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### Viewing cable 06PARIS953, EUR PDAS VOLKER'S FEB 3 MEETING WITH SARKOZY

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
06PARIS953 | 2006-02-14 17:05 | 2011-02-10 08:08 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Paris
Appears in these articles: http://abonnes.lemonde.fr/documents-wikileaks/article/2011/02/09/wikileaks-les-visiteurs-de-l-ambassade_1477418_1446239.htm

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    VZCZCXRO6882
    RR RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
    DE RUEHFR #0953/01 0451700
    ZNY CCCCC ZZH
    R 141700Z FEB 06
    FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 4253
    INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
    RUEHC/DEPARTMENT OF LABOR WASHDC
    RUCPDOC/DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE WASHDC
    RUEATRS/DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY WASHDC

` `

    C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PARIS 000953

    SIPDIS

    SIPDIS

    DEPT ALSO FOR EUR/WE, DRL/IL, INR/EUC, EUR/ERA, EUR/PPD,
    AND EB
    DEPT OF COMMERCE FOR ITA
    DEPT OF LABOR FOR ILAB

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/07/2016
    TAGS: PGOV ELAB EU FR PINR SOCI ECON
    SUBJECT: EUR PDAS VOLKER'S FEB 3 MEETING WITH SARKOZY
    ADVISOR AND FORMER INDUSTRY MINISTER PARTICK DEVEDJIAN

    REF: A. (A) EMBASSY PARIS DAILY REPORT FOR FEBRUARY 6
    ¶B. 2006 AND PRIOR
    (WWW.STATE.SGOV.GOV/P/EUR/PARIS/INDEX.CFM)

    Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt for reaso
    ns 1.4 (b) and (d)

    ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: EUR Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary
    Kurt Volker reviewed on February 3 with Patrick Devedjian, a
    former industry minister and key advisor to Interior Minister
    Sarkozy, how a possible Sarkozy administration would likely
    approach relations with the U.S. Devedjian said a Sarkozy
    administration would make "economic gestures" in connection
    with the reconstruction of Iraq to signal -- as much as
    domestic French opinion would allow -- France's more active
    association with U.S. goals in the region. Devedjian
    acknowledged that a Sarkozy victory in 2007 is far from a
    sure thing, while discounting Prime Minister de Villepin's
    chances of pushing Sarkozy aside as leader of the
    center-right governing party. Devedjian acknowledged that
    the unexpectedly persistent popularity of Socialist Party
    (PS) dark horse Segolene Royal (ref A) was an unforeseen
    development that is forcing contenders of both left and right
    to revisit their electoral calculations, even if he did not
    believe she could win in the end. END SUMMARY.

    WHAT TO EXPECT FROM A SARKOZY ADMINISTRATION
    --------------------------------------------
    ¶2. (C) "We will make economic gestures with regard to the
    Iraq situation" is how Devedjian expressed what would be a
    new French willingness, under a Sarkozy administration, to
    more actively support U.S. goals in Iraq. Devedjian, evoking
    the strand of anti-Americanism that persists in France and
    the widespread public hostility to the U.S.-led invasion of
    Iraq, cautioned however that how much France might be able to
    do along these lines depended on what would be "politically
    possible" at the time. Devedjian did not specify what those
    "economic gestures" might be. Comment: Increases in
    development aid and, possibly further debt forgiveness, could
    be what he had in mind. End Commentg.

    ¶3. (C) Devedjian used the phrase "Atlanticist and
    communitarian" to describe Sarkozy's overall outlook, and to
    distinguish it from that of Villepin, which is often
    described as "nationalist and Republican." Devedjian
    underlined that "we will not be ceding to an anti-American
    campaign," notwithstanding the efforts of Sarkozy's opponents
    to try and tar Sarkozy as pro-American. Devedjian made clear
    that not only would the Sarkozy campaign not engage in any
    outbidding of the opposition in anti-Americanism, but that it
    would also make every effort to avoid "bringing the U.S. into
    our domestic politics."

    ¶4. (C) In response to PDAS Volker's hope that, at NATO, a
    Sarkozy victory might result in useful, operationally
    consequential changes in French behavior, Devedjian lamented
    that the French press and public "are not interested in
    NATO." This has permitted President Chirac, he said, to
    conduct French policy in NATO beyond public scrutiny, without
    accountability for the consequences. Devedjian suggested
    that French institutional reforms proposed by Sarkozy,
    specifically, an NSC-like coordinating mechanism for foreign
    policy and periodic reports by the president to the
    parliament on current issues, could have the effect of
    bringing France's NATO policy out of the shadows. This might
    eventually lead to a more positive appreciation of NATO's
    role by the French public.

    LONG, UNCERTAIN ROAD TO 2007
    ----------------------------
    ¶5. (C) Getting to a Sarkozy administration in 2007, as
    Devedjian soberly acknowledged, was far from a foregone
    conclusion. Devedjian believed that Sarkozy's "type of
    leadership" -- "the hands-on leadership" seen in Sarkozy's
    successful, personal management of the security response to
    the urban unrest that swept France last fall, along with the
    "rupture" with past practice advocated by Sarkozy -- are what
    the French people truly want. Devedjian specified that by
    "rupture with the past," Sarkozy primarily means slimming
    down a bloated and pervasive state that stifles growth by
    taking too big a share of national wealth and which
    undermines individual initiative and commercial innovation by
    over-regulation of business activity. Devedjian underlined
    that voters want "renewal," and he musingly volunteered that

    PARIS 00000953 002 OF 003

    "Sarkozy on the right, and Segolene (Royal) on the left" were
    "the two candidates that would most respond to this desire
    for change."

    ¶6. (C) Devedjian confidently dismissed the possibility of
    Prime Minister de Villepin mounting a successful campaign to
    replace Sarkozy as the candidate of the center-right in 2007.
    Devedjian said that "Villepin and Sarkozy are in agreement"
    that some sort of primary process should decide a single
    nominee for their party, the UMP. Devedjian observed that
    Villepin won't challenge Sarkozy for control of the party so
    long as Sarkozy clearly benefits from both firm command of
    the party and a healthy public image. He added that Villepin
    "has always counted on Sarkozy's self-destruction -- which
    he's been counting on in vain since 2002." Devedjian alluded
    to Villepin's view that Sarkozy's personality -- somehow, not
    presidential -- would in the long run work to shift the
    support of the center-right to Villepin.

    ¶7. (C) Turning to the potential opposition to Sarkozy on the
    center-left, Devedjian clucked at the long-running, confused
    contentiousness in the Socialist Party (PS) over both who
    will lead the party and what the party will stand for in
    ¶2007. In Devedjian's view, neither Party First Secretary
    Francois Hollande nor any of the party's mainstream figures
    are likely to make compelling candidates. Asked to assess
    the option for the socialists of "bringing back Jospin" --
    that is, unifying the divided PS under former Prime Minister
    Lionel Jospin -- Devedjian declared that "Jospin isn't the
    future, he's the past -- and that's not what voters are
    looking for." As for the popular President of the
    Poitou-Charentes Region, Segolene Royal, Devedjian said that,
    despite her appeal to voters wanting change, "Segolene has no
    chance" of winning the PS nomination.

    ¶8. (C) Devedjian pointed out that Royal had in preceding
    days made statements in support of "Blairist" policies to
    address some of France's economic problems. "The only other
    Blairists in the PS are Kouchner and Bockel," Devedjian
    summed up. (Note and comment: Former Health Minster Bernard
    Kouchner and Mayor of Mulhouse Jean-Marie Bockel are the PS's
    most outspoken "liberals." Adoption of anything resembling
    their views is out of the question for the vast majority of
    PS party members. Even so, Devedjian's inference is
    disingenuous -- Royal is exceedingly popular among party
    members. End note and comment.) Reflecting on how Royal's
    popularity -- the emergence of her candidacy as a potentially
    serious one -- has upset the calculations of contenders on
    both left and right, Devedjian joked, "Now that she's wound
    up and going, even Francois Hollande must realize she's not
    going to quit at his, or anybody else's say so." (Note:
    Royal and Hollande have been domestic partners for over 20
    years. End Note.) Devedjian reprised the familiar refrain
    that Royal's personality, allegedly both disagreeable and
    brittle, is not up to carrying the weight of the presidency.
    Implying that this unfitness for the job would become evident
    in due time, Devedjian said that "Everybody who knows her
    knows it, Francois Hollande most of all."

    PARTICIPANTS
    ------------
    ¶9. (SBU) Devejian was accompanied by the UMP's Director for
    International Affairs, Pascal Drouhaut and a staff assistant,
    Marie-Celie Guillaume. PDAS Volker was accompanied by POl
    M-C and PolOff. Devedjian and Volker parted agreeing to stay
    in touch -- in particular, should Devedjian, Drouhaut or
    other Sarkozy advisors travel to Washington in the near
    future.

    SARKOZY'S ADVISORS
    ------------------
    ¶10. (C) Sarkozy's inner circle of political allies and
    advisors consists of Francois Fillon, Brice Hortefeux and
    Patrick Devedjian. Hortefeux is currently Junior Minister
    (for Territorial Collectivities) under Sarkozy at the
    Interior Ministry. Fillon and Devedjian, who were members of
    the government of Jean-Pierre Rafferin, were excluded from
    the current Villepin government precisely because of their
    closeness to Sarkozy. Under Rafferin, Fillon was Minister of
    Education and Devedjian was Junior Minister for Industry.
    Both now have positions in the UMP, and devote themselves
    full-time to making Nicholas Sarkozy the next president of
    France. Fillon tends to take the lead in the fashioning of
    Sarkozy's policy proposals, while Devedjian tends to focus on

    PARIS 00000953 003 OF 003

    tactics for countering other contenders and on strategy for
    getting the votes to win. Fillon is considered a likely
    candidate for prime minister, with Devedjian at Justice or
    Interior, should Sarkozy win in 2007.

    ¶11. (U) This message has not been cleared by PDAS Volker.
    Please visit Paris' Classified Website at:
    http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm

    Stapleton

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