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### Viewing cable 08BUENOSAIRES235, ARGENTINA: GETTING PAST SQUARE ONE WITH THE

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
08BUENOSAIRES235 | 2008-02-26 12:12 | 2010-11-30 16:04 | SECRET | Embassy Buenos Aires

`

    VZCZCXYZ0003
    OO RUEHWEB

    DE RUEHBU #0235/01 0571220
    ZNY SSSSS ZZH
    O 261220Z FEB 08
    FM AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0322
    RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
    INFO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
    RHMFISS/HQ USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL PRIORITY
    RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
    RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
    RHMCSUU/FBI WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
    RHMFISS/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY

` `

    S E C R E T BUENOS AIRES 000235

    SIPDIS

    SIPDIS

    FOR P - U/S BURNS, WHA - A/S SHANNON, EEB A/S SULLIVAN
    NSC FOR DAN FISK
    TREASURY FOR A/S LOERY AND DAS O'NEILL
    DOD FOR DASD STEPHEN JOHNSON
    SOUTHCOM FOR ADM STAVRIDIS
    FBI FOR TOM FUENTES

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/22/2028
    TAGS: PREL CJAN KJUS EFIN SNAR MASS VZ AR
    SUBJECT: ARGENTINA: GETTING PAST SQUARE ONE WITH THE
    FERNANDEZ DE KIRCHNER GOVERNMENT

    REF: A. BUENOS AIRES 124
    ¶B. BUENOS AIRES 172
    ¶C. BUENOS AIRES 178
    ¶D. BUENOS AIRES 188
    ¶E. BUENOS AIRES 216
    ¶F. BUENOS AIRES 225

    Classified By: DCM Tom Kelly for reasons b, d.

    ¶1. (C) Summary: With a seven-week period of bilateral
    estrangement in our rear-view window, we have an opportunity
    -- again -- to build a more constructive relationship with
    Argentina. The warming trend in the bilateral relationship
    continues. President Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner and her
    government rolled out the red carpet for CODEL Engel and
    PDDNI Kerr, and the circle of GOA luminaries making positive
    statements about the United States is growing. Capitalizing
    on this opportunity, however, will be no easy task.
    Confidence must be rebuilt on our side and in Buenos Aires.
    The GOA must demonstrate its commitment to a constructive
    relationship, including through visits to the United States.
    But concerted effort is also needed from our side, including
    visits to Argentina by senior USG officials. The presence of
    authoritative USG officials here, and the attendant positive
    media coverage it creates, feed the Argentine need for
    attention, directly attacking one of the main causes of
    anti-Americanism here -- the perception that the USG does not
    care enough about Argentina. The hard work will be worth the
    effort if we can make a dent in anti-U.S. sentiment and
    influence Argentina to stay out of the Bolivarian camp.
    Making Argentina a more cooperative interlocutor and
    receptive audience for U.S. ideas is achievable. End Summary.

    An Austral Warming Trend
    ------------------------

    ¶2. (C) Three weeks have passed since the GOA signaled an end
    to its bilateral squabble with the USG via a highly
    publicized meeting on January 31 betweQPresident Cristina
    Fernandez de Kirchner (CFK) and Ambassador Wayne. (The U.S.
    Ambassador is the only Chief of Mission who has been received
    privately by CFK; she has now received him three times since
    her inauguration.) The change in how the United States is
    treated and portrayed by Argentine authorities is striking.
    As we had agreed beforehand, CFK insiders followed the
    January 31 session with positive and conciliatory statements
    from Cabinet Chief Alberto Fernandez, Foreign Minister Jorge
    Taiana, and others. From January 31 on, the Argentines have
    given prominent positive public play to each event involving
    a USG visitor, including the two (CODEL Engel and PDDNI) that
    occurred in the last week.

    ¶3. (C) The chorus of anti-U.S. recriminations has fallen
    silent. In their place, we are hearing positive
    pronouncements about our country. On February 20, for
    example, after a meeting between the Ambassador and Minister
    of Defense Garre, a hold-over from the first Kirchner
    administration who had previously resisted close cooperation
    with the USG, the Defense Ministry issued an upbeat
    communique on its website noting that "the Argentine side
    expressed gratitude for American assistance." The statement
    then proceeded to detail several areas of successful
    bilateral cooperation that helped to train and transform
    Argentina's military.

    ¶4. (C) In the wake of the meeting three weeks ago with CFK,
    the Ambassador has had friendly and productive meetings with
    Cabinet heavyweights such as Cabinet Chief Fernandez, MOD
    Garre, Foreign Minister Taiana, Economy Minister Lousteau,
    and Justice Minister Anibal Fernandez (reftels A-E).

    ¶5. (C) More importantly, CFK herself has demonstrated her
    continuing personal interest in ties with the USG by hosting
    two meetings in her presidential office at the Casa Rosada
    with U.S. visitors in rapid succession: a positive,
    well-covered session with CODEL Engel on February 21, and
    PDDNI Kerr, who had a productive meeting with her on February
    ¶25. Privately, Rep. Engel described the CODEL's 90-minute

    meeting with CFK as "a home-run." The meeting was covered
    intensively by the media, which characterized the event as a
    "Gesture of Detente" and "Improvement in Bilateral Relations"
    in leading daily headlines. PDDNI Kerr's meeting was equally
    positive. CFK warmly thanked him for his "important" visit,
    and repeated several times her commitment to the struggle
    against terrorism (saying, for example, that her government
    was "strongly committed to fight terrorism at home and
    internationally" and that her commitment to counter-terrorism
    was "absolute").

    Argentina Is In Play
    --------------------

    ¶6. (C) The about-face is striking, because it comes on the
    heels of a coordinated GOA effort, with the Kirchners and
    other GOA all-stars front and center, to impugn the motives
    of the United States in the Miami prosecution of Venezuelan
    agents connected to the matter of Guido Alejandro
    Antonini-Wilson's cash-filled suitcase. But the rhetorical
    course-correction is not surprising. CFK spent much of the
    latter half of 2007 telegraphing her intention to pursue
    closer relations with the United States, holding three
    meetings with Ambassador Wayne and spending a week in New
    York City wooing investors and the media, as well as meeting
    A/S Shannon. Just days before her inauguration, in a meeting
    with the Ambassador, CFK expressed her admiration for the
    United States and her desire to improve the bilateral
    relationship. Her Cabinet Chief Fernandez and new Ambassador
    to the United States Timerman argue forcefully that she wants
    to change past GOA practices and maintain good relations with
    the USG.

    ¶7. (C) Clearly, there is still hard work to be done to build
    mutual confidence and establish a basis for sustained "good"
    relations. To maintain and reinforce the recent positive
    momentum, we need more engagement, not less -- by both sides.
    The GOA certainly needs to demonstrate its commitment to
    this effort. But it is important to remember that we also
    have much to gain if things go well.

    ¶8. (C) The foreign policy orientation of the fledgling CFK
    government is very much in play. Moreover, in our view, the
    prevailing winds in the region favor our efforts to help
    Argentina evolve into a constructive partner. Hugo Chavez
    (whom CFK will visit in early March to ink an oil-for-food
    deal -- septel) is being portrayed in the local media as
    increasingly on the defensive, and Fidel Castro's withdrawal
    from the Cuban political scene is being covered here as the
    end of a radical era. In contrast, neo-left politicians like
    Lula (who just visited Buenos Aires to sign a number of
    bilateral agreements) and Chile's Michelle Bachelet are
    well-regarded here as pragmatic leaders who are making
    progress on social justice while maintaining good relations
    with Washington. We read the tea leaves to indicate that CFK
    much prefers to follow Lula's path than Chavez's, and wants
    to diversify Argentina's good relations in the world.

    ¶9. (C) At the same time, there are countervailing forces that
    could push the new president in another direction.
    Influential figures within her government, such as Planning
    Minister Julio de Vido, espouse a close embrace of Chavez's
    Bolivarian project. Although de Vido's primary motive for
    tilting towards Chavez may be pecuniary, a Bolivarian
    approach to foreign policy would sit well with CFK's poor and
    working class political constituency, and probably appeal at
    a certain level to the Peronist/populist instincts of CFK and
    her husband. Nestor Kirchner himself was never as
    comfortable with the United States as his wife has proven to
    be. For example, he never received this Ambassador or
    publicized contacts with us, whereas CFK has met the
    Ambassador six times and played each meeting positively and
    prominently in the media. While Nestor Kirchner is still a
    powerful decision-maker, he is by most reports ceding foreign
    policy to CFK.

    ¶10. (C) In our view, the government's left-leaning,
    nationalistic heritage does not necessarily lead to chronic

    confrontation with the United States. CFK seems more
    interested in governance and the longevity of her family's
    political prospects than in gratuitous Yankee-bashing.
    Without U.S. engagement, however, our opportunity to develop
    a more constructive relationship with Argentina could be
    squandered. We need to stay on the field to win the game.

    Why Visits Help Educate and Show Interest
    -----------------------------------------

    ¶11. (C) Engagement means, among other things, senior-level
    visits in both directions. This is true for symbolic and
    practical reasons. Like other geographically isolated
    countries, Argentines keep track of who visits them and who
    doesn't. The GOA's infatuation with the travel plans of
    Assistant Secretary Shannon reflects a deep-seated,
    society-wide insecurity about Argentina's relative importance
    in the world. Argentines obsess over the perceived
    indifference of other countries to their interests and
    concerns, especially that of the United States. Visits to
    the region by senior USG officials that seem to hopscotch
    over Argentina are always noted in the press and the
    corridors of power.

    ¶12. (C) CFK clearly shares this fixation. She told the
    Ambassador late last year that she faults the USG for not
    paying sufficient attention to Latin America (read:
    Argentina) over the past few years, and repeated that
    analysis to CODEL Engel on February 21 (ref F). This is not
    new, or confined to CFK and her constituency. It is a widely
    shared perception in Argentina that the United States has
    only rarely sustained positive interest in the Southern Cone.
    (At a recent lunch with prominent local analysts,
    businesspersons, and media figures for PDDNI Kerr, this was a
    recurrent theme -- and none of them were government
    supporters.) High-level visits can be used to demonstrate
    our good intentions and sincere desires for stronger
    relations. For example, Secretary Chao's December visit to
    CFK's inauguration helped us to rebut accusations of a U.S.
    conspiracy against the GOA during the furor over the Miami
    court case.

    ¶13. (C) Just as importantly, visits help GOA officials to
    learn. CFK and her husband know little about the way that
    our society and political system function. This holds true
    for most of their closest advisors and the Argentine
    political establishment writ large as well. The recent
    bilateral crisis, for example, reminded us how few of them
    (including those in the "pro-U.S." camp) really understand
    the extent of our justice system's independence. To our
    great advantage, Argentina is now headed by a President who
    wants to learn more about our country -- evinced, for
    instance, by the manner in which she pumps visitors for
    information about the U.S. presidential race. (Though she
    initially favored another woman candidate, it was clear by
    February 21 that she had absorbed much about all three
    leading candidates, and in both of her meetings with USG
    visitors in recent days she made positive comments about all
    three and about the vitality of our electoral process.)
    Alberto Fernandez told the Ambassador that he recently
    recommended that CFK accept Gordon Brown's invitation to
    travel to London for a gathering of international political
    party leaders precisely because it would be an excellent
    opportunity for her to learn more about the global scene
    through direct contact with other world leaders.

    The Most Promising Areas of Focus
    ---------------------------------

    ¶14. (C) On the practical level, despite this Mission's
    renewed access to every level of the Argentine government,
    there are a number of concrete policy areas in which
    Washington-based agencies and their leaders need to engage,
    including via the personal contact that visits make possible:

    -- (C) Finance: Achievement of a closer economic
    relationship, which CFK has told us she wants, will not

    happen without a Paris Club deal to normalize the GOA's debt
    to official creditors. That in turn will require Treasury's
    engagement with CFK's capable young Economy Minister Martin
    Lousteau. A Paris Club deal would be a critical first step
    towards an economically resurgent Argentina's broader
    reinsertion into global capital markets. This, in turn, will
    lessen Argentina's reliance on Venezuela to help place new
    Argentine debt, a reliance that comes with Bolivarian
    political and ideological strings attached. It could also
    help Lousteau, who is engaged in an internal tug-of-war with
    less market-friendly forces on many issues critical to the
    500 U.S. companies doing business here, establish his primacy
    within the GOA on economic policy.

    -- (C) Defense Cooperation: The Ministry of Defense is more
    friendly to us now than it has been at any time since MOD
    Garre took office two years ago. The Army chief, who
    previously kept his distance from the United States, has
    reached out to us for contact. Argentina's Navy and Air
    Force are eager to work with us. To capitalize on this
    attitudinal shift, we need high-profile U.S. military leaders
    like Southcom Commander Stavridis (scheduled to visit in May)
    to come to Argentina. His visit could help us bring the
    military relationship to another level, advancing the ball on
    issues like Argentine participation in exercises, exchanges,
    and regional security cooperation. Such a visit could also
    keep U.S. military suppliers in the race for important
    contracts like 3-D radars. MOD U/S Forti told the Ambassador
    last week that he hopes to get MOD Garre to the United States
    in the months ahead.

    -- (C) Law Enforcement and Intelligence: Cooperation in this
    area was a bright spot in the bilateral relationship, even
    during the most difficult periods of the first Kirchner
    administration. The worrying freeze in cooperation that took
    place during the period of estrangement is over, and our
    cooperation is returning to normal. We need senior-level
    visits, such as the planned trip by Deputy FBI Director
    Pistole in May, to advance U.S. interests in intensified
    counter-terrorism work, and to resume our valuable
    partnership with the GOA to bring the Iranian-sponsored
    perpetrators of the 1994 AMIA bombing to justice. We also
    need to get leading GOA law enforcement officials to the
    United States for bilateral consultations.

    -- (S) Intelligence: Argentine intelligence officials highly
    value their relationship with U.S. counterparts, as PDDNI
    Kerr's visit amply demonstrated. During a dinner with the
    PDDNI February 23, the GOA's Deputy Director of Intelligence
    recounted with pride that his service has shared high-value
    information with us and worked closely with us in support of
    U.S. goals. The PDDNI's visit reinforced our superb working
    relationship with Argentina's service (the National
    Intelligence Service -- SIDE), and we need to keep developing
    it through continued cooperation.

    -- (SBU) Science and Technology: CFK has repeatedly cited
    this as an area where she hopes to expand contact and
    cooperation with the United States.

    ¶15. (C) Visits by high-level U.S. and GOA officials to each
    other's country on these and other areas will advance our
    long-term interest in a friendly relationship with a
    populous, fast-growing country with considerable talent and
    resources. As importantly, such travel advances key U.S.
    interests in specific policy areas -- normalization of
    financial relationships between developing economies and
    creditors, amicable military-to-military ties, and
    cooperation on regional counter-terrorism issues -- that
    matter to our country's security interests.

    ¶16. (C) Finally, travel by prominent USG and GOA officials to
    each other's countries directly addresses one of the main
    causes of anti-Americanism here -- the perception that the
    USG does not care enough about Argentina. The positive media
    coverage created by such visits makes Argentines at all
    levels of society feel relevant in the world and taken into
    considerations by our powerful country. This cannot help but

    chip away at this society's collective animus towards out
    nation, which stems to a large extent from its collective
    insecurity about itself.

    Let's Make It Work
    ------------------

    ¶17. (C) Events over the past two years remind us that
    relations with the GOA are not easy. Nonetheless, we have a
    real opportunity to reach a more positive equilibrium in the
    bilateral relationship. In his January 31 meeting with CFK,
    the Ambassador deployed Department-cleared talking points
    that featured the proposal that both sides would demonstrate
    interest in the relationship by engaging each other,
    including via visits in each direction. As reported in ref
    A, CFK agreed, and expressed interest in a steady stream of
    high-level visits. We therefore have a deal in place with
    the GOA on travel in both directions. The Argentines need to
    hold up their end of the bargain. Cabinet Chief Fernandez
    told the Ambassador February 21 that he had identified March
    8-12 for travel to the United States. Foreign Minister
    Taiana, MOD Garre, and Economy Minister Lousteau also intend
    to travel to the United States soon. We should remain
    committed to our part in this effort, especially after
    several weeks of positive interaction with the GOA.
    KELLY

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