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### Viewing cable 06LAPAZ3400, WILL THE REAL OPPOSITION LEADER PLEASE STAND UP?

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
06LAPAZ3400 | 2006-12-18 21:09 | 2010-12-03 21:09 | SECRET//NOFORN | Embassy La Paz

`

    VZCZCXRO8185
    PP RUEHLMC
    DE RUEHLP #3400/01 3522107
    ZNY SSSSS ZZH
    P 182107Z DEC 06
    FM AMEMBASSY LA PAZ
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1676
    INFO RUEHAC/AMEMBASSY ASUNCION 6399
    RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA 3723
    RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 7593
    RUEHBU/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES 4843
    RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 2095
    RUEHGT/AMEMBASSY GUATEMALA 0611
    RUEHPE/AMEMBASSY LIMA 2168
    RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID 3228
    RUEHME/AMEMBASSY MEXICO 1985
    RUEHMN/AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO 4290
    RUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO 4732
    RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO 9317
    RHMFISS/HQ USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
    RUMIAAA/USCINCSO MIAMI FL
    RUEHLMC/MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE CORP
    RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC
    RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
    RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC

` `

    S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 LA PAZ 003400

    SIPDIS

    S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 LA PAZ 003400

    SIPDIS

    NOFORN
    SIPDIS

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/18/2036
    TAGS: ECON PGOV PREL BL
    SUBJECT: WILL THE REAL OPPOSITION LEADER PLEASE STAND UP?

    REF: LA PAZ 03178

    Classified By: ECOPOL Counselor Andrew Erickson for reason 1.4 (d).

    -------
    SUMMARY
    -------

    ¶1. (C) Evo Morales' election in December 2005 was a political
    earthquake in Bolivia, sweeping aside political expectations
    that have defined Bolivian politics for generations and at
    the same time breaking open fissures and offering up new
    possibilities. While President Morales' popularity has risen
    and fallen since his election, his popularity has surged
    since the hydrocarbons nationalization and his successful use
    of political hardball tactics to overcome an
    opposition-imposed blockade of the senate. For now, the
    traditional opposition appears to be crumbling under the
    GOB's pressure. While it is too early to discern the final
    shifts of Bolivia's political tectonic plates this cable is
    an effort to explore the new political geography of current
    and potentially future leaders of the country. End Summary.

    -----------------------------
    INDIGENOUS & REGIONAL LEADERS
    -----------------------------

    ¶2. (C) RENE JOAQUINO CABRERA: A mason by trade, Potosi Mayor
    Rene Joaquino Cabrera is an emerging politician known for
    competent management, reported honesty, and efforts to govern
    transparently. Despite a low public profile, Joaquino has
    been involved in politics since 1993 and has twice been
    elected mayor of Potosi. His political group, the Social
    Alliance of the People, has earned a reputation of acting
    independently and moderately to build consensus within
    Bolivia's Constituent Assembly (CA). However, Joaquino does
    not have the name recognition or funding necessary for a
    national campaign. Given the number of potential candidates
    for the next presidential race, there may not be enough
    political space for Joaquino to make a convincing bid for
    national office. Despite these challenges to Joaquino's
    emergence nationally, his indigenous background and personal
    biography as a former child laborer in the country's mines
    could galvanize popular support.

    ¶3. (C) OSCAR GERARDO MONTES: A member of the Movement of the
    Revolutionary Left (MIR) party, Tarija Mayor Oscar Montes is
    an intelligent strategist who understands the realities that
    the political opposition faces in Bolivia's current political
    climate. With a wealth of political experience that includes
    positions within national and local government, Montes has
    regional name recognition within Tarija and enjoys a good
    reputation. Understanding the political chasm that separates
    the country's eastern and western regions, Montes has
    expressed interest in creating a politically viable
    alternative to the MAS that includes an alliance among
    Bolivia's southern-most departments (Chuquisaca, Potosi,
    Ouro, and Tarija). He is politically aligned with Joaquino
    (see above). Poloffs believe a national ticket featuring
    Joaquino as the presidential candidate and Montes as the
    candidate for vice-president could empower Bolivia's southern
    departments and garner wide national support.

    ¶4. (C) PEDRO TICANA: Former minister of indigenous affairs
    under the Mesa and Rodriguez governments, Pedro Ticana is
    unaffiliated with a particular political party and is an
    effective political operator with a diverse political
    background. A former adviser to Movement Towards Socialism
    (MAS), Ticana is now closely aligned with Potosi Mayor
    Joaquino and eastern Bolivia. Helping Joaquino organize a
    new political party, Ticana could help establish a political
    block comprising the country's southern and eastern
    departments. Ticana's political experience with three

    LA PAZ 00003400 002 OF 005

    different governments demonstrates his ability to work beyond
    party lines to establish effective political connections and
    build consensus. As a Quechua, Ticana has the ability to
    take advantage of the political prominence indigenous groups
    now enjoy. Political analysts, however, note Ticana prefers
    to remain behind the scenes rather than seek a national
    leadership position. At a November 2006 indigenous
    roundtable with Ambassadors Goldberg and Shapiro, Ticana
    presented himself as a moderate political thinker who seeks
    to establish a political environment that values inclusion
    and dialogue.

    ¶5. (C) MARIO COSSIO CEJAS: Touting a wide range of
    experience in academia and politics, Tarija Prefect Mario
    Cossio's potential as a rising opposition leader is aided by
    his hydrocarbons-rich prefecture. Given Tarija's
    hydrocarbons revenues, Cossio is well-equipped to advance the
    agenda of the media luna (Pando, Beni, Tarija, and Santa Cruz
    departments), especially on regional autonomy. A member of
    Camino al Cambio, a civic political group, Cossio enjoys
    broad public support and is viewed positively by the Bolivian
    national media. His ability to rise as a national opposition
    leader may also be aided by his discreet role in the highly
    publicized divide between the media luna and the GOB, which
    could help Cossio attract more wide-ranging political
    support. Physically mestizo, Cossio can tap into the support
    President Morales now enjoys by Bolivians who identify with
    him and his background.

    ¶6. (C) RUBEN COSTAS: The public face of the media luna and a
    member of Autonomia Por Bolivia, Ruben Costas' position as
    prefect of the economic powerhouse Santa Cruz department
    gives him a natural edge in establishing himself as a
    regional opposition leader. Costas' willingness to work with
    the United States would make him a solid democratic partner.
    His politically savvy use of the media to advance the
    interests of the media luna have helped establish Costas as
    one of the primary political opposition leaders. His public
    confrontations with the Morales administration, the latest
    bringing a public retraction by Morales of his accusations
    that Costas was involved in a plot against him, have helped
    Costas score public victories against the GOB. Given his
    close relationship with other prefects in eastern Bolivia and
    his leadership on regional autonomy, Costas is well-known and
    respected in the east. However, his close association with
    eastern Bolivia may limit him to a regional leadership
    position, as the Altiplano has historically opposed
    candidates hailing from the east, especially the Santa Cruz
    department.

    -------------
    THE DINOSAURS
    -------------

    ¶7. (C) JOSE LUIS PAREDES MUNOZ: A member of PODEMOS who
    values U.S. assistance in Bolivia, La Paz prefect Jose Luis
    Paredes stands out as a potential national opposition leader.
    In an October 11 meeting with ECOPOL, Paredes privately
    expressed his interest in obtaining U.S. support to run for
    the presidency (poloff explained that we do not intervene in
    Bolivia's internal affairs). As the former mayor of El Alto,
    Paredes has a strong base of support in the Altiplano,
    despite the efforts of several MAS-controlled social sector
    groups to drive him from office. With a history of
    demonstrating an ability to govern, Paredes has responded
    well to the enormous pressure he is under from his
    constituency and from the central government. With an eye
    towards his political future, Paredes is attempting to shore
    up support through a public relations campaign highlighting
    his accomplishments as prefect. However, Paredes remains
    very vulnerable to allegations of corruption in regard to
    charges filed against him on October 16 for actions allegedly
    committed while he was mayor of El Alto.

    LA PAZ 00003400 003 OF 005

    ¶8. (C) MANFRED REYES VILLA: A former presidential candidate,
    Cochabamba Prefect and Agrupacion Unidad por Cochabamba (AUC)
    leader Manfred Reyes Villa has a wealth of political
    experience and broad name recognition although whispers of
    corruption haunt him. Known for delivering on his promises,
    Reyes is popular among his constituents, which is
    particularly challenging given his position in an otherwise
    MAS-dominated prefecture. Despite his political experience,
    Reyes' political potential may have peaked during his 2002
    presidential campaign, when he garnered approximately 22
    percent of the national vote. Lacking a politically relevant
    party, Reyes ties to Bolivia's old guard politicians will
    likely keep him from regaining a national position. Although
    Reyes may be unable to assume a national role, he will likely
    remain an important player regionally.

    ¶9. (C) SAMUEL DORIA MEDINA: A wealthy prominent businessman
    and national political figure (since his third place finish
    in Bolivia's December 2005 national elections) Samuel Doria
    Medina is the head of the National Unity (UN) party and a
    delegate in the CA. An entrepreneur and former minister
    under ex-President Jaime Paz Zamora, Medina's financial
    resources and position within the CA enable him to coordinate
    a national opposition movement. Known for having political
    ambitions, Medina may try to thrust himself into the next
    presidential race without regard for his realistic chances of
    winning it. Medina's chances to run for the presidency,
    however, have been reportedly neutralized by his willingness
    to broker deals with the MAS in the CA and threats by the GOB
    to nationalize his businesses. While the impact of these
    reports are unknown, Medina would still have to find support
    outside his party and overcome the leftist, indigenous trend
    in Bolivian politics if he were to attempt a presidential
    campaign. In the meantime, Medina will likely continue to
    play a key role building consensus in the CA.

    ----------
    IRRELEVANT
    ----------

    ¶10. (C) JORGE "TUTO" QUIROGA RAMIREZ: The recognized leader
    of PODEMOS, Jorge "Tuto" Quiroga is considered the glue that
    binds his party in the CA and in Bolivia's congress.
    Unfortunately, he seems tone-deaf to Bolivia's radically
    changed political environment, and has been unable to strike
    a chord with the population. As the leader of the largest
    opposition group in the CA and a former president, Quiroga
    remains Bolivia's primary opposition leader. Like Ortiz,
    Quiroga's leadership of PODEMOS may undermine his ability to
    win national office. Beginning late-November 2006, Quiroga
    has started to take a more public stance on divisive issues
    between his party and the GOB to build pressure and support
    for a two-thirds vote in the CA. While effective as a party
    leader, most political analysts concede Quiroga would not
    fare well in a future presidential race. In a recent meeting
    with the Ambassador, Quiroga appeared less interested in
    Bolivian politics than discussing foreign policy -- that of
    Bolivia as well as the U.S.

    ¶11. (C) OSCAR ORTIZ: An influential and well-known
    opposition senator from Santa Cruz, Oscar Ortiz has made a
    name for himself by using his political position to publicly
    criticize the GOB. A member of PODEMOS, with a background in
    business, Ortiz understands the intricacies of economics and
    can use his experience to communicate policies that would
    resonate with a Bolivian electorate that is increasingly
    focused on employment. Like Costas, his ties to eastern
    Bolivia and his pro-business outlook may diminish his ability
    to rise through the political ranks, particularly in light of
    GOB rhetoric against free market economics. Ortiz's
    affiliation with the PODEMOS party may also prevent his

    LA PAZ 00003400 004 OF 005

    emergence as an opposition leader that can gain broad
    political appeal.

    -------------
    LEFT FIELDERS
    -------------

    ¶12. (S/NF) SANTOS RAMIREZ: The president of Bolivia's senate,
    Movement Towards Socialism (MAS) senator Santos Ramirez is
    considered the political confidant of President Morales. A
    lawyer by education and a teacher by training, Ramirez has an
    extensive history in politics as a member of congress before
    being elected to the senate in 2006. Born in the Potosi
    department, Ramirez is well-known in Potosi and serves as the
    head of the MAS party there. With a political career closely
    aligned to President Morales' legislative agenda, Ramirez'
    political future is considered heavily dependent on the
    political successes of the GOB. Rumored to be a major player
    in the MAS' political playbook, Ramirez is in a position to
    assume a leadership position in the event President Morales
    stumbles (reftel A). Ramirez' role in railroading
    controversial legislative measures supported by President
    Morales confirms the opinions of many political analysts who
    consider him a radical. Emboldened by the newfound wave of
    popularity President Morales is enjoying, Ramirez may shed
    his politically adept style for a more radical approach.
    With his strong alliances with the GOB, Ramirez may ride out
    the wave of President Morales' strong popularity before
    revealing his personal aspirations to emerge on Bolivia's
    national stage. Sensitive reporting indicates that Ramirez
    may be very vulnerable on corruption and human smuggling
    charges.

    ¶13. (C) FERNANDO HUANACUNI: A relative unknown in Bolivia's
    political sphere, professor, lawyer, and Aymara writer
    Fernando Huanacuni has raised the eyebrows of political
    analysts convinced President Morales' successor will hail
    from the country's indigenous community. Relatively young in
    political terms at thirty-nine years old, Huanacuni may
    present a fresh perspective that would be welcomed by a
    growing population of young Bolivians frustrated with a
    government they view as unresponsive. A resident of El Alto
    and born in the La Paz department, Huanacuni's ability to
    galvanize support for a national run would directly challenge
    President Morales' base of support. Despite his lack of name
    recognition, Huanacuni's television show on social pressures
    is helping him gain wider recognition if he uses it as a
    method to raise his political profile. Similar to the
    assessments made for other indigenous politicians,
    Huanacuni's indigenous background could help him galvanize
    greater support.

    ¶14. (C) JUAN DEL GRANADO: Known as the "the Gardener" for his
    passionate support for environmentally-friendly public works,
    La Paz Mayor Juan del Granado is popular among his
    constituency for his efforts to reform La Paz and fight
    corruption. He stands as a likely candidate to emerge
    nationally from the MAS' rank-and-file if the opportunity
    presented itself. A former member of the MIR and the
    Movimiento Bolivia Libre (MBL), Granado is the founder and
    current leader of the Movimiento Sin Miedo (MSM), a political
    party he started when he ran for mayor that is now allied
    with the MAS. In addition to the publicity Granado enjoys
    from his position, his skillful use of radio and television
    for constituent outreach help him raise his profile among the
    electorate while highlighting his accomplishments in office.
    Despite his alliances with MAS, however, Granado political
    viability remains murky at best. Considered a member of the
    middle class, Granado would likely have to counter negative
    perceptions of the middle class among the indigenous
    community and traditionally marginalized groups to court
    their vote. A former minister in the Gonzalo Sanchez de
    Lozada administration, Granado would be an easy target for

    LA PAZ 00003400 005 OF 005

    this past association and this would present a high hurdle
    for Granado to clear in a national run for office.

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    COMMENT
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    ¶12. (C) The December 2005 and July 2006 national elections
    exposed what turned out to be a hollow center of leadership
    in Bolivia's political traditional political classes. It was
    in this vacuum that Evo Morales took the presidency;
    Bolivia's traditional leaders are still reacting to the
    earthquake his victory represented. The rough-and-tumble
    politics favored by Morales have further exposed the many
    weaknesses of the traditional opposition. Most recently, the
    emergence of divisive issues within the CA has spurred some
    political leaders to action, and offered tentative clues to
    possible alternative opposition leadership. While a
    resurgence of the old opposition is possible, it is unlikely
    that Bolivia's future leader will be one of the political
    dinosaurs and irrelevant leaders of the past. Bolivia
    remains an overwhelmingly poor country. Given the leftward
    shift of rhetoric among many voters, a post-Morales
    environment would likely offer serious electoral advantages
    to a leader emerging from Evo's indigenous supporters. If
    Morales were to exit unexpectedly, an indigenous or strong
    regional leader would be the most likely candidate to fill
    his position. This year, President Morales has had a lucky
    run, with high hydrocarbons and other commodity revenues
    leaving him abundant room to maneuver. That situation will
    change dramatically, however, when his economic luck runs
    out. End Comment.
    GOLDBERG
    SELECT * FROM `cable` WHERE `id` = '90016' ORDER BY `date` ASC

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