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### Viewing cable 09RABAT706, WESTERN SAHARA REALITIES

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
09RABAT706 | 2009-08-17 17:05 | 2010-12-03 21:09 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Rabat

`

    VZCZCXYZ0000
    RR RUEHWEB

    DE RUEHRB #0706/01 2291734
    ZNY CCCCC ZZH
    R 171734Z AUG 09
    FM AMEMBASSY RABAT
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0575
    INFO RUCNMGH/MAGHREB COLLECTIVE
    RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 0528
    RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 0452
    RUEHVI/AMEMBASSY VIENNA 0153
    RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA

` `

    C O N F I D E N T I A L RABAT 000706

    SIPDIS

    STATE FOR NEA/MAG, IO/UNP, PRM/AF AND DRL/NESCA
    NSC FOR MCDERMOTT

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/17/2019
    TAGS: PBTS PHUM ECON PREF WI AG MO
    SUBJECT: WESTERN SAHARA REALITIES

    REF: RABAT 0693

    Classified By: Charge d'Affaires, a.i., Robert P. Jackson for reasons 1
    .4 (b) and (d).

    ¶1. (C) Summary: Although the Western Sahara negotiations
    have now re-started (Reftel), the conflict is 34 years old.
    The Government of Morocco (GOM) has invested tremendous
    resources in the territory, and some observers estimate that
    it spends USD 2.7 billion per year on the territory and its
    385,000 residents. The level of development and of social
    services clearly exceeds the level in Morocco proper.
    Significant voter participation )- despite a Polisario call
    for a boycott -- in the June 12 local elections may be a sign
    that support for independence is waning although support for
    self-government is real. Serious human rights abusers have
    been transferred, and respect for human rights in the
    territory has greatly improved, reaching the same plane as in
    Morocco. However, advocating independence is still a red
    line, and the GOM refuses to register pro-Polisario NGOs.
    Giving the territory more autonomy, improving
    Algerian-Moroccan relations, enhancing regional integration,
    building real confidence, and addressing all parties,
    propaganda seem essential to resolving the conflict. End
    Summary.

    ¶2. (C) Since King Hassan II launched the Green March in
    1975, the Western Sahara issue has been intimately linked to
    the stability of the throne and Morocco itself. Hassan,
    twice victim of coup attempts and for years at war with the
    left, used Western Sahara to bolster nationalism and park his
    army far away in the desert. More recently, however, that
    link has blurred. King Mohammed VI is more secure,
    maintained in power more by love than fear and facing no
    apparent major domestic threat. He recently has somewhat
    distanced himself from the issue, however, and has not
    visited the territory in three years, a stark contrast to his
    peripatetic ribbon cutting throughout the Kingdom.

    ¶3. (C) The GOM continues to subsidize the territory and
    provide tax and duty exemptions that form the base of much of
    the private fortunes there (mostly key clans loyal to the
    throne and a few senior military). Despite some siphoning,
    the investment has produced higher levels of urban
    development than in comparably sized cities in Morocco proper
    and made the capital, Laayoune, the first city without any
    shantytowns. Social indicators such as access to and level
    of education and availability of health care and social
    facilities exceed Moroccan norms and far surpass those in
    comparably sized Morocco,s cities. Growth in Morocco has
    made these expenditures much more bearable to Rabat,s
    exchequer than they once were.

    ¶4. (SBU) In April 2009, a local weekly newsmagazine TelQuel
    published an article laying out and likely even exaggerating
    what the Sahara was costing Morocco. TelQuel claimed that
    the GOM has spent 1.2 trillion dirhams on the territory since
    1975 and is spending 3 percent of GDP or USD 2.7 billion per
    year, including the funds to maintain two-thirds of the Royal
    Armed Forces in Western Sahara. (Note: TelQuel faced no
    consequences for the article. Even with the relative
    expansion of the freedom of the press in Morocco to cover
    subjects formerly taboo, this was astonishing. End Note.)

    ¶5. (C) In the June 12 local elections, &First Friend8
    Fouad Ali el Himma,s Party of Authenticity and Modernity
    (PAM) challenged local Laayoune strongman and Royal
    Consultative Council for Saharan Affairs (CORCAS) head
    Kalihenna Ould er Rachid. The PAM lost, despite having an el
    Himma protege installed. The Ould er Rachid family and clan
    control the Tammany Hall-like Istiqlal party machine that has
    run the territory for many years, and played a major part in
    winning the Prime Minister,s chair for party head Abbas El
    Fassi. Voter participation in the Sahara, stoked by clan
    rivalries, was far above the norm, despite a
    Polisario-declared boycott. Some pro-independence Sahrawis
    reportedly voted for the Ould er Rachid because they alone
    were deemed strong enough to stand up to the government in
    Rabat. This real political competition, while perhaps not
    democracy, seems far more open than the Cuba-like Polisario
    system. It underscores the fact that there is a significant
    part of the population of the Sahrawi territory, in addition
    to most immigrants, who support Moroccan sovereignty.

    ¶6. (C) After it took control of Western Sahara, Morocco
    tried to affect any vote by promoting immigration by its
    nationals, who now are well over half of the some 385,000
    residents of the territory. Perhaps half of the immigrants,
    however, were themselves Sahrawis, from areas just north of
    the dividing line that were also home to some of the most
    nationalistic Sahrawis. In a referendum that could include
    independence, they are not seen by the GOM as reliable
    voters, partly explaining GOM reluctance to go to a vote.
    (Comment: Curiously, we know of no advocate of independence
    that has ever claimed the &Sahrawi8 territories in Morocco,
    Algeria or Mauritania as part of a national homeland,
    although some members of the CORCAS unsuccessfully tried to
    include the Moroccan parts in the autonomous region, when it
    was first proposed. The absence of such larger nationalism,
    along with the Polisario,s 1970,s war against Mauritania
    --the world,s only Sahrawi state -- suggest the conflict is
    less nationalist than geopolitical, linked to the much older
    dispute between Algeria and Morocco, and hardly boosts the
    case for an independent state. End Comment.)

    ¶7. (C) Given the small population at stake, Spain,s
    granting of Spanish nationality, with the possibility of
    migrating to Spain, its nearby Canary Islands or elsewhere in
    Europe, is significant, and, indeed in better times,
    resettlement could be a simple way of resolving the plight of
    the refugees.

    -----------
    Who Counts?
    -----------

    ¶8. (C) The UN process recognizes the parties in the
    negotiations as Morocco and the Polisario. This asymmetry
    makes any resolution difficult, as it does not recognize the
    determinative role of Algiers, which the Moroccans see as
    their real adversary in this dispute. It also neglects the
    diverse views among the Sahrawis.

    --------------------------------------------- -
    Human Rights: Progress but Continuing Paranoia
    --------------------------------------------- -

    ¶9. (U) The human rights situation in the territory has
    dramatically improved since a brief &intifada8 in 2005.
    Like Morocco itself, Western Sahara has come a very long way
    from the mass disappearances of the &years of lead8 during
    Hassan II,s reign. Pro-Polisario Sahrawis are able to
    organize under the rubric of human rights activists, which
    most of them legitimately pursue, such as last year,s RFK
    award winner, Aminatou Haidar from the Sahrawi Collective of
    Human Rights Defenders (CODESA). In just over a year,
    restrictions on their international travel have disappeared.

    ¶10. (C) Since mid-2008, once common beatings and arbitrary
    imprisonment have also essentially ceased. One key to the
    reduction in abuses last year was the transfer of
    long-serving security officials with consistent records as
    abusers. Activists and officials confirmed in July 2009 that
    more transfers (many by promotion) had recently taken place,
    and most well known abusers are reportedly now gone. All
    sources report the territory is quiet, with residents hopeful
    for some political progress.

    ¶11. (C) What opponents of Morocco cannot do is explicitly
    organize in favor of independence or a referendum thereon,
    nor can they publish or even distribute tracts on the
    subject. In addition, they are denied by the government the
    right to operate as legal entities. Establishing these
    rights would not only be just, but would help build
    confidence in a consensual solution that would involve
    re-integration. The Sahrawi Association of Human Rights
    Victims (ASVDH) has even obtained court approval for its
    registration as an NGO and won on appeal lodged by the
    Interior Ministry (MOI), but has not been able to get local
    officials to accept its registration. The USG has pushed for
    this for some time. We recently heard that the local Wali
    has proposed to MOI that it accept the registration but the
    decision is pending. We should press the GOM on this both
    here and in Washington.

    ¶12. (C) Despite this substantial progress, which leaves the
    human rights situation in Western Sahara nearly equivalent to
    Morocco, Morocco campaigned for most of the year and spent
    scarce diplomatic capital in a successful effort to push back
    proposals for the UN to have a monitoring role on this issue.
    It is possible that they have understood the opportunity
    costs of that strategy and appear more recently to have been
    somewhat less vocal on the issue.

    --------------------
    What the People Want
    --------------------

    ¶13. (C) Extensive interviews and independent sources in the
    territory suggest that the principal goal of most Sahrawis is
    more self-government than self-determination; a desire more
    for protection and identity than independence, an army and
    embassies. The small vocally pro-Polisario minority,
    including many of the human rights activists, formerly
    enjoyed the support of the &silent majority8 of these
    Sahrawis, particularly during periods of repression.
    Development and reduced oppression have reduced this support.
    The Sahrawi &silent majority8 in the territory has been
    intrigued by the prospect of autonomy and has generally
    quietly awaited its development. Recently, a pro-Polisario
    activist, when asked, confided to us that he believed that in
    a free election held now a majority of voters in the
    territory would choose autonomy.

    -----------------------------
    On the Other Side of the Berm
    -----------------------------

    ¶14. (C) While not the competent Mission to comment on the
    Polisario or the camps, Embassy Rabat understands the
    situation for the refugees in Tindouf is difficult but
    support for the Polisario appears strong. Nevertheless, we
    hear from credible Sahrawis that there is growing interest
    there in a negotiated solution, belying the stories of
    unrealistic saber-rattling, frequently attributed to Sahrawi
    youth. GOM calls for a census and audit of international
    programs seem reasonable to us. Finally, if there is no
    prospect of a solution, re-settlement should be considered an
    option. The Spanish decision in 2008 to accord passports to
    1975 residents of its former colony could be implemented in
    Tindouf as it has been in Laayoune (but not in the current
    economic climate).

    -------------------
    Frozen Negotiations
    -------------------

    ¶15. (C) Meanwhile, the UN Secretary General,s Personal
    Envoy for Western Sahara has struggled to get the UN
    negotiations back on track. The negotiation process
    re-started in 2007, after Morocco tabled a proposal for
    autonomy that had been carefully negotiated with the Bush
    Administration. The main impetus to getting the plan
    produced was then-USUN Permrep John Bolton,s threat (October
    2006) to end MINURSO,s mandate. When first released, the
    USG called the autonomy proposal &serious and credible.8
    In substance, the proposal was serious, including local
    police and some independence for the judiciary, and was
    accompanied by a declared willingness to negotiate. It was
    also viewed as credible by the international community,
    including explicitly Russia and implicitly China, which
    nearly universally expressed a willingness to accept this as
    a possible outcome, if agreed. Credibility was an issue,
    however, among Sahrawis on both sides of the berm, as there
    was little confidence, given past Moroccan evasions, that
    even if agreed, the GOM would implement the plan. This
    credibility gap has narrowed, but only slightly, due to the
    improvements in the human rights situation. Credibility is,
    therefore, key to winning hearts and minds.

    ¶16. (C) In April 2007, the United Nations Security Council
    lengthened the mandate of MINURSO to 12 months (from six) and
    the &Manhasset talks8 (named after the Long Island, New
    York town where they were held) began. The Moroccans, while
    negotiating with the Polisario, showed them no credence and
    sent Moroccan Sahrawis to seek defectors. CORCAS head
    Kalihenna questioned the Polisario,s right to be there. The
    Polisario broke diplomatic and Middle Eastern protocol by
    refusing to shake hands with the Sahrawis on the Moroccan
    delegation and walked out or turned away when they spoke.

    ¶17. (C) Neither side offered any compromise or considered
    the arguments of the other. This was hardened when, at the
    end of 2007, King Mohammed VI publicly instructed his
    delegation to discuss no solution but autonomy, creating
    little room for discussion. This hard-line stance may have
    been bolstered by what was perceived in the Palace as
    uncritical support from Washington. In the end, there was no
    result after four rounds of rotating restatement of static
    positions. Former UN Personal Envoy Peter Van Walsum cited
    immovable Moroccan commitment to retain sovereignty, and
    called the prospect of independence unrealistic. For this
    unusual frankness, the UN let Van Walsum go, at Algerian and
    Polisario insistence.

    ¶18. (C) The new Personal Envoy, Ambassador Christopher Ross,
    long one of the stars of U.S. diplomacy in the region, seems
    better positioned than anyone to budge President Bouteflika
    and his government. In recognition, he was granted the
    additional mandate to help improve Moroccan-Algerian
    relations. King Mohammed VI took note of this and conveyed
    through Ross an offer of unconditional, at-any-level and
    on-any-subject, bilateral talks. Ross did get Algeria to
    agree to go to the &informals8 but only as observers. He
    got no response on the bilateral issue, although it is still
    early in Bouteflika,s new term. The informal meeting this
    month in Vienna has at least re-launched the negotiations.

    --------------------------------------------- --------
    Regional Link: Algeria-Morocco Key to Sahara Solution
    --------------------------------------------- --------

    ¶19. (C) Algeria and Morocco are demographically similar but
    with differences in historical experience that go back
    hundreds of years. About a year after Algeria,s hard-won
    independence, it and Morocco fought &The War of the Sands,8
    over their then-disputed frontier, drawn by colonial France.
    In 1975, when the Algerians sheltered the Polisario, it was
    at least as much a reflection of their historical rivalry as
    ideological support for a fellow liberation movement. King
    Hassan II managed to work out a frontier agreement with the
    Algerians which the GOM maintains has been ratified, and
    needs only an exchange of instruments of ratification. The
    subsequent closure of the Algeria-Moroccan border is now an
    anomaly in a Mediterranean region of growing links. There
    have been modestly growing functional links in recent years,
    much of it under Arab Maghreb Union auspices and in 2008 some
    technical agreements were signed. But direct high-level
    communication remains cut and both quiet and public GOM
    overtures to reopen it have been rebuffed. The Government of
    Algeria (GOA) turned down then-Secretary Rice,s invitation
    for a trilateral ministerial meeting on the margins of the
    2008 UNGA.

    -------
    Comment
    -------

    ¶20. (C) Algeria, Morocco and the Western Sahara dispute is a
    chicken and egg situation. Algeria has indicated relations
    cannot improve until there is self-determination in Western
    Sahara. Morocco, following the close links between the
    Polisario leadership and their Algerian hosts, remains
    convinced that there will be no agreement if relations with
    Algiers do not improve. In response, as of June 2009, the
    Moroccans have maintained that their principal goal now is
    rapprochement with Algeria, which could be discussed
    separately.

    ¶21. (C) The international community is ready to support
    Maghreb rapprochement and integration, which can only occur
    in parallel with a settlement of the longstanding dispute
    over the Western Sahara and resettlement of the
    long-suffering refugees. Then-President Putin of Russia
    urged Algerian-Moroccan compromise in vain, as have the
    French, the Spanish, and the USG. We are not aware of any of
    the P-5 opposing an autonomy-based solution, nor have we seen
    real urgency or priority for the international community to
    resolve a dispute over which there has been no real fighting
    for 18 years. End Comment.

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    Visit Embassy Rabat's Classified Website;
    http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Moro cco
    *****************************************

    Jackson

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