Cable Viewer

Currently released so far... 5218 / 251,287

### Articles

Brazil Sri Lanka United Kingdom Sweden Editorial United States Latin America Egypt Yemen Jordan

### Browse latest releases

2010/11 2010/12 2011/01 2011/02 2011/03
2010/11/28 2010/11/29 2010/11/30
2010/12/01 2010/12/02 2010/12/03 2010/12/04 2010/12/05 2010/12/06 2010/12/07 2010/12/08 2010/12/09 2010/12/10 2010/12/11 2010/12/12 2010/12/13 2010/12/14 2010/12/15 2010/12/16 2010/12/17 2010/12/18 2010/12/19 2010/12/20 2010/12/21 2010/12/22 2010/12/23 2010/12/24 2010/12/25 2010/12/26 2010/12/27 2010/12/28 2010/12/29 2010/12/30
2011/01/01 2011/01/02 2011/01/04 2011/01/05 2011/01/07 2011/01/09 2011/01/10 2011/01/11 2011/01/12 2011/01/13 2011/01/14 2011/01/15 2011/01/16 2011/01/17 2011/01/18 2011/01/19 2011/01/20 2011/01/21 2011/01/22 2011/01/23 2011/01/24 2011/01/25 2011/01/26 2011/01/27 2011/01/28 2011/01/29 2011/01/30 2011/01/31
2011/02/01 2011/02/02 2011/02/03 2011/02/04 2011/02/05 2011/02/06 2011/02/07 2011/02/08 2011/02/09 2011/02/10 2011/02/11 2011/02/12 2011/02/13 2011/02/14 2011/02/15 2011/02/16 2011/02/17 2011/02/18 2011/02/19 2011/02/20 2011/02/21 2011/02/22 2011/02/23 2011/02/24 2011/02/25 2011/02/26 2011/02/27 2011/02/28
2011/03/01 2011/03/02 2011/03/03 2011/03/04

### Browse by creation date

66 72 73 75 79 86 88 89 90 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10
1966/12
1972/02 1972/08
1973/04
1975/03
1979/08
1986/05
1988/01
1989/12
1990/01 1990/07 1990/08
2000/06 2000/09 2000/11
2001/02 2001/03 2001/07 2001/10
2002/02 2002/03 2002/11
2003/03 2003/04 2003/05 2003/06 2003/07 2003/08 2003/09 2003/10 2003/11 2003/12
2004/01 2004/02 2004/03 2004/04 2004/05 2004/06 2004/07 2004/08 2004/09 2004/10 2004/11 2004/12
2005/01 2005/02 2005/03 2005/04 2005/05 2005/06 2005/07 2005/08 2005/09 2005/10 2005/11 2005/12
2006/01 2006/02 2006/03 2006/04 2006/05 2006/06 2006/07 2006/08 2006/09 2006/10 2006/11 2006/12
2007/01 2007/02 2007/03 2007/04 2007/05 2007/06 2007/07 2007/08 2007/09 2007/10 2007/11 2007/12
2008/01 2008/02 2008/03 2008/04 2008/05 2008/06 2008/07 2008/08 2008/09 2008/10 2008/11 2008/12
2009/01 2009/02 2009/03 2009/04 2009/05 2009/06 2009/07 2009/08 2009/09 2009/10 2009/11 2009/12
2010/01 2010/02

### Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z
Embassy Athens Embassy Asuncion Embassy Astana Embassy Asmara Embassy Ashgabat Embassy Ankara Embassy Amman Embassy Algiers Embassy Addis Ababa Embassy Accra Embassy Abuja Embassy Abu Dhabi Embassy Abidjan Consulate Amsterdam American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura Embassy Buenos Aires Embassy Budapest Embassy Bucharest Embassy Brussels Embassy Bridgetown Embassy Bratislava Embassy Brasilia Embassy Bogota Embassy Bishkek Embassy Bern Embassy Berlin Embassy Belgrade Embassy Beirut Embassy Beijing Embassy Banjul Embassy Bangkok Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan Embassy Bamako Embassy Baku Embassy Baghdad Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen Embassy Conakry Embassy Colombo Embassy Chisinau Embassy Caracas Embassy Canberra Embassy Cairo Consulate Curacao Consulate Casablanca Consulate Cape Town
Embassy Dushanbe Embassy Dublin Embassy Doha Embassy Djibouti Embassy Dhaka Embassy Dar Es Salaam Embassy Damascus Embassy Dakar Consulate Dubai
Embassy Freetown
Embassy Guatemala Embassy Gaborone Consulate Guadalajara
Embassy Helsinki Embassy Harare Embassy Hanoi Consulate Hermosillo Consulate Hamburg
Iran RPO Dubai Embassy Islamabad Consulate Istanbul
Embassy Jakarta Consulate Jerusalem Consulate Jeddah
Embassy Kyiv Embassy Kuwait Embassy Kuala Lumpur Embassy Kinshasa Embassy Kigali Embassy Khartoum Embassy Kampala Embassy Kabul
Embassy Luxembourg Embassy Luanda Embassy London Embassy Ljubljana Embassy Lisbon Embassy Lima Embassy Lilongwe Embassy La Paz Consulate Lagos
Mission USNATO Embassy Muscat Embassy Moscow Embassy Montevideo Embassy Monrovia Embassy Minsk Embassy Mexico Embassy Mbabane Embassy Maputo Embassy Manama Embassy Managua Embassy Malabo Embassy Madrid Consulate Munich Consulate Montreal Consulate Monterrey
Embassy New Delhi Embassy Nassau Embassy Nairobi Consulate Naples
Embassy Ouagadougou Embassy Ottawa Embassy Oslo
Embassy Pristina Embassy Pretoria Embassy Prague Embassy Port Au Prince Embassy Phnom Penh Embassy Paris Embassy Paramaribo Embassy Panama Consulate Peshawar
Embassy Quito
REO Basrah Embassy Rome Embassy Riyadh Embassy Riga Embassy Reykjavik Embassy Rangoon Embassy Rabat Consulate Rio De Janeiro Consulate Recife
Secretary of State Embassy Stockholm Embassy Sofia Embassy Skopje Embassy Singapore Embassy Seoul Embassy Sarajevo Embassy Santo Domingo Embassy Santiago Embassy Sanaa Embassy San Salvador Embassy San Jose Consulate Strasbourg Consulate Shenyang Consulate Shanghai Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis Embassy Tripoli Embassy Tokyo Embassy The Hague Embassy Tel Aviv Embassy Tehran Embassy Tegucigalpa Embassy Tbilisi Embassy Tashkent Embassy Tallinn
USUN New York USEU Brussels US Mission Geneva US Interests Section Havana US Delegation, Secretary UNVIE Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius Embassy Vienna Embassy Vatican Consulate Vladivostok
Embassy Windhoek Embassy Wellington Embassy Warsaw
Embassy Yerevan Embassy Yaounde
Embassy Zagreb

### Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
AF ASEC AR AORC AJ AM AMGT AE AU AGMT AG AS AFIN APER ABUD ATRN AL AEMR ACOA AO AX AMED ADCO AODE AFFAIRS AC ASIG ABLD AA AFU ASUP AROC ATFN AVERY APCS AER ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG AEC APECO
BM BR BL BA BILAT BTIO BEXP BH BE BK BRUSSELS BX BU BO BIDEN BY BG BF BB BC BBSR BMGT BTIU
CU CO CH CDG CIA CACM CDB CI CS CVIS CA CBW CASC CD CV CMGT CLINTON CE CJAN CG CF CN CAN COUNTER CIS CM CONDOLEEZZA COE CR CY CTM COUNTRY CLEARANCE CPAS CWC CT CKGR CB CACS COM CJUS CARSON CL COUNTERTERRORISM
DJ DEAX DR DA DHS DOE DEA DK DISENGAGEMENT DS DTRA DOD
EG ECON ETTC EFIN EZ ETRD EUN ELAB EU EINV EAID EMIN ENRG ECPS EN ER ET ES EPET EUC EI EAIR EAGR EIND EWWT ELTN EREL ECIN EFIS EINT EC ECONEFIN ENVR ECA ELN EFTA EXTERNAL EINVETC ENIV EINN ENGR EUR ESA ENERG EK ENGY ETRO ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS ETRDEINVTINTCS ENVI ESENV ELECTIONS ECUN EINVEFIN ECIP EINDETRD
FR FINR FAO FTAA FREEDOM FI FARC FBI FJ FMLN
GM GG GV GH GA GE GT GR GTIP GOI GCC GAZA GZ GTMO
HU HR HA HILLARY HUMAN HO HYMPSK HURI HK HSTC
IV IR IS IZ IAEA IN IT ICTY IQ ICAO INTERPOL IPR INRB IRAJ INRA INRO IO IC ID IIP ITPHUM IWC ISRAELI IRAQI ICRC IMO IF ILC IEFIN INTELSAT IL IA IBRD IMF INR IRC ITALY ITALIAN
JAMES JO JA JOSEPH JP JOHNNIE JUS
KGIC KDEM KTIP KOMC KNNP KWBG KU KPAL KGHG KAWK KISL KPAO KHLS KSUM KSPR KJUS KCRM KGCC KPIN KDRG KTFN KG KBIO KHIV KSCA KN KS KCOR KZ KE KFRD KIPR KPKO KNUC KMDR KPLS KOLY KUNR KIRF KIRC KACT KRAD KCOM KMCA KV KHDP KVPR KDEV KWMN KMPI KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KCFC KTIA KPRP KAWC KCIP KCFE KOCI KTDB KMRS KLIG KBCT KICC KGIT KSTC KPAK KNEI KSEP KPOA KFLU KNUP KNNPMNUC KO KTER KHUM KRFD KBTR KDDG KWWMN KFLO KSAF KBTS KPRV KNPP KNAR KWMM KERG KFIN KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KTBT KCRS KRVC KSTH KREL KNSD KTEX KPAI KHSA KR KPWR KWAC KMIG KSEC KIFR KDEMAF
LE LG LH LY LU LI LO LOG LT
MOPS MARR MNUC MX MASS MCAP MO MIL MTCRE ML MR MZ MPOS MOPPS MTCR MAPP MU MY MA MG MASC MCC MEPP MK MTRE MP MDC MAR MEPI MRCRE MI MT MQADHAFI MD MAPS MUCN MASSMNUC MERCOSUR MC
NATO NL NU NIPP NI NPT NG NO NE NS NAR NZ NPG NK NSG NA NT NASA NGO NP NSF NATIONAL
OVIP OPDC OPRC OIIP OFFICIALS OSAC OAS OEXC ODIP OREP OFDP OTRA OSCE OPIC OECD OPCW OSCI OIE OIC OTR OVP
PARM PREL PTER PHUM PGOV PINR PINS PREF PK PE PBTS POGOV PROP PINL PL POL PBIO PSOE PHSA PKFK PO PGOF PA PARMS PORG PM PMIL PTERE PF PALESTINIAN PY PGGV PNR POV PAK PAO PFOR PHALANAGE PARTY PRGOV PNAT PROV PEL PINF PGOVE POLINT PRL PRAM PMAR PGOVLO PHUMBA PHUS PHUMPREL POLITICS PEPR PSI PINT PU POLITICAL PARTIES PECON
QA
RS RO REGION RU RW RP RIGHTS RICE ROBERT RF RFE
SOCI SY SENV SA SP SNAR SG SCUL SR STEINBERG SF SW SU SL SMIG SO SN SHUM SZ SYR ST SANC SC SAN SIPRS SK SH SI
TS TU TX TBIO TW TSPA TH TIP TI TRGY TC TR TT TERRORISM TO TFIN TD TSPL TZ TPHY TK TNGD TINT TRSY TP
UK UN US UNGA UNSC UNO UNMIK UV UY UP UG USEU USUN UZ UNESCO UE UAE UNEP USTR UNHCR UNDP UNHRC USAID UNCHS UNAUS UNCHC
VE VZ VN VT VM VTPREL
WTO WTRO WA WI WZ WMO WTRQ WHO WWARD WB WBG WEU WHA
XG XT XM XF XR XS XL XK XH XA XY XC XZ XW XD XE
YE YM YI
ZB ZI ZF ZP ZK ZANU ZOELLICK ZR ZU ZA ZO ZJ

### Browse by classification

CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN SECRET SECRET//NOFORN UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

### Community resources

Follow us on Twitter Check our Reddit Twitter this Digg this page Contact us on IRC

courage is contagious

### Viewing cable 09MEXICO944, FRAUD SUMMARY - EMBASSY MEXICO CITY

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:

- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09MEXICO944.

Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
09MEXICO944 | 2009-04-01 13:01 | 2011-02-17 12:12 | UNCLASSIFIED | Embassy Mexico
Appears in these articles: http://wikileaks.jornada.com.mx/notas/fraude

`

    VZCZCXRO6397
    RR RUEHCD RUEHGD RUEHHO RUEHMC RUEHNG RUEHNL RUEHRD RUEHRS RUEHTM
    DE RUEHME #0944/01 0911319
    ZNR UUUUU ZZH
    R 011319Z APR 09
    FM AMEMBASSY MEXICO
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5900
    RUEHPNH/NVC PORTSMOUTH NH 0425
    INFO RUEHXC/ALL US CONSULATES IN MEXICO COLLECTIVE
    RHMFIUU/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC
    RHMFIUU/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHINGTON DC

` `

    200095
    2009-04-01 13:19:00
    09MEXICO944
    Embassy Mexico
    UNCLASSIFIED
    09MEXICO1296|09MEXICO398
    VZCZCXRO6397
    RR RUEHCD RUEHGD RUEHHO RUEHMC RUEHNG RUEHNL RUEHRD RUEHRS RUEHTM
    DE RUEHME #0944/01 0911319
    ZNR UUUUU ZZH
    R 011319Z APR 09
    FM AMEMBASSY MEXICO
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5900
    RUEHPNH/NVC PORTSMOUTH NH 0425
    INFO RUEHXC/ALL US CONSULATES IN MEXICO COLLECTIVE
    RHMFIUU/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC
    RHMFIUU/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHINGTON DC

    UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 09 MEXICO 000944

    SIPDIS

    DEPT FOR CA/FPP
    POSTS FOR FRAUD PREVENTION MANAGERS

    E.O. 12958: N/A
    TAGS: KFRD CVIS CPAS CMGT ASEC MX
    SUBJECT: FRAUD SUMMARY - EMBASSY MEXICO CITY

    REF: A) MEXICO 398 B) MEXICO 1296

    ¶1.  SUMMARY:  During the six months from September 2008 to February
    2009, Embassy Mexico City's Fraud Prevention Unit (FPU) focused on
    the detection of fraudulent documents, the identification of
    prominent purveyors of fraudulent materials, and training in fraud
    detection and interviewing techniques in order to decrease the
    likelihood that mala fide travelers gain access to the United
    States.  END SUMMARY.

    EMBASSY MEXICO CITY FRAUD CONDITIONS
    --------------------------------------------- -------

    ¶2.  High poverty and limited economic opportunities in Mexico make
    the prospect of living and working in the United States, legally or
    illegally, very attractive to many Mexicans and third country
    nationals (TCNs) in Embassy Mexico City's consular district.
    Fraudulent Mexican identity documents and employment documents are
    relatively inexpensive and easy to obtain.  Numerous "coyotes" are
    readily available to provide their services - sometimes at an
    exorbitant cost to applicants.  Fraudulent Consular Reports of Birth
    Abroad (CRBAs) and passport applications are a continuing problem.
    As a result, fraud is considered medium-to-high at post.

    NIV FRAUD
    --------------------------------------------- -------

    ¶3.  As one of the busiest Nonimmigrant Visa (NIV) units in the
    world, Mexico City processes between 1,500-2,000 visas on a daily
    basis.  As such, officers routinely encounter fraudulent documents.
    In order to demonstrate strong ties to Mexico and to overcome the
    presumption of immigrant intent under Section 214(B) of the
    Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), applicants frequently present
    various fraudulent documents, to include employment documents, bank
    statements, professional credentials, and even legal identification.
     In this reporting period FPU has seen various fraudulent employment
    and business documentation, as well as genuine identity documents
    with false information.

    ¶4.  At least one FPU investigator is stationed in the NIV unit at
    all times, to answer factual questions about Mexico, check possibly
    fraudulent documents, ask several quick questions of an applicant,
    or to conduct a more extensive investigation into a suspect case.
    In certain visa classes, FPU pre-screens companies and applicants.

    ¶5.  In cases that cannot be quickly resolved, NIV officers and
    investigators have found the "Refer to FPU" function an effective
    tool in combating fraud.  After the officer refers the case in the
    NIV system, the FPU investigator conducts an investigation, enters
    case notes, and then passes the case back to the officer to
    adjudicate.  This process adds to efficiency and accountability.

    Total Cases referred to fraud - 298
    Cases confirmed fraudulent - 129
    Cases no fraud found - 167
    Pending investigations - 2

    FPU also handled 2,576 minor NIV cases this reporting period.

    ¶6.  This post encounters fraud in virtually all visa classes.  The
    most prevalent types of fraud are detailed below.

    a.  TOURIST AND BUSINESS VISAS:  On occasion, the fraudulent
    documents and questionable stories officers come across on the visa
    line lead to FPU investigations that uncover a higher, and at times
    more sophisticated level of fraud.  Many of these cases are part of
    several wide-spread fraud trends that FPU repeatedly encounters.

    i.  "COYOTES":  FPU carefully monitors the activities of "coyotes,"
    individuals and businesses that often offer "guaranteed" visa
    issuances to their clients.  Through painstaking record-keeping and
    surveillance of these agents, who often accompany their clients to
    the Embassy and wait for them outside, FPU has been successful in
    discovering their methods and building cases against them.  When
    possible, FPU will take aside applicants using the services of a
    coyote and interview them separately in order to ascertain how much
    they paid the coyote, what promises the coyote made, and if the
    coyote supplied the applicant with fraudulent documents and coaching
    for the interview. As a result of the information gathered through
    such investigations, a number of coyotes have had their visas
    revoked under Section 212(a)(6)(E) of the INA and some have been
    turned over to the Mexican legal authorities.

    ii.  "CONSULTANCY" SERVICES:  In a recent case, FPU investigated a
    local business purporting to assist Mexicans interested in applying
    for Nonimmigrant Visas.  The business had its main office in the
    Sheraton Hotel next door to the Embassy.  Using text search, FPU

    MEXICO 00000944  002 OF 009

    linked the owners to 10 cases in which fraudulent employment
    documentation had been presented.  Former clients provided sworn
    affidavits stating that they had been charged upwards of 18,000
    Mexican pesos (approximately 1,228 USD) for fraudulent employment
    packages, which FPU used to support a revocation of the business
    owners' visas under INA Section 212(a)(6)(E).

    Undeterred, the business owners are in the process of moving their
    business to a street behind the Embassy.  FPU has documented several
    recent cases in which the owners charge the equivalent of 250USD in
    order to schedule an electronic U.S. passport appointment.  In at
    least one case, the business has refused to return U.S. birth
    documents to their client unless they are paid a large sum.  FPU is
    currently working with Regional Security Office (RSO) and the local
    Mexican authorities to prosecute the business owners.

    iii.  VISAS FOR RENT:  Recently, post has identified a fraud trend
    that involves teachers "renting" their visas to friends or
    acquaintances, who are also often teachers or posing as such.  In
    one case, the officer noticed that the male applicant was 11 years
    younger than his purported wife, a rare occurrence in Mexico.  The
    applicant presented his genuine school teacher credentials, the visa
    of his supposed wife, and a fraudulent marriage certificate.  The
    applicant admitted to FPU that he had paid a coyote 5,000MXP
    (approximately 400USD) for the fraudulent package, and he was to pay
    5,000MXP more if the visa was issued.  The woman who "rented" her
    visa had her visa revoked under INA Section 212(a)(6)(E).

    iv.  SINGLE PARENT PRESENCE AT MINOR'S PASSPORT ISSUANCE:  The
    consular section continues to monitor closely any case involving a
    minor with the code "4.1" in his/her passport.  FPU previously
    convinced Mexican passport officials to include this code to
    indicate when parental permission to issue a passport was given from
    abroad.  90 to 95% of these types of cases involve a minor with one
    parent living illegally in the U.S.  In a recent FPU visit to the
    Civil Registry in the state of Michoacn - the largest immigrant
    sending state in Mexico - FPU was informed that a full 30% of minors
    applying for passports have a parent living abroad.

    v.  ADOPTIONS "A LA MEXICANA":  FPU often encounters cases that
    involve a particularly Mexican phenomenon: adoptions "a la
    Mexicana."  In these cases the biological mother informally agrees
    to give (or sell) her child to an interested third party, usually an
    acquaintance or a family member, thus circumventing adoption law.
    Often the receiving party has been unable to bear children, or
    simply wants to assist a friend who is otherwise unable or unwilling
    to care for the child.

    In a recent case on the visa line, a Legal Permanent Resident (LPR)
    mother applied for an NIV for her newborn.  After noting the 4.1
    code in the child's passport, the officer was told by the mother
    that she and her LPR husband live in Los Angeles, CA but that she
    returned to Mexico to give birth.  This unusual story, coupled with
    the fact that the mother would have been forty-seven years old at
    the time of birth and had no other children, prompted the officer to
    refer the case to FPU.  The woman admitted that her cousin had put
    her in touch with a woman who was considering an abortion, as she
    had conceived while her husband was living in the U.S.  The woman
    enlisted the help of a doctor in Michoacn to ensure that her name
    was on the birth documentation.  The child was refused 214(b) and
    the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) at post was alerted to the
    case.

    b.  GROUP INTERVIEWS:  FPU Mexico City continues to closely monitor
    applicants who apply in groups. There appears to be a widely-held
    belief in Mexico that such visas are easier to obtain than those
    that are applied for individually.  Once NIV has scheduled an
    appointment for a group (groups may include municipal employees,
    school groups, athletes, etc.), the case is sent to FPU.  Family
    members are not accepted as part of the group unless they can prove
    their presence is absolutely necessary to the group. In groups with
    young children, however, this rule is relaxed to take into account
    their special circumstances.

    For all groups, an FPU investigator assesses the proposed trip and
    runs the names through CCD. If the group seems to be legitimate, the
    applicants will continue with their interview as usual.  If FPU has
    suspicions about a particular group or individual, FPU alerts one of
    the three officers who conduct group interviews.  The officer then
    refers the entire group to FPU after enrollment where an
    investigator interviews members of the group to determine the
    existence of fraud.

    Currently the NIV unit in Mexico City is working to schedule all
    group appointments through Computer Sciences Corporation (CSC) in
    partnership with Teletech (an appointment call center) - as most
    other visa appointments are scheduled.  FPU has ensured that all the

    MEXICO 00000944  003 OF 009

    information used in the pre-screening process will still be readily
    accessible to investigators.

    The most common fraud found in groups occurs when applicants who are
    not legitimate members of the group pose as such.  This phenomenon
    is particularly common with student groups (siblings or children of
    teachers being added as "students" when they do not attend the
    school) and cultural groups (non-performers who are friends of the
    director or legitimate member).  In one recent case, a group of 10
    and 11 year olds was traveling to Texas to play in a football match.
     However, the consular officer noted that one of the children was
    considerably older than the rest of the group members.  After
    questioning, the coach admitted that the applicant was not a
    legitimate team member but actually a brother of another player.  In
    an interesting twist, the coach had an IAFIS hit from 2003 for
    theft.  Given serious doubts on the ultimate motives and credibility
    of the coach, the entire team was refused under INA Section 214(b).

    c.  EMPLOYMENT VISAS:  Mexico City interviews applicants in almost
    all employment visa categories.  The types of prevalent fraud vary
    by visa class.

    i.  E VISAS:  Generally speaking, E visas are not a large source of
    fraud.  The most common type of fraud occurs when an applicant has
    abused his tourist visa prior to requesting E status.  In one recent
    case a family of four applied for E-2 visas.  The father had
    established a school in Illinois several years before, and said that
    he had been traveling between Mexico and the U.S. on his tourist
    visa while managing the school.  He said that the rest of his family
    had been living in Mexico, and that they had last visited the U.S.
    several months earlier.  The son's fingerprints, however, revealed
    that he had been arrested for underage drinking in Illinois only
    weeks before the interview.  The father and son confessed that they
    had been living in the U.S. for the past six months, and that the
    son had enrolled in school.  The officer refused the family's
    application for E visas, and revoked the tourist visas of the father
    and son.

    ii.  H1B AND L VISAS:  Though H1B and L visa approval rates are very
    high, Mexico City has persistent fraud problems in these categories.
     Most of the fraud arises from the fact that many of the applicants
    are looking for a way to immigrate to the U.S.  While dual intent is
    allowed in these visa categories, the most common forms of fraud
    arise when the applicant's sole intention is to reside in the U.S.
    permanently.  Applicants will overstate experience, education, or
    future job responsibilities in efforts to bolster their
    applications.  They will also misrepresent previous employment to
    conceal periods of illegal presence in the U.S. and/or to hide the
    fact that - for L visas - they do not have the requisite one year of
    work abroad in the previous three years.  Individuals may also set
    up shell companies as a means to live in the U.S.  The most common
    false documents presented at the interview or in petition packages
    submitted to United States Citizenship and Immigration Services
    (USCIS) are false pay receipts.  On occasion, applicants present
    false educational or professional credentials.

    In a recent case, a family with a one-year L-1 "new office" visa was
    refused a renewal visa as the Kentucky Consular Center (KCC) field
    research cast serious doubts on their business activity.  The
    applicants were unable to physically describe their purported office
    building and there were many inconsistencies in their business
    registration.  The officer refused the cases under INA Section
    221(g) and submitted a petition revocation to USCIS.

    iii.  H2B VISAS:  FPU works closely with the groups team in
    processing H2B applicants.  Prior to the interview, the Fraud
    Prevention Manager (FPM) vets petitioning companies by checking PIMS
    for adverse field memos, verifying employer location using
    LexisNexis, and by consulting the H2B watchlist of fraudulent
    companies that is published by the Consulate General in Monterrey.
    The H2B-dedicated investigator conducts text searches in the
    Consular Consolidated Database (CCD) to ascertain whether the
    petitioning company has applied at other consulates.  If any adverse
    information is found at this stage it is sent to the H2B
    adjudicating officers for their review.  Additionally, on the day of
    the interview the investigator pre-screens the applicants by
    conducting spot "pre-interviews."  If fraud is suspected, the
    investigator will work with the officer to offer support during the
    interviews.

    There are two major areas of fraud consistently encountered in H2B
    applications.  The first concerns prior illegal presence in the U.S.
    that an applicant refuses to disclose.  IDENT and IAFIS results
    often tell a different story than what the applicant reports.
    Officers have noticed a recent trend in which applicants with years
    of H2B visa experience attempt to cross illegally in between

    MEXICO 00000944  004 OF 009

    applications.  Many of these applicants report that they feared that
    they would be unable to secure a petition in the future, given
    concerns over the future of the H2B program coupled with fears about
    the economy.

    The second major area of fraud occurs when an applicant has misused
    a prior visa by working for a different company.  Post has noticed a
    recent related trend in which companies no longer able to petition
    for workers or who have had fraud issues in the past enlist the help
    of partner or shell companies to petition for workers who will in
    reality work for the first company upon arrival.  In a recent case,
    a large proportion of almost one hundred workers who had been
    previously refused under INA Section 221(g) at the Consulate General
    in Monterrey applied at Mexico City.  After liaising with Monterrey
    on the case, post discovered that the workers had been petitioned by
    a hospitality company that was in fact a shell for a company with an
    extensive history of fraud problems.  The otherwise qualified
    applicants were refused under INA Section 221(g) pending a review of
    their petition.

    With the support of H and L funds, FPU engages in various outreach
    initiatives in order to educate the Mexican public on the H2
    program, with an end goal of debunking myths and protecting workers'
    rights.  Recently, two FPU investigators traveled to the state of
    Michoacn where they presented on the H2B program at a workshop on
    migration issues sponsored by the Mexican Immigration Secretariat.
    Over 120 people attended, with participants from 90 municipalities
    (mostly former migrants and/or LPRs) as well as representatives from
    other Mexican government agencies and U.S. law firms.

    iv.  PERFORMER VISAS:  There are generally two kinds of performer
    visa fraud - fraudulent applicants (usually hidden within a
    legitimate group) and applicants who previously abused their tourist
    visas by performing without a P1 visa.  As with other group visa
    applications, FPU vets P1 applicants prior to the interview.

    In a recent musical group case an applicant applied for a P-1 visa
    as a road manager.  An IAFIS hit revealed that the applicant was
    arrested for forgery in 2007.  When questioned, the applicant denied
    he had ever been to the U.S.  However, the applicant's passport
    indicated that he had just returned the day before from overseas.
    Finally, the applicant confessed that he was not part of the musical
    group and was really just a friend of one of the artists.  The
    applicant was refused under INA Section 9(B)(2).

    v.  RELIGIOUS VISAS:  Before the advent of the petition-based R
    visa, fraud was commonly encountered. Drawing on specialized
    knowledge, FPU investigators are able to recognize fraudulent
    religious credentials and have on occasion discovered completely
    fake ministers, priests, and nuns.

    In recent months, officers have interviewed applicants with approved
    petitions - all of whom have been well qualified.  R officers
    received training on religious workers from the Church of Latter Day
    Saints - a denomination that sends many applicants to the U.S.  With
    this training, the officers are now more confident in their
    adjudications.

    vi.  TN (NAFTA) VISAS:  Most TN visa fraud cases involve applicants
    who present fake "cedulas profesionales" (legal proof of a
    professional degree), have overstayed their tourist or other visas
    in the past, and/or whose job duties differ greatly from those
    listed on the job letter.

    Mexico City requires all TN applicants who are applying for
    professional employment that requires a four-year degree (per
    Appendix 1603.D.1 of NAFTA) to present a "cedula profesional."  The
    ability of consular officers to verify the authenticity of "cedulas
    profesionales" on Mexico's Education Secretariat's website has
    proven invaluable in detecting fraud.

    Some TN applicants have flagrantly overstayed their visas in the
    past.  There have been several families who had been working and/or
    going to public school on tourist visas who then attempted to get a
    TN visa to regularize their status.

    One major problem concerns discrepancies between the real job duties
    and the job duties stated in the job offer letter.  Applicants
    either exaggerate the scope of their responsibilities or completely
    fabricate their duties in order to make them "fit" more easily
    within a TN profession.  Given that there are only two categories of
    TN jobs - Scientific Technician and Management Consultant - that do
    not require a "cedula profesional," FPU has noticed that many
    applicants who are not professionally titled often misrepresent
    their job duties in order to qualify under one of these two
    classifications.

    MEXICO 00000944  005 OF 009

    IV FRAUD
    --------------------------------------------- --------

    ¶7.  Mexico City does not process immigrant visas.

    DV FRAUD
    --------------------------------------------- --------

    ¶8.  Mexico City does not process diversity visas.

    ACS AND U.S. PASSPORT FRAUD
    --------------------------------------------- --------

    ¶9.  Mexico City FPU investigated 86 passport and CRBA cases during
    this reporting period (49 major, 18 minor), as well as 19 other
    American Citizen Services (ACS) cases (most often LexisNexis
    searches to locate next of kin).

    ¶10.  With the implementation of the air phase of the Western
    Hemisphere Travel Initiative (WHTI), the ACS unit saw a significant
    increase in passport applications.  As the June 1, 2009
    implementation date for the land and sea phase of WHTI draws near,
    post expected a similar up tick in passport demand, given that land
    travel is often the preferred method of entering the U.S. from
    Mexico.  However, in recent months passport applications slowed and
    are now just beginning to increase.  To date, the bulk of the
    passport application demand consists of minor children who have
    traveled to Mexico from the U.S. without travel documentation.
    These children have often been sent back to Mexico by parents who,
    documented or not, remain in the U.S. to work.  Many of these
    children return at a very young age, often only days old, which
    precludes the existence of any U.S.-based documentation other than a
    birth certificate.  Passport officers are insistent on seeing as
    much documentation surrounding the pre-natal care and birth of these
    children in the United States as possible before approving such
    cases.

    ¶11.  A further complicating factor in these cases is that often the
    U.S.-born child will later obtain a birth certificate in Mexico, as
    many schools require Mexican birth registration in order to enroll.
    This phenomenon leads to many inquiries from USCIS adjudicators in
    the U.S. who have questions about these seemingly fraudulent double
    birth registrations.  FPU verifies that the Mexican birth
    registration occurred after the U.S. birth certificate was issued by
    liaising with local civil registry contacts.

    ¶12.  When post encounters a midwife instead of a doctor on a U.S.
    birth certificate, the officer consults the electronic Suspect Birth
    Attendant (SBA) List found in the Fraud Library section of PLOTS.
    Regardless of whether the midwife is on the list, the officer will
    often ask for extensive documentation of the birth.  However, such
    cases often occur many years after the fact, and the documentation
    may be inconclusive.  In these cases, FPU works to resolve the case
    at post through targeted interviews with the parents.

    ¶13.  Post continues to see cases in which individuals apply for
    passports and/or CRBAs for minors who are not their biological
    children.  In a recent case, a naturalized Philippine mother and a
    Mexican LPR father who normally reside in CA applied for a CRBA and
    passport for their four-year old son.  They stated that their son
    was born in Mexico and presented a Mexican birth certificate.  After
    questioning, the parents admitted that the child was in fact not
    their biological son and that he was sold to them for 2,000USD by a
    friend who was planning on having an abortion.  They stated that
    they collected the child at a hospital in Sacramento, CA and had not
    seen the birth mother since and thus had no U.S. birth documentation
    for him.  They acquired a report of birth from a hospital in
    Michoacn and then applied for a Mexican birth certificate, for
    which they paid 1,100 MXP (approximately 95USD and far more than the
    normal cost).  Unable to determine the citizenship of the child, the
    officer refused the CRBA and passport applications.  FPU worked with
    DHS at post to enter lookouts on the parents.

    ¶14.  Mexico City has seen a number of imposter cases where an
    applicant applies for a passport at post but a passport under the
    applicant's professed identity has already been issued to a
    different person.  Whether the person is a victim of identity theft
    or has given or sold his/her ID documents is difficult to determine.
     Usually the original fraud has occurred in the United States and is
    not discovered until years later.  In these cases FPU works with the
    Assistant Regional Security Officer for Investigations (ARSO-I) to
    initiate U.S.-based investigations where appropriate.

    ¶15.  In one such recent case, an applicant presented his U.S.
    passport issued in 1998 during a renewal interview at post in
    November 2008.  In 2006, a man claiming the same identity applied
    for a passport in the U.S.  Diplomatic Security (DS) undertook an

    MEXICO 00000944  006 OF 009

    investigation as the subject claimed to be a first time applicant
    and his identity documents were recently issued.  DS decided that
    this man was the true owner of the identity; he was issued a
    passport in 2007.  The investigation notes stated that the subject
    served time in jail from 2002-2003.  He said he did not know the man
    who was issued a passport in 1998.  Interestingly, the man who
    applied at the Embassy in November 2008 said that he met the man who
    was issued a passport in 2007 in jail, as they were cell mates.  The
    November 2008 applicant never returned to the Embassy with further
    identity documentation, and was thus refused as a suspected
    imposter.

    ¶16.  On occasion, ACS is confronted with cases in which it is
    extremely difficult to verify U.S. citizenship.  In one recent case,
    a man approached a consular agency office and claimed to be a
    destitute American citizen.  At the Embassy the man could not
    provide contact information in relation to a repatriation process.
    FPU conducted a LexisNexis search which did not return relevant
    information on the subject who claimed to have lived his entire life
    in the U.S. and who spoke English quite well.  The man refused to
    leave and was eventually escorted out of the Embassy by U.S. Marines
    and RSO personnel who needed pepper spray to subdue him.  The
    following day the man approached a local non-governmental
    organization (NGO) that assists American citizens in order to
    request a bus ticket to the U.S. border.  The NGO contacted the
    Embassy and ACS related its inability to confirm his citizenship.
    Two days later the subject was arrested by local officials.  ACS
    requested that the Mexican authorities fingerprint the man.  The
    A-RSOI queried the prints against IAFIS and the results returned a
    confirmed record for a Mexican national with a completely different
    name.  The subject had been deported or voluntarily departed the
    U.S. five times since 1998, with his most recent removal occurring
    in October 2008.  ACS has not heard from the man since.

    ¶17.  FPU liaises closely with CA/FPP on all passport and CRBA cases
    in which the subject and/or a parent has a fraud-related hit in
    CLASS.  In these cases, the officer contacts FPU who accesses the
    relevant PLOTS record and reviews the information.  CA/FPP is always
    contacted in order to seek concurrence if the officer believes the
    claim to U.S. citizenship is credible or if more information is
    needed to adjudicate the case.  CA/FPP is a constant source of
    support and guidance and responds rapidly to all inquiries from
    post.

    ADOPTION FRAUD
    --------------------------------------------- --------

    ¶18.  Mexico City does not process adoption cases.

    USE OF DNA TESTING
    --------------------------------------------- --------

    ¶19. Post uses DNA testing in passport/CRBA cases where no positive
    proof of parentage exists.  The most common scenario in which this
    need arises is when one or both parents were married to another
    person at the time of the child's conception or birth.  In such a
    scenario, DNA testing is requested almost as a matter of course.
    DNA testing may also be requested when the AMCIT parent swears in
    his/her affidavit of physical presence that he/she was apart from
    the other parent at the time of the child's conception.  Often this
    is simply a matter of the parent noting travel dates incorrectly,
    but if no other evidence can be found or developed in the interview
    to account for the discrepancy, DNA testing is often the only way in
    which to determine parentage.

    ¶20.  When requested, the applicant is given information on how to
    pay for the DNA test at a designated testing facility in the U.S.
    Once payment has been received, an appointment is made at a local
    laboratory for the applicant and his/her purported child to give
    swab samples for DNA testing.  An officer and an LES are present
    when the samples are collected by a technician at the laboratory,
    and the officer initials over the seal of the samples collected.
    The samples are then forwarded to the U.S. for testing, and results
    are received at post in a matter of weeks.  Post requests DNA
    testing from applicants on average three times per month.
    Approximately one out of every 20 tests results in the purported
    father being excluded as the genetic parent of the child.

    ASYLUM AND OTHER DHS BENEFIT FRAUD
    --------------------------------------------- --------

    ¶21.  Mexico City has representatives from DHS and thus does not have
    any involvement with DHS benefits.

    ALIEN SMUGGLING, TRAFFICKING, ORGANIZED CRIME, AND TERRORIST TRAVEL
    --------------------------------------------- --------
    ¶22.  Post has encountered cases of TCNs and transnational criminals

    MEXICO 00000944  007 OF 009

    who capitalize on the systemic malfeasance and corruption found in
    the immigration and civil registry agencies of the Mexican
    Government to obtain genuine Mexican ID documents.  As the drug war
    in Mexico reaches a fever pitch, FPU has worked increasingly closely
    with various U.S. Law Enforcement agencies at post to build
    revocation cases against visa holders with INA Section 2(C)(1) and
    2(C)(2) ineligibilities.
    ¶23.  Widespread forgery and alteration of documents undermine all
    efforts to combat document fraud in Mexico.  Criminal intelligence
    supports the conclusion that any document necessary for travel can
    be purchased for a price in Mexico.  Documents are produced by
    multiple organized criminal sources that have both sophisticated and
    non-sophisticated capabilities to forge and alter documents, provide
    false entry/exit stamps, wash visas, and provide false passports.
    The most misused and available documents are fraudulent birth
    records, which are often used as breeder documents to obtain a
    genuine Mexican passport.
    DS CRIMINAL FRAUD INVESTIGATIONS
    --------------------------------------------- --------

    ¶24.  The Bureau of Diplomatic Security's Criminal Investigations
    Program and Visa and Passport Security Program are well established
    in Mexico.   Mexico currently has six DS Special Agents who serve as
    ARSO-Is who are co-located in consular sections in Mexico City,
    Hermosillo, Ciudad Juarez, Tijuana, Matamoros, and Monterrey.  A
    seventh ARSO-I position should be operational in Guadalajara in July
    2009, and Nuevo Laredo is also expecting an ARSO-I position in the
    near future.  The Acting Deputy Regional Security Officer manages
    the entire program from Mexico City.

    ¶25.  Once FPU has identified a fraud case and it appears to involve
    clear violations of U.S. law or evidence of criminal activity, the
    ARSO-I reviews the case for potential criminal case development.
    All criminal cases accepted by DS are reported monthly through DS
    channels to DS's Criminal Investigations Division.  Significant
    cases, updates, and final disposition are then shared by DS in
    regular meetings with CA/FPP.  Cases that have only a local nexus
    are passed on to the host nation authorities for prosecution and
    monitored by the ARSO-I for final disposition.

    ¶26.  In a recent case, an NIV line officer contacted the ARSO-I
    after noting suspicious movements in a visa applicant's bank
    accounts.  After reviewing the case, the ARSO/I referred it to DS
    for investigation in the U.S. for suspected money laundering.

    ¶27.  A steady stream of H cases continue to be developed and
    referred back to the U.S. for investigation and prosecution.  The
    program has been working regularly with KCC's fraud and analytical
    units to scrutinize many H visa petitions, as well as U.S.
    Immigration and Customs Enforcement's (ICE) Document and Benefit
    Fraud Task Forces to bring to bear a coordinated multi-agency
    criminal investigation where fraud is suspected.

    HOST COUNTRY PASSPORT, IDENTITY DOCUMENTS, AND CIVIL REGISTRY
    --------------------------------------------- --------

    ¶28.  Mexico City's FPU continues to have concerns regarding Mexican
    passport security.  While the Mexican passport itself features a
    number of effective security features, it remains very easy to
    acquire a legitimate Mexican passport with fraudulent birth
    certificates or other identity documents.  Mexico City's FPU has
    shared with the Mexican Secretariat of External Relations (SRE)
    information on the "delegaciones" (local passport offices) that have
    a history of issuing Mexican passports to Central and South
    Americans, Europeans, as well as to Mexicans with false identities.

    ¶29.  In a seemingly routine visa renewal case, a subject claimed to
    be born in Mexico City and presented a genuine Mexican passport.
    However, the applicant's fingerprints returned an IAFIS hit that
    revealed him to be the subject of an Interpol Red Notice and the
    owner of a completely different identity.  The subject's Mexican
    passport was issued under a false name.  Given that the subject's
    past U.S. visa was issued under the same name, the subject had
    evidently used his false identity for at least ten years.  The
    subject is actually from Spain where he is wanted for bank fraud
    (with damages in the range of 50 million USD) committed in the early
    1990's.  ARSO-I coordinated with Interpol to have the subject
    apprehended when he returned to the Embassy to ostensibly collect
    his visa.  The subject is currently in Mexican prison while Mexico
    and Spain arrange extradition details.

    ¶30.  In late 2007 the SRE decided to start its own passport
    anti-fraud unit.  With Narcotics Affairs Section (NAS) funding, the
    SRE sent several members of their new anti-fraud team to Washington
    in February 2008 to observe and learn about USG anti-fraud
    operations.  Ultimately an SRE anti-fraud unit should lead to

    MEXICO 00000944  008 OF 009

    stricter internal controls on Mexican passport issuances and thus to
    fewer applicants (for NIV and ACS services) with false identities
    but legitimate Mexican documents.  Unfortunately, the unit will not
    begin operations until a new passport director is named.

    ¶31.  As previously reported in Reftels, the Government of Mexico
    (GOM) debuted a new "G" series passport.  In addition to some
    quality issues with the new passport, the GOM had been issuing two
    versions of the new passport simultaneously.  As well as issuing
    both versions of the "G" series passport, the SRE continued to issue
    "F" series passports in order to finish their inventory of "F"
    passport books.  Currently, it appears that the SRE has made the
    transition and is now only printing one version of the "G" series
    passport.  GOM contracts a Spanish company - Indira- to produce its
    laminate passport books.

    COOPERATION WITH HOST GOVERNMENT AUTHORITIES
    --------------------------------------------- --------

    ¶32.  FPU has an excellent working relationship with the SRE and good
    contacts with civil registries in the consular district.  FPU has
    made valuable contacts in the financial and travel sectors through
    FPU-led training sessions on U.S. and Mexican travel documents.  A
    strong relationship with local law enforcement has enabled DS to
    refer various visa cases with criminal implications to the relevant
    authorities.

    ¶33.  FPU - with the support of ARSO-I - works closely with the
    Mexican Attorney General's office (PGR) on various issues.  The PGR
    has agreed to start prosecuting double identity cases in which the
    applicant has a national voting card (IFE).  Additionally, the PGR
    and DS have agreed to use a separate section of Mexican Law
    (referred to as Article 4) to prosecute particularly egregious fraud
    cases.  Article 4 allows the Mexican authorities to prosecute
    Mexican citizens for crimes they have committed in other countries.

    ¶34.  In a recent case, an observant LES enroller came across a
    passport that looked suspicious.  FPU verified that the passport was
    indeed a fake, as was the copy of the IFE he presented.  The subject
    said he bought the fake passport and IFE because it was easier than
    waiting in line.  His fingerprint results told a different story.
    The subject had been deported/voluntarily departed from the U.S. at
    least five times.  He has at least ten charges from 1999-2007,
    including possession and sale of narcotics, drinking under the
    influence, and spousal abuse.  During his criminal career, the
    subject has used at least five different names.  ARSO-I contacted
    the PGR who came to the NIV section to place the subject under
    arrest.  Interestingly, for legal purposes, the PGR considers the
    Embassy "another country" and as such, the subject's crime of
    presenting a false identity can be prosecuted under Article 4.

    ¶35.  FPU routinely meets with the Mexican Education Secretariat
    (SEP) in order to return fraudulent "cedulas profesionales."  The
    SEP then follows up with the PGR in order to prosecute these
    fraudulent professionals.  Previously, ARSO-I presented various
    cases to the Mexican authorities in which practicing physicians had
    fake professional credentials.  To our knowledge, none of these
    cases have been prosecuted.

    AREAS OF PARTICULAR CONCERN
    --------------------------------------------- --------

    ¶36.  We would like to see more of our investigators taken for FSI
    Fraud Prevention Training as currently only two of the six
    investigators have been able to take the current course.

    STAFFING AND TRAINING
    --------------------------------------------- --------

    ¶37.  Current positions that are dedicated exclusively to FPU and
    fraud prevention training received by each employee:

    Fraud Prevention Manager (acting):  XXXXXXXXXXXX
    (Fraud Prevention Manager course at FSI in Sept. 2006 and on the job
    training)

    ARSO-I:  XXXXXXXXXXXX (on the job training)

    Junior Officer Rotation:  XXXXXXXXXXXX (on the job training)

    Senior FSN Fraud Investigator:  XXXXXXXXXXXX
    (Equivalent of PC 542 taken in Fort Lauderdale, FL in 1998 and on
    the job training)

    FSN Fraud Investigator:  XXXXXXXXXXXX (PC 542 in March 2006 and
    on the job training)

    MEXICO 00000944  009 OF 009

    FSN Fraud Investigator:  XXXXXXXXXXXX (on the job training)

    FSN Fraud Investigator:  XXXXXXXXXXXX (on the job training)

    FSN Fraud Investigator:  XXXXXXXXXXXX (on the job training)

    FSN Fraud Investigator (H and L):  XXXXXXXXXXXX (on the job
    training)

    FSN Administrative Assistant:  XXXXXXXXXXXX (on the job training)

    ¶38.  FPU provided anti-fraud training to 599 people in this
    reporting period, for a total of 100 hours of training.  FPU trained
    39 Foreign Service Officers, 51 LES and 509 outside contacts,
    including representatives from the financial sector, Mexican
    governmental agencies, and airlines.  Building on the initial fraud
    training offered to newly-arrived consular officers, FPU began a
    mandatory "Fraud Refresher" course for consular officers who have
    conducted visa interviews for three months or more.  FPU also
    started a monthly seminar series that educates officers on Mexican
    structures and institutions, to include various political, economic,
    and governmental topics. FPU led three city tours this period, two
    for consular officers and one for other members of the Embassy
    community.
    BASSETT

`