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### Viewing cable 06THEHAGUE2597, NETHERLANDS/BALKENENDE: PM OPTIMISTIC ABOUT THE

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
06THEHAGUE2597 | 2006-12-13 09:09 | 2011-01-17 00:12 | SECRET | Embassy The Hague

`

    VZCZCXRO3686
    OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDIR RUEHKUK
    DE RUEHTC #2597/01 3470948
    ZNY SSSSS ZZH
    O 130948Z DEC 06
    FM AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7668
    INFO RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 1696
    RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
    RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
    RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHDC PRIORITY
    RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE
    RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE

` `

    S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 THE HAGUE 002597

    SIPDIS

    SIPDIS

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/02/2026
    TAGS: PREL PGOV KDEM ECON IR RU NL
    SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS/BALKENENDE:  PM OPTIMISTIC ABOUT THE
    FUTURE

    REF: THE HAGUE 2544

    Classified By: A...

    89263,12/13/2006 9:48,06THEHAGUE2597,"Embassy The
    Hague",SECRET,06THEHAGUE2544,"VZCZCXRO3686
    OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDIR RUEHKUK
    DE RUEHTC #2597/01 3470948
    ZNY SSSSS ZZH
    O 130948Z DEC 06
    FM AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7668
    INFO RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 1696
    RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
    RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
    RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHDC PRIORITY
    RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE
    RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE","S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 THE HAGUE 002597
    SIPDIS
    SIPDIS
    E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/02/2026
    TAGS: PREL PGOV KDEM ECON IR RU NL
    SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS/BALKENENDE: PM OPTIMISTIC ABOUT THE
    FUTURE
    REF: THE HAGUE 2544
    Classified By: AMBASSADOR ROLAND E. ARNALL FOR REASONS 1.4(B/D).

    ¶1. (S) SUMMARY: During a December 12 meeting with Ambassador
    Arnall, Dutch Prime Minister Jan Pieter Balkenende expressed
    satisfaction with his party's strong performance in the
    November elections, and predicted a centrist-coalition
    government could be in place by February. According to
    Balkenende, the Dutch two-year commitment to Uruzgan will not
    be affected by ongoing coalition negotiations, and will be
    honored by the next government. Having raised Dutch concerns
    with Iranian Foreign Minister Mottaki on December 7,
    Balkenende expressed irritation with the Iranian's
    ""diplomatic speech"" and his ""unacceptable"" comments on the
    Holocaust. Separately, Balkenende's senior foreign policy
    advisor confirmed that the Prime Minister is directly engaged
    in trying to resolve Shell's ongoing dispute with the Russian
    government over Sakhalin, and claimed the Russians are
    ""trying to squeeze us like a lemon."" Despite the uncertainty
    about the next government, Balkenende appeared comfortable
    with the current situation, optimistic about the future, and
    confident in his leadership role. END SUMMARY.

    CENTRIST GOVERNMENT BY FEBRUARY?
    --------------------------------

    ¶2. (C) Ambassador Arnall complemented the Prime Minister on
    his successful election campaign. Balkenende acknowledged
    that he had -- once again -- defied expectations by leading
    the Christian Democrats (CDA) to remain the largest party in
    Parliament, when ""six months ago, everyone expected the next
    Prime Minister to be Wouter Bos"" (head of the opposition
    Labor Party, or PvdA). The recent elections had overturned
    many assumptions about Dutch politics; the CDA, for example,
    had done better than usual among young voters and in urban
    areas than in the past. Unfortunately, however, the
    electorate's unexpected swing to the extreme right -- Geert
    Wilders' Freedom Party (PVV) and extreme left -- Jan
    Marijnissen's Socialist Party (SP) -- was now complicating
    the process of forming a coalition. Balkenende's preferred
    coalition partner -- the conservative Liberal Party (VVD) --
    had run a bad campaign and suffered from internal power
    struggles, so was no longer in the running.

    ¶3. (C) Balkenende said he was ""not unhappy"" that attempts to
    form a coalition with PvdA and SP had collapsed, since there
    was no realistic chance of CDA and SP governing together.
    This opened the door to the possibility of a ""centrist""
    coalition between CDA, PvdA, and one of the smaller parties
    -- most likely Christian Union or GreenLeft. Balkenende
    suggested that such a coalition could be in place by
    February, although this would depend on how long it took for
    Wouter Bos to convince his membership to support such a
    coalition; the process could conceivably drag on past the
    provincial elections in March. Although he clearly felt that
    it was up to the PvdA to make most of the concessions
    necessary to join a coalition government, Balkenende
    acknowledged that the SP's surprisingly strong showing posed
    a real dilemma for the PvdA leadership, since they now faced
    a serious challenger on their left flank.

    AFGHANISTAN COMMITMENT REMAINS FIRM
    -----------------------------------
    ¶4. (C) Ambassador Arnall asked Balkenende how the coalition
    negotiations might impact the Dutch deployment to Uruzgan.
    Balkenende responded emphatically that it would be
    ""impossible"" for a future government to renege on the
    two-year Dutch commitment to the region. The fact that SP
    wanted to withdraw Dutch forces sooner, he added, was one
    reason why the CDA could not join them in a coalition
    government. PvdA, he said, had the same view as the CDA in
    this regard, as they had supported the original decision to
    deploy troops for two years.

    ¶5. (C) Turning to the Riga summit, Balkenende said that he
    was generally pleased that NATO had sent a strong signal of
    support for the Afghan mission. The willingness of some
    countries, such as Norway and Poland, to increase their
    contributions was also encouraging. On the other hand,
    Balkenende expressed concern about Canadian Prime Minister
    Harper's domestic political situation and its possible impact
    on the Canadian deployment to the south. He noted that he had
    also had intense discussions with German Chancellor Merkel,
    who had made clear that German forces would be available to
    THE HAGUE 00002597 002 OF 002
    support others in extremis.

    ""STRANGE"" MESSAGE FROM IRANIAN FOREIGN MINISTER
    --------------------------------------------- --

    ¶6. (C) Balkenende described his short December 7 meeting
    with visiting Iranian Foreign Minister Mottaki as ""strange.""
    He had raised Iran's destabilizing role in the region,
    support for terrorism, human rights violations, and nuclear
    ambitions. On the latter, Balkenende stressed that Iran must
    comply with its IAEA obligations if it is serious about
    negotiating a positive outcome to the current situation.
    Mottaki, according to Balkenende, had responded with
    non-substantive ""diplomatic speech."" More disturbingly, in
    their discussion on the Middle East, Mottaki had made
    comments on the Holocaust which Balkenende found
    ""irritating,"" ""terrible,"" and ""absolutely unacceptable.""
    Although the Netherlands has a good economic dialogue with
    Iran, Balkenende concluded, he had sent a ""very clear""
    message about Dutch concerns.

    SAKHALIN-SHELL: RUSSIANS ""SQUEEZING US LIKE A LEMON""
    --------------------------------------------- --------

    ¶7. (S) As Ambassador Arnall was leaving Balkenende's office,
    Karel van Oosterom -- Balkenende's senior foreign policy and
    defense advisor -- confided that Balkenende was following
    closely Shell's ongoing dispute with the Russian government
    over Sakhalin. Van Oosterom dismissed recent press reports
    claiming the issue was settled, saying their release was just
    a Russian negotiating tactic. Shell, he stressed, has not
    agreed to any settlement; on the contrary, the chairman of
    Shell had visited van Oosterom that day to complain that the
    Russians had given him ""an offer he couldn't refuse."" Van
    Oosterom -- who served in China previously -- joked that,
    while the Chinese could ""threaten with a straight face,"" the
    Russians ""laugh when they give an ultimatum -- then tell you
    what they really want."" He reiterated that the Dutch were
    not impressed with the ""mafia-style"" Russian approach and
    understood that Russia wanted to ""squeeze Shell like a
    lemon."" On the other hand, Russia was in a much stronger
    position now than when the original deal was signed, and knew
    it. Van Oosterom did not speculate on what next steps might
    be, but stated that Shell and the Prime Minister were now
    ""studying"" the Russian proposal.

    COMMENT:
    --------

    ¶8. (C) Balkenende joked at the start of the conversation that
    he is currently holding three jobs -- Prime Minister, CDA
    faction leader in Parliament, and chief CDA negotiator in the
    coalition talks. If this situation is causing him stress,
    however, he did not let it show during the meeting. On the
    contrary, Balkenende was clearly in command of his portfolio
    and seemed positively invigorated by the challenges before
    him. He also obviously relishes the prospect of heading the
    next Dutch government -- which would be his fourth in as many
    years. Once dismissed as a ""Harry Potter"" clone with no
    charisma, Balkenende has made a career out of defying
    expectations -- and appears, once again, to have proven his
    doubters wrong.
    ARNALL

`