Cable Viewer

Currently released so far... 5440 / 251,287

### Articles

Brazil Sri Lanka United Kingdom Sweden Editorial United States Latin America Egypt Yemen Jordan

### Browse latest releases

2010/11 2010/12 2011/01 2011/02 2011/03
2010/11/28 2010/11/29 2010/11/30
2010/12/01 2010/12/02 2010/12/03 2010/12/04 2010/12/05 2010/12/06 2010/12/07 2010/12/08 2010/12/09 2010/12/10 2010/12/11 2010/12/12 2010/12/13 2010/12/14 2010/12/15 2010/12/16 2010/12/17 2010/12/18 2010/12/19 2010/12/20 2010/12/21 2010/12/22 2010/12/23 2010/12/24 2010/12/25 2010/12/26 2010/12/27 2010/12/28 2010/12/29 2010/12/30
2011/01/01 2011/01/02 2011/01/04 2011/01/05 2011/01/07 2011/01/09 2011/01/10 2011/01/11 2011/01/12 2011/01/13 2011/01/14 2011/01/15 2011/01/16 2011/01/17 2011/01/18 2011/01/19 2011/01/20 2011/01/21 2011/01/22 2011/01/23 2011/01/24 2011/01/25 2011/01/26 2011/01/27 2011/01/28 2011/01/29 2011/01/30 2011/01/31
2011/02/01 2011/02/02 2011/02/03 2011/02/04 2011/02/05 2011/02/06 2011/02/07 2011/02/08 2011/02/09 2011/02/10 2011/02/11 2011/02/12 2011/02/13 2011/02/14 2011/02/15 2011/02/16 2011/02/17 2011/02/18 2011/02/19 2011/02/20 2011/02/21 2011/02/22 2011/02/23 2011/02/24 2011/02/25 2011/02/26 2011/02/27 2011/02/28
2011/03/01 2011/03/02 2011/03/03 2011/03/04 2011/03/05 2011/03/06 2011/03/07 2011/03/08 2011/03/09 2011/03/10 2011/03/11

### Browse by creation date

66 72 73 75 79 86 88 89 90 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10
1966/12
1972/02 1972/08
1973/04
1975/03
1979/08
1986/05
1988/01
1989/12
1990/01 1990/07 1990/08 1990/10
2000/06 2000/09 2000/11
2001/02 2001/03 2001/07 2001/10
2002/02 2002/03 2002/11
2003/03 2003/04 2003/05 2003/06 2003/07 2003/08 2003/09 2003/10 2003/11 2003/12
2004/01 2004/02 2004/03 2004/04 2004/05 2004/06 2004/07 2004/08 2004/09 2004/10 2004/11 2004/12
2005/01 2005/02 2005/03 2005/04 2005/05 2005/06 2005/07 2005/08 2005/09 2005/10 2005/11 2005/12
2006/01 2006/02 2006/03 2006/04 2006/05 2006/06 2006/07 2006/08 2006/09 2006/10 2006/11 2006/12
2007/01 2007/02 2007/03 2007/04 2007/05 2007/06 2007/07 2007/08 2007/09 2007/10 2007/11 2007/12
2008/01 2008/02 2008/03 2008/04 2008/05 2008/06 2008/07 2008/08 2008/09 2008/10 2008/11 2008/12
2009/01 2009/02 2009/03 2009/04 2009/05 2009/06 2009/07 2009/08 2009/09 2009/10 2009/11 2009/12
2010/01 2010/02

### Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z
Embassy Athens Embassy Asuncion Embassy Astana Embassy Asmara Embassy Ashgabat Embassy Ankara Embassy Amman Embassy Algiers Embassy Addis Ababa Embassy Accra Embassy Abuja Embassy Abu Dhabi Embassy Abidjan Consulate Amsterdam American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura Embassy Buenos Aires Embassy Budapest Embassy Bucharest Embassy Brussels Embassy Bridgetown Embassy Bratislava Embassy Brasilia Embassy Bogota Embassy Bishkek Embassy Bern Embassy Berlin Embassy Belgrade Embassy Beirut Embassy Beijing Embassy Banjul Embassy Bangkok Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan Embassy Bamako Embassy Baku Embassy Baghdad Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen Embassy Conakry Embassy Colombo Embassy Chisinau Embassy Caracas Embassy Canberra Embassy Cairo Consulate Curacao Consulate Casablanca Consulate Cape Town
Embassy Dushanbe Embassy Dublin Embassy Doha Embassy Djibouti Embassy Dhaka Embassy Dar Es Salaam Embassy Damascus Embassy Dakar Consulate Dubai
Embassy Freetown
Embassy Guatemala Embassy Gaborone Consulate Guadalajara
Embassy Helsinki Embassy Harare Embassy Hanoi Consulate Hermosillo Consulate Hamburg
Iran RPO Dubai Embassy Islamabad Consulate Istanbul
Embassy Jakarta Consulate Jerusalem Consulate Jeddah
Embassy Kyiv Embassy Kuwait Embassy Kuala Lumpur Embassy Kinshasa Embassy Kigali Embassy Khartoum Embassy Kampala Embassy Kabul
Embassy Luxembourg Embassy Luanda Embassy London Embassy Ljubljana Embassy Lisbon Embassy Lima Embassy Lilongwe Embassy La Paz Consulate Lagos
Mission USNATO Embassy Muscat Embassy Moscow Embassy Montevideo Embassy Monrovia Embassy Minsk Embassy Mexico Embassy Mbabane Embassy Maputo Embassy Manama Embassy Managua Embassy Malabo Embassy Madrid Consulate Munich Consulate Montreal Consulate Monterrey Consulate Milan
Embassy New Delhi Embassy Nassau Embassy Nairobi Consulate Naples
Embassy Ouagadougou Embassy Ottawa Embassy Oslo
Embassy Pristina Embassy Pretoria Embassy Prague Embassy Port Au Prince Embassy Phnom Penh Embassy Paris Embassy Paramaribo Embassy Panama Consulate Peshawar
Embassy Quito
REO Basrah Embassy Rome Embassy Riyadh Embassy Riga Embassy Reykjavik Embassy Rangoon Embassy Rabat Consulate Rio De Janeiro Consulate Recife
Secretary of State Embassy Stockholm Embassy Sofia Embassy Skopje Embassy Singapore Embassy Seoul Embassy Sarajevo Embassy Santo Domingo Embassy Santiago Embassy Sanaa Embassy San Salvador Embassy San Jose Consulate Strasbourg Consulate Shenyang Consulate Shanghai Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis Embassy Tripoli Embassy Tokyo Embassy The Hague Embassy Tel Aviv Embassy Tehran Embassy Tegucigalpa Embassy Tbilisi Embassy Tashkent Embassy Tallinn
USUN New York USEU Brussels US Mission Geneva US Interests Section Havana US Delegation, Secretary UNVIE Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius Embassy Vienna Embassy Vatican Consulate Vladivostok
Embassy Windhoek Embassy Wellington Embassy Warsaw
Embassy Yerevan Embassy Yaounde
Embassy Zagreb

### Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
AR ASEC AEMR AORC AJ AF AMGT ACOA AO AE AU AFIN AX AMED ADCO AG AODE APER AFFAIRS AC AS AM AL ASIG ABLD ABUD AA AFU ASUP AROC ATFN AVERY APCS AER ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG AEC APECO AGMT ATRN
BA BR BL BO BH BTIO BEXP BU BIDEN BM BK BY BG BE BF BB BC BBSR BMGT BRUSSELS BTIU BILAT BX
CO CS CH COUNTER CVIS CASC CDG CI CU CIS CA CBW CF CM CLINTON CMGT CN CE CJAN CONDOLEEZZA COE CR CY CG CD CTM COUNTRY CLEARANCE CPAS CWC CT CKGR CB CACS COM CJUS CARSON CL COUNTERTERRORISM CIA CACM CDB CV CAN
DR DA DHS DOE DEA DK DJ DISENGAGEMENT DS DTRA DOD DEAX
ETTC EG ECON EINV EFIN ETRD EAGR ELAB ENRG ECPS EWWT EUN EAID EU EAIR ECIN EPET ER EINT EIND EMIN ELTN EFIS EI EN ES EC EXTERNAL EINVETC ENVR ENIV EZ EINN ENGR EUR ECA ET ESA ELN ENERG EK ENGY ETRO ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS ETRDEINVTINTCS ESENV ENVI EFTA ELECTIONS ECUN EINVEFIN ECIP EINDETRD EUC EREL ECONEFIN
FR FAO FTAA FREEDOM FI FARC FBI FJ FMLN FINR
GE GG GR GM GH GTIP GV GT GOI GCC GAZA GZ GA GANGS GTMO
HUMAN HILLARY HO HA HYMPSK HR HU HURI HK HSTC
IS IAEA IC IZ IR IT ITPHUM IV IPR IWC IQ IN IO ID ICTY ISRAELI IRAQI IIP ICRC ICAO IMO IF ILC IEFIN INRB INTELSAT IL IA IBRD IMF INR IRC ITALY ITALIAN INTERPOL IRAJ INRA INRO
JOSEPH JA JO JP JOHNNIE JUS JAMES
KCRM KPAL KDEM KE KWMN KPAO KNNP KJUS KGHG KN KS KISL KTIP KDRG KSCA KCOR KIPR KTLA KIRF KV KCFC KHLS KGIC KRAD KSPR KG KZ KTFN KTIA KHIV KWBG KACT KPRP KU KAWC KOLY KCIP KCFE KOCI KPKO KTDB KMRS KFRD KLIG KBCT KICC KMCA KGIT KSTC KMDR KUNR KPAK KNEI KSEP KPOA KFLU KNUP KNNPMNUC KVPR KOMC KAWK KO KTER KSUM KHUM KRFD KBIO KBTR KDDG KWWMN KFLO KSAF KBTS KPRV KMPI KHDP KNPP KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KNAR KWMM KERG KFIN KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KTBT KCRS KRVC KSTH KREL KIRC KNSD KTEX KPAI KHSA KPLS KR KPWR KWAC KMIG KSEC KIFR KDEMAF KGCC KPIN KNUC KCOM KDEV
LY LE LG LH LI LU LO LOG LT
MASS MNUC MEPP MOPS MARR MTCRE MK MTRE MX MU MCAP ML MO MP MA MY MIL MDC MTCR MAR MEPI MRCRE MI MT MR MQADHAFI MD MAPS MUCN MASC MASSMNUC MERCOSUR MC MPOS MZ MOPPS MAPP MG MCC
NATO NE NS NPT NL NAR NO NI NIPP NZ NU NPG NK NSG NA NT NASA NG NGO NP NSF NATIONAL
OPDC OREP ODIP OTRA OVIP OSCE OPRC OAS OFDP OPIC OIIP OEXC OECD OPCW OSCI OIE OIC OTR OVP OFFICIALS OSAC
PGOV PTER PREL PHUM PINR PINS PARM PREF PBTS PARMS PORG PE PK PHSA PROP PO PA PM PMIL PL PTERE POL PF PALESTINIAN PY PGGV PNR POV PAK PAO PFOR PHALANAGE PARTY PRGOV PNAT PROV PEL PINF PGOVE POLINT PRL PRAM PMAR PGOVLO PHUMBA PHUS PHUMPREL PG POLITICS PEPR PSI PINT PSOE PU POLITICAL PARTIES PBIO PECON POGOV PINL PKFK PGOF
QA
RS RU RO RIGHTS RW RICE ROBERT RF RFE RP REGION
SMIG SNAR SENV SOCI SCUL SY SO SP SA SW SHUM SR SF SZ SU SL SYR ST SANC SC SAN SIPRS SK SH SI SNARCS STEINBERG SN SG
TERRORISM TSPA TH TU TO TBIO TW TX TFIN TD TRGY TSPL TZ TIP TPHY TS TK TNGD TI TC TINT TRSY TP TR TT
UNGA UNSC UK UNESCO UN UP UZ UY UE UAE UNO UNEP UG US USTR UNHCR UNMIK UNDP UNHRC USAID UNCHS UNAUS USUN USEU UNCHC UV
VE VT VM VZ VTPREL VN
WZ WMO WI WTRO WTRQ WHO WWARD WB WBG WEU WHA WTO WA
XF XM XA XL XZ XW XR XH XG XT XC XY XD XE XK XS
YM YI YE
ZI ZP ZK ZF ZB ZANU ZOELLICK ZR ZU ZA ZO ZJ

### Browse by classification

CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN SECRET SECRET//NOFORN UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

### Community resources

Follow us on Twitter Check our Reddit Twitter this Digg this page Contact us on IRC

courage is contagious

### Viewing cable 07PORTAUPRINCE408, RESPONSE TO INR/B REQUIREMENTS ON PRESIDENT PREVAL

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:

- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #07PORTAUPRINCE408.

Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
07PORTAUPRINCE408 | 2007-03-01 17:05 | 2010-11-30 16:04 | SECRET | Embassy Port Au Prince

`

    VZCZCXRO2249
    OO RUEHQU
    DE RUEHPU #0408/01 0601750
    ZNY SSSSS ZZH
    O 011750Z MAR 07
    FM AMEMBASSY PORT AU PRINCE
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5478
    INFO RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC PRIORITY
    RUEHZH/HAITI COLLECTIVE
    RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 1434
    RUEHSA/AMEMBASSY PRETORIA 1257
    RUMIAAA/HQ USSOUTHCOM J2 MIAMI FL
    RUCOWCV/CCGDSEVEN MIAMI FL//OLE/OI//

` `

    S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 07 PORT AU PRINCE 000408

    SIPDIS

    SIPDIS

    STATE FOR WHA/CAR
    DRL
    S/CRS
    SOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD
    STATE PASS AID FOR LAC/CAR
    INR/IAA (BEN-YEHUDA)
    TREASURY FOR JEFFREY LEVINE

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/26/2017
    TAGS: PGOV PREL SNAR KCRM HA
    SUBJECT: RESPONSE TO INR/B REQUIREMENTS ON PRESIDENT PREVAL

    REF: STATE 5107

    Classified By: Classified by Ambassador Janet A. Sanderson for reasons
    1.4(b) and (d).

    ¶1. (C) Introduction: Reftel asks for a comprehensive
    assessment of President Preval's decision-making process and
    leadership style. As noted in reftel, post has reported on
    many of the specific topics inquired about over the course of
    Preval's re-election campaign and the first year of his
    second term. We welcome the opportunity to reiterate key
    judgments that we believe will become increasingly important
    as the Preval administration approaches completion of its
    first year in office. In sum, we believe Preval's commitment
    to building democratic institutions, promoting political
    stability, and developing the economy corresponds with our
    own interests. However, Preval's weaknesses as an executive,
    his reflexive nationalism, and his disinterest in managing
    bilateral relations in a broad diplomatic sense, will lead to
    periodic frictions as we move forward our bilateral agenda.
    Case in point, we believe that in terms of foreign policy,
    Preval is most interested in gaining increased assistance
    from any available resource. He is likely to be tempted to
    frame his relationship with Venezuela and Chavez-allies in
    the hemisphere in a way that he hopes will create a
    competitive atmosphere as far as who can provide the most to
    Haiti. Additionally, Preval has displayed a tendency to
    fixate on a particular issue at the exclusion of all others
    and then to move on to other issues without leaving much to
    show for his efforts. Since taking office in May 2006,
    Preval has been the education president, the roads president,
    and now the anti-narcotics president. All of these issues
    are worthy of his time and attention, but require a coherent
    approach to policy implementation in addition to rhetoric.
    End Introduction.

    ¶2. (U) The answers below are keyed to the questions in
    reftel:

    Question A
    ----------

    ¶3. (C) How Does Preval make policy decisions? What sources
    of information does Preval draw from when making decisions
    and how does he process that information, e.g. is he
    receptive new information, does he seek advice or rely on his
    own intuition? Does Preval tend to see policy issues in
    black and white or in shades of grey?

    ¶4. (C) We judge that Preval largely relies on his own
    intuition and experience in formulating policy. We see that
    experiences from his first presidential term are nearly
    always a touchstone on key bilateral issues, even when
    circumstances have significantly changed or the conclusion he
    is drawing is not directly applicable to the issue at hand.
    Preval's recent insistence that the U.S. does not do enough
    to combat narcotics traffic through Haiti is a clear example
    of an attitude carried over from his first term. Likewise,
    Preval's current resistance to making a placating gesture to
    China after the GoH voiced support for Taiwan at the UN is
    based in part on Preval's belief that China behaved
    unreasonably when renewing UN mission mandates during his
    first term.

    ¶5. (C) On balance, we see that issues where Preval has a
    fixed view, for example relations with China, he is
    remarkably resistant to policy advice. On other issues,
    where Preval is not so engaged either because of lack of
    personal interest or lack of experience, Preval seems readily
    open to new information and flexible in his approach. This
    seems most apparent in issues relating to economic policy.
    Rather than separating Preval's thinking into black and white
    or shades of gray, we believe it is more useful to bear in
    mind that Preval often appears not to fully think through the
    implications or consequences of a particular issue. He
    neglects to carry out the kind of study or put in place the
    administrative structure required to turn an idea into
    workable policy. This was most obvious in his approach to
    negotiations with gang leaders, his focus throughout the

    PORT AU PR 00000408 002 OF 007

    summer of 2006. Due to a lack of results however, he
    abandoned the effort. Preval's entire policy seemed to be
    encapsulated in the formulation, ''disarm or die.'' He
    never appears to have coherently addressed the issue central
    to the negotiations -- the future of the most violent
    gang-leaders.

    Question B
    ----------

    ¶6. (C) Does Preval seek advice from a wide array of sources
    or only look to certain people, if so, whom and on what
    issues? Does he trust any of his advisers or ministers to
    make key decisions in his stead? How does he deal with
    dissension or criticism from his advisors? What tone does he
    set when he meets with his advisers - e.g., does he encourage
    them to work collegially, competitively, or within the formal
    bureaucratic structure? Has Bob Manuel's influence with
    Preval diminished, and if so, why? Does Manuel continue to
    informally oversee the security portfolio? If not, who does,
    is there another adviser poised to succeed Manuel as Preval's
    ''right-hand man.''?

    ¶7. (C) Preval seems open to a wide array of sources -- he
    reportedly reads and pays attention to the media on a wide
    variety of subjects and maintains a broad circle of friends
    -- but appears to limit the number of people from whom he
    actively seeks advice. Some, most notably Robert Manuel,
    have complained that the number is growing smaller and that
    his fiancee, Elizabeth Delatour, is the only advisor with
    whom he has meaningful discussions. Fritz Longchamp,
    Secretary General of the Presidency, appears to have gained

    SIPDIS
    access and influence to Preval regarding the dispute with
    China. As a former foreign minister, Longchamp may also be
    advising on broader foreign policy issues. Gabriel Verret
    remains Preval's closest advisor on economic issues. Lionel
    Delatour, Elizabeth Delatour's brother-in-law, maintains
    somewhat regular access due to his family ties and his direct
    involvement with the effort to promote HOPE legislation,
    however Delatour himself has complained that Preval often
    ignores his advice. With a few exceptions, Preval appears
    not to trust his advisers or ministers to make key decisions,
    or even to implement key decisions. The most recent account
    of the council of ministers meetings provided by Gabriel
    Verret to the Ambassador describes Preval going through the
    action items of each ministry and demanding status reports.

    ¶8. (C) With the Embassy and USG representatives, ministers as
    a group are deferential and mostly subdued in Preval's
    presence. There is little air of give-and-take or
    willingness among ministers to extemporize. In meetings with
    USG officials Preval has abruptly cut off Prime Minister
    Alexis on two occasions, disagreeing with his views. On
    another occasion he cut off Minister of Public Works Frantz
    Varella, who had offered an observation regarding security,
    telling him that security was not his responsibility. We
    hear of very little, if any, substantive criticism or
    dissension among the cabinet in private. The most visible
    intra-cabinet dissension, so far, has been between the
    judiciary and security officials; most recently, a rift
    between the justice minister and chief prosecutor Claudy
    Gassant. Preval has pointedly refused to intervene. Many
    among Haiti's chattering classes attribute this to a strategy
    on Preval's part to keep members of his government divided
    and weak. We judge rather that his attitude is more in line
    with his overall passivity as an executive.

    ¶9. (C) Having observed the Preval-Manuel relationship over
    the past two years since Manuel's return to Haiti to join the
    Preval campaign, we judge that Manuel's role is most
    accurately described as Best Friend. Manuel remains Preval's
    closest confidante, and Preval still uses him as his personal
    emissary, but the influence of Manuel's own views on any
    given subject appear limited. For example, against Manuel's
    advice and own wishes, Preval involved Manuel in his first
    negotiations with gang leaders in the summer of 2006. With
    Manuel's displeasure with this policy unabated, Preval simply
    cut him out of the process. Manuel appears still to be
    charged with the management of Preval's personal security,

    PORT AU PR 00000408 003 OF 007

    overseeing the Presidential Protection Unit (USPN) in the
    palace, but Preval himself appears to have taken complete
    charge of security policy. Manuel, along with the justice
    minister, is charged with preparing President Preval for the
    upcoming drug trafficking summit in the Dominican Republic on
    March 16, but our contacts with Manuel on narcotics issues so
    far indicate that he does no more than to restate Preval's
    own views, often with more passion. Manuel confided to the
    Ambassador that he is frustrated with Preval's unwillingness
    to listen to him and heed advice and that he wants to leave
    Haiti, preferably as Ambassador to Mexico, but that Preval
    has been non-committal about the timing of his appointment.
    Whatever the state of their relationship on policy issues,
    Preval clearly values Manuel's friendship and may be
    reluctant to let him go.

    Question C
    ----------

    ¶10. (C) What is the nature of Preval's relationship with
    Director General of the Haitian National Police Mario
    Andresol, Foreign Minister Jean Reynald Clerisme, Secretary
    of State for Public Security Luc Eucher Joseph, Secretary
    General of the Presidency Fritz Longchamp, and economic
    advisor Gabriel Verret.

    ¶11. (C) Preval's relationship with Andresol does not appear
    to extend beyond their formal association as president and
    the chief of police. Preval and Andresol had no personal
    connection to speak of before Preval inherited and then
    re-appointed Andresol director general of the HNP. For his
    part, Andresol has, on several occasions, expressed
    frustration that he has not been able to gain more trust from
    Preval. Likewise, Preval's relationship with Eucher seems
    limited to their formal roles: Eucher is not otherwise a
    close of advisor from whom Preval seeks counsel. Preval and
    Clerisme have a large number of mutual acquaintances from the
    rural/populist movements, however they do not have a close
    personal bond. Preval has reportedly taken personal charge of
    all important foreign policy issues, leaving Clerisme with
    little influence. Longchamp is both a trusted advisor and
    personal friend. With Preval limiting PM Alexis' direction
    of the cabinet, and not having named a chief of staff, the
    importance of Longchamp's position has steadily increased.
    Finally, Gabriel Verret, perhaps even more than either Robert
    Manuel or Longchamp, is the other advisor in the palace who
    can claim to be both a trusted confidante and influential
    policy advisor, as Preval remains open to advice on economic
    matters. In the same way, Elizabeth Delatour, who is also
    formally charged with providing economic advice, might be the
    single most important influence on Preval.

    Question D
    ----------

    ¶12. (C) What are Alexis and Foreign Minister Clerisme's
    perceptions of former President Jean-Bertrand Aristide?

    ¶13. (C) Based on Alexis' long-standing personal association
    with Preval from his previous administration through his
    active role in the most recent presidential campaign, we
    surmise that Alexis' views on Aristide hew closely to
    Preval's own (i.e. that Aristide betrayed the Haitian
    people). If Alexis believes otherwise, he gives no hint of
    disagreement with Preval. We are less familiar with
    Clerisme, but note that Clerisme's political engagement began
    with his involvement as a liberation theology priest working
    in the rural, peasant movement in Haiti's northeast. Most of
    this movement's leaders became disillusioned with Aristide
    during the mid-1990's. Whatever Clerisme's views, as with
    Alexis, to the extent they do not correspond to Preval's, he
    keeps them to himself.

    Question E
    ----------

    ¶14. (C) Is Preval influenced by ideology, and if so, what are
    the major influences? What motivated him to return to
    politics? What role do Catholicism, voodoo, and

    PORT AU PR 00000408 004 OF 007

    liberation-theology play in his worldview? What is his full
    educational history and experience working in private
    industry?

    ¶15. (C) Preval seems profoundly uninfluenced and uninterested
    in ideology at this stage in his life. Despite his
    involvement in radical/communist circles as a student in
    Belgium and his entrance into Haitian politics through a
    populist movement deeply influenced by liberation theology,
    Preval's public and private discourse is practically devoid
    of any notions reflecting that background. In the context of
    the developing world, we would most accurately describe him
    as a neo-liberal, particularly in that he has embraced free
    markets and foreign investment.

    ¶16. (C) At the same time, Preval's discourse regarding
    Haitian politics remains framed in the context of his past.
    He still refers broadly to ''the people'' and ''the
    bourgeois'' in referring to Haitian society. His leftist
    views reportedly caused a deep rift between himself and his
    family, particularly his father, who although opposed to
    Duvalier held traditional Haitian upper-class views. This is
    as close to an insight as we may venture into his motivation
    to return to politics, which is something of a puzzle. While
    a canny politician and an effective campaigner Preval evinces
    little of the ambition or overt drive typical of most
    politicians. It may be simply that he rightly recognized
    that he was the only leader in Haiti who legitimately
    represented the broad-based popular movement that toppled
    Duvalier and first brought Aristide to power.

    ¶17. (C) Like most Haitians, Preval was raised Catholic with
    an exposure to voodoo practices. He is a non-observant
    Catholic but maintains a cordial and respectful relationship
    with Haiti's Catholic hierarchy. He is particularly close to
    Haiti's Archbishop, who was a life-long friend of his
    parents. Likewise, he maintains a respectful and cordial
    relationship with Voodoo leaders. There are unconfirmed
    reports that Robert Manuel, who is a born-again Christian,
    influences Preval's religious views and that the two
    regularly pray together. However, Preval has been jocular
    and once dismissive of Manuel's praying in conversations with
    ambassadors.

    ¶18. (C) Preval's educational and professional experiences
    listed in open sources are mostly accurate. He studied
    agronomy at the University of Louvain in Belgium but did not
    receive a degree reportedly because he spent too much time
    participating in political activities. Though he obtained a
    position with the National Institute for Mineral Resources,
    apparently as part of Jean-Claude Duvalier's conciliatory
    gestures to his father's opponents, Embassy sources do not
    believe he actually worked at his job. He went into the
    bakery business with several friends in the mid-1970,
    including Michele Pierre Louis, a renowned patron of Haitian
    arts, and through her met Aristide. Preval's bakery was
    successful, but destroyed by associates of the military after
    the 1991 coup d'etat. Among the many incidents of conflict
    between the right-wing and Aristide supporters, Preval
    apparently holds a special grudge against those who destroyed
    his business.

    Question F
    ----------

    ¶19. (C) What is Preval's relationship to Geri Benoit? Does
    his sister, Marie-Claude Calvin, play an influential role in
    his administration? Does Elizabeth Delatour yield influence
    over Preval's political decision-making? What is the status
    of their impending nuptials? One of Preval's daughters lives
    with him in Port-au-Prince. Where is the other and what does
    she do?

    ¶20. (C) Though Preval and his second wife, Geri Benoit,
    appeared together at times during the campaign, they have
    apparently lived entirely separate lives since his
    inauguration. Mrs. Calvin and Preval are very close. She
    was among the family members on the payroll at his
    agricultural foundation in Marmalade, which was funded by

    PORT AU PR 00000408 005 OF 007

    Taiwan. Calvin acts as his scheduler, keeps an office in the
    palace, and one ambassador reports that Calvin kept him at
    bay for several days when he had an urgent request to see
    Preval. Calvin and her husband also accompanied Preval on
    his second trip to Cuba for medical attention. Mrs. Calvin
    does not appear to play any role in influencing government
    policy.

    ¶21. (C) It is difficult to assess Elizabeth Delatour's
    influence on policy. She is extremely private and reserved
    and does not generally engage foreign officials in
    substantive conversation. She politely resisted the
    Ambassador's attempts to establish a more social
    relationship. Numerous people close to Preval complain that
    Preval has neglected both his work and limited the input of
    other advisors in favor of Delatour. During the critical
    juncture over the dispute with China regarding the renewal of
    MINUSTAH's mandate, Delatour appeared to play a central role.
    SRSG Mulet chose Delatour as his contact when he argued that
    the GoH must provide China some kind of written apology:
    Preval ultimately grudgingly signed a letter. Delatour
    called the Ambassador in Washington when she was in the
    Department for consultations asking for an update on the
    Chinese delegation's position in New York. Preval's wedding
    plans remain perhaps the best kept secret in Haiti. We have
    confirmed from multiple reliable sources that they are
    formally engaged, but no further reliable news regarding
    wedding plans has emerged. Factors that might be
    complicating their plans include Preval's health and living
    arrangements for Delatour's 11-year old son.

    ¶22. (C) Preval's older daughter, Dominique, lives with her
    mother in Port-au-Prince and runs a stationery store above
    her mother's book store. She is close to both her parents.
    Preval's younger daughter, Patricia, is currently in Sri
    Lanka studying Asian art.

    Question G
    ----------

    ¶23. (C) How much importance does Preval place on maintaining
    close bilateral relations with the United States? Are there
    aspects of the relationship he values more than others? Does
    he view it as a mutually beneficial relationship? Does he
    see Haiti as having obligations or responsibilities to the
    U.S.? How does he view the U.S.' previous involvement in
    Haiti? What is Preval's relationship with the Haitian
    Diaspora?

    ¶24. (C) Preval recognizes that the U.S. is Haiti's most
    important bilateral partner and that Haiti's closest societal
    links internationally are with the U.S. His priority on the
    bilateral agenda is to leverage and extract the most
    assistance for Haiti on his own terms and to tap into the
    wealth and resources of the Haitian-American community in the
    U.S. As the president of a small, poor nation in the shadow
    of the American behemoth, he clearly believes that the U.S.
    has far greater obligations to Haiti than the other way
    around, if, in fact, Haiti has any obligations at all.
    Preval numbers a few close friends in the diaspora of whom we
    know. He established a friendship with Dumarsais Simeus
    during the presidential campaign, and they stay in contact by
    email. For the most part, however, Preval does not seem
    closely connected to or interested in Haitian communities
    abroad. He has indicated on a number of occasions that he
    fears that pro-Aristide extremists exert excessive influence
    in diaspora communities.

    Question H
    ----------

    ¶25. (C) Are cabinet officials involved in any illicit
    activities? How does Preval handle corruption within his
    administration?

    ¶26. (C) There has been little indication that cabinet members
    have been involved in illicit activities so far. At the time
    of the cabinet's formation, observers noted that the
    ministers had been mostly free of suspicion over the course

    PORT AU PR 00000408 006 OF 007

    of their careers. Indications regarding Preval's own
    attitude toward corruption are mixed. During his first term,
    Preval either tolerated or was forced to accept gross abuses
    on the part of close associates of Aristide. In either case,
    Preval has exhibited a non-confrontational approach with
    passivity toward difficult issues as the hallmark of his
    political career. Preval maintains a reputation for personal
    honesty.

    Question I
    ----------

    ¶27. (C) How has Preval handled domestic criticism thus far?
    Does he have a public communications or publicity strategy or
    manager? How does he perform under significant stress? How
    does he respond to confrontation, either personally or
    indirectly, e.g. mass unrest?

    ¶28. (C) Preval has been remarkably impervious and
    unresponsive to domestic criticism thus far, which mostly
    centers on his approach to security and the gang activity
    during the fall of 2006, when kidnapping and crime spiked
    upward. There have been no significant incidents of mass
    unrest since his inauguration on which to judge his reaction.
    Based on his intense involvement in the daily review of
    security policy, we surmise that he pays close attention to
    public opinion, even if remaining uncommunicative himself.
    He has a palace spokesman in name, Assad Volce but hardly
    uses him. Nor does he use the minister for communication,
    who is traditionally the government's chief spokesperson.
    Regarding his public relations strategy, he has said on
    several occasions, that he wants to change the tradition of
    Haiti's presidents being the center of attention who make
    promises that they are unable to deliver. ''I will talk when
    I have some accomplishments to talk about.''

    Question J
    ----------

    ¶29. (C) What is the status of Preval's Lespwa coalition? Is
    it a cohesive coalition or is it fractured? Do its members
    regard Preval as their leader? What is Preval's relationship
    to Fanmi Lavalas (FL)?

    ¶30. (C) Preval has removed himself from involvement in Lespwa
    and undertakes little visible role in managing relations with
    the parliament. Lespwa is directionless as a party. Though,
    in the general, Lespwa's drift does not particularly stand
    out in the incohesive atmosphere of Haiti's parliament.
    Senate President Joseph Lambert, has emerged as a leader
    among Lespwa parliamentarians, but devotes more of his energy
    to cultivating his image as parliament's chief, rather than
    simply a party leader. No other Lespwa parliamentarian has
    demonstrated a capacity to take direction of the party.
    Lespwa parliamentarians no longer regard Preval as their
    party leader, but recognizing he remains the country's most
    popular politician and still associated with Lespwa in the
    public's mind, they do not generally criticize him in public
    or in private. Preval has virtually no contact with any of
    the various FL factions.

    Question K
    ----------

    ¶31. (C) How long are Preval's workdays? How many breaks does
    he take during his workday, what does he do during them and
    how long do they last? Under what circumstances?

    ¶32. (C) Preval appears to be keeping an increasingly busy
    schedule, working longer hours and seeing more visitors. The
    Ambassador has taken phone calls from him as early as 6:30 am
    and has had meetings as late as 6:30 pm. Preval told the
    Ambassador recently that he has for many years taken a full,
    in-pajamas 2-3 hour nap every afternoon, allowing him to
    maintain his energy.

    Question L
    ----------

    PORT AU PR 00000408 007 OF 007

    ¶33. (S/NF) What family history of alcohol or substance use
    does Preval have? What alcohol or drugs has he been observed
    using, how much, and under what circumstances? Any related
    problems? Has Preval ever been observed to be high or drunk,
    disoriented, trembling or physically jittery, or had memory
    lapses? How many drinks can Preval consume before he shows
    signs of inebriation? Does Preval take any medications?

    ¶34. (S/NF) Preval's parents both lived well into their
    eighties. His father, in particular, reportedly enjoyed
    robust health. No one in his immediate family has or had a
    reputation for alcohol abuse. Preval drinks whiskey and
    smokes in public, including at Embassy functions, but we have
    not observed him inebriated nor seen him take more than one
    or two drinks. Rumors abound about his deteriorating
    physical condition -- intense physical pain, high dosages of
    medication, however; we have no credible first-hand reports
    to confirm this. In our meetings Preval has always been
    completely lucid and has never appeared to be in any great
    pain. Special intelligence indicates that he began taking
    medication after the most recent round of medical
    examinations in Cuba that indicated a possibility of the
    return of prostate cancer.
    TIGHE

`