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### Viewing cable 07LIMA2323, OLLANTA HUMALA - THE BENEFITS OF SOCIAL UNREST

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
07LIMA2323 | 2007-07-06 23:11 | 2011-02-20 12:12 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Lima
Appears in these articles: http://elcomercio.pe/

`

    VZCZCXYZ0000
    PP RUEHWEB

    DE RUEHPE #2323/01 1872331
    ZNY CCCCC ZZH
    P 062331Z JUL 07
    FM AMEMBASSY LIMA
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6086
    INFO RUEHAC/AMEMBASSY ASUNCION 1709
    RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA 4840
    RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 7443
    RUEHBU/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES 2964
    RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 0528
    RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ JUL LIMA
    RUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO 1326
    RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO 1371
    RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
    RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC

` `

    C O N F I D E N T I A L LIMA 002323

    SIPDIS

    SIPDIS

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/24/2016
    TAGS: PE PGOV PHUM PINR PREL SNAR
    SUBJECT: OLLANTA HUMALA - THE BENEFITS OF SOCIAL UNREST

    REF: A. LIMA 2000
         ¶B. LIMA 2009
         ¶C. LIMA 2126
        ...
    id: 114649
    date: 7/6/2007 23:31
    refid: 07LIMA2323
    origin: Embassy Lima
    classification: CONFIDENTIAL
    destination: 07LIMA2000|07LIMA2009|07LIMA2126|07LIMA2236
    header:
    VZCZCXYZ0000
    PP RUEHWEB

    DE RUEHPE #2323/01 1872331
    ZNY CCCCC ZZH
    P 062331Z JUL 07
    FM AMEMBASSY LIMA
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6086
    INFO RUEHAC/AMEMBASSY ASUNCION 1709
    RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA 4840
    RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 7443
    RUEHBU/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES 2964
    RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 0528
    RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ JUL LIMA
    RUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO 1326
    RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO 1371
    RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
    RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC

    ----------------- header ends ----------------

    C O N F I D E N T I A L LIMA 002323

    SIPDIS

    SIPDIS

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/24/2016
    TAGS: PE PGOV PHUM PINR PREL SNAR
    SUBJECT: OLLANTA HUMALA - THE BENEFITS OF SOCIAL UNREST

    REF: A. LIMA 2000
         ¶B. LIMA 2009
         ¶C. LIMA 2126
         ¶D. LIMA 2236

    Classified By: Classified By:  A/DCM V. Wunder, for Reasons 1.4 (c,d)

    ¶1.  (C) Summary:  Ambassador Struble paid a cordial
    farewell call on Ollanta Humala, president of the
    Nationalist Party of Peru (PNP) on July 3.  Humala said
    the Garcia administration's indifference to Peru's social
    problems was causing mounting unrest in the country.
    Humala noted his growing alliance with striking workers,
    protesting regional defense fronts and other frustrated
    Peruvians, predicting he would soon lead a broad-based
    political movement in favor of his goal of radical change.
    The nationalist leader said it would be bad for the country
    if Garcia were pushed out of office early, but the
    President was risking such an outcome by turning his
    back on electoral promises.  Humala admitted his party
    had experienced growing pains.  He lamented the
    coalition with the UPP and said his nationalists had no
    interest in proposals by the center-right Unidad Nacional
    for opposition control of the Congress.  Reflecting a
    continued anti-systemic outlook, Humala said he would
    not hesitate to walk away from the nationalist
    Congressional bloc if they discredit his movement.  He
    expressed concern that his reputation had become
    entangled with the fate of Puno regional President
    Fuentes because of the latter's strong embrace of Hugo
    Chavez.  Humala said he was trying to rally leftist
    support for Fuentes and to advise the regional president,
    but was uncertain whether he would succeed.
    (Ambassador's comment: Humala exuded an excited
    belief that things are moving his way.  Many of the
    movements now flocking to him, however, are
    opportunists angling for a deal.  I expect many of them
    will be peeled off by the GOP in coming weeks.  Humala
    retains most of the advantages he brought to last year's
    strong electoral showing -- confidence, conviction,
    charm, credibility with the poor and a handsome dark
    face in a country where most national leaders look
    unmistakably European.  He also, however, is still
    burdened with the same disadvantages.  Those include a
    military-molded personality that demands complete
    obedience and eschews compromise, association with the
    locally unpopular Hugo Chavez, and a certain naivet,
    about the motives of some who rally to his banner.  End
    Comment.)  End Summary.

    --------------------------
    The Cause of Social Unrest
    --------------------------
    ¶2.  (C) Ambassador Struble met with Ollanta Humala and
    his wife Nadine Heredia, the PNP's head of international
    relations, for one hour on July 3.  The tone of the meeting
    was cordial and open.  Humala said social tensions in
    Peru's interior are rising, prompted by the recognition that
    the GOP is unable -- or perhaps unwilling -- to fulfill
    campaign promises to address the social crisis in the
    countryside. Little had been done, for example, to fix
    crumbling roads, reform corrupt courts, or address Peru's
    twin problems of discrimination and exclusion.
    According to Humala, the GOP had focused instead on
    advancing the narrow self-interests of the ruling elite; in
    the words of Heredia, the governing party "was not
    Aprista but Alanista."  Ollanta said that it would not be
    good for Peru if Garcia were forced out of the Presidency
    short of term.  However, Humala seemed to believe that
    Garcia was doomed to fall unless he changed his ways.

    ¶3.  (C) Humala cited congressional approval of the PTPA
    as an example of how the GOP pandered to the rich.  Free
    trade, he argued, benefited only a portion of Peruvian
    society and created hardships for small agricultural
    producers.  The treaty, moreover, lacked legitimacy in
    Peru because it was passed without public debate and was
    the creation of a party -- former president Toledo's Peru
    Possible -- that had practically ceased to exist.

    ¶4.  (C) Humala saw public frustration at the gap between
    governmental rhetoric and reality as the fuel for a
    growing number of protests throughout Peru, with
    historically inarticulate groups -- workers, campesinos,
    and indigenous communities -- forming for the first time
    coalitions across regional, ethnic, and economic lines.  In
    the midst of this ferment, PNP party members were
    working at the district level to shape a common agenda
    that would unite protesters into a broad-based political
    movement.  For Humala, GOP dithering in addressing
    social problems in the mountains and in the jungles was
    creating an army of potential recruits for the PNP.
    Nadine Heredia noted that political observers had made
    much of Humala's failure to win regional presidencies in
    the November 2006 regional/municipal elections.  She
    suggested that the various regional "defense fronts"
    leading strikes and protests now underway in the jungle
    and highlands represented popular power.  They were
    seeking out Humala, as were some regional Presidents,
    the striking miners in Casaplaca and other aggrieved
    groups.  She predicted that they would coalesce into a
    new national opposition led by Humala.  Both Ollanta
    and Nadine were visibly excited by these strikes and
    protests

    -------------------------
    The Problem of Governance
    -------------------------

    ¶5.  (C) Humala admitted that organizing and
    administering a national political party was hard work,
    and he said that "criticizing is one thing, managing
    another," as evidenced by the fate of fellow radical
    Hernan Fuentes, regional president of Puno.  Humala said
    Fuentes faced stiff challenges in delivering good
    government in Puno -- a lack of talented technocrats,
    regional infighting, and a restive and extremist Aymara
    community -- but Fuentes had made the situation worse.
    Though Fuentes was not elected on the PNP banner,
    Humala admitted that nationalists would be tarnished
    by the Puno President's failure; Fuentes strong embrace
    of Bolivarianism (reftels A and D) and Hugo Chavez led
    many people to identify him with Ollanta.  (Humala said
    that his own identification with Chavez was exaggerated,
    though he added that he admires the Venezuelan leader
    and considers him a friend.)  Humala said that he would
    soon meet with Fuentes to advise that he spend more time
    fixing broken public services.  Humala had also called
    Jose Quintana, who lost to Fuentes by only one
    percentage point, to urge that he help Fuentes in the name
    of leftist solidarity; there was too much bad blood
    between the men, though, and a rapprochement seemed
    impossible.

    ¶6.  (C)  Humala said that the PNP erred by aligning with
    the Union for Peru (UPP) after the 2006 elections.  The
    UPP was better organized and more experienced than the
    PNP and represented both groups in the Congress'
    governing body.  UPP used those advantages to mislead
    and betray the PNP, pushing the nationalist agenda to the
    side.  Relations were much better now that the parties had
    ended their formal coalition.  As a result of the earlier
    experience, Humala said, he was completely disinterested
    in proposals by the center-right Unidad Nacional that the
    opposition form a joint slate to take the Presidency of
    Congress.  What do we have in common with Unidad
    Nacional?, he asked rhetorically.  Humala recognized that
    the PNP could fall prey to the same public discontent
    directed at the traditional parties and said he would not
    hesitate to walk away from his deputies if they discredit
    the movement.  All the same, he argued that only the PNP
    offered a genuine ideological choice within the Peruvian
    Congress and predicted that the PNP's focus on grass-
    roots organization would prevent his party from ignoring
    broad sectors of the society.

    ------------------------
    Radicalism not Extremism
    ------------------------

    ¶7.  (SBU) Humala characterized himself as a radical, but
    not an extremist, defining the two terms as follows:  A
    radical believes the status quo is unjust but offers
    concrete proposals to remedy the situation.  An extremist
    likewise believes society is unjust, but only tears down
    and does not seek to build up.  Ollanta reiterated his
    support for free elections and democracy.  He said he had
    a positive political program that sought, for example, to
    redefine the relationship between the state and foreign
    capital and to promote economic development -- as long
    as regulations protecting the environment and the rights
    of workers were enforced.  In his view, the GOP's
    counter-narcotics program needed to be redesigned to
    find markets for legal coca, a solution that would
    undercut the appeal of both the Shining Path and narco-
    traffickers.  If those kinds of reforms were not made,
    extremist groups -- who oppose any kind of economic
    development -- would grow stronger.  Humala
    maintained that he was not anti-US -- though he opposed
    aspects of US policy -- and that he recognized the
    preeminent role the US plays in Latin America.

    ¶8.  (SBU) Comment: Humala's sweeping analysis of
    Peruvian politics sometimes stumbled over facts.  The
    Ambassador pointed out, for example, that the PTPA had
    been debated extensively in congressional committees.
    Humala's claim that regional protests are coalescing also
    is suspect and ignores both the wide difference over goals
    in disparate social movements and the government's
    success in addressing local complaints (see septel).
    Humala's endorsement of electoral democracy was
    welcome, but there may be more than a little opportunism
    in his stance: many observes suspect he has already been
    eclipsed in the nationalist movement by his brother
    Antuaro, whose political platform is racist, violent, and
    anti-democratic (reftels B and C).  The Humala family
    remains an important force within Peru's radical left, and
    the Humalas have shown a willingness to talk to Embassy
    officials.  Post plans to continue to take advantage of their
    garrulousness.  End Comment.
    STRUBLE

    =======================CABLE ENDS============================

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