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### Viewing cable 06PARIS1251, FORMER PRIME MINISTER RAYMOND BARRE SHARES

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
06PARIS1251 | 2006-02-28 17:05 | 2011-02-10 08:08 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Paris
Appears in these articles: http://abonnes.lemonde.fr/documents-wikileaks/article/2011/02/09/wikileaks-les-visiteurs-de-l-ambassade_1477418_1446239.htm

`

    This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

` `

    C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 PARIS 001251

    SIPDIS

    DEPT ALSO FOR EUR/WE, DRL/IL, INR/EUC, EUR/ERA, EUR/PPD,
    AND EB
    DEPT OF COMMERCE FOR ITA
    DEPT OF LABOR FOR ILAB

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/07/2015
    TAGS: PGOV ELAB EU FR PINR SOCI ECON
    SUBJECT: FORMER PRIME MINISTER RAYMOND BARRE SHARES
    INSIGHTS FROM A HALF-CENTURY IN POLITICS

    REF: A. (A) PARIS 1113
    ¶B. (B) EMBASSY PARIS DAILY REPORT FOR FEBRUARY 17
    ¶C. 2006
    ¶D. (C) PARIS 953

    Classified By: Ambassador Craig Stapleton for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

    SUMMARY
    -------
    ¶1. (C) In a February 21 meeting with Ambassador Stapleton,
    former prime minister Raymond Barre cautioned against any
    overconfidence that right-wing, nativist and xenophobic
    sentiment in France might be something of the past. If
    anything, in Barre's view, popular reaction to urban unrest
    and other recent events may have strengthened this current in
    public opinion. Barre said President Chirac's avidity for
    power was such that Chirac, circumstances permitting, might
    yet decide to pursue a third term in office. Barre called
    Interior Minister Sarkozy "courageous" in his willingness to
    confront -- and articulate -- the hard choices facing France.
    Barre discounted PM de Villepin's chances of winning the
    center-right nomination, and criticized the Socialist Party's
    "unrealistic ideology" on tax policy, labor market reform and
    economic growth. He thought Segolene Royal could win the
    Socialist Party nomination if "the French are really fed up
    and intent on something new," viewed former PM Jospin has her
    most likely rival, and excoriated former PM Fabius's decision
    to advocate rejection of the proposed EU constitution to
    further his presidential ambitions. Barre was confident that
    Europe would overcome its current crisis "like all the
    others" because economic interests had always proved stronger
    than the "political disagreements of the moment," although he
    faulted lack of British devotion to the European idea,
    blaming it on the UK's attachment to its privileged
    relationship with the U.S. End summary.

    KEEPING THE EXTREMES AT BAY, ESPECIALLY THE FAR RIGHT
    --------------------------------------------- --------
    ¶2. (C) Over lunch with Ambassador Stapleton on February 21
    former prime minister Raymond Barre articulated a vision for
    governing France from the center, keeping policy pragmatic
    and on an even keel managing -- indeed, manipulating -- the
    ever-present extremes so they don't become powerful enough to
    skew policy in ideologically driven, vindictive directions.
    He called these extremes -- both the "ideological left" and
    the "extreme right" -- "permanent currents in French public
    opinion." Barre was particularly firm in cautioning against
    the latent strength of the extreme right. Suggesting that
    the current of opinion driven by nativist fears and
    xenophobic reaction could be catalyzed "around immigration,"
    he said these sentiments could boost support for National
    Front (FN) leader Jean-Marie Le Pen notwithstanding Le Pen's
    advancing age and the fading of his ability as a populist
    firebrand.

    DON'T WRITE OFF PRESIDENT CHIRAC
    --------------------------------
    ¶3. (C) Barre said he had known Chirac for "forty years" and
    that the intensity of Chirac's desire for power was such that
    "it would not surprise me if Chirac decided to run again."
    In Barre's view, for Chirac -- as for others, like
    Mitterrand, who climb to the top and stay there -- "politics
    is combat," and succeeding requires "equipping oneself with
    whatever it takes." As an example, Barre pointed to Chirac's
    "equipping himself" with the mayoralty of Paris and
    transforming it into a powerful engine for generating support
    for the political machine that was key to Chirac's successful
    first election to the presidency in 1995. (Note: Chirac
    served as mayor of Paris from 1977 - 1995. End Note.) Barre
    added that Chirac's tremendous talent for projecting himself
    as a regular guy with whom everyday French people identify
    could, under the right circumstances, keep drawing
    significant electoral support.

    ¶4. (C) As unlikely as such a stab at a third term might
    seem, Barre said he detected that Chirac was carefully
    positioning himself in case. Barre noted the uncommon
    prominence in the media recently of Bernadette Chirac, who,
    Barre said, "has long enjoyed strong popularity." He also
    mentioned a series of articles and video reports that have
    appeared lately with details about the Chiracs' adopted
    (Vietnamese refugee) daughter and other, positive, aspects of
    the presidential couple's private life. Most interestingly,
    Barre pointed to Chirac's electoral base in France's rural
    and agricultural sector, and observed how Chirac had
    carefully engineered an agreement with France's EU partners
    that would keep intact the EU's Common Agricultural Policy
    (and therefore also the subsidy regime so beneficial to
    French farmers) until 2012 -- the very year he would leave
    office after a third term.

    CHIRAC AND IRAQ -- CHOOSING THE POPULAR
    ---------------------------------------
    OVER THE RESPONSIBLE
    --------------------
    ¶5. (C) Barre was scathing in his criticism of President
    Chirac and then Foreign Minister de Villepin's handling of
    France's opposition to the U.S.-led invasion of Irak in early
    ¶2003. Barre said that Chirac, sensing the popularity of
    "going against" the U.S., irresponsibly overplayed France's
    opposition to Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) "just to benefit
    from public opinion." In retrospect, Barre implied, the
    damage done to the trust that must obtain between two allies
    if they are to confront differences and work together
    effectively was clearly not worth the temporary lift in
    approval ratings Chirac (and Villepin) achieved for
    themselves. Barre, adding that he believed the U.S. had
    acted precipitously and made a serious strategic error in
    undertaking OIF, underlined that France could well have
    firmly registered its misgivings as a concerned ally, without
    the grandstanding, veto-wielding opposition indulged in by
    Chirac and Villepin. Barre speculated that President
    Mitterrand would have handled France's misgivings about OIF
    in such a subtler, more responsible way. The Ambassador and
    Barre agreed that in recent months, U.S.-France relations had
    returned to "normal," as a result of careful cooperation
    across a range of continuing issues, along with the emergence
    of new, shared challenges, particularly in the greater Middle
    East.

    SARKOZY AND VILLEPIN
    --------------------
    ¶6. (C) Barre placed the current vying among would-be
    presidential contenders in the context of what he called "the
    problem of France's political class," specifically "their
    inability to enlighten public opinion." He excepted only
    Interior Minister Sarkozy from what seemed his blanket
    pessimism about the political elite's obsessive electoral
    competitiveness and lack of talent for leading public opinion
    to a better understanding of the challenges and options
    facing the country. Even as he called Sarkozy "courageous"
    -- in the sense of being willing to confront the hard choices
    facing France and un-varnishedly presenting them to the
    French public -- he also cautioned that public opinion had
    best not be led too brusquely, however honestly. His advice
    to Sarkozy would be to "tone down the 'rupture' rhetoric"
    lest he frighten away potential support.

    ¶7. (C) Barre (like most experienced politicians who have
    commented to us on the matter) discounts the chances of Prime
    Minister de Villepin prevailing in his rivalry with Sarkozy,
    unless Sarkozy grievously stumbles -- or is tripped. Very
    much tracking with the conventional wisdom, Barre observed
    that Sarkozy's control of the ruling Union for a Popular
    Movement (UMP) party, and the firm support for Sarkozy among
    party members make it difficult for any center-right
    presidential hopeful to dislodge Sarkozy as the UMP standard
    bearer. However, Barre also added that "people just run on
    their own" -- there is nothing preventing someone like
    Villepin, if his ambitions should drive him to it, from
    putting together an organization and launching himself as
    another candidate in the first round of the 2007 election.
    Barre also commented that the political enmity between Chirac
    (and Villepin) and Sarkozy is of the sort that brooks no
    quarter, and implied that Chirac was, as intently as ever,
    watching for the opportunity to torpedo Sarkozy's chances of
    succeeding him.

    ROYAL AND JOSPIN
    ----------------
    ¶8. (C) Barre observed that Socialist Party (PS) First
    Secretary Francois Hollande was "in a bit of a pickle" --

    SIPDIS
    caught between the presidential ambitions of his longtime
    domestic partner, Poitou-Charentes Region President Segolene
    Royal, and his longtime patron in PS, former prime minister
    Lionel Jospin. In recent weeks, Jospin has been ever more
    overtly "running on the sidelines," alongside the pack of
    declared contenders for the PS presidential nomination (ref
    B). Barre speculated that "Segolene against Jospin" might be
    a face-off the PS might not be able to avoid come its
    presidential primary next November. Barre (unlike most
    experienced politicians who have discussed Segolene Royal's
    presidential prospects with us (refs A and C)) did not
    dismiss her chances of staying in the race and winning
    election as France's first woman president. Barre said, "if
    the French are really fed up and intent on something new,
    they could very well vote for her." Barre, however, also
    raised the possibility of "the reprise of the 2002 election
    that should have been," and indicated that the French
    political system's insular inertias and murky deal-making
    could produce a "Jospin versus Chirac" second round in 2007.

    IDEOLOGY, OPPORTUNISM, AND REASON ON THE LEFT
    ---------------------------------------------
    ¶9. (C) Turning his attention to the difficulties that the
    center-left PS is having declaring itself a normal,
    social-democratic governing party, Barre contrasted the
    "reason" of former socialist finance minister Dominique
    Strauss-Kahn with the "opportunism" of former socialist prime
    minister Laurent Fabius. (Note: Both Strauss-Kahn and
    Fabius are among the declared candidates for the PS's
    presidential nomination. End Note.) Barre spoke highly of
    Strauss-Kahn, insisting on, in Barre's view, the admirable
    realism of what would be Strauss-Kahn's economic
    policy-making, notwithstanding Stauss-Kahn's "socialist"
    political orientation.

    ¶10. (C) By contrast, Barre was unsparing in his criticism of
    Fabius for opportunistically pandering to the ideologically
    motivated left of party. (Note: In a transparent effort at
    building a base in the left of the party, Fabius was the only
    center-left heavyweight to advocate rejection of the proposed
    EU Constitution last May. End Note.) Barre reviled Fabius'
    decision to "betray his own convictions against the interests
    of his country," and advocate rejection of the proposed EU
    Constitution in order to further his own presidential
    ambitions. Returning to his theme of the importance of
    keeping extremes under control, Barre lamented the damage
    done to France by economic policies driven "by the
    ideological left." In particular, Barre identified misguided
    soak-the-rich tax policies and "hyper-Keynesian" fiscal
    policies as having stunted business investment and led to
    "excessive" -- debt-fueled and unsustainable -- state
    investment in social services and infrastructure.

    THE BRITISH ARE NOT EUROPEAN AT HEART
    -------------------------------------
    ¶11. (C) Observing that he had been "personally involved in
    European affairs since 1959," Barre said that he was
    confident that Europe's current crisis over rejection of the
    proposed constitution would also be overcome "like all the
    others." Barre said that, at each of the regularly occurring
    crises that have marked the history of the European
    construction, "everybody says Europe is finished." "Not at
    all," exclaimed Barre. Notwithstanding the political
    differences driving these crises, he averred, the underlying
    dynamic of "ever more closely intertwined" economic and
    commercial interests always trumps the "disagreements of the
    moment." Barre however, added that differences with the
    British might make the exception to this rule, observing that
    "the British will never be wholeheartedly European." He
    suggested that a key part of this lack of genuine commitment
    to a political Europe on the part of the British was due to
    their wanting to "privilege" their special relationship with
    the U.S.

    MITTERRAND --"GREAT ADVENTURER" OF FRENCH POLITICS
    --------------------------------------------- -----
    ¶12. (C) Recalling his political battles against Socialist
    President Francois Mitterrand -- and returning to his theme
    of "politics is combat" that requires "equipping oneself with
    whatever it takes" -- Barre called Mitterrand a "great
    political adventurer," who commandeered the socialist party
    "because he had tried everything else, and this was the only
    means" for him to achieve power. Barre, while admitting that
    getting to the top and staying there "requires compromising
    with financial interests," made a point nonetheless of
    insisting on Mitterrand's fundamental integrity. Barre made
    clear that he believed Mitterrand (and Chirac) -- while
    definitely not personally enriching themselves -- had
    knowingly allowed serious financial impropriety aimed at
    keeping politically damaging secrets secret and at keeping
    campaign war chests full. Even so, Barre said that
    Mitterrand remained admirably true to one or two core
    convictions, such as his patriotism with regard to France and
    his commitment to European integration and its promise of
    lasting peace. Mitterrand, according to Barre, subjected all
    else to the exigencies of getting into power and staying
    there, including his political convictions. "He was a
    socialist like I'm the Pope," said Barre of Mitterrand, who
    led France's Socialist Party for over a quarter century.

    NOTE AND COMMENT
    ----------------
    ¶13. (C) Barre is an economist by training who served as
    prime minister under President Valery Giscard d'Estaing from
    1976 - 1981. Barre unsuccessfully ran for the presidency in
    1988, coming very close to edging out Chirac as the
    center-right's candidate against Mitterrand. Though
    associated with the centrist Union for French Democracy
    (UDF), Barre never joined any political party. Barre served
    as mayor of Lyon from 1995 - 2001. He eloquently evoked the
    "Radical Socialist" (i.e. moderate socialist) civic spirit
    that animates the inhabitants of the city, and contributes to
    the high quality of life enjoyed by city residents. He also
    evoked the city's centuries-long history as a trading and
    banking center due to its silk industry, and suggested that
    Lyon's success attracting European and globally oriented
    companies was in part due to its outward-looking, commercial
    heritage. Throughout his discussion with Ambassador
    Stapleton, Barre exemplified the realism and probity that
    almost made him president notwithstanding his rejection of
    political partisanship. End note and comment.

    Please visit Paris' Classified Website at:
    http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm

    Stapleton

`