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### Viewing cable 05MADRID1141, SPAIN: SCENESETTER FOR DEPUTY SECRETARY VISIT TO

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
05MADRID1141 | 2005-03-23 16:04 | 2010-12-07 12:12 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Madrid

`

    This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

` `

    C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 MADRID 001141

    SIPDIS

    STATE FOR D AND EUR/WE
    NSC FOR VOLKER

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/23/2015
    TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER MOPS ECON IZ SP NATO
    SUBJECT: SPAIN: SCENESETTER FOR DEPUTY SECRETARY VISIT TO
    MADRID

    Classified By: Charge d'Affaires J. Robert Manzanares,
    reasons 1.4(b) and (d).

    -------
    SUMMARY
    -------

    ¶1. (C) Your visit to Madrid comes after a difficult year in
    our bilateral relationship but also at a time when we are
    gradually moving relations to a more positive track. The
    Madrid train bombings in March 2004 came as a terrible shock
    to a country that felt it was accustomed to dealing with
    terrorism (in the form of its 30-year conflict with ETA) and
    considered itself a bridge between the Islamic world and the
    West. Voters punished the then-ruling Popular Party after
    the attacks out of resentment over President Aznar's decision
    to ignore strong public opposition to the deployment of
    Spanish forces to Iraq, and for the government's mishandling
    of the investigation into the train bombings. A year later,
    President Zapatero's Socialist Party has consolidated its
    control at the national level and the Popular Party remains
    very much on the defensive.

    ¶2. (C) At the international level, Zapatero is working to
    repair relations with the USG damaged by Spain's sudden and
    poorly coordinated pullout from Iraq and by the Spanish
    government's sharp rhetoric against U.S. policy in Iraq.
    While the public strongly supported Zapatero's withdrawal of
    troops from Iraq, the Socialists' mishandling of relations
    with the U.S. exposed the GOS to media and opposition
    attacks. We are slowly putting relations back on track,
    though differences remain on some issues, such as Spain's
    unwillingness to permit the deployment of Spanish NATO
    officers to support NATO operations in Iraq. Our objective
    is to work with Spain on issues of importance to us and,
    where possible, to steer the Zapatero government away from
    actions that undermine USG policy objectives. Bilateral
    cooperation against terrorism remained strong despite
    turbulence in other aspects of the relationship, as did
    military to military relations. Spain continues to provide
    U.S. forces full access to its naval base at Rota and its air
    base at Moron, as well as providing blanket flight clearances
    for U.S. forces moving to and from Iraq and Afghanistan.
    Spanish Foreign Minister Miguel Angel Moratinos and Minister
    of Defense Jose Bono are scheduled to visit Washington this
    spring for meetings with Secretary Rice and Secretary
    Rumsfeld, and the Ministers of Interior and Justice are
    arranging meetings in Washington as well. End Summary.

    ------------------------
    A YEAR AFTER THE ATTACKS
    ------------------------

    ¶3. (C) You arrive in Spain just over a year after the Madrid
    train bombings of March 11, 2004 killed 191 people and
    wounded over 1600. It was the worst terrorist attack ever in
    an EU country and shook a nation that felt it was accustomed
    to dealing with terrorism as a result of its 30-year conflict
    with ETA. Attorney General Alberto Gonzales's attendance at
    the one-year commemoration of the bombings symbolized USG
    support for the victims of the attack and our respect for the
    Spanish people. Secretary Powell's visit to Spain in the
    wake of the 3/11 attacks was appreciated as a positive
    gesture, but bilateral friction between the USG and the
    Zapatero government since that time has generated a public
    perception that the USG is punishing Spain for Zapatero's
    actions. Both the USG and the Zapatero government have an
    interest in putting relations on a more positive track and
    your visit is a signal that despite our differences we value
    Spain as an ally.

    --------------------------------------------
    SOCIALISTS IN CONTROL OF NATIONAL GOVERNMENT
    --------------------------------------------

    ¶4. (C) The 3/11 attacks and their aftermath were a turning
    point in modern Spanish politics. After taking office in
    1996, President Aznar led his center-right Popular Party (PP)
    to unprecedented power at the national and regional level.
    Although he was not a candidate in 2004, the PP was poised to
    win its third national election in a row, despite widespread
    dissatisfaction with Aznar's decision to contribute forces to
    U.S.-led operations in Iraq. The Madrid train attacks
    shocked the Spanish public and triggered an outpouring of
    grief and sadness, but then anger when the PP government
    continued to blame ETA for the bombings after evidence arose
    pointing to Islamic radicals as authors of the attacks. The
    bombings allowed the Socialists to capitalize on simmering
    resentment of Aznar's decision to send troops to Iraq,
    leading to a huge voter turnout and a Socialist victory.

    ¶5. (C) Zapatero moved quickly on his pre-election promise to
    withdraw Spanish forces from Iraq, a move widely supported by
    the Spanish public. He then pressed forward on a social
    agenda that appealed to Spain's center-left electorate (gay
    rights, curbing the power of the Catholic Church, better
    relations with regional governments in Catalonia and the
    Basque Region) further broadening the Socialists' appeal.
    Aznar and the PP, meanwhile, remained unapologetic for their
    handling of the 3/11 bombings and declined to sideline
    leaders discredited by their actions in the wake of the
    bombings, further eroding their public support. Zapatero's
    main internal challenge is an effort by the Basque Regional
    Government (comprised of moderate Basque nationalists opposed
    to ETA violence) to increase its autonomy from Spain's
    central government. This is a potential powder keg since
    most other regions of Spain strongly oppose increasing the
    Basque Region's already considerable independence, unless
    they too are given greater independence. Zapatero now enjoys
    an approval rating of over 60 percent and, barring a major
    setback, is likely to remain in power for at least one term
    (until 2008). The Socialist Party (PSOE) as a whole also
    gets much higher marks today than the PP opposition.

    ----------------------------
    STRAINED BILATERAL RELATIONS
    ----------------------------

    ¶6. (C) The first eleven months of the Zapatero administration
    have proven among the most difficult in recent U.S.-Spanish
    history. Throughout the most frustrating episodes, the USG
    won points for sticking to the high road and refusing to be
    baited into public disputes with the GOS. Despite our
    efforts, senior GOS officials continued to make unhelpful
    remarks throughout 2004, particularly regarding the U.S. role
    in Iraq. Spain has also irritated us by leading an effort to
    ease EU pressure on Cuba and engaging the Chavez government
    in Venezuela, mainly to satisfy leftist supporters and to
    contrast Zapatero's emphasis on "dialogue" with Aznar's
    tougher line.

    ¶7. (C) The turning point in Zapatero's approach to the U.S.
    came when former Ambassador Argyros declined to attend
    Spain's October 12 national day parade, putting the public
    spotlight on our disappointment with the tone and direction
    of Spanish foreign policy. This episode undermined Spanish
    government assertions in the press that Zapatero's policies
    had not strained ties with Washington. This exposed Zapatero
    to withering opposition criticism that he had scuttled one of
    Spain's most important bilateral relationships and relegated
    Spain to second-class status. While polls consistently
    demonstrate widespread hostility among Spaniards to USG
    foreign policy, the public still expects the GOS to maintain
    healthy working relations with the U.S. Zapatero has
    responded accordingly and has initiated moves to repair ties
    with the USG.

    ------------------------
    RECENT POSITIVE GESTURES
    ------------------------

    ¶8. (C) Since November, Spanish officials at all levels have
    made clear their desire to restore strong bilateral ties,
    with the Foreign Ministry's Director General for Foreign
    Policy (under secretary equivalent) telling us bluntly, "We
    want back in." In response, we've told our Spanish contacts
    that we are prepared to move forward on issues of bilateral
    importance and that unambiguous, positive steps by Spain
    would be the best signal to the USG that they too were ready
    to move forward. Spain subsequently agreed to USG requests
    that it lead a Provincial Reconstruction Team and a Forward
    Support Base in western Afghanistan as part of NATO's mission
    in that country, issued positive statements regarding the
    Iraq elections, and contributed $20 million to the Iraq
    elections fund. Spain also continues to disburse $300
    million in assistance to Iraq pledged during the 2003 Iraq
    Donors Conference in Madrid, and has agreed to train Iraqi
    security forces in Spain. We expect Foreign Minister
    Moratinos to highlight these moves during his April 15
    meeting with Secretary Rice.

    ¶9. (C) The USG has welcomed these steps, while making clear
    that we remain troubled by mixed signals from Spain, such as
    continued characterizations of the conflict in Iraq as "an
    illegal war" by senior Spanish officials. Separately, we
    want Spain to lift its caveats on the deployment of Spanish
    NATO officers to participate in NATO missions, including in
    Iraq. Also, Zapatero is negotiating to sell naval vessels to
    Venezuela to support Spain's troubled shipbuilding industry
    and Spain continues to press for closer EU ties with Castro.
    Despite these differences, we believe relations are moving in
    a positive direction and we want to move ahead in our
    significant bilateral agenda with Spain.

    -----------------------------
    COUNTER-TERRORISM COOPERATION
    -----------------------------

    ¶10. (C) A critical element in our bilateral relationship is
    our high level of cooperation on law enforcement and
    counter-terrorism issues. Spain remains an active front in
    the War on Terror. Investigations since the 3/11 attack have
    confirmed suspicions that there is a large pool of Islamic
    extremists throughout the country, including one cell that
    plotted attacks against Spain's High Court and other targets
    during the latter half of 2004. ETA also continues to carry
    out small-scale bombings, though it has been greatly weakened
    in the last year by arrests of key leaders in Spain and
    France. Spanish authorities arrested 117 suspected Islamic
    terrorists during the year, routinely sharing with USG
    officials information derived from those arrests. A DOJ team
    met with Spanish counterparts in December to identify
    mechanisms for improving information sharing and judicial
    cooperation, particularly on counter-terrorism
    investigations. Attorney General Gonzales and Minister of
    Justice Aguilar issued a joint statement on March 11, 2005
    committing the USG and GOS to closer cooperation on
    counter-terrorism investigations. Aguilar and Minister of
    Interior Jose Antonio Alonso had excellent meetings with
    Attorney General Gonzales. Alonso will travel to Washington
    April 18 and Aguilar will visit May 5.

    --------------------
    MILITARY COOPERATION
    --------------------

    ¶11. (C) Military to military relations remain very strong
    despite the change in government; the Zapatero government has
    continued to provide broad access for U.S. forces to Rota
    Naval Base (on Spain's southern coast) and Moron Air Base
    (southwest Spain). There are currently over 2500 active duty
    U.S. military stationed at the two bases, the vast majority
    at Rota. The American presence at the bases tops 5,000 when
    U.S. civilians and dependents are included. Zapatero has
    also left untouched Spain's practice of providing blanket
    flight clearances for U.S. military aircraft, including in
    support of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Spanish
    military is still smarting from its ignominious withdrawal
    from Iraq and, largely as a result of the Iraq withdrawal, is
    very unhappy with the Socialist government. The Spanish
    armed forces strongly support close relations with the U.S.
    and consider Zapatero's distancing from the U.S. a profound
    error. Minister of Defense Bono will meet with Secretary
    Rumsfeld May 3 in Washington.

    -------------------
    BROADER MIDDLE EAST
    -------------------

    ¶12. (C) The Zapatero government may tell you it has much to
    offer in finding solutions to the issues that face the
    Broader Middle East because of Spain's proximity to the area
    and its experience with Islamic immigrants. FM Moratinos in
    particular touts his experience as the EU's Middle East
    envoy. The Spanish speak frequently of the 10-year
    commemoration of the EU's Barcelona Process, which will be
    held in Barcelona this October. In his speech at the 2004
    UNGA, Zapatero announced a concept he called "The Alliance of
    Civilizations," a sketchy plan dealing with relations between
    the Islamic world and the West that remains very much
    undefined. We have told the Zapatero government that while
    we look forward to learning more about the Alliance of
    Civilizations, it is important that proposals for greater
    understanding and spreading democracy in the region are
    consistent with other initiatives, such as the G-8's Broader
    Middle East and North Africa Initiative.

    ---------------------------------
    ECONOMIC AND COMMERCIAL RELATIONS
    ---------------------------------

    ¶13. (C) We have important commercial interests in Spain as
    well, with a business community that is staunchly supportive
    of U.S. investment and concerned that Zapatero's policies
    will lead to a decrease in U.S. business involvement. At
    every opportunity, we work to encourage a business-friendly
    environment in Spain.

    ¶14. (U) The GOS cooperates with the U.S. on terrorism finance
    issues. Working-level contacts have repeatedly sought
    information on pre-notifications. The GOS checks for assets
    upon receiving information from us, but to date has not found
    such assets. The Interior Ministry is working on
    implementing regulations to a terrorism finance law that will
    enhance the government,s ability to freeze assets.

    ¶15. (U) Spain is an Airbus stakeholder. Recently, Iberia
    chose Airbus to replace a number of medium-sized jets despite
    extensive lobbying by the Embassy on Boeing,s behalf. With
    respect to the Airbus-Boeing subsidies dispute, Spanish
    interlocutors indicate that Spain lets the Commission
    formulate policy. Spain was pleased that the rice issue was
    recently satisfactorily resolved as the retaliation
    contemplated by the U.S. would have struck Spanish olive,
    clementine, and saffron exports particularly hard. Spain
    voted in favor of extending the reprieve on implementing the
    EU,s wood packing directive.

    ¶16. (U) Spain is not on the Special 301 list. However, we
    are working to improve respect for IPR in Spain. The GOS has
    agreed to participate in a U.S.-Spain IPR roundtable
    scheduled for the end of June or September. Commerce
    Assistant Secretary Lash will lead the U.S. delegation at
    this event. We are also working on agricultural
    biotechnology issues in Spain. The previous government was
    largely positive with respect to the technology. The current
    government,s environment minister is opposed. In particular,
    we are seeking to obtain approval for Monsanto's NK 603
    variety, favorable Spanish votes on Commission proposals for
    biotechnology approvals (the Zapatero government has
    abstained on four important votes) and a rational
    co-existence decree.

    --------------------------------------------- ---------
    YOUR VISIT WILL HELP KEEP RELATIONS ON POSITIVE COURSE
    --------------------------------------------- ---------

    ¶17. (C) The USG will not re-establish with Zapatero the deep
    and close relationship we had with the Aznar administration.
    However, we are currently moving towards a more productive
    course that achieves USG interests in Spain and in other
    regions. Your visit will help us emphasize to the Zapatero
    government and the Spanish people that despite our
    differences with the Zapatero administration, we continue to
    consider Spain a close and important ally and, provided Spain
    works with us, we can move ahead together on robust bilateral
    and multilateral agendas.

    MANZANARES

`