -

    Rural and Indigenous Role

    - - - - - - - - - - - - -

    ¶5. (SBU) Although the opposition is making a mighty effort

    across the country to rally against the constitution, the

    forces of inertia seem to be conspiring against them,

    particularly in the form of a largely uneducated rural base

    in the Altiplano.  Leading daily La Razon interviewed several

    community leaders from the Altiplano, and their supporters,

    and reported on January 18 that neither the leaders nor the

    supporters had read the Constitution.  Instead, the repeated

    message was that rural communities would take their marching

    orders from the MAS, and vote for the constitution. According

    to the Ipso poll of capital cities, only four percent of

    respondents said they had read much or all of the

    constitution, 45 percent of respondents said they have read

    some, and 50 percent said they had read none of the draft

    text.  In the countryside, the number of those reading the

    constitution is much lower.  Post suspects disinterest, blind

    faith in Evo Morales' political project, and illiteracy,

    despite the Cuban literacy program, all play a role.  In

    addition, the sheer volume of the 411-article constitution

    probably scares some potential readership away.

    ¶6. (C) However, despite the overall level of MAS dominance

    among campesinos and indigenous voters, some opposition does

    exist, albeit for a variety of reasons.  The xxxxxxxxxxxx, has tried to rally

    support against the MAS and the proposed constitution (Reftel

    A).  In a meeting with PolOffs, they lamented the way the MAS

    had "cheated" and "fooled" campesinos into believing Morales

    was himself truly indigenous or cared about indigenous

    issues.  Although they held a national meeting on January 17

    and tried to reach out to the press, they sounded defeated

    when they acknowledged that the MAS, through a combination of

    funding and pressure on local social and business leaders,

    held a "vertical control" in the countryside that would be

    difficult to break.  They also noted rural communities tended

    to vote in blocks, supporting one political party until they

    discarded it to vote en masse for another.

    ¶7. (C) Going in a completely different direction, some rural

    social groups and far-left leaders, such as Achacachi Mayor

    Eugenio Rojas and El Alto City Councilor Roberto de La Cruz

    also publicly recommended voting against it because it was

    seen as not revolutionary enough.  They criticized the

    government for making too many concessions to the opposition

    during the constitutional compromise reached on October 21,

    including the agreement to not make land reform retroactive.

    However, they have a relatively small following, and some,

    like de La Cruz, eventually reversed course as the projected

    MAS margin of victory shrunk in January.  Edgar Patana,

    leader of the regional workers union (COR), other El Alto

    union leaders, and the majority of social groups have

    recommended voting for the constitution.

    - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

    Opposition Feisty, But Realistic

    - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

    ¶8. (C) The opposition has not given up, but seems to be

    battling

    more to limit the margin of defeat than to win.  In

    Santa Cruz,xxxxxxxxxxxx

    told EmbOff that polls show an overwhelming victory for the

    "No" vote in Santa Cruz, but that he is worried about the

    opposition's goal of winning in five of Bolivia's nine

    departments (Reftel E).  Although a current

    privately-commissioned opposition poll showed the

    constitution ahead by a margin of only five points, 39 to 34

    percent (with 20 percent undecided), opposition alternate

    xxxxxxxxxxxx doubted the opposition would be able to

    win the referendum outright even under the most optimistic

    scenario.  He predicted that Morales would succeed in

    personalizing the constitution as "Evo's constitution" and

    leverage his cult of personality.  Ultimately xxxxxxxxxxxx was more

    concerned with the margin of the opposition's defeat and

    discrediting the results of "any election that uses this

    voter roll" (Reftel C).

    ¶9. (C) xxxxxxxxxxxx has been

    criss-crossing the country with opposition xxxxxxxxxxxx

    xxxxxxxxxxxx, campaigning against the proposed constitution, but

    also building a foundation for a likely run for the

    presidency. xxxxxxxxxxxx claimed opposition leaders put aside

    jockeying to be the 2009 opposition unity presidential

    candidate in the final days of the "no" campaign to "attack

    the government from three sides:" the prefects (governors)

    who been traveling around the Media Luna to show &they are

    not afraid" of government threats to arrest them and

    galvanize support in opposition departments, a group of three

    presidential contenders to show opposition unity and

    xxxxxxxxxxxx, who is used for more cerebral attacks on the CPE

    and to &dismiss the governments mythology that they

    exclusively represent the indigenous.8  xxxxxxxxxxxx noted that

    opposition parties Podemos and MNR are playing a deliberately

    muted role, recognizing that their unpopular association with

    the &old regimes8 would play into MAS strategy.  "Political

    parties are bad words in Bolivia," xxxxxxxxxxxx

    xxxxxxxxxxxx La

    Paz-based group of mostly young professionals who focus on

    issues and distance themselves from the party moniker.  "We

    need parties, but we need to start from scratch, without the

    old leaders.  This will take time."

    ¶10. (C) xxxxxxxxxxxx told

    PolOff the opposition is chipping away at the MAS referendum

    lead despite the government's leviathan advantage in

    resources by de-personalizing the constitution and

    "convincing people on the street that is not in their best

    interests."  Although he conceded the "no" campaign would

    ultimately be a losing effort, he cited the emerging feud

    between Morales and Church, corruption charges against

    government officials, and the increasingly precarious economy

    as emerging factors in December and January that created an

    opposition "surge" after "we were so depressed" in the fall.

    xxxxxxxxxxxx said that the government's newfound mobilization of

    congressmen and deputies to challenge the opposition view on

    television and radio shows is proof of government panic.

    "Before they just thought they could ignore us (and win),"

    said xxxxxxxxxxxx.  "They said there was no opposition." xxxxxxxxxxxx

    agreed, and added that this is playing into the opposition's

    hands, because they "are forced to defend a constitution they

    often know little about."  According to xxxxxxxxxxxx has

    been challenging MAS supporters to debate him during his

    speaking tours and embarrassed Vice Minister of Social Groups

    Sacha Llorenti in a January 20 debate when he started talking

    in fluent Aymara.  He asked the dumbstruck Llorenti what he

    planned to do if the constitution passed, since all public

    officials will be required to speak one of Bolivia's

    indigenous languages.  Later he challenged President Morales

    to debate him in Aymara, which the president allegedly speaks

    poorly.

    - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

    Fraud, Doubts, and Questions

    - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

    ¶11. (C) The National Electoral Court (CNE), which will

    oversee and ratify the results of the referendum, has

    undertaken a public relations campaign to assure the public

    of the security of the election rolls, which came under

    scrutiny after leading daily La Razon published a series of

    articles questioning the validity of the August 10, 2008

    recall referendum.  Several contacts, including xxxxxxxxxxxx

    xxxxxxxxxxxx, told us the MAS padded their

    August referendum victory by five to seven points through

    fraud at several levels (reftel C).  While many international

    observers groups are expected to view the January 25

    constitutional referendum -- including the European Union,

    the OAS, the Carter Center, the UN, the CAN, the

    South-American and Andean parliaments, and UNASUR (septel) --

    the depth of the earlier fraud has muted the opposition's

    confidence in observers' ability to ensure the results are

    fair.  Members of the Santa Cruz civic committee told EmbOff

    that they have no faith in international observers.  The

    committee has met with the OAS team already and "told our

    side of the story", describing the discoveries of tens of

    thousands of false voter cards and the statistical signs of

    fraud in areas that managed to vote 100 percent for President

    Morales in the August 2008 referendum.  However, the civic

    committee said that the fact that international observers

    blessed the August referendum means they do not expect an

    honest review of the constitutional referendum.  Civic

    committee members also noted that small numbers of observers,

    generally based in the city, will not be able to stop

    widespread fraud in the countryside, which is where they

    believe most of the August 10 fraud took place.

    ¶12. (C) In a press conference designed to bolster confidence

    in the security of the electoral rolls, National Electoral

    Court (CNE) President Jose Luis Exeni presented a PowerPoint

    describing the bill of clean health given by the OAS.  As

    part of the presentation, he showed the number of voters

    dropped from the rolls for not participating in prior

    elections and the number added during this cycle.  While all

    departments projected to vote against the constitution had a

    net reduction in the voter rolls, including 85,000 Crucenos

    and 17,000 Benianos, MAS strongholds including La Paz

    (38,000) and Potosi (16,000) saw substantial gains -- a

    curious reckoning, considering population and migration

    trends to the contrary.

    - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

    Pando At Center of Storm, Again

    - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

    ¶13. (C) While it is possible the constitution could pass in

    Beni, most opposition leaders tell us the MAS has set its

    sights on lightly-populated Pando department as its best

    chance to win in five departments.  By winning the popular

    vote and a majority of the departments, the MAS could more

    credibly claim to have support throughout the country.  Pando

    has also traditionally aligned with the opposition, so a

    breakthrough win there would send a strong signal that the

    strength of the MAS continues to rise.  And with fewer than

    32,000 registered voters, or less than one percent of the

    country's voting population, Pando is the most vulnerable

    department to even small amounts of fraud or voter

    registration changes.

    ¶14. (C) In a conversation with PolOff, xxxxxxxxxxxx

    xxxxxxxxxxxx alleged the MAS deliberately fomented unrest in Pando

    in September to justify a military siege, depose Prefect

    Leopoldo Fernandez, and arrest opposition-aligned leaders to

    swing the balance of power to the MAS in the Senate.  Besides

    disabling the opposition's ability to campaign by arresting

    many of its leaders,xxxxxxxxxxxx alleged the government crackdown

    changed Pando's electoral map by causing hundreds of

    opposition voters to flee to Brazil while importing 2,000 new

    security forces, which xxxxxxxxxxxx claimed were likely MAS voters

    from the Altiplano (Reftel B).  xxxxxxxxxxxx added

    that in the run-up to the August 2008 referendum, Government

    Minister Alfredo Rada facilitated the establishment of fake

    identities via the police role in issuing national identity

    cards (which can then be used to vote).  (Reftel C).

    - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

    January 26: What Happens Next?

    - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

    ¶15. (C) xxxxxxxxxxxx told PolOff December 31 that

    a general election prompted by passage of the new

    constitution requires a plethora of enabling legislation that

    the opposition-controlled Senate will block, at least in the

    forms likely to be proposed by the MAS (Reftel B).  xxxxxxxxxxxx

    said the new draft constitution is deliberately vague, which

    grants MAS legislators wide discretion to "fill in the

    blanks" with new implementing legislation.  He also said the

    Senate would clash with the government on assigning new

    borders for electoral districts, needed for the general

    election.  xxxxxxxxxxxx added that Morales' MAS party is

    already injecting "ridiculous" interpretations of the

    constitution into a wide gamut of implementing legislation

    that "the Senate cannot in good conscious agree to."  He said

    Senate rejection of MAS proposals provides a ready excuse for

    Morales to dismiss congress for "rejecting the will of the

    people" and then have President Morales rule by decree

    (Reftel D).

    ¶16. (C) Despite the official government position that

    President Morales will undergo treatment to correct a

    deviated septum immediately following the referendum, several

    contacts confirm that the problem is actually a tumor in the

    pituitary near the sella turcica and that Morales will travel

    to Spain for the operation.  xxxxxxxxxxxx

    xxxxxxxxxxxx told us Morales' first choice, Cuba, could not

    perform the surgery.  Article 238 is also of consequence to

    the post-January 25 political landscape.  It would establish

    that all other government officials must stand down three

    months before general elections expected in 2009, with the

    notable exception of the president and vice president.

    Besides providing the MAS the advantage of ruling during the

    campaign, it also ensures leadership cannot pass to the

    opposition-controlled Senate.  It is unclear why the

    opposition waited until the final week before the referendum

    to complain about the article or why they accepted it during

    marathon sessions in October to arrive at a "compromise

    text," which, it should be noted, the opposition agreed to

    under duress, with thousands of MAS-aligned protesters

    surrounding the congress and threatening violence.

    - - - -

    Comment

    - - - -

    ¶17. (C) It is likely there will be some amount of fraud in a

    referendum the MAS seems likely to win legitimately anyway.

    While it can be difficult to separate fact from fiction, the

    Morales administration has a reputation of doing exactly what

    they announce they will do.  In this case, 66 percent seems

    to be the target number, and the MAS is likely to pull out

    all the stops to reach that level.  With at least two-thirds

    support across the country and a minimum of five of the nine

    departments under his belt, President Morales would be able

    to claim a political mandate to implement the constitution

    quickly.  Practically speaking, this will put great pressure

    on the Congress, especially the opposition-controlled Senate,

    to acquiesce in negotiations and accept MAS versions of

    implementation legislation.  If they do not, Morales and

    others in the MAS have spoken of rule by decree.  Using

    similar logic, Morales could call for early elections to more

    quickly advance the "democratic revolution" in Bolivia.

    Early elections would also help the MAS avoid dealing with

    the quickly-crumbling economy, which would likely be more of

    an issue in December.

    ¶18. (C) Both sides seem to be angling over the margin of the

    MAS victory, not the victory itself.  While Morales continues

    to predict a victory of up to 80 percent, Vice President

    Garcia

    Linera tried to manage expectations with a 66 percent

    estimate on January 21.  The margin matters.  If the

    constitution gets less than two-thirds support, many

    observers feel this would represent a relative defeat,

    especially when Morales himself has set such high

    expectations.  On the other hand, we are equally concerned

    that large-margin victories in media luna departments could

    lead opposition leaders to ignore the national results and

    resume a course for autonomy on their own terms -- putting

    them on a collision course with the national government.  A

    solid but not overwhelming MAS victory, perhaps around 56 to

    60 percent, might be the best outcome to keep both sides from

    claiming a strong mandate for extreme measures.

    URS

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