Cable Viewer

Currently released so far... 5440 / 251,287

### Articles

Brazil Sri Lanka United Kingdom Sweden Editorial United States Latin America Egypt Yemen Jordan

### Browse latest releases

2010/11 2010/12 2011/01 2011/02 2011/03
2010/11/28 2010/11/29 2010/11/30
2010/12/01 2010/12/02 2010/12/03 2010/12/04 2010/12/05 2010/12/06 2010/12/07 2010/12/08 2010/12/09 2010/12/10 2010/12/11 2010/12/12 2010/12/13 2010/12/14 2010/12/15 2010/12/16 2010/12/17 2010/12/18 2010/12/19 2010/12/20 2010/12/21 2010/12/22 2010/12/23 2010/12/24 2010/12/25 2010/12/26 2010/12/27 2010/12/28 2010/12/29 2010/12/30
2011/01/01 2011/01/02 2011/01/04 2011/01/05 2011/01/07 2011/01/09 2011/01/10 2011/01/11 2011/01/12 2011/01/13 2011/01/14 2011/01/15 2011/01/16 2011/01/17 2011/01/18 2011/01/19 2011/01/20 2011/01/21 2011/01/22 2011/01/23 2011/01/24 2011/01/25 2011/01/26 2011/01/27 2011/01/28 2011/01/29 2011/01/30 2011/01/31
2011/02/01 2011/02/02 2011/02/03 2011/02/04 2011/02/05 2011/02/06 2011/02/07 2011/02/08 2011/02/09 2011/02/10 2011/02/11 2011/02/12 2011/02/13 2011/02/14 2011/02/15 2011/02/16 2011/02/17 2011/02/18 2011/02/19 2011/02/20 2011/02/21 2011/02/22 2011/02/23 2011/02/24 2011/02/25 2011/02/26 2011/02/27 2011/02/28
2011/03/01 2011/03/02 2011/03/03 2011/03/04 2011/03/05 2011/03/06 2011/03/07 2011/03/08 2011/03/09 2011/03/10 2011/03/11

### Browse by creation date

66 72 73 75 79 86 88 89 90 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10
1966/12
1972/02 1972/08
1973/04
1975/03
1979/08
1986/05
1988/01
1989/12
1990/01 1990/07 1990/08 1990/10
2000/06 2000/09 2000/11
2001/02 2001/03 2001/07 2001/10
2002/02 2002/03 2002/11
2003/03 2003/04 2003/05 2003/06 2003/07 2003/08 2003/09 2003/10 2003/11 2003/12
2004/01 2004/02 2004/03 2004/04 2004/05 2004/06 2004/07 2004/08 2004/09 2004/10 2004/11 2004/12
2005/01 2005/02 2005/03 2005/04 2005/05 2005/06 2005/07 2005/08 2005/09 2005/10 2005/11 2005/12
2006/01 2006/02 2006/03 2006/04 2006/05 2006/06 2006/07 2006/08 2006/09 2006/10 2006/11 2006/12
2007/01 2007/02 2007/03 2007/04 2007/05 2007/06 2007/07 2007/08 2007/09 2007/10 2007/11 2007/12
2008/01 2008/02 2008/03 2008/04 2008/05 2008/06 2008/07 2008/08 2008/09 2008/10 2008/11 2008/12
2009/01 2009/02 2009/03 2009/04 2009/05 2009/06 2009/07 2009/08 2009/09 2009/10 2009/11 2009/12
2010/01 2010/02

### Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z
Embassy Athens Embassy Asuncion Embassy Astana Embassy Asmara Embassy Ashgabat Embassy Ankara Embassy Amman Embassy Algiers Embassy Addis Ababa Embassy Accra Embassy Abuja Embassy Abu Dhabi Embassy Abidjan Consulate Amsterdam American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura Embassy Buenos Aires Embassy Budapest Embassy Bucharest Embassy Brussels Embassy Bridgetown Embassy Bratislava Embassy Brasilia Embassy Bogota Embassy Bishkek Embassy Bern Embassy Berlin Embassy Belgrade Embassy Beirut Embassy Beijing Embassy Banjul Embassy Bangkok Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan Embassy Bamako Embassy Baku Embassy Baghdad Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen Embassy Conakry Embassy Colombo Embassy Chisinau Embassy Caracas Embassy Canberra Embassy Cairo Consulate Curacao Consulate Casablanca Consulate Cape Town
Embassy Dushanbe Embassy Dublin Embassy Doha Embassy Djibouti Embassy Dhaka Embassy Dar Es Salaam Embassy Damascus Embassy Dakar Consulate Dubai
Embassy Freetown
Embassy Guatemala Embassy Gaborone Consulate Guadalajara
Embassy Helsinki Embassy Harare Embassy Hanoi Consulate Hermosillo Consulate Hamburg
Iran RPO Dubai Embassy Islamabad Consulate Istanbul
Embassy Jakarta Consulate Jerusalem Consulate Jeddah
Embassy Kyiv Embassy Kuwait Embassy Kuala Lumpur Embassy Kinshasa Embassy Kigali Embassy Khartoum Embassy Kampala Embassy Kabul
Embassy Luxembourg Embassy Luanda Embassy London Embassy Ljubljana Embassy Lisbon Embassy Lima Embassy Lilongwe Embassy La Paz Consulate Lagos
Mission USNATO Embassy Muscat Embassy Moscow Embassy Montevideo Embassy Monrovia Embassy Minsk Embassy Mexico Embassy Mbabane Embassy Maputo Embassy Manama Embassy Managua Embassy Malabo Embassy Madrid Consulate Munich Consulate Montreal Consulate Monterrey Consulate Milan
Embassy New Delhi Embassy Nassau Embassy Nairobi Consulate Naples
Embassy Ouagadougou Embassy Ottawa Embassy Oslo
Embassy Pristina Embassy Pretoria Embassy Prague Embassy Port Au Prince Embassy Phnom Penh Embassy Paris Embassy Paramaribo Embassy Panama Consulate Peshawar
Embassy Quito
REO Basrah Embassy Rome Embassy Riyadh Embassy Riga Embassy Reykjavik Embassy Rangoon Embassy Rabat Consulate Rio De Janeiro Consulate Recife
Secretary of State Embassy Stockholm Embassy Sofia Embassy Skopje Embassy Singapore Embassy Seoul Embassy Sarajevo Embassy Santo Domingo Embassy Santiago Embassy Sanaa Embassy San Salvador Embassy San Jose Consulate Strasbourg Consulate Shenyang Consulate Shanghai Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis Embassy Tripoli Embassy Tokyo Embassy The Hague Embassy Tel Aviv Embassy Tehran Embassy Tegucigalpa Embassy Tbilisi Embassy Tashkent Embassy Tallinn
USUN New York USEU Brussels US Mission Geneva US Interests Section Havana US Delegation, Secretary UNVIE Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius Embassy Vienna Embassy Vatican Consulate Vladivostok
Embassy Windhoek Embassy Wellington Embassy Warsaw
Embassy Yerevan Embassy Yaounde
Embassy Zagreb

### Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
AF ASEC AR AORC AJ AM AMGT AE AU AGMT AG AS AFIN APER ABUD ATRN AL AEMR ACOA AO AX AMED ADCO AODE AFFAIRS AC ASIG ABLD AA AFU ASUP AROC ATFN AVERY APCS AER ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG AEC APECO
BM BR BL BA BILAT BTIO BEXP BH BE BK BRUSSELS BX BU BO BIDEN BY BG BF BB BC BBSR BMGT BTIU
CU CO CH CDG CIA CACM CDB CI CS CVIS CA CBW CASC CD CV CMGT CLINTON CE CJAN CG CF CN CAN COUNTER CIS CM CONDOLEEZZA COE CR CY CTM COUNTRY CLEARANCE CPAS CWC CT CKGR CB CACS COM CJUS CARSON CL COUNTERTERRORISM
DJ DEAX DR DA DHS DOE DEA DK DISENGAGEMENT DS DTRA DOD
EG ECON ETTC EFIN EZ ETRD EUN ELAB EU EINV EAID EMIN ENRG ECPS EN ER ET ES EPET EUC EI EAIR EAGR EIND EWWT ELTN EREL ECIN EFIS EINT EC ECONEFIN ENVR ECA ELN EFTA EXTERNAL EINVETC ENIV EINN ENGR EUR ESA ENERG EK ENGY ETRO ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS ETRDEINVTINTCS ESENV ENVI ELECTIONS ECUN EINVEFIN ECIP EINDETRD
FR FINR FAO FTAA FREEDOM FI FARC FBI FJ FMLN
GM GG GV GH GA GE GT GR GTIP GOI GCC GAZA GZ GANGS GTMO
HU HR HA HILLARY HUMAN HO HYMPSK HURI HK HSTC
IV IR IS IZ IAEA IN IT ICTY IQ ICAO INTERPOL IPR INRB IRAJ INRA INRO IO IC ID IIP ITPHUM IWC ISRAELI IRAQI ICRC IMO IF ILC IEFIN INTELSAT IL IA IBRD IMF INR IRC ITALY ITALIAN
JAMES JO JA JOSEPH JP JOHNNIE JUS
KGIC KDEM KTIP KOMC KNNP KWBG KU KPAL KGHG KAWK KISL KPAO KHLS KSUM KSPR KJUS KCRM KGCC KPIN KDRG KTFN KG KBIO KHIV KSCA KN KS KCOR KZ KE KFRD KIPR KPKO KNUC KMDR KPLS KOLY KUNR KIRF KIRC KACT KRAD KCOM KMCA KV KHDP KVPR KDEV KWMN KMPI KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KTLA KCFC KTIA KPRP KAWC KCIP KCFE KOCI KTDB KMRS KLIG KBCT KICC KGIT KSTC KPAK KNEI KSEP KPOA KFLU KNUP KNNPMNUC KO KTER KHUM KRFD KBTR KDDG KWWMN KFLO KSAF KBTS KPRV KNPP KNAR KWMM KERG KFIN KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KTBT KCRS KRVC KSTH KREL KNSD KTEX KPAI KHSA KR KPWR KWAC KMIG KSEC KIFR KDEMAF
LE LG LH LY LU LI LO LOG LT
MOPS MARR MNUC MX MASS MCAP MO MIL MTCRE ML MR MZ MPOS MOPPS MTCR MAPP MU MY MA MG MASC MCC MEPP MK MTRE MP MDC MAR MEPI MRCRE MI MT MQADHAFI MD MAPS MUCN MASSMNUC MERCOSUR MC
NATO NL NU NIPP NI NPT NG NO NE NS NAR NZ NPG NK NSG NA NT NASA NGO NP NSF NATIONAL
OVIP OPDC OPRC OIIP OFFICIALS OSAC OAS OEXC ODIP OREP OFDP OTRA OSCE OPIC OECD OPCW OSCI OIE OIC OTR OVP
PARM PREL PTER PHUM PGOV PINR PINS PREF PK PE PBTS POGOV PROP PINL PL POL PBIO PSOE PHSA PKFK PO PGOF PA PARMS PORG PM PMIL PTERE PF PALESTINIAN PY PGGV PNR POV PAK PAO PFOR PHALANAGE PARTY PRGOV PNAT PROV PEL PINF PGOVE POLINT PRL PRAM PMAR PGOVLO PHUMBA PHUS PHUMPREL PG POLITICS PEPR PSI PINT PU POLITICAL PARTIES PECON
QA
RS RO REGION RU RW RP RIGHTS RICE ROBERT RF RFE
SOCI SY SENV SA SP SNAR SG SCUL SR STEINBERG SF SW SU SL SMIG SO SN SHUM SZ SYR ST SANC SC SAN SIPRS SK SH SI SNARCS
TS TU TX TBIO TW TSPA TH TIP TI TRGY TC TR TT TERRORISM TO TFIN TD TSPL TZ TPHY TK TNGD TINT TRSY TP
UK UN US UNGA UNSC UNO UNMIK UV UY UP UG USEU USUN UZ UNESCO UE UAE UNEP USTR UNHCR UNDP UNHRC USAID UNCHS UNAUS UNCHC
VE VZ VN VT VM VTPREL
WTO WTRO WA WI WZ WMO WTRQ WHO WWARD WB WBG WEU WHA
XG XT XM XF XR XS XL XK XH XA XY XC XZ XW XD XE
YE YM YI
ZB ZI ZF ZP ZK ZANU ZOELLICK ZR ZU ZA ZO ZJ

### Browse by classification

CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN SECRET SECRET//NOFORN UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

### Community resources

Follow us on Twitter Check our Reddit Twitter this Digg this page Contact us on IRC

courage is contagious

### Viewing cable 09TELAVIV1177, CODELS CASEY AND ACKERMAN MEET WITH DEFENSE

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:

- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09TELAVIV1177.

Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
09TELAVIV1177 | 2009-06-02 06:06 | 2010-11-28 18:06 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Tel Aviv

`

    VZCZCXRO8024
    OO RUEHROV
    DE RUEHTV #1177/01 1530619
    ZNY CCCCC ZZH
    O 020619Z JUN 09
    FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2000
    INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
    RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
    RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
    RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY

` `

    C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TEL AVIV 001177

    SIPDIS

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/01/2019
    TAGS: PREL PTER PGOV MOPS IR KWBG IS
    SUBJECT: CODELS CASEY AND ACKERMAN MEET WITH DEFENSE
    MINISTER BARAK

    Classified By: DCM Luis G. Moreno, reasons 1.4 (b,d)

    ¶1. (C) Summary:  Post hosted two CODELS during the week of
    May 25: one from the Senate Foreign Relations Committee led
    by Senator Casey, the other from the House Committee on
    Foreign Affairs led by Congressman Ackerman.  Both
    delegations met with Defense Minister Ehud Barak, who
    conveyed similar points on the Peace Process and Israel's
    concerns about Iran.  End summary.

    Peace Process
    -------------

    ¶2. (C) Barak began his meeting with the Casey delegation by
    apologizing for being late due to what he described as an
    "internal debate" at the Prime Minister's office regarding
    the development of a response to President Obama's upcoming
    speech in Cairo.  He noted there are "perceived gaps" between
    the USG and the GOI regarding the Peace Process, and
    explained the GOI's internal debate is focused primarily on
    how to ensure that the U.S. and Israel "trust each other."
    Barak expressed confidence that PM Netanyahu is sincere in
    wanting to "seize this opportunity and move forward" with the
    Palestinians, but alluded to members of the coalition who do
    not agree with this course of action.

    ¶3. (C) From his perspective, Barak told the Casey delegation
    that the GOI was in no position to dictate policy to the
    Palestinians or the USG regarding the Peace Process -- "it
    takes two to tango, and three to negotiate," he said.  Barak
    noted that it is the GOI's responsibility to ensure that "no
    stone is left unturned" regarding the Peace Process; if
    efforts to achieve peace ultimately fail, then the GOI must
    be able to state that every effort was pursued.  He said he
    personally had no objection to "two states for two nations,"
    and panned Arab arguments for a bi-national state in Israel.
    Barak said Israel envisions "two peoples living side by side
    in peace and good neighborliness" as the final goal.

    ¶4. (C) With the Ackerman delegation, Barak focused on the
    need for a regional approach to the peace process.  He
    supports a regional initiative for peace and cooperation for
    the entire Middle East region to be launched by Israel.  He
    stressed as well the need to build trust and convince the
    U.S. administration that the new Israeli government is
    "serious in its efforts toward peace."

    ¶5. (C) Barak commented on political developments in the West
    Bank and Gaza in both meetings.  He said the GOI continues to
    review its policy, and then added that the Palestinian
    Authority has much to accomplish in terms of law enforcement,
    a functioning judiciary, and regaining control of Gaza before
    a "balanced" Palestinian state can be created.  He has been
    extremely impressed with the work of U.S. Security
    Coordinator Gen. Dayton training PA security forces, and
    commended Salam Fayyad's concrete, practical approach.

    ¶6. (C) Barak made clear in these meetings that he feels the
    Palestinian Authority is weak and lacks self-confidence, and
    that Gen. Dayton's training helps bolster confidence.  He
    explained that the GOI had consulted with Egypt and Fatah
    prior to Operation Cast Lead, asking if they were willing to
    assume control of Gaza once Israel defeated Hamas.  Not
    surprisingly, Barak said, the GOI received negative answers
    from both.  He stressed the importance of continued
    consultations with both Egypt and Fatah -- as well as the NGO
    community -- regarding Gaza reconstruction, and to avoid
    publicly linking any resolution in Gaza to the release of
    kidnapped IDF soldier Gilad Shalit.

    Iran/North Korea
    ----------------

    ¶7. (C) In his meeting with CODEL Casey, Barak said the GOI
    believes its "keystone" relations with the USG remain strong.
     He described the integral role the USG plays in preserving
    Israel's Qualitative Military Edge (QME), especially when
    faced with threats posed by Iran, Hizballah, and Hamas.  He
    noted that the GOI's positions on Iran are well known, and
    described North Korea's recent nuclear test as a "second
    wake-up call" (the first being the AQ Khan network).  Barak
    asked rhetorically how a lack of firm response to North Korea
    would be interpreted by Iran's leadership, speculating the
    USG would be viewed as a "paper tiger."

    ¶8. (C) In both meetings, Barak said "no option should be
    removed from the table" when confronting Iran and North
    Korea; engagement will only work in conjunction with a
    credible military option, he said.  Barak said he was

    TEL AVIV 00001177  002 OF 002

    personally skeptical that engagement would lead to an
    acceptable resolution, and argued in favor of a paradigm
    shift to confront the triple threat posed by nuclear
    proliferation, Islamic extremist terrorism, and rogue/failing
    states.  He said a strategic partnership with China, Russia,
    India, and the EU is essential in facing these threats.
    Barak argued that failure to prevent a nuclear-armed Iran
    would result in a nuclear arms race in the region as Turkey,
    Egypt, and Saudi Arabia look to acquire nuclear weapons.

    ¶9. (C) When asked if the USG and GOI have fundamental
    differences of opinion when assessing Iran's nuclear program,
    Barak said we share the same intelligence, but acknowledged
    differences in analysis.  He suggested that the USG view is
    similar to presenting evidence in a criminal court case in
    which a defendant is presumed innocent until proven guilty.
    As such, USG standards are tougher -- especially following
    the failure to find WMD in Iraq -- while end-products such as
    the 2007 NIE unintentionally take on a softer tone as a
    result.  Barak said the fate of the region and the world
    rests on our ability to prevent Iran from gaining nuclear
    weapons -- as such, the standards for determining guilt
    should be lower as the costs are higher.

    ¶10. (C) In both meetings, Barak described Iranians as "chess,
    not backgammon players."  As such, Iran will attempt to avoid
    any hook to hang accusations on, and look to Pakistan and
    North Korea as models to emulate in terms of acquiring
    nuclear weapons while defying the international community.
    He doubted Tehran would opt for an open, relatively
    low-threshold test like the recent one in North Korea.
    Rather, Iran will seek ways to bypass the NPT while ensuring
    its program is redundant and well-protected to prevent an
    irreparable military strike.  Barak estimated a window
    between 6 and 18 months from now in which stopping Iran from
    acquiring nuclear weapons might still be viable.  After that,
    he said, any military solution would result in unacceptable
    collateral damage.  He also expressed concern that should
    Iran develop nuclear capabilities, other rogue states and/or
    terrorist groups would not be far behind.

    Pakistan
    --------

    ¶11. (C) Barak reinforced his message regarding Pakistan in
    both meetings.  He described Pakistan as his "private
    nightmare," suggesting the world might wake up one morning
    "with everything changed" following a potential Islamic
    extremist takeover.  When asked if the use of force on Iran
    might backfire with moderate Muslims in Pakistan, thereby
    exacerbating the situation, Barak acknowledged Iran and
    Pakistan are interconnected, but disagreed with a causal
    chain. To the contrary, he argued that if the United States
    had directly confronted North Korea in recent years, others
    would be less inclined to pursue nuclear weapons programs.
    By avoiding confrontation with Iran, Barak argued, the U.S.
    faces a perception of weakness in the region.

    ¶12. (U) CODELS Casey and Ackerman did not have the
    opportunity to clear this message.

    ********************************************* ********************
    Visit Embassy Tel Aviv's Classified Website:
    http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/telaviv
    ********************************************* ********************
    CUNNINGHAM

`