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### Viewing cable 10AMMAN329, JORDAN SCENESETTER FOR JOINT CHIEFS CHAIRMAN ADM

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
10AMMAN329 | 2010-02-08 06:06 | 2011-01-31 00:12 | SECRET//NOFORN | Embassy Amman

`

    VZCZCXRO8648
    PP RUEHBC RUEHDH RUEHKUK RUEHROV
    DE RUEHAM #0329/01 0390643
    ZNY SSSSS ZZH
    P 080643Z FEB 10
    FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6860
    RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY
    INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
    RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 2033
    RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0227
    RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD 6380
    RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM 5787
    RUFTNAB/COMUSNAVCENT
    RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
    RUEHAM/MAP AMMAN JO
    RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC 0436
    RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
    RUEHAM/USDAO AMMAN JO
    RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
    RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 0081

` `

    S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 AMMAN 000329

    SIPDIS
    NOFORN

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/08/2020
    TAGS: PREL PGOV MOPS OVIP JO
    SUBJECT: JORDAN SCENESETTER FOR JOINT CHIEFS CHAIRMAN ADM
    MIKE MULLEN

    Classified By: Ambassador R. Stephen Beecroft
    for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

    ¶1.  (S//NF) SUMMARY:  The Chairman's visit comes at a time
    when Jordan has made significant contributions both in
    Afghanistan and to broader regional security: encouraging
    Syria to seek a moderate Arab alternative to Iranian
    influence, maintaining its focus on a two-state solution to
    the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and   redoubling its
    efforts to strengthen ties with Baghdad.  At the same time,
    Amman perceives U.S. military financial support as not
    keeping pace with the level of Jordanian regional
    contributions.  Despite the 2008 Memorandum of Understanding
    on foreign assistance agreeing on an annual commitment of
    $300 million in Foreign Military Financing (FMF) through
    2014, Jordan continues to seek additional assistance in the
    form of supplemental appropriations.  In 2009 Jordan was
    successful in obtaining $150 million in forward-financed
    assistance in this manner, directly reducing our FMF
    commitment for 2010.  Jordan has so far been disappointed
    with our lack of commitment to leave behind or store military
    equipment redeploying through Jordan from Iraq.  End Summary.

    Middle East Peace
    -----------------

    ¶2.  (S//NF)  Jordan continues to play a central role in
    fostering Middle East peace and a two-state solution to the
    Arab-Israeli conflict.  Both the King and his Foreign
    Minister Naser Joudeh have maintained steady pressure on
    other Arab states to offer modest deliverables to Israel.
    The King's efforts, which have met with some success, seek
    tangible steps such as overflight permission for Israeli air
    traffic, linking telecommunications networks with Israel, and
    reducing restrictions on travelers who have transited Israel.
    Recently however, the King has adopted a new approach,
    pressing PM Netanyahu and President Abbas to initiate
    immediate negotiations aimed at producing even limited
    Israeli concessions.  Positive progress at the negotiating
    table, however meager, could provide crucial political cover
    for Abu Mazen, affording him a measure of maneuverability.

    ¶3.  (S//NF)  Given his public backing of U.S. attempts to
    restart Middle East Peace negotiations, the King views the
    lack of progress as damaging to his credibility.  This damage
    could limit his ability to play a constructive role in the
    future.  At the same time, Jordanian officials consistently
    express concern that Jordan will be asked to assume a degree
    of guardianship over the West Bank, a move which many believe
    would alter Jordan's demographic makeup in ways that directly
    threaten its Hashemite rule, and consequently, the interests
    of the East Bank elites.

    Iraq
    ----

    ¶4.  (C)  Jordan has been a leader in engaging with Iraq,
    using engagement to promote bilateral trade and encouraging
    Iraq to build stronger ties with Arab states rather than with
    Iran.  As evidence of the proactive Jordanian position the
    King became the first Arab Head of State to visit Baghdad, in
    July 2008, and has named an Ambassador to Iraq. The King
    supports Prime Minister Maliki and sees progress as slow, but
    moving in the right direction.  Senior Jordanian leaders have
    become concerned that increasing tensions between the central
    government and the Kurdistan Region will erupt in violent
    conflict and are skeptical that Iraq can maintain stability
    as U.S. forces withdraw.

    ¶5.  (S)  In response to a request by General Odierno to
    provide capacity-building assistance to the Iraqi Ministries
    of Defense and Interior, Jordan has hosted visits of Iraqi
    officers to learn about border security operations on the
    Syrian border and observe military cooperation through joint

    AMMAN 00000329  002 OF 005

    exercises with CENTCOM.  Jordan hosted Iraqis at two 2009
    seminars aimed at building the Iraqi capacity to manage their
    own Foreign Military Sales workload.  Jordan has also said it
    will send a Defense Attach to Baghdad, but has not yet made
    plans to do so.

    ¶6.  (S)  Jordan signed a Technical Agreement with CENTCOM in
    July, laying the groundwork for redeployment of U.S. forces
    and equipment from Iraq through Jordan.  In November, the
    first set of U.S. Brigade Combat Team (BCT) equipment
    redeployed through Jordan, signaling an appreciable increase
    in throughput with additional BCT sets redeploying in
    December and January.  Over the course of the next six
    months, seven additional BCT sets of equipment are scheduled
    to transit Jordan en route to the port of Aqaba and
    ultimately to the U.S.  Redeployment represents a significant
    boon to the Jordanian economy: $15.1M in 2009. The military
    and political leadership of Jordan has been frustrated that
    the U.S. has not committed to leave equipment behind in
    Jordan to be donated, refurbished, or stored.  Two further
    disappointments include the termination of jet fuel shipments
    through Jordan into Western Iraq, and the U.S. decision not
    to train Iraqi F-16 pilots in Jordanian flight schools.

    Iran
    ----

    ¶7.  (S//NF)  Jordan is concerned about Iranian influence in
    the region, particularly the potentially destabilizing effect
    of an Iranian nuclear program,  support for Hizballah and
    Hamas, support for the Huthi and other armed groups in Yemen,
    and Iran's role in Iraq and links with Syria.  The King
    believes that the recent post-election violence in Iran
    exposes deep fissures in the Iranian polity that "makes the
    Supreme Leader look a bit less supreme," forcing Iran's
    leadership to turn inward on domestic issues and limiting
    their freedom and resources to act internationally.
    Especially with the recent buildup of U.S. military assets in
    the Persian Gulf, fear remains that Iran will try to counter
    these perceptions with a dramatic act.  Jordan will support
    new UNSC sanctions against Iran, but will be loath to enforce
    those sanctions in the absence of progress in the Middle East
    Peace Process.  Without a material improvement in the Peace
    Process, any confrontation with Iran risks backlash from
    Palestinian groups
    who cast Tehran as their protector.

    ¶8.  (S//NF)  Jordan's senior leadership draws a direct link
    between the willingness of Arab states to counter Iran, and
    progress on Middle East peace, saying that Israeli and
    Sunni-Arab interests are perfectly aligned with respect to
    Iran.  Arab governments are restricted in their ability to
    deal with Iran, they say, so long as Iran is seen as
    supporting the Palestinians against Israel.  Realization of
    the two-state solution would consolidate the regional
    consensus against Iran, Jordan believes.

    Syria
    -----

    ¶9.  (S/NF)  Jordan increased its engagement with Syria in the
    last half of 2009 attempting to draw Damascus toward an
    alignment with moderate Arab states and away from Iranian
    influence.  The King and Syrian President Bashar Al Assad met
    at least four times in 2009, which resulted in agreements on
    a number of initiatives, including border demarcation,
    customs procedures, and commercial transport.  Although
    Jordanian officials continue to be skeptical of Syrian
    intentions to follow through, Jordan is supported in its
    dialogue with Syria by Turkey, which is interested in
    increasing its ground transit of commercial goods through
    Syria to Gulf countries.

    AMMAN 00000329  003 OF 005

    Domestic Politics
    -----------------

    ¶10.  (C)  King Abdullah dissolved the unpopular Parliament
    and announced a new Cabinet in December 2009, ending months
    of infighting and legislative stalemate.  The King has
    mandated that new elections take place before the end of 2010
    with a new election law currently being drafted.  It is
    unclear whether the new law will correct the disproportionate
    districting that systematically under represents urban
    Palestinian-Jordanians in Parliament.  The current electoral
    system favors rural, traditionally East-Bank districts, over
    the cities.  It is too soon to tell by how much the numbers
    might shift or how tribal or traditional East Bank interests
    would be affected.

    ¶11.  (S/NF)  We have been urging the Jordanians to
    re-invigorate social and political reforms, expanding
    political space for civil society, pressing electoral changes
    aimed at a more representative, inclusive system, and further
    loosening of state control over the economy.  The King's
    economic and political changes face domestic opposition from
    tribal leaders and an array of entrenched East Bank
    interests.  The latter include many in the military, security
    services, and bureaucracy, who enjoy a disproportionate share
    of the current system.

    ¶12.  (S//NF)  Jordan has made progress on the economic front:
    buying back debt, eliminating subsidies, and promoting a
    trade-based, market-oriented economy.  The positive effects
    of those measures are starting to wane, in part, a
    ramification of the global financial crisis, but also due to
    poor budget management and poor management of its limited
    water and energy resources.  Jordan is one of the world's
    most water-poor nations and is moving aggressively on
    independent and regional initiatives to address its water
    needs.  GAMA, a Turkish company partially owned by General
    Electric was awarded an $800 million contract to pump water
    from Southern Jordan's Disi aquifer to Amman.  While a World
    Bank-led study continues on conveying water from the Red Sea
    to the Dead Sea to rehabilitate the Dead Sea, generate
    hydropower, and provide desalinated water to Jordan, Israel,
    and the Palestinian Authority, Jordan announced in May 2009,
    similar plans for the unilateral $10 billion Jordan Red Sea
    Development Project to bene
    fit Jordan only.  Jordan has yet to secure the requisite
    funding to begin the single-country project.

    ¶13. (S//NF)   Jordan's economy is also affected by its energy
    needs.  Jordan is a net importer of energy and thus subject
    to market fluctuations for oil prices.  It imports some of
    its fuel needs from Iraq, but poor infrastructure limits
    import quantities, which must travel overland by tanker
    truck.  Consequently, the discount offered barely offsets
    transportation costs.  Since 2003, Jordan has paid market
    rate for other imported fuel.  Jordan sees nuclear energy as
    its future and the King has placed a priority on developing a
    civilian nuclear energy program. The GOJ is anxious to sign a
    Nuclear Cooperation Agreement (NCA) with the United States,
    required for U.S. companies to provide nuclear reactors, fuel
    or materials. NCA negotiations are currently stalled however,
    with the Chairman of the Jordan Atomic Energy Commission
    objecting to assurances sought by the U.S. that Jordan will
    not refine or enrich uranium in Jordan.  Meanwhile, the GOJ
    continues to advance its nuclear energy program and has
    signed either MOUs or NCAs with the United States, Canada,
    China, France, South Korea, the UK, and a number of other
    countries.

    Military Assistance and Cooperation
    -----------------------------------

    ¶14.  (C)  The U.S.-Jordan mil-to-mil relationship is among
    the most extensive in the region.  In September 2008, an MOU
    on Foreign Assistance was signed with Jordan that included a

    AMMAN 00000329  004 OF 005

    commitment to $300 million annually in Foreign Military
    Financing (FMF) through 2014.  In 2009 Congress allocated
    $150 million (of the $300 million) in forward-financed FMF to
    Jordan through the Supplemental Appropriation (which will
    reduce the FMF commitment for 2010 by an equal amount.)  In
    January, Jordan's top military advisor, Prince Faisal, and
    Minister of Planning met Defense and State Department
    officials and Members of Congress in Washington aimed at
    securing a pledge of funds through an anticipated Afghanistan
    supplemental appropriation.  Although these assistance levels
    are substantial, Jordan is sensitive to decreases in FMF from
    the height of the war in Iraq when Jordan received large
    supplemental appropriations.  For example, combined FMF was
    $497 million in 2008, $307 million in 2007, and $305 million
    in 2006.

    ¶15.  (U)  In addition to FMF, Jordan is one of the largest
    recipients of Individual Military Education and Training
    (IMET) funding, which will be $3.8M in 2010 and $3.7M in
    ¶2011.  The program pays immense dividends, developing strong
    professional bonds between U.S. and JAF officer corps.

    ¶16.  (C)  Jordan makes significant contributions to U.S.
    regional security priorities.  In July 2009, Jordan deployed
    a 712-soldier Ranger Battalion to Logar Province in
    Afghanistan to provide election security (TF 222).  The JAF
    deployed the second battalion rotation in support of OEF in
    January 2010, despite the cost (pay entitlements) and risk to
    their soldiers' safety.  JAF leaders have intimated that they
    would advocate even larger-scale deployments (a brigade), if
    the pay/entitlement expense were not so burdensome.  In fact,
    during the Joint Military Commission in November 2009, MG
    Mash'al Al Zaben, Chief of Staff for Strategy, stated that
    Jordan would stay in Afghanistan until the last U.S. soldier
    came home.  In October, Jordan deployed the second rotation
    of a Special Operations company (TF 111) that conducts combat
    operations alongside U.S. Special Forces. The third
    rotational company deploys in February 2010.

    ¶17.  (S/NF) Following the December 30 suicide bombing by a
    Jordanian national in Khost, Afghanistan, Jordan has
    experienced increased calls by opposition groups and
    non-governmental figures to explain its Afghanistan
    assistance and end its security cooperation with the United
    States.  So far, such calls and commentary in the press have
    received no traction with the government, which vigorously
    and publically defends its efforts to combat terrorism.
    Jordanian government officials have privately reiterated the
    commitment to maintaining their relationship with us,
    highlighting their deployments in Afghanistan and elsewhere.

    ¶18. (C) In May, Jordan completed a donation of 10 M60 tanks
    to Lebanon, funded by UAE.  Jordan delivered to Yemen 25 M113
    Armored Personnel Carriers in response to a request from
    State Department, funded by UAE.  Jordan has offered to
    assist with other deployments, counter-piracy missions, and
    to host training courses and exercises for Iraqi, Lebanese,
    and other forces, but remains dependent on external financial
    support to fund its contributions.  Jordan continues to
    supply forces to U.N. sponsored Peace-Keeping Operations
    around the world.

    ¶19.  (S).  Jordan is anxious to provide additional
    contributions to the fight in Afghanistan, and made this
    clear during HRH Prince Feisal's recent trip to Washington.
    OSD, Joint Staff and CENTCOM are reviewing their proposals.

    ¶20.  (S)  Despite the high levels of FMF and other security
    assistance, Jordan continues to request additional financial
    resources from external sources to make each contribution to
    regional security possible.  For example, the Lebanon and
    Yemen donations were financed with funds from the UAE.
    Training programs for regional forces are financed through
    U.S. Anti-Terrorist Assistance (ATA) funds or the U.S.
    Security Coordinator (USSC).  In addition, Jordanian law
    stipulates that its soldiers deployed overseas are entitled

    AMMAN 00000329  005 OF 005

    to approximately $1,700 monthly in combat pay, which has been
    financed through the United Nations for peacekeeping
    operations.  Jordan has not yet identified a source of combat
    pay funding for its Afghanistan deployments but is hopeful
    NATO will contribute.

    ¶21.  (S)  Jordan has used its FMF to improve its border
    security and defensive capabilities remaining cognizant of
    interoperability with U.S. forces.  We are concerned that
    Jordan has focused too heavily on acquiring expensive new
    technology and needs to place more emphasis on the training
    and maintenance needs of existing programs.
    Beecroft

`