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### Viewing cable 06BOGOTA5603, POSSIBLE GOC-FARC TALKS: VIEW FROM THE COLOMBIAN

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
06BOGOTA5603 | 2006-06-21 22:10 | 2011-03-02 12:12 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Bogota
Appears in these articles: http://www.elespectador.com/wikileaks

`

    VZCZCXYZ0000
    RR RUEHWEB

    DE RUEHBO #5603/01 1722205
    ZNY CCCCC ZZH
    R 212205Z JUN 06
    FM AMEMBASSY BOGOTA
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 6223
    INFO RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 7858
    RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ JUN LIMA 3930
    RUEHZP/AMEMBASSY PANAMA 9277
    RUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO 4578
    RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
    RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
    RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC//USDP ADMIN/CHAIRS//

` `

    CO N F I D E N T I A L BOGOTA 005603

    SIPDIS

    SIPDIS

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/07/2016
    TAGS: PTER PGOV MARR CO
    SUBJECT: POSSIBLE GOC-FARC TALKS: VIEW FROM THE COLOMBIAN
    LEFT

    REF: BOGOTA 4662

    Classified By: Ambassador William B. Wood.
    Reason: 1.4 (b,d)

    -------
    Summary
    -------

    ¶1. (C)  Reftel outlined reasons why some mainly leftist
    interlocutors considered GOC-FARC peace talks possible in
    President Uribe's second term.  According to these contacts,
    the FARC's top demands are land reform, political
    reconstruction, and social welfare programs, along with a
    need for personal security and "respect" for the FARC's
    "struggle."  They said the GOC should continue military
    pressure and consider creative proposals to draw the FARC
    leadership into talks.  They also asserted U.S. engagement
    would be vital to a successful process.  End Summary.

    -------------------
    What the FARC Wants
    -------------------

    ¶2. (C)  Former peace commissioner Daniel Garcia Pena said the
    FARC's priority is land reform.  Academic Fernando Cubides
    added the FARC wanted to reverse appropriations by
    paramilitaries.  Demobilized FARC commander alias 'Nicolas'
    concurred, saying, "This is not about confiscation but about
    redistribution."  The guerillas' economic agenda has mellowed
    over time, according to President Pastrana's peace
    commissionerCamilo Gonzalez, from "a Stalinist to a Social
    Democratic platform."  Garcia Pena stressed that, "The FARC
    define themselves as Marxists but their agenda is not."

    ¶3. (C)  The FARC's agenda would include social issues.  In a
    2006 communique, FARC leader Manuel Marulanda referred to
    FARC proposals at Caguan which the GOC did not address:
    unemployment subsidies, money for social work projects, and
    pilot programs for alternative crops to coca.  Cubides
    emphasized welfare programs to alleviate underlying problems
    driving coca cultivation.  Ex-FARC commander 'Nicolas' spoke
    of the restructuring of wealth and social reinvestment,
    applying the FARC adage "social justice is the name of peace"
    to food, health, and jobs.  Policy analyst Ana Teresa Bernal
    recounted that at Caguan, "Marulanda said the most important
    thing was employment.... a jump-start plan not profound
    reforms.  Mostly the FARC wanted to show the population that
    their plans were of benefit."

    ¶4. (C)  Politically the FARC wants "a reordering of the
    political-administrative map" (said Cubides) and "a
    government of national reconstruction" (said Garcia Pena).
    The consensus view was that a constitutional assembly would
    be essential to write any accord into law.  Gonzalez noted
    the FARC had no popular base and would demand a guaranteed
    bloc in such a forum (on the order of 10-15 percent).  Form
    is as important as substance, he said: "It would be a fiction
    but an important one."  Reparations Commission chair Eduardo
    Pizarro pragmatically agreed that an assembly is not a reform
    per se, only a framework for future changes.  It would
    satisfy what several speakers signaled as the FARC's vital
    need for recognition as political actors.  In Pizarro's more
    pointed phrasing, "The FARC will negotiate to save face.
    They need to justify forty years of war."

    -------------------------
    Policy: 'Push' and 'Pull'
    -------------------------

    ¶5. (C)  Interlocutors recommended a combination of military
    pressure and policy incentives to both push and pull the FARC
    to the table.  Despite the overall leftward leaning of the
    group, none favored leniency; all agreed it was critical for
    the GOC to sustain military operations against the FARC until
    they agreed to negotiate.  Ironically it was ex-FARC
    commander 'Nicolas' who was most emphatic on this point:
    "Continued military pressure is essential...to show the FARC
    there is absolutely no possibility they can take power with
    military action."

    ¶6. (C)  All said military pressure must go hand in hand with
    political, economic, and social incentives.  (Embassy

    MILGROUP says even COLMIL commanders echo the same
    sentiment.)  Gonzalez spoke at length on this theme,
    stressing the need to break out of conventional molds and
    explore "audacious ideas."  With respect to agrarian reform,
    for example, he commented positively on Marulanda'sCaguan
    proposal that the GOC give the FARC lands to showcase
    agrarian reforms, however unrealistic it might sound.  For a
    political agenda, he urged a dedicated planning task force,
    on the same lines as MOD strategy teams.

    --------------------------------------------- --------
    U.S. Role: Prestige, Mediation, and (Non-)Extradition
    --------------------------------------------- --------

    ¶7. (C)  Marulanda'scommunique of January 2006 said, "The
    gringos play a part in the conflict, and any solution must
    pass through them."  Several commentators stressed the
    critical role of the U.S. in any peace process with the FARC.
     A large part of this is related to prestige; according to
    Gonzalez, "The FARC would only negotiate with those they
    consider powerful, such as the U.S.  Because they have a
    simplistic conception of the U.S. as their enemy, they would
    also respect it as an interlocutor.  This would be the FARC's
    biggest triumph."

    ¶8. (C)  The U.S. role has practical ramifications, too,
    particularly regarding the FARC's desire for guarantees of
    personal security against the threat of extradition.  Pizarro
    advised that in coming months Washington's attitude should
    "move from stick to carrot, from tough to talking."  He
    (echoed by 'Nicolas') said the U.S. "big incentive" is
    extradition, and suggested U.S. mediation would be required
    before a deal was struck.  The presence of the international
    community at peace talks would lend to the proceedings the
    prestige the FARC leadership craves.

    ---------------------------
    How Might The FARC Respond?
    ---------------------------

    ¶9. (C)  The FARC leadership is marked by a high degree of
    unity and unanimity, according to analysts, and would be
    unlikely to split into factions during talks.  Pizarro
    stressed its "enormous internal cohesion" and lack of
    infighting over decades.  Garcia seconded this, saying the
    Secretariat was "profoundly unified.... Decisions are by

    SIPDIS
    consensus."  Marulanda is said to have the last word; but his
    advanced age (around eighty) throws open the issue of
    succession.  Looking ahead, FARC behavior in peace talks is
    difficult to predict, because it would depend on the
    personalities in charge at the time.

    ¶10. (C)  Garcia said FARC members of campesino origin (like
    Marulanda and military leader alias Mono Jojoy) tend to be
    most pragmatic, while those of urban origin and higher
    education (e.g., ideologue Alfonso Cano) are most radical and
    stubborn.  Unfortunately, Pizarro predicted leadership in a
    negotiation scenario would likely pass to the urban political
    types, while military chiefs would take a back seat.
    'Nicolas' summed up, "Mono was pragmatic only because he
    doesn't believe in negotiation; he's a man of action.  Cano
    would never negotiate, for the opposite reason, that he's too
    political.... Ivan Marquez would be disposed to peace.  He
    has said that after 40 years of fighting it's time to end it
    but without betraying Marxist principles.... The Army should
    get Cano and Mono, to allow Marquez to breathe and lead."

    -------------------------------
    Past Attempts: Lessons Learned?
    -------------------------------

    ¶11.  (C)  Three sets of FARC talks have occurred in the last
    25 years, each failing for distinct reasons:

    - In 1983-6 at La Uribe, the FARC was more dogmatic than
    pragmatic, says former negotiator Camilo Gonzalez; its
    Marxist rhetoric has since mellowed.

    - In 1991 the FARC broke off brief talks at Caracas/Tlaxcala;
    Gonzalez cited excessive FARC demands for the failure, while
    ex-EPL leader Alvaro Villaraga added FARC "outrage" at
    parallel processes with other guerilla groups, heavy COLMIL
    strikes including on the FARC's high command, and post-Soviet
    communist disarray.

    - The last attempt, in 1999-2002 at Caguan, was merely a
    "pretense," said Gonzalez, with the FARC buying time to
    strengthen its forces and the GOC launching Plan Colombia.
    Analyst Alfredo Rangel said the GOC showed up with no plans:
    "The government did not make any proposals at Caguan; all
    proposals came from the FARC."  FARC leader Marulanda
    similarly attributed the 2002 collapse to GOC unpreparedness
    and its failure to offer anything concrete in return for
    demobilization.

    ¶12. (C)  Historically the FARC has not negotiated in good
    faith.  Villaraga and ex-FARC commander alias 'Nicolas'
    insisted the FARC was serious about peace and political
    reform in 1983-1986, but academic Roman Ortiz said both were
    proven wrong by the FARC's 1982 Conference resolution to
    double its forces.  'Nicolas' confirmed that at the 2000
    plenum the FARC's leading ideologue Alfonso Cano proposed
    striking the oligarchy while its guard was down.  With regard
    to drugs, there is no evidence for the FARC's purported
    interest in eliminating trafficking (reftel).  The precedents
    suggest a wary attitude towards FARC intent, as well as an
    attitude of 'trust but verify' during any period of cease
    fire.

    -------
    Comment
    -------

    ¶13. (C)  The interlocutors cited above either honestly or
    dishonestly portray the FARC as serious about its political
    agenda and depict peace talks as a forum for setting national
    policies and programs.  Unquestionably the FARC is to some
    degree a captive of its political rhetoric, but we would
    expect FARC policy interests to take a back seat to the
    conditions and obligations of their demobilization in any
    eventual peace talks.  We also would expect the GOC to reject
    any discussions of national policy beyond the conditions of
    FARC re-insertion.  We do not believe that the FARC is so
    unified that no elements would seek a separate peace with the
    government, but we agree that if talks ever begin with the
    FARC as such, they will be able to maintain a consolidated
    negotiating position.  Finally, it was predictable that U.S.
    direct involvement would be sought.  We see no reason even to
    contemplate such a step.
    WOOD

`