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### Viewing cable 05LIMA2158, COCALEROS ATTRACTIVE TO POLITICAL GROUPS BUT

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
05LIMA2158 | 2005-05-12 18:06 | 2010-12-12 21:09 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Lima

`

    This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

` `

    C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 LIMA 002158

    SIPDIS

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/11/2014
    TAGS: SNAR ASEC PGOV PTER PE
    SUBJECT: COCALEROS ATTRACTIVE TO POLITICAL GROUPS BUT
    NARCOTRAFFICKERS GIVE THEM ALL THE SUPPORT THEY NEED

    REF: A. LIMA 2055

    ¶B. LIMA 1929
    ¶C. LIMA 1794
    ¶D. LIMA 1712
    ¶E. LIMA 1418

    Classified By: PolCouns Alexander Margulies. Reason: 1.4 (b,d)

    ¶1. (C) Summary: Although the various cocalero groups remain
    fragmented with no national leadership or strategy, they are
    courted by disparate radical elements in Peruvian society who
    view the cocaleros as potential allies. In addition, there
    is evidence that narcotraffickers are arming and radicalizing
    cocaleros creating an increasing threat to eradication teams.
    Bolivian followers of Evo Morales are traveling widely in
    the Apurimac and Ene river valleys (VRAE) area to garner
    support for a MAS-style Peruvian cocalero party. A coca
    researcher's recent visit to the VRAE during the last two
    weeks of April found cocaleros eager to be the ones to down a
    helicopter. The Peruvian National Police (PNP) are
    responding with interdiction operations in the Upper Huallaga
    Valleys and VRAE, and they plan a prolonged eradication
    operation in the area of recent helicopter attacks in
    Polvora-Pizana area of San Martin. End Summary.

    ¶2. (C) In the wake of the fizzled Third Cocalero Congress
    (Ref E), cocalero organizations have still failed to develop
    an effective national strategy or organization. However,
    cocaleros constitute an increasingly vocal single-issue bloc
    in their own areas, and local cocalero power is turning some
    districts into no-man's lands that defy the limited capacity
    of law enforcement to respond; XXXXXXXXXXXX a lon
     time Embassy contact told Poloff on 5/3 of  his recent investigation
    of VRAE coca growing areas; he found  his contacts increasingly
     reluctant to share information as  the long reach of narcotraffickers
    made talking to outsiders  risky.

    ¶3. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX contacts reported no knowledge of
    Venezuelan agents in the Apurimac valleys, but they said that
    Bolivian representatives of the MAS party were frequent
    visitors. From a trip to Cuzco several weeks earlier,
    XXXXXXXXXXXX reported that Bolivian MAS representatives
    were  making a heavy recruiting effort. XXXXXXXXXXXX
    said that the  failure of MAS leader Evo Morales to complete a
    planned trip  to Cuzco in early April was the main reason that
    Cuzco  cocaleros did not rally to form a MAS-style party.

    ¶4. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX contacts reported that APRA party
    representatives were also canvassing cocalero areas in Cuzco
    and the Apurimac Valleys, but that other political parties
    were not in evidence except for "Peru Ahora," a traditional
    supporter of cocalero causes. His contacts saw little
    serious effort by labor unions to court cocaleros in these
    areas. (Note: Labor centrals and left-wing parties have
    supported cocalero protests in Lima and other urban areas,
    but their courtship has not/not extended to aggressive
    outreach to the cocaleros in their home areas. End Note. )

    ¶5. (C) What was increasing in the VRAE districts,
    XXXXXXXXXXXX said, was the takeover of local politic
     by cocaleros and  narcotraffickers. He noted that the
    creation of new  districts in 1992 during the Fujimori era,
    designed to  increase state presence in remote areas,
    had backfired, with  whole districts having city councils
    and mayoral  administrations that favored cocalero interests.
    Examples were Pichali, Santa Rosa and Sivia districts in the
    VRAE.  The increased buying power of cocaleros was one
    reason for  this infiltration of coca into local politics, fueled by a
    significant increase in the hectarage under cultivation.

    ¶6. (C) Cocalero influence was gradually seeping into
    provincial and regional politics, XXXXXXXXXXXX continued.
    (Note:  decentralization is bringing increasing control at the
    regional and provincial level over government financial
    resources. End Note.) The La Convencion Province (Cuzco
    Department), for example, recently included in its budget a
    line item for the "sacred leaf." Ayacucho Regional President
    Omar Quesada (who in January declared coca a cultural
    patrimony) did a publicized walking tour in late April to
    connect with residents abutting a road project running
    through provincial capital Querobamba (a relatively new
    province, created in 1986). XXXXXXXXXXXX,s contacts
     reported  that at night Quesada met with cocaleros after his
    publicized  development meetings during the day. In March,
    Quesada  signed a declaration with Ayacucho cocaleros calling
    on the  GOP to suspend all eradication efforts and for an end to
    alternative development programs. (Note: When PolCouns
    confronted APRA co-Secretary General Jorge del Castillo with
    this declaration, the latter stated that this did not reflect
    APRA's position and that he would take this mater up with the
    party's political committee. End Note.)

    ¶7. (C) The potential for cocalero violence appears to be
    growing. XXXXXXXXXXXX contacts uniformly reported that
    narcotraffickers were training and arming cocaleros. Local
    employment is increasing of non-growers (frequently family
    members of growers) for trafficking-related tasks such as
    transporting coca paste with backpacks, driving pack mules,
    operating maceration pits, manual labor for cocaine labs and
    joining narcotraffickers as foot soldiers. The cocaleros
    were increasingly receptive, XXXXXXXXXXXX said, to
    viewing their  coca fields as something worth fighting for and
    to the offer  of arms and firearm training to effect defense of
    their fields. Cocaine labs were increasing, XXXXXXXXXXXX
    continued,  and the highest-paying jobs went to those entrusted
    with  delivering cocaine to Lima.

    ¶8. (C) While XXXXXXXXXXXX,s visit yielded little evidence
    of  direct Sendero Luminoso (SL) activity in the VRAE, the
    narcotrafficker influence made the area equally dangerous.
    XXXXXXXXXXXX on this trip was unable to enter areas tha
     he had  on previous trips. The contacts that would speak to him
    reported that any contact with outsiders was increasingly
    dangerous. Many people have disappeared in recent months,
    either from running afoul of narcotraffickers or victims of
    local score-settling that the lawless climate facilitates.

    ¶9. (C) The high level of organization that cocaleros have
    used to menace helicopters on eradication missions further
    north in the Upper Huallaga River region (Refs A - D) is an
    indication of an escalation in their organization, training
    and tactics. In a tactic that has become common during
    eradication operations over the past weeks, cocaleros hang
    back during eradication and the initial stages of evacuation
    of the eradicators and their security elements. When all
    helicopters have departed save one, and the PNP security is
    withdrawing to mount the last helicopter, the cocaleros then
    close in with extensive launching of rocks (up to 2 lbs) from
    long-range slings. Security police and crew departing from
    the last helos have reported that the front line of cocaleros
    will launch their rocks, then crouch so that a second, and
    then a third line of rock-slingers can launch their
    projectiles against the helo cabin and rotor blades.

    ¶10. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX,s visit to the VRAE came after the
    April 12  attacks to the north (Refs A - D); his contacts reported
    the wide dissemination of the perceived success by cocaleros
    and  their allies in damaging the helicopters. Groups of
    cocaleros held parties to celebrate the helicopter attacks.
    Several contacts noted that in past years SL fighters had
    poor success in downing Army helicopters
     XXXXXXXXXXXX,s  contacts further reported that many
    Apurimac cocaleros in the  VRAE expressed hopes that they
    could be involved in the  downing of a helicopter.

    ¶11. (C) While so far cocaleros have used sling-launched rocks
    against eradicators, their security elements and helicopters,
    XXXXXXXXXXXX painted a disturbing picture for the future.
    His  contacts in the VRAE said that narcotraffickers are arming
    cocaleros there at an unprecedented rate, either selling
    modern selective-fire rifles such as FN-FALs and Galils - and
    even rocket launchers - or giving them the arms as an advance
    on coca sales. Cocaleros increasingly perceive their
    interests as an armed resistance to any eradication efforts
    in the future.

    ¶12. (C) National Police chief Marco Miyashiro has noted
    privately to Emboffs and publicly that the PNP,s current
    emphasis on interdicting cocaine base laboratories is
    designed, and to a degree has been successful in delinking
    coca growers from narcotraffickers. When PNP units strike
    laboratories, coca growers are torn between protecting their
    own fields and protecting narcotrafficker production labs.
    By and large they choose to stay with their fields, and as a
    result there have been few large-scale protests or assaults
    on the PNP troops while they are destroying the pits. An
    ominous sign for the future, however, is the growing trend
    that coca growers operate their own maceration pits; some may
    begin a more aggressive defense of their pits.

    ¶13. (C) Comment: This report, based chiefly on a well-placed
    and historically reliable source may not reflect the entire
    picture but is disturbing. GOP helicopters and eradication
    teams, as well as alternative development workers, will be
    put at ever higher risk without action by the government to
    exert state control over the increasingly lawless coca zones
    such as the VRAE and Upper Huallaga. The PNP raid of April 24
    (Ref B) found evidence that clearly linked the SL and
    narco-trafficking in the San Martin/Ucayali/Huanuco
    Departments. Current PNP plans to mount extensive operations
    where helicopters have been attacked are promising. The PNP
    is continuing interdiction operations in the Upper Huallaga
    and in the immediate future, DIRANDRO will deploy 350
    counter-narcotic police to the Polvora-Pizana area in support
    of a prolonged eradication and interdiction operation. In
    addition, a multi-tiered enforcement operation will begin in
    the VRAE in June to destroy cocaine-base labs. Enactment of
    a new coca law that continues to be advanced by some
    congressmen would probably reinforce the growing power of
    local and regional coca politicians and give cocaleros an
    incentive to unite on a national basis; the Embassy will
    continue to discourage consideration of a coca law on all
    fronts.

    STRUBLE

`