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### Viewing cable 08NAIROBI574, KENYA: BEHIND A CALM FACADE, HARDLINERS PREPARE FOR MORE VIOLENCE

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
08NAIROBI574 | 2008-02-27 10:10 | 2011-03-01 21:09 | SECRET | Embassy Nairobi

`

    VZCZCXRO8304
    OO RUEHROV
    DE RUEHNR #0574/01 0581032
    ZNY SSSSS ZZH
    O 271032Z FEB 08
    FM AMEMBASSY NAIROBI
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4862
    INFO RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE
    RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA 9925
    RUEHDR/AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM 5822
    RUEHDJ/AMEMBASSY DJIBOUTI 5132
    RUEHKM/AMEMBASSY KAMPALA 2651
    RUEHKH/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM 1909
    RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 2685
    RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 2617
    RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL

` `

    S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 NAIROBI 000574

    SIPDIS

    SIPDIS

    DEPT FOR DS/IP/AF, DS/DSS/ITA, INR, AF/E, S, D, P, G, R,
    DS, DRL

    E.O. 12958: DECL:02/27/2028
    TAGS: ASEC PGOV KE
    SUBJECT: KENYA: BEHIND A CALM FACADE, HARDLINERS PREPARE FOR MORE VIOLENCE

    Ref:  Nairobi 379

    Classified by Ambassador Michael E. Ranneberger for reasons 1.4 (b)
    and (d).

    ¶1. (C) Summary: Kenya has been tense but remarkably calm since the
    end of January, thanks in large part to the progress being made in
    the Kofi Annan-mediated peace talks and the visit of the Secretary.
    Tensions remain very high, however, and behind this calm facade lurks
    the potential for more ferocious, ethnically-motivated violence.  One
    sign is that ethnically-based forced evictions continue around
    Nairobi.  More ominous are a steady stream of rumors that hardline
    elements from both sides of the political divide are organizing for
    more violence should the peace talks fail.  The pivot will thus be
    the outcome of the peace talks.  If a compromise is reached on power
    sharing that is seen as fair by all sides, support for organized
    violence is likely to ebb away.  If not, however, then Kenya could
    see a wave of violence far worse than the unrest seen in January
    following the disputed election.  End Summary.

    ----------------
    A Deceptive Calm
    ----------------

    ¶2.  (SBU) Kenya has remained tense but remarkably calm throughout the
    month of February.  In late January, the country was shocked by
    violent, ethnically-motivated clashes in the tourist towns of Nakuru
    and Naivaisha, both not far from Nairobi.  This was followed by the
    back-to-back murders of two opposition Orange Democratic Movement
    (ODM) parliamentarians on January 29 and January 31 (reftel), which
    led to a brief spasm of unrest in Kericho in western Kenya.  In
    short, at the end of January, the country appeared teetering on the
    edge of all-out anarchy and sustained civil unrest and disobedience.

    ¶3.  (SBU) Since then, however, Kenya has generally enjoyed an
    interlude of relative calm, in large part due to the progress made
    each week in the Kofi Annan-mediated peace talks, which has led both
    political camps to call for an end to violence.  U.S. support for the
    talks, including through the Secretary's visit, has also helped
    reassure Kenyans.  The current perception that the country's
    politicians are taking steps towards an agreement on power sharing,
    which could pave the way for political reconciliation and a return to
    normalcy, has since continued to keep tensions and violence at bay.

    -------------------------------------
    Forced Evictions Keep Nairobi On Edge
    -------------------------------------

    ¶4.  (C) The current state of relative calm, however, should not be
    interpreted as a return to sustained peace and normalcy.  In fact,
    the opposite may be true.  Throughout February, there has been a
    stream of anecdotal evidence and reporting indicating that
    ethnically-motivated forced evictions continue to occur around the
    country, including parts of Nairobi.  While it is often difficult to
    conclusively confirm what is happening, it appears that in Nairobi,
    Kikuyu youth gangs, probably incited and funded by hardline Kikuyu
    politicians and businessmen, are taking revenge for the violent
    "ethnic cleansing" of their Kikuyu breathren in January in western
    Kenya by rival Luo, Kalenjin, and other groups.   In early February,
    there was a spate of media and first-hand reports, including from
    U.S. Mission staff members, that Kikuyu gangs were marking the doors
    of non-Kikuyu residents in the Kilimani, Eastlands, and Kibera areas
    of Nairob in an attempt to intimidate them into leaving.  In the
    largely Kikuyu, rough-and-tumble area of Banana Hill on the city's
    northwestern edge, leaflets were allegedly circulating threatening
    non-Kikuyus with beheading if they did not leave.  There were also
    many reports of Kikuyu landlords being threatened with violence if
    they did not summarily evict their non-Kikuyu tenants.

    --------------------------------
    Militias: Preparing for Battle?
    --------------------------------

    ¶5.  (C) More ominous than forced evictions are daily rumors about the
    formation and arming of ethnic-based militias in different parts of
    the country.  It remains very difficult to confirm rumors that
    militias are being organized, but where there is so much smoke, there
    is likely to be fire, and the logic behind this phenomenon is
    compelling: Should the Kofi Annan-mediated peace talks fail, all
    sides want to be ready for the violent aftermath.  Perhaps one of the

    NAIROBI 00000574  002 OF 004

    most difficult puzzles to solve is the extent to which such militias
    are truly militias, characterized by a discernable chain of command
    and requisite weaponry and training, versus mere youth gangs
    organized and bussed to a site on an ad hoc basis to engage in
    violence when it is in the interest of hardline leaders to have them
    do so.  In either event, however, the results are violent and
    difficult to control.

    -------------------------------
    Kalenjins: Arming to the Teeth?
    -------------------------------

    ¶6.  (C) The most persistent stories about militias have the Kalenjin
    community in Rift Valley Province as the best organized and most
    war-like.  Conventional wisdom explains this as due in part to the
    Kalenjins' strong warrior/cattle rustling cultural tradition, but
    also to the fact that under the regime of Danial arap Moi, Kalenjins
    filled out the ranks of the Kenyan military in disproportionately
    high numbers, including in the officer corps.  As many as 25-30
    senior Kalenjin officers lost their positions after the 2002 election
    of Mwai Kibaki, adding fuel to broader, longstanding grievances among
    the Kalenjin over unfair land allocations and economic and political
    marginalization at the hands of the Kikuyu.

    ¶7. (S) The combination of these grievances and the fact that many
    Kalenjins have military training and experience has created a
    potential scenario: That of a highly motivated and highly effective
    para-military force that could make Rift Valley Province ungovernable
    if the peace talks fail.  While the Embassy is unable to fully
    confirm these reports at this time, Kalenjin militias are purportedly
    organizing under the leadership of retired Kalenjin General John
    Koech, and are arming themselves to the teeth, according to some
    contacts.  (Note: Another contact, however, indicates Kikuyu
    politicians are attempting to link Koech to Rift Valley violence, but
    that he is in fact clean.  His role thus remains unclear.  End note).
     A local contact reports that the Kalinjin forces are in firm
    alliance with the self proclaimed Sabaot Land Defense Force (SLDF), a
    clan-based militia in the Mt. Elgon region of western Kenya
    established to defend ethnic Sabaots in land disputes that pre-date
    the post-electoral unrest.  Indeed, there has been an increase in
    attacks, including cattle rustling and rape, by the SLDF in the Mount
    Elgon and Trans Nzoia areas on the homes of Kikuyu settlers.  The
    SLDF has historically been well armed, and is reportedly well-versed
    in obtaining weapons via Uganda.

    ---------------------------------
    Kikuyus Not Afraid to Strike Back
    ---------------------------------

    ¶8.  (C) On the other side, Kikuyu vigilantes are also organizing to
    defend against attacks or carry out revenge attacks on ethnic rivals.
     Many attribute Kikuyu-led violence to the Mungiki, a
    well-established Kikuyu criminal organization/religious sect with
    deep roots in Kenyan history.  However, after engaging in a violent
    crime spree last year well before (and unrelated to) the elections,
    the Kenyan policy cracked down on the group, reportedly fracturing
    its leadership.  It is thus unclear whether the Mungiki have in fact
    been re-energized and are behind some of the current tensions, or
    whether newer groups have formed and ordinary Kenyans simply can't
    tell the difference.  It's likely both scenarios are playing out, as
    the current environment is providing the perfect context for the
    rejuvenation of the Mungiki, as well as for the formation of new
    groups catering to the large numbers of unemployed, disaffected
    Kikuyu youth in Nairobi and elsewhere.

    ¶9.  (S)  According to an Embassy source, elements of the
    Kikuyu-dominated Party of National Unity (PNU) are backing the
    so-called "Forest Guard" militia, which includes Mungiki members and
    is being organized and led by retired General H.W. Njoroge, former
    Commandant of the National Defense College.  Njoroge has reportedly
    put pressure on current Kenya Army Commander, Lieutenant General
    Augustino Njoroge (no known relation) to release G3 rifles and
    provide helicopter support to the Forest Guard.  H.W. Njoroge is
    allegedly being assisted by retired Brigadier General Peter Ikenya,
    who is acting as Chief of Staff for the effort.  This movement is
    reportedly receiving funding from a number of Kikuyu businessmen,
    including a Solomon Karanja and Steven Mbugwa.  Mbugwa is said to be
    running fund raising and other financial support operations out of
    his business Muthaiga, Nairobi.

    NAIROBI 00000574  003 OF 004

    ¶10. (SBU) Finally, in the Coast Province, as in Rift, there is a
    tradition of youth organizing "in defense" of their communities.  The
    Provincial Security Committee in Coast, acting on information that
    youths in the South Coast were being armed and trained "in readiness
    for war", held a meeting two weeks ago with the local elders in an
    attempt to dissuade the youth from continuing this preparation.
    Should other areas explode if current negotiations fail, the
    currently quiet province, popular with tourists, may see more
    turbulent times.

    ---------------------------------
    Police Transfers and Live Bullets
    ---------------------------------

    ¶11. (C) In a related development, tensions are running high in the
    lakeside city of Kisumu in western Nyanza Province, around which much
    of the immediate post-electoral violence was centered.  The Kenya
    Police Service (KPS) recently transferred 200 Luo and Luyhia officers
    from Nyanza Province, an ethnic Luo stronghold.  KPS publicly stated
    that the transfers were routine, but police sources have since
    reported that the Provincial Police Officer (PPO) for Nyanza is on
    record as claiming that those being transferred were responsible for
    leaking police operational details to the opposition based on their
    Luo affiliation.  The PPO also reportedly ordered his Officers in
    Charge to ensure the transfers took place no later than 22 February.

    ¶12. (C) On top of this came news last week from police sources that
    the PPO issued a stunning directive to his Station Commanders telling
    them that during any future political protests in the region, deadly
    force is immediately authorized.  He further assured the officers
    that any query as to the nature of the death or injury resulting from
    this order should be directed to him personally and that he would
    support the "victimized" officers.

    ¶13. (C) Subsequently, an Embassy FSN Investigator based in Kisumu
    reported that a consignment of live ammunition, allegedly received
    from Israel, had recently been received in Kisumu, and that 30 Kenyan
    Army troops had arrived in the city on February 21, to be joined
    within days by an additional 100 KPS/General Service Unit (GSU)
    personnel.  These movements could be seen as prudent reinforcement on
    the part of the Kenyan Government, as KPS was unable to control the
    violence that erupted after the elections in early January.  On the
    other hand, it could be an indication that the government does not
    expect the peace talks to succeed and is readying for a violent
    crackdown in that event.  In response to the order to use live
    ammunition, the Ambassador wrote February 22 to Police Commissioner
    Ali to express U.S. concern about any such change in the rules of
    engagement for police in dealing with unrest.  Text of this letter
    follows below in para 16.

    ----------------------------
    Crime: Waiting for an Uptick
    ----------------------------

    ¶14.  (SBU) Finally, in light of the distraction and stress on the
    police caused by ongoing political tensions, there is a real risk
    that there will be an uptick in ordinary crime in Kenya in the coming
    weeks and months.  Even if a political agreement is reached, those
    now ready to engage in political and ethnic violence may turn their
    weaponry and attention to common crime instead as a new livelihood.
    The armed carjacking on February 15 in broad daylight of a U.S.
    Mission employee a short distance from the Embassy (the employee was
    robbed but released unharmed) served to remind that Kenya is rated
    "critical" for crime for a good reason.

    ---------------------------------
    Comment: Peace Deal Holds theKey
    ---------------------------------

    ¶15.  (C) Behind the current quiet facade, there is trouble lurking in
    the shadows.  Whether the genie of ethnic-based violence can be put
    back in the bottle or not clearly hinges on the outcome of the Kofi
    Annan-led peace talks, now at a pivotal moment.  If a compromise is
    reached that is agreeable to the two sides and most of their
    followers, then we believe much of the impetus and support for
    organized violence will fade away.  If not, however, then we should
    brace for a fresh round of violence that could dwarf January's unrest
    in its scope and ferocity.

    ¶16.  (SBU) Text of February 22 letter from the Ambassador to Police

    NAIROBI 00000574  004 OF 004

    Commissioner Ali follows below:

    Dear Commissioner Ali:

    I would like to take this opportunity to first commend you and the
    vast majority of police professionals in the Kenya Police Service
    (KPS) for your efforts over the past few months in maintaining law
    and order during this most trying time in Kenya's history.  I have
    been encouraged by the numerous reports received of KPS leadership
    effectively and peacefully engaging large gatherings, resulting in no
    injuries to the populace at the hands of authorities or the public.
    I also applaud all efforts to investigate and hold accountable all
    persons involved in inciting violence during this time, whether
    civilian or civil servant.

    However, we have recently become aware that certain officers in
    charge have directed personnel under their command that "the
    immediate use of deadly force is authorized to quell any and all new
    political protests".  Obviously, reports of this nature are both
    alarming and contrary to established rules of engagement and, in the
    spirit of true cooperation, I feel compelled to bring this to your
    immediate attention, as we have enjoyed a tremendous partnership
    across an array of law enforcement and security issues.
    Consequently, we believe that the established rules of engagement and
    situation-specific circumstances should continue to dictate the
    minimal use of deadly force.

    We trust that you will continue to address this issue with the
    urgency and importance it merits.

    Sincerely,

    End text.
    Ranneberger

`