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### Viewing cable 09CAIRO999, ARAB DARFUR LEADERS IN CAIRO ADVOCATE FOR DARFUR

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
09CAIRO999 | 2009-06-02 12:12 | 2011-02-16 21:09 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Cairo

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    VZCZCXRO8297
    PP RUEHROV
    DE RUEHEG #0999/01 1531219
    ZNY CCCCC ZZH
    P 021219Z JUN 09
    FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2772
    INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
    RUEHDO/AMEMBASSY DOHA 0271
    RUEHKH/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM 1305
    RUEHNJ/AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA 0019
    RUEHRH/AMEMBASSY RIYADH 0919

` `

    C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 CAIRO 000999

    SIPDIS

    DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/ELA, NEA/ARP, AF/SPG, AF/C

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/28/2019
    TAGS: PREL PHUM SU CD QA SA EG
    SUBJECT: ARAB DARFUR LEADERS IN CAIRO ADVOCATE FOR DARFUR
    DIALOGUE Classified By: Minister Counselor for Economic and Political Affairs William R. Stewart for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
    1.(C) Key Points: -- Three Darfuri rebel leaders, in separate meetings, all advocated for a Darfur-Darfur dialogue to resolve the conflicts in the region. All the leaders suggested that the USG play a role in facilitating the dialogue, and they said that the international community's participation in the dialogue was key to its success. -- All three leaders mentioned that the Government of Sudan (GOS) was able to use Arab Darfuri tribes to facilitate the conflict in Darfur. Most mentioned that the GOS was able to manipulate the Arab tribes because they are the most marginalized in Darfur. All leaders stated that Khartoum is working to convince Arab Darfuris and the international community that the GOS is the representative al all Arabs both in Darfur and at the peace table. -- The Doha talks are not viewed favorably because they have focused on the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) and leave out the Darfuri Arab tribes. -- An unbiased U.S. role is needed to help resolve the crisis in Darfur. However, the USG, because of domestic pressures, tends to favor African tribes at the expense of Arab tribes. -- Two of the leaders stated that the Government of Chad and JEM were receiving "Saudi funding" to offset Libyan influence in the region. Saudi funding was a result of a personal conflict between Saudi King Abdallah and Libyan leader Moammar Ghaddafi.

    2.(C) Comment: The Arab Darfur leaders expressed confidence of their analysis of the situation in Darfur, but none articulated a vision for the future of Darfur. Despite advocating for dialogue, not one of the Arab Darfuri leaders wanted to meet with us in a roundtable format in the presence of their fellow leaders. Although all three of the leaders spoke about unity, all envisioned themselves to be the leader of a "united group." One leader told us that "once you are a leader, you cannot become less than that in the future." This is the first time that we have heard about a Saudi funding connection to Chad. However, the two Arab Darfuris that mentioned it both seemed to be well informed and were not connected to each other. Still it is unclear whether the information is from one source or from multiple sources. End Comment. ----------------------- Darfuri Dialogue Needed -----------------------

    3.(C) During the week of May 10, we met separately with three Arab Darfuri leaders in Cairo. Osama El Hassan, leader of the Democratic Popular Front (DPF), Salah Mohamed Abdel Rahman Abu Sura, leader of the Revolutionary Forces Democratic Front (RFDF) and Anwar Khater. Hassan told us that there was a need to create a dialogue among Darfur groups to bring about political reconciliation and a fair solution to Darfur's problems. Hassan said that all groups need to be included in the process including rebel movement leaders, IDP leaders and tribal leaders. He said that approving a mechanism for civilian protection must be the initial focus of the gathering. Hassan said that the goals of the dialogue should also include signing an agreement to stop hostilities, banning war planes over Darfur, paying "blood money" reparations to victim's families and guaranteeing the commitment of UNAMID forces for a specific time frame to facilitate the peace.

    4.(C) Abu Sura agreed that there needed to be a Darfur dialogue. He stated that any lasting solution to the Darfur crisis needs to address the inequality of power and wealth in the region by promoting economic development and democracy. Abu Sura advocated for an economic program focused on growing the agricultural and animal husbandry industries, which capitalize on the skills of the local population. He also said that there is a need to increase the political participation of the marginalized in Darfur society to address their needs, which he said included humanitarian assistance, security, and land ownership. CAIRO 00000999 002 OF 003

    5.(C) Khater stated that all Darfur leaders believe that unity is the solution to the crisis in the region. However, he said that unless there is a Darfur dialogue that includes militia, IDP and civil society leaders, there would not be a sustainable ceasefire because of a lack of trust in what the process will deliver. Khater feels that the most productive dialogue would take place in the U.S. or Europe so as to remove participants from regional pressures that could be counterproductive. He specifically mentioned that Libya and Chad support certain solutions favoring their Arab and Zaghawa allies respectively. Khater opined that the direct involvement of those two countries in the process will ultimately lead to failure. He also said that a discussion in the U.S. or European could involve the Darfuri Diaspora in the peace process. ---------------------------- GOS Using Darfur Arab Tribes ----------------------------

    6.(C) Khater said that the GOS has used the Arab tribes to fight the war in Darfur, and he told us that the GOS is now telling the Arab Darfuris that they must ally with Khartoum for protection from the African tribes. He dismissed the idea that the conflict in Darfur is an Arab-African conflict. He said that this idea has been used to attract the international community's attention to the conflict and the GOS uses this notion to "divide and conquer" the people in Darfur. Hassan told us that the GOS is trying to create the impression that it represents the Darfur Arab tribes. He stated that this is not true, but he said that this perception benefits the GOS because it allows it to represent the Arabs at any peace negotiations.

    7.(C) Abu Sura told us that the international community's perception that the Darfuri Arabs are the "source" of the problems in the region is not completely true. Abu Sura said that Darfuri Arabs are the most marginalized group in Darfur and this led them to be easily manipulated by the GOS to stage janjawiid attacks. He said that continued marginalization of Arab Darfuris allows the GOS to recruit Arabs as proxies for its conflict against Chad. However, he stated that the Darfuri Arabs are looking for Western assistance to meet their economic development needs and they have no loyalty to the GOS. --------------------------------------------- Doha Talks Discriminate Against Darfuri Arabs ---------------------------------------------

    8.(C) Hassan said that the DPF is against the Doha process because it only engages African tribes at the expense of the Arab tribes in Darfur. He stated that the Doha talks have not even made mention that the Arab tribes need to be included in the process. Abu Sura encouraged us to "leave Doha out" because it the Government of Qatar does not understand the "complexities" of Darfur. He said that the current Doha process will only lead to Darfuri Arabs feeling further marginalized because they are not included in the process. Khater told us that the Darfur community rejects Qatar role in resolving the Darfur conflict, because of Doha's "Islamist leanings." He stated that the Doha talks favor Islamist parties and individuals such as JEM, and Hassan al-Turabi.

    9.(C) Hassan said Doha's focus on the JEM has "polarized" the discussion on Darfur because JEM is a "group of thugs," supported by the Chadian Government and has "Islamist" ties to Dr. Hassan al-Turabi. Abu Sura stated that the JEM has regional ambitions to increase the role of the Zaghawa at the expense of the other groups in Darfur and Eastern Chad. He said that the JEM is either "buying off" some groups or attacking groups that it cannot buy such as SLA-Minawi, SLA-Unity and the United Resistance Front (URF). Despite antipathy for the JEM, all the leaders agreed that JEM should not be excluded from the Darfur dialogue or the peace process, but they also should not dominate it. --------------------------------- Strong, Unbiased U.S. Role Needed ---------------------------------

    10.(C) Khater told us that the USG is the one entity that can facilitate a successful peace process in Darfur because it is "trusted." However he stated that the U.S. relies too much on the Zaghawa as the solution to the problems in CAIRO 00000999 003 OF 003 Darfur. Khater stated that Minni Minawi's signature in Abuja did not resolve the Darfur conflict, and he opined that discussions with Khalil Ibrahim will not resolve the conflict either. He said the USG needs to reach out to both the Fur and Arab populations in Darfur, which make up the majority of the population. Abu Sura agreed that the USG needs to play a bigger role in a Darfur peace deal. He advised the U.S. not to spend time in getting parties to "sign superficial peace deals" that blow up the next day. He said that the USG should focus on promoting economic development, democracy, and the rule of law in Darfur to gain the support of the people.

    11.(C) Hassan said that U.S. policy on Darfur had been biased by "lobby groups" that pushed for African tribal rights at the expense of the Arab tribes in Darfur, which they wrongly lumped in with the GOS. He opined that this is the reason for USG support for African militias such as the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) and the JEM. Hassan said that U.S. policy intentionally leaves out the Arab Darfuri because it considers them to be janjawiid and condemns them for the atrocities in Darfur. However, Hassan stated that "the janjawiid are not all Arabs and all Arabs are not janjawiid." He said that GOS pushed blame on Arab Darfuris to avoid more condemnation. ------------------------- The Saudi-Chad Connection -------------------------

    12.(C) All the leaders mentioned the role of Chadian Government in the continuing conflict in Darfur. Most discussion centered around Chadian support for the JEM in Darfur. However, two of the leaders referred to Saudi funding for Chad and the JEM. Hassan told us that there is a lot of money coming into Chad from Saudi Arabia. He stated that this money is used to fund the JEM to be the Sudanese opposition. Abu Sura told us that a ceasefire will be difficult to obtain because the conflict between Sudan and Chad is part of a "personal regional conflict" between Saudi King Abdallah and Libyan leader Moammar Ghaddafi, in which Saudi Arabia supports the Chadian government and its proxy, the JEM, while the Libyan Government supports Chadian rebel groups.

    12.(U) MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. SCOBEY

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