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### Viewing cable 06BOGOTA10691, CARAMAGNA SAYS PEACE PROCESS RESPONSIBLE FOR

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
06BOGOTA10691 | 2006-11-24 15:03 | 2011-02-20 12:12 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Bogota

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    VZCZCXYZ0000
    PP RUEHWEB

    DE RUEHBO #0691/01 3281556
    ZNY CCCCC ZZH
    P 241556Z NOV 06
    FM AMEMBASSY BOGOTA
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0970
    INFO RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 7282
    RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 8453
    RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ NOV LIMA 4505
    RUEHZP/AMEMBASSY PANAMA 9770
    RUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO 5167
    RUEHGL/AMCONSUL GUAYAQUIL 3777
    RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
    RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC
    RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
    RHEHOND/DIRONDCP WASHDC
    RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
    RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
    RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC

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    C O N F I D E N T I A L BOGOTA 010691

    SIPDIS

    SIPDIS

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/25/2016
    TAGS: KJUS PGOV PINR PREL PTER CO
    SUBJECT: CARAMAGNA SAYS PEACE PROCESS RESPONSIBLE FOR
    AIRING POLITICAL-PARAMILITARY TIES

    Classified By: Political Counselor John S. Creamer
    Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d)

    -------
    Summary
    -------

    ¶1.  (C) Sergio Caramagna, Director of the Mission to Support
    the Peace Process in Colombia (MAPP/OAS), told us on November
    20 that the peace process with the paramilitaries has helped
    expose the ties between the paramilitaries and politicians.
    Caramagna was pleased by a recent meeting held with top GOC
    civilian and military officials on the need to combat new,
    emerging criminal groups.  Defense Minister Santos suggested
    a monthly meeting to exchange information. Caramagna also
    said the MAPP/OAS has unofficial GOC approval to extend its
    mandate for three years.  End summary.

    ---------------------------------------
    Caramagna's Reaction to Recent Scandals
    ---------------------------------------

    ¶2.  (C) MAPP/OAS Director Sergio Caramagna told us on
    November 20 that politician-paramilitary ties would not have
    become a public issue if not for the peace process with the
    paramilitaries.  He was encouraged by the public exposure of
    such links and hoped the truth would continue to emerge.  He
    said Colombia's judicial system needed more resources to
    implement the Justice and Peace law, but stressed that
    Colombia was the only country in the world with a plan to
    compensate victims and to punish the main perpetrators of
    crimes against humanity.

    ¶3.  (C) Caramagna said when he visited La Ceja two weeks ago,
    former paramilitary leaders told him they had not been able
    to control their former mid-level commanders for some time.
    He noted the former paramilitary leaders were alone and
    resentful.  Even though they are better off in La Ceja than
    they would be in other prison facilities, what was important
    was that "they feel imprisoned."

    --------------------------------------------- --
    MAPP/OAS and GOC Establish Information Exchange
    --------------------------------------------- --

    ¶4.  (C) Caramagna was pleased with a November 10 meeting
    convoked by Vice President Francisco Santos to exchange
    MAPP/OAS and GOC information on rearmament and emerging
    criminal groups.  Caramagna said the purpose was to offer the
    GOC an opportunity to respond to the  MAPP/OAS's VIII
    Quarterly Report, which focused on the emergence of new
    criminal groups.  GOC officials in attendance included Vice
    President Santos, Minister of Defense Juan Manuel Santos,
    Prosecutor General Mario Iguaran, Peace Commissioner
    Restrepo, the chiefs of the branches of the Armed Services,
    National Police Director General Jorge Castro, DIJIN Director
    General Oscar Naranjo, and Carabineros Director Jorge Gomez.

    ¶5.  (C) Caramagna said the MAPP/OAS presented its report to
    the GOC on 22 criminal structures associated with former
    demobilized paramilitaries (please see paragraphs 12 and 13
    for information on the groups).  Caramagna noted the 22
    criminal structures have survived military and police
    operations to dismantle them.  He gave special attention to
    former mid-level paramilitaries from the North Bloc, whose
    organizations remain largely intact and are especially strong
    in Cesar and southern Magdalena.  MAPP/OAS also warned of
    cooperation in certain regions between these criminal groups
    and elements of the security forces.

    ¶6.  (C) Defense Minister Santos said the GOC should meet
    monthly with the MAPP/OEA to evaluate the situation.  Santos
    said the GOC should receive the MAPP/OAS quarterly reports
    with gratitude rather than resistance, and use them
    constructively.  Permanent coordination and confidence
    building should include constructive criticism.  He said he

    "perceived government willingness to combat these gangs but
    it has not been enough." The Colombian Army Intelligence
    motto should not say "God rewards persistence," but rather
    "God rewards persistence and efficiency."  He also suggested
    the information reward system be expanded, not only to cover
    leaders such as Vicente Castano and "Los Mellizos," but also
    to include former mid-level paramilitary leaders.  Lastly, he
    recommended that the Administrative Department of Security
    (DAS) and the Reinsertion Commissioner's Office attend these
    meetings.

    ----------------------------------------
    Actions Against Emerging Criminal Gangs
    ----------------------------------------

    ¶7.  (C) In the November 10 meeting, National Police Director
    General Castro emphasized the increased police presence in
    demobilized areas and the number of operations against
    emerging criminal groups.  In 2006, the police inaugurated 54
    stations in 18 departments to establish GOC control over
    areas formerly controlled by the ex-paras.  Moreover, the
    police established 12 additional stations in areas associated
    with new criminal groups.  The police have 2,733 new officers
    dedicated exclusively to securing  areas formerly controlled
    by the ex-paras.  Castro hoped to add 38 additional stations
    by the end of 2006, with 50 more planned for 2007.  He said
    that in October, the police conducted 15 operations against
    these groups and captured 90 people.

    ¶8.  (C) Military Commander General Mario Montoya stressed
    that the last paramilitary group demobilized in August which
    means the AUC no longer exists.  He characterized the task
    facing security forces as combating "criminal gangs or
    delinquents at the service of narcotraffickers."  Montoya
    emphasized the need for the military to occupy strategic
    areas previously occupied by the paramilitaries.  He said
    mobile brigades have been sent to key areas and joint task
    forces have been created in the departments of Choco,
    Cordoba, Meta, Cauca, Narino, Antioquia Risaralda, and areas
    between Valle and Choco.

    ¶9.  (C) Peace Commissioner Restrepo agreed with the MAPP/OAS
    assertion that emerging criminal gangs have been hit.  But he
    noted they had not been eliminated because "they are anchored
    to the region's illicit economy and their social control over
    the population persists."  Restrepo said the police needed
    more resources to fight the groups.  He stressed that
    corruption within security forces needed to be addressed.
    Examples should be made of corrupt officials to show that the
    government was serious.

    -----------------------------------
    MAPP/OAS Plan of Action for 2007-10
    -----------------------------------

    ¶10.  (C) Caramagna said the GOC has unofficially approved an
    extension of the MAPP/OAS mandate for an additional three
    years.  He talked to Minister of Foreign Affairs Maria
    Consuelo Araujo and Peace Commissioner Restrepo, and both
    agreed with extending the Mission's mandate beyond its
    current January 2007 deadline.  The MAPP/OAS is also working
    on a new action plan which it plans to present to the Group
    of Friends on November 28.

    ¶11.  (C) The new action plan includes two strategies:
    consolidate the work with the AUC, and expand support for any
    similar process with the ELN or FARC.  The first strategy
    includes post-demobilization and reinsertion verification;
    Justice and Peace Law monitoring; support for the Reparations
    and Reconciliation Commission; and support for local and
    civil society initiatives.  The second strategy consists of
    improving MAPP/OAS's analytical capacity on the armed
    conflict and scenarios for a political negotiation;
    confidence building efforts; geographical presence in key
    territories; and technical support for any future peace
    processes.  Caramagna said the only international group
    prepared to assist in a future peace process with the ELN or

    the FARC was the OAS.  He said both the European Union and
    the United Nations would face political and technical
    difficulties in playing such a role.

    --------------------------------------------- -
    Information on the 22 Emerging Criminal Groups
    --------------------------------------------- -

    ¶12.  (C) The MAPP/OAS identified 22 cases of rearmament of
    former demobilized paramilitaries.  It had verified the
    existence of fourteen groups in ten departments and was
    examining reports regarding eight more groups.  It estimated
    there were a total of 3,000 criminal group members, among
    them common criminals, narcotraffickers, paramilitaries who
    never demobilized, and former demobilized paramilitaries.
    The percentage of the former demobilized paramilitaries
    participating was still small, but this could change.  The
    following are the 14 cases of rearmament:

    - Guajira Department: three groups called "Aguilas Negras,"
    "Aguilas de la Sierra," and "AUC," composed of 160 members,
    led by former mid-level paramilitary leaders.  The modus
    operandi was control of illicit economy -- narcotrafficking
    and hydrocarbons contraband.

    - Atlantico Department: a 60-member group led by former
    mid-level paramilitary leaders; they continue to call
    themselves AUC.  The modus operandi is control of illicit and
    licit economy -- education and healthcare sectors.

    - Cesar Department: three groups composed of 400 members led
    by former mid-level paramilitary leaders; one group's name is
    "Aguilas Negras."  The modus operandi is control of illicit
    and licit economy -- public works projects.

    - North Santander Department: a 300-400 member group led by
    former mid-level paramilitary leaders; they continue to call
    themselves "Aguilas Negras."  The modus operandi is control
    of illicit economy -- narcotrafficking, arms trafficking, and
    hydrocarbons contraband.

    - Bolivar Department: a 50-member group led by former
    mid-level paramilitary leaders; their group name is unknown.
    The modus operandi is control of coca production, kidnapping,
    and selective killings.

    - Cordoba Department: a 50-member group led by a former
    mid-level paramilitary leader; the group name is "Los
    Traquetos."  The modus operandi is control of coca production
    and control over the population.

    - Tolima Department: a 20-member group; the group name is
    "Bloque Pijao."  The leader is undetermined.  The modus
    operandi is extortion and kidnapping.

    - Casanare Department: a 200-member group led by a former
    mid-level paramilitary leader; the group name is
    undetermined.  The modus operandi is extortion.  Military
    operations, however, have forced its displacement.

    - Caqueta Department: a 50-member group led by a former
    mid-level paramilitary leader; the group name is not
    determined.  The modus operandi is extortion and control over
    the population.  Military operations on October 21 led to the
    death of two members, one of which was the principal
    commander.

    - Narino Department: a 250-300-member group led by a former
    mid-level paramilitary leader; the group name is "Nueva
    Generacion Colombia" or "Mano Negra."  The modus operandi is
    control of extortion and control over the population.  In
    September and October the FARC's 29th Front confronted the
    group.  These combats led to the displacement of residents in
    several administrative units or "corregimientos."

    ¶13.  The following are eight groups still being identified:

    - Cesar Department: a 70-member group led by former mid-level
    paramilitary leaders; the group name is not determined.  The
    modus operandi is extortion and control over the population.

    - Magdalena Department: a 150-member group led by former
    mid-level paramilitary leaders; the group name is "Mano Negra
    and/or Power Rangers."  The modus operandi is extortion and
    control over the population.

    - Sucre Department: a 20-member group led by a former
    mid-level paramilitary leader; the group name is "Cartel
    Verde" or "Aguilas Negras."  The modus operandi is economic
    and political control over the population.

    - Antioquia Department: a 60-member group led by former
    mid-level paramilitary leaders; the group name is not
    determined.  The modus operandi is control over the
    population and the illicit economy.

    - Santander Department: a 25-member group led by a former
    mid-level paramilitary leaders; the group name is not
    determined.  The modus operandi is extortion and illicit
    economy.

    - Meta Department: a 200-member group led by a former
    mid-level paramilitary leader; the group name is not
    determined.  The modus operandi illicit crops and
    narcotrafficking.

    - Narino Department: a 100-member group; group's leader has
    not been determined; the group has several names "Nueva
    Generacion Colombia," "Mano Negra," "Los Traquetos, and "Los
    Rastrojos."  The modus operandi is narcotrafficking.

    - Putumayo Department: a 350-member group; the group's leader
    has not been determined; the group has several names
    "Rastrojos," "Cruzados," or "a faction of Sur Putumayo Front
    that never demobilized."  The modus operandi is
    narcotrafficking.
    WOOD

    =======================CABLE ENDS============================

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