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### Viewing cable 09THEHAGUE328, NETHERLANDS/SCENESETTER; SECRETARY,S JUNE 1OTH

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
09THEHAGUE328 | 2009-06-02 16:04 | 2011-01-17 00:12 | SECRET//NOFORN | Embassy The Hague

`

    VZCZCXYZ0001
    OO RUEHWEB

    DE RUEHTC #0328/01 1531618
    ZNY SSSSS ZZH
    O 021618Z JUN 09
    FM AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
    TO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
    INFO RUEHBM/AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST IMMEDIATE 1201
    RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA IMMEDIATE 2807
    RUEHCP/AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN IMMEDIATE 6735
    RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL IMMEDIATE 0404
    RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 1845
    RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA IMMEDIATE 5251
    RUEHTL/AMEMBASSY TALLINN IMMEDIATE 0179
    RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE 2226
    RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE
    RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHDC IMMEDIATE
    RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE
    RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE IMMEDIATE
    RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE
    RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2887
    RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS IMMEDIATE 0674

` `

    S E C R E T THE HAGUE 000328

    NOFORN
    SIPDIS

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/02/2019
    TAGS: PREL NATO MOPS MARR AF PAK NL
    SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS/SCENESETTER; SECRETARY,S JUNE 1OTH
    BILATERAL WITH DEFENSE MINISTER VAN MIDDELKOOP

    Classified By: Char...

    209768,6/2/2009 16:18,09THEHAGUE328,"Embassy The
    Hague",SECRET//NOFORN,,"VZCZCXYZ0001
    OO RUEHWEB
    DE RUEHTC #0328/01 1531618
    ZNY SSSSS ZZH
    O 021618Z JUN 09
    FM AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
    TO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
    INFO RUEHBM/AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST IMMEDIATE 1201
    RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA IMMEDIATE 2807
    RUEHCP/AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN IMMEDIATE 6735
    RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL IMMEDIATE 0404
    RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 1845
    RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA IMMEDIATE 5251
    RUEHTL/AMEMBASSY TALLINN IMMEDIATE 0179
    RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE 2226
    RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE
    RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHDC IMMEDIATE
    RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE
    RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE IMMEDIATE
    RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE
    RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2887
    RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS IMMEDIATE 0674
    ","S E C R E T THE HAGUE 000328
    NOFORN
    SIPDIS
    E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/02/2019
    TAGS: PREL NATO MOPS MARR AF PAK NL
    SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS/SCENESETTER; SECRETARY,S JUNE 1OTH
    BILATERAL WITH DEFENSE MINISTER VAN MIDDELKOOP
    Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Michael F. Gallagher reasons 1.4 (b) a
    nd (d).
    Mr. Secretary:
    --------
    Overview:
    --------
    ¶1. (S) Your participation in the Regional Command-South
    RC-South) meeting and the bilateral with Dutch Minister of
    Defense Emert van Middelkoop comes at a critical time for the
    advancement of key U.S. priorities. Van Middelkoop and the
    Dutch government as a whole remain among our strongest
    allies, but Dutch domestic politics threaten to limit
    progress on our common agenda. On Afghanistan, the
    government faces an uphill battle to convince Parliament and
    the Dutch people to continue combat missions after 2010.
    ¶2. (C) Van Middelkoop -- one of only two ministers from the
    smallest member of the coalition government, the Christian
    Union (CU) -- has a decidedly mixed record. He has vast
    foreign and security policy experience as a member of
    Parliament. He is also widely recognized as the author of
    the Dutch policy requiring parliamentary approval of military
    deployments overseas -- a result of the Dutch failure to
    prevent the massacre at the Muslim enclave of Srebrenica in
    ¶1995. At the same time, this is the first time the CU and
    van Middelkoop have served in the government, and their lack
    of experience has been evident in several instances. In
    January, for example, Van Middelkoop first denied and then
    was forced to apologize for his remarks about the Dutch
    mission in Afghanistan. He now almost exclusively reads
    aloud from written notes to avoid additional missteps. More
    influential voices on Afghanistan policy are Foreign Minister
    Verhagen of the Christian Democrat party and Development
    Minister Koenders of the Labor Party (reflecting the Dutch 3D
    Approach (Development, Diplomacy and Defense).
    ¶3. (C) During his June 10 bilateral meeting with you, Van
    Middelkoop will be interested in hearing more about new U.S.
    command structures in Afghanistan; the influx of U.S. troops
    into RC-S, including strategic objectives; and initiatives on
    civil-military cooperation. Van Middelkoop will anticipate
    questions regarding the future of the Dutch mission beyond
    August 2010, although his comments will likely be guarded
    ahead of a late autumn cabinet decision on the issue. Among
    his public statements and misstatements, however, Van
    Middelkoop has suggested he believes the Dutch will scale
    down their presence.
    ¶4. (C) For the June 11 RC-S Ministerial, the Dutch foresee an
    ""intimate"" atmosphere in a 1 3 format with delegates from the
    eight countries with troops in RC-S. Besides Van Middelkoop
    and yourself, the principals will be Mr. John Hutton (United
    Kingdom), Mr. Joel Fitzgibbon (Australia), Mr. Peter Kordon
    MacKay (Canada), Mr. Soren Gade (Denmark), Mr. Jaak Aaviksoo
    (Estonia), and Mr. Mihai Stanisoara (Romania). The Dutch
    envision an informal round-table discussion centered around
    three main agenda items: the evolution of RC-S, training and
    Qthree main agenda items: the evolution of RC-S, training and
    handover of responsibilities, and RC-S engagement with
    Pakistan. Prior to the round-table discussion, the Dutch
    request that you begin the meeting with an overview of
    political developments to include the U.S. review, the influx
    of U.S. troops, and new leadership in the mission.
    -----------
    Afghanistan
    -----------
    ¶5. (C) The Dutch cabinet is presently considering the
    Netherlands, role in Afghanistan after 2010, including our
    ""Afghanistan Asks"" request (Ref A). Senior officials have
    specifically requested that we give them the room to
    deliberate and come to their own decision, rather than
    applying any sort of public pressure. The Embassy strongly
    supports that approach, particularly because we are on the
    right track for a good decision from the Dutch if we move
    carefully.
    ¶6. (S/NF) On receipt of the ""Afghanistan Asks"" demarche, the
    Deputy Director General for Political Affairs, Robert de
    Groot, told us that most of the requests were very real
    possibilities (Ref B). However, we omitted from the formal
    request the proposed Provisional Reconstruction Team in the
    province of Dai Kundi because De Groot had earlier advised us
    that such a request would hurt our cause as negotiations in
    the Dutch cabinet proceed. Since that time, there have been
    two or three cabinet meetings on the issue. Subsequent
    staff-level comments have not been as optimistic as De
    Groot,s original remarks, so we are using every high-level
    meeting as opportunity to press the U.S. request discreetly.
    ¶7. (C) The international media has lauded the accomplishments
    of the ""Dutch Model"" for Development, Diplomacy, and Defense
    (3D) integrated efforts. This praise has been better
    received internationally than domestically where the public,
    although very supportive of the soldiers, does not strongly
    support their deployment. The Dutch have lost 19 soldiers to
    date, and Dutch public believes they have done more than
    their fair share. Moreover, many Dutch legislators are
    concerned about the effect of the deployment on military
    readiness and recruitment. The Dutch still have a shortfall
    of approximately 7,000 personnel. The Dutch media report
    that the ISAF mission is not successful in bringing security
    to the region and many development programs are ineffective.
    The cabinet and the Parliament will have to make very strong
    and convincing arguments to continue a strong commitment
    beyond 2010.
    ¶8. (C) A majority of the cabinet (the Christian Democrats and
    the Christian Union) is committed to the NATO/ISAF mission
    and the Afghan people. Throughout the cabinet's decision
    process, the Prime Minister, the Foreign Minister and van
    Middelkoop will be strong and effective allies in winning
    support from the Parliament. The political challenge lies
    with the Labor Party, where Development Cooperation Minister
    Koenders will be the key player. Although part of the
    coalition, Labor is the most skeptical of continuing ground
    engagement in Afghanistan after 2010. For Labor,s rank and
    file, the most compelling arguments are those that
    demonstrate how Dutch efforts benefit the Afghan people,
    rather than how essential the Dutch military is for ISAF
    success. The March 31 Afghanistan Conference in The Hague
    provided the cabinet a platform to portray its eventual
    decision as one that was consultative in nature, ""one among
    equals"", and not one of ""request"" from the U.S. or NATO.
    This small point is very crucial in dealing with the Dutch
    psyche and understanding their decision process. The cabinet
    Qpsyche and understanding their decision process. The cabinet
    will be very deft in announcing their decision which is
    expected in the fall. Cabinet approval for some sort of
    follow-on mission is only the first step. That plan then
    goes to Parliament for approval. Although the coalition has
    sufficient votes to pass a plan, Dutch consensus will require
    support from parties other than just those in the coalition.
    The Embassy believes the cabinet and Parliament will
    eventually agree to some follow-on mission in Uruzgan, along
    the lines of our ""asks"" items, but the number of Dutch
    military troops committed to a battle group will be reduced
    significantly and it will step down as lead nation for Task
    Force Uruzgan. There is little information being provided by
    the decision makers but what is received indicates that the
    Dutch will commit to all of the ""asks"" with the exception
    that the funding levels may be lower.
    ¶9. (C) From ref A, the specific ""asks"" delivered to the
    Netherlands were:
    - Contribute to fulfillment of Election Support Force
    requirements for Regional Command-South
    - Retain PRT, OMLTs, Special Operations Forces, and critical
    enablers in Uruzgan Province beyond 2010
    - Special Operations Task Group with Rotary Wing Lift to
    conduct military training and mentoring
    - Contribute $20 million per year for five years to the
    Afghan National Army Trust Fund
    - Support counter-narcotics initiatives including the GPI,
    training the Counter-Narcotics Police of Afghanistan, and
    funding Counter-Narcotics Advisory Teams
    - Deploy gendarmerie for training and mentoring Afghan police
    - Contribute $10 million/year for the ARTF and work with RC-S
    partners to contribute resources to promote regional
    agriculture and power development
    - Continued training and contribution of fully-formed police
    mentor teams for districts in Uruzgan Province to all future
    cycles of Focused District Development
    - Increased support for governance and development programs
    at PRTs, including additional civilian experts with access to
    programming resources
    ----
    JSF
    ----
    ¶10. (C) The Dutch have gone to the brink as JSF partners. In
    a bitter late-April political debate, the Labor Party forced
    a compromise to purchase only one of the planned two OT&E
    aircraft, and delay the decision on the purchase of the
    second test aircraft until 2010, and delayed the decision to
    buy 85 JSF aircraft from 2010 to 2012. Although strongly
    supported by State Secretary of Defense DeVries, JSF will
    likely continue to face headwinds in the Parliament for some
    time to come.
    ¶11. (C) More broadly, the JSF compromise could indirectly
    threaten the Dutch decision to stay in Afghanistan after
    ¶2010. The Labor Party, already skeptical on Afghanistan, is
    viewed as having lost the JSF debate and several other policy
    issues. Looking for a victory, the Labor Party may thus make
    negotiations over Afghanistan more difficult.
    --------
    LAIRCM
    --------
    ¶12. (C) The recent approval by OSD to grant an exception to
    LAIRCM release policy for Dutch KDC-10 aircraft presents an
    opportunity to reiterate appreciation for Dutch efforts and
    shared risks in Afghanistan, along with the hope that a
    significant contribution of Dutch military capabilities will
    continue beyond 2010.
    -------------------------------
    Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV)
    -------------------------------
    ¶13. (C) SAF/IA recently approved exchange of two Dutch Air
    Force operators into an operational UAV squadron at Nellis
    AFB, if the Netherlands agree to purchase MQ-1 or MQ-9 UAVs
    within the next twelve to eighteen months. The Netherlands
    move towards this type of system is borne out of their
    experience in Afghanistan. Should this offer be accepted by
    the Netherlands, it will the first of its kind for UAVs.
    GALLAGHER

`