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### Viewing cable 06PARIS5974, FRENCH ELECTION 2007: NICOLAS SARKOZY -- THE

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
06PARIS5974 | 2006-09-06 15:03 | 2010-11-30 21:09 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Paris

`

    VZCZCXRO2589
    PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
    DE RUEHFR #5974/01 2491539
    ZNY CCCCC ZZH
    P 061539Z SEP 06
    FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1063
    INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
    RUEHC/DEPARTMENT OF LABOR WASHDC
    RUCPDOC/DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE WASHDC
    RUEATRS/DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY WASHDC

` `

    C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 PARIS 005974

    SIPDIS

    SIPDIS

    DEPT ALSO FOR EUR/WE, DRL/IL, INR/EUC, EUR/ERA, EUR/PPD,
    AND EB
    DEPT OF COMMERCE FOR ITA
    DEPT OF LABOR FOR ILAB

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/07/2015
    TAGS: PGOV ELAB EU FR PINR SOCI ECON
    SUBJECT: FRENCH ELECTION 2007: NICOLAS SARKOZY -- THE
    CANDIDATE WHO MIGHT CHANGE FRANCE

    Classified By: Ambassador Craig Stapleton for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

    Summary
    -------
    ¶1. (C) Eight months before France's 2007 Presidential
    election, Interior Minister Nicholas Sarkozy remains the best
    positioned of the many contenders for France's presidency.
    He is a markedly different presidential heavyweight,
    pro-American and committed to free-market principles.
    Notwithstanding his evident strengths and popularity, many
    French voters are still uncomfortable with the idea of
    "President Sarkozy," and questions about his hyperactive
    personality, his core law-and-order agenda, and divisions
    within the ruling UMP make his election far from certain.
    Sarkozy's Gaullist political heritage and his likely "I can
    speak frankly to the Americans" refrain mean that France and
    Sarkozy would remain an independent and challenging ally.
    However, a Sarkozy presidency would certainly bring a new and
    welcome tone to U.S.-French relations -- and perhaps, over
    time, a French approach to world problems that is less
    fixated on reflexively seeking ways to distinguish France
    from the U.S. Sarkozy's greatest contribution to France
    could be his promise to free the country's latent economic
    dynamism from the constraints of statism and labor rigidity.
    End Summary.

    Timeline to the Election
    ------------------------
    ¶2. (U) Eight months ahead of the first round of France's
    2007 presidential election, to be held on either Sunday,
    April 15 or Sunday, April 22, 2007, Interior Minister and
    President of the center-right Union for a Popular Movement
    party (UMP) Nicolas Sarkozy remains the best positioned of
    the many contenders. In the last presidential election in
    2002, there were 16 candidates in the first round. Slightly
    fewer are expected this time around. The second round
    run-off between the top two vote-getters of the first round
    will be held two weeks later, either Sunday, April 29 or
    Sunday, May 6. Sarkozy has served as Interior Minister in
    the government of Prime Minister Dominique de Villepin since
    that government's inception in June 2005. In January 2007
    (tentatively scheduled for January 14-15) the UMP will hold a
    party congress expected to designate Sarkozy, the party
    leader, as its presidential candidate. Shortly before that
    congress, Sarkozy may well leave the government to dedicate
    himself full-time to pursuing the presidency. In recent
    weeks Sarkozy has been careful to signal that he is keeping
    all his options open in this connection, pointing out that
    nothing prevents him from remaining in the government while
    he pursues the presidency. Sarkozy himself will make the
    final decision -- and will not hesitate to ignore the advice
    of others -- as he did when he chose to rejoin the government
    in June 2005.

    The Best Positioned Contender
    -----------------------------
    ¶3. (C) Ever since his first tenure as interior minister
    (2002 - 2004), when he emerged as a top-tier national
    political figure, Sarkozy has been highly popular with a
    large segment of the French electorate. The most recent
    polling figures show that popularity holding steady.
    Sarkozy's unchallenged control of the Union for a Popular
    Movement (UMP) party (which was founded by President Chirac)
    also increases his election chances. Sarkozy has worked to
    turn the UMP into a formidable electoral machine, complete
    with focus groups for keeping his message tuned to voters'
    concerns and volunteer organizations for turning out the
    Sarkozy-for-president vote. Since he became president of the
    party in 2004, Sarkozy has also increased the number of party
    members from 100,000 to 250,000 today. This political
    organization gives Sarkozy a powerful advantage, and should
    ensure his presence in the second round of the election.
    Moreover, Sarkozy is a formidable campaigner, energetic,
    quick on his feet and appealingly direct. The combination of
    popularity, control of his party, and masterful political
    skills, including as a campaigner, is unmatched by any of the
    other presidential contenders.

    A Different Kind of Presidential Heavyweight
    --------------------------------------------
    ¶4. (C) Sarkozy is hard to pigeon-hole; he is not a
    traditional French conservative, which is clear from some of
    his policy proposals. Sarkozy often speaks of the need for
    France to break with policies and attitudes that undercut the

    PARIS 00005974 002.2 OF 004

    country's economic dynamism. Sarkozy has long called for
    lower taxes and more "liberal" (i.e., free-market) economic
    policies to encourage entrepreneurship. He has also long
    called for a less regulated environment for big business,
    something of a novelty in a country in which both left and
    right have always been comfortable with a high level of
    government regulation of the economy. The untested
    popularity of Sarkozy's free-market orientation helps explain
    why few commentators at this stage are ready to hazard a firm
    prediction on the outcome of the 2007 election other than to
    affirm that -- presuming candidates of the center-left and of
    the center-right compete in the second round -- it will be
    exceedingly close; Sarkozy himself has indicated to us on a
    numerous occasions that the election will be "51 - 49."
    Sarkozy is well aware of the resistance in France to
    shrinking the role of the state in protecting the economic
    security of both individuals and businesses.

    ¶5. (C) Sarkozy's proposals in the field of social policy --
    for example, affirmative action in employment and education
    for immigrants who are discriminated against, and limited
    voting rights for non-citizen residents -- are not policies
    traditionally associated with the right of the political
    spectrum in France. Sarkozy's proposals for reforming French
    government institutions -- making the president answerable to
    the legislature and responsible for the domestic policies of
    the government, while giving the legislature more oversight
    over France's foreign policy -- also break the mold of
    traditional, center-right French Gaullism. Most of all,
    Sarkozy is associated with tough, firm enforcement of
    anti-crime and counter-terrorism measures.

    Doubts about a "President Sarkozy"
    ----------------------------------
    ¶6. (C) Sarkozy is also perceived as a different kind of
    political personality. Recent polls point to the austere De
    Gaulle and the imperturbable Mitterrand as by far the most
    revered of French presidents. That the edgy, intense,
    hands-on Sarkozy is so far from the preferred model of
    Olympian reserve raises the question of whether, as a matter
    of cultural psychology, the French are ready to entrust the
    presidency to Sarkozy. Clearly many French people recognize
    that a "new model" is needed -- a presidency that directs and
    is responsible for domestic policy, especially given the new,
    shorter five-year presidential term. The iconoclastic
    Sarkozy has the most extensive experience and strongest
    credentials for filling that role. The French however, are
    also famously hesitant to embrace change, and in a time of
    apprehension and self-doubt could prefer a more traditional
    and reassuring figure. Some also fear a Sarkozy presidency,
    citing his "hyper-active" personality, and persisting
    factional splits within his own party, and his polarizing
    image as a law-and-order strongman. Electorally, Sarkozy's
    law-and-order image is potentially the most significant. It
    is this hard-edged profile that makes Sarkozy a divisive more
    than unifying figure, generating intense allegiance on the
    right and, equally strongly, unsettling so many on the left
    and even the center of the political spectrum.

    Pro-American at Heart, but Still a French Gaullist
    --------------------------------------------- -----
    ¶7. (C) Sarkozy -- for a French politician -- is forceful and
    unabashed about the need for France to get beyond its
    anti-American reflexes. With the exception of his
    reservations about the wisdom of the U.S. invasion of Iraq in
    2003, Sarkozy is the French political leader most supportive
    of the U.S. role in the world. Sarkozy has told the
    Ambassador on several occasions that France needs to help the
    U.S. "get out of Iraq." Sarkozy's pro-American orientation
    has earned him the sobriquet "Sarkozy the American," and his
    affinity for Americans and the U.S. is genuine and heartfelt.
    Sarkozy's admiration for the U.S. comes through in one of
    his favorite stories: when, as a young boy, he told father
    that he wanted to be president, his father told him, "In that
    case, with a name like Sarkozy, you'd better immigrate to
    America." The young Nicolas replied that he wanted to become
    President of France, not the U.S. Sarkozy has always wanted
    to make France a land of equal opportunity for immigrants
    also.

    ¶8. (C) Sarkozy's pro-Americanism , however, should not be
    interpreted as meaning that Gaullist insistence on France's
    (and the EU's) independence from the U.S. in the
    international arena will disappear. France's selective

    PARIS 00005974 003 OF 004

    support for U.S. positions will continue. Nor will Sarkozy
    likely abandon France's traditional preference for
    strengthening the EU over NATO in the name of trans-Atlantic
    rapprochement. As Sarkozy told a visiting Congressional
    delegation last year, "We should never forget that we are
    loyal friends -- and that friends can disagree." Although
    Sarkozy feels close to America (to this day, he recalls with
    fondness his "discovery" of America as an International
    Visitors Program grantee in 1985), his assertive personality
    is such that, as France's president, he would not shy away
    from offering firm advice about how the U.S. might best
    advance towards shared goals -- up to and including bald
    advice to change course. Even so, what Sarkozy would call
    the "loyalty" factor in his friendship toward the U.S. would
    remain intact, and Sarkozy's articulate, public defense of
    that attitude could, over time, result in a greater French
    receptivity to America's global outlook and policy positions.
    Especially if extended over a two-term, ten-year Presidency,
    the result could be a France less resentful of the U.S. --
    one less reflexively inclined to taking positions that
    intensify and highlight France's differences with the U.S.

    Sarkozy's Free-Market Convictions Could Transform France
    --------------------------------------------- -----------
    ¶9. (C) Sarkozy's greatest contribution to France could be in
    freeing the country's latent economic dynamism from the
    constraints of statism and labor rigidity. Sarkozy has,
    since the beginning of his long career in politics, been
    among the most outspokenly "liberal" (that is,
    pro-free-market) of French political leaders. His speeches
    on economic and social issues nearly invariably include
    paeans to commerce, hard work, and entrepreneurship, followed
    by an exhortation to Frenchmen and women to be proud of these
    qualities. Sarkozy would like to make the French more
    "liberal" than they are, and believes economic forces acting
    on France justify his endeavor. Sarkozy often underlines the
    inescapability of the global market and exhorts the French to
    accept the challenges of competing in it with greater
    self-confidence. He is adept at depicting, in ways that
    ordinary voters understand, the drag on opportunity and
    growth of a bloated state intent on monitoring nearly every
    aspect of economic life.

    ¶10. (C) At the same time, Sarkozy understands that the
    French want to be protected and that they are comfortable
    with a high degree of state involvement in the economy. The
    current controversy over the privatization and merger
    involving the national gas company (GDF) and a the energy
    giant Suez exemplifies the persisting sensitivity of
    loosening state control over the economy in France.
    Sarkozy's record -- he is above all a pragmatic politician --
    as a "liberalizing" policy practitioner is quite mixed. For
    example, during his tenure as Finance Minister
    (March-November 2004), when confronted by labor union
    resistance to significant privatization of state utilities,
    Sarkozy compromised. He worked hard -- and offered
    government assistance -- to keep factories threatened with
    closure operating in France. Spurred by public complaints
    about rising prices in supermarkets, he negotiated
    "voluntary" price controls with major chains. He practiced
    "patriotic liberalism" in helping engineer the merger of a
    large French pharmaceutical company (Aventis) with a larger
    French pharmaceutical firm (Sanofi) rather than with Sanofi's
    foreign rival (the Swiss firm, Novartis). By and large, the
    public approved Sarkozy's protectionist actions.

    ¶11. (C) It remains to be seen whether economic reform will
    be a decisive issue in the upcoming presidential campaign.
    (Comment: If the current trend of economic growth and reduced
    unemployment continues, this is less likely to be the case.
    End Comment.) If it does emerge as the key campaign issue,
    and if a victorious Sarkozy moves early and aggressively to
    effect reform, then he could push the French past the tipping
    point and into a far-reaching and necessary restructuring of
    the French social model. An ambitious Sarkozy reform program
    would likely include, for example, measures to further loosen
    the currently mandated 35-hour workweek, measures to reduce
    wealth and inheritance taxes to encourage long-term
    investment in family firms, measures to restructure
    unemployment and welfare benefits so they act as incentives
    to find work quickly, and measures to reform the university
    system so it provides students with the skills the job market
    requires from them. The result could be a society in which
    entrepreneurship, self-reliance and optimism would be more

    PARIS 00005974 004 OF 004

    highly valued, and in which competition could co-exist with
    the cherished notion of "equality." Such changes could
    release the latent economic creativity and dynamism of the
    French, who, by and large, are highly skilled and
    hard-working. But it will be a tall order.

    ¶12. (C) In Sarkozy, who harbors a more America-like vision
    for France, the moment might well meet the man, ushering in
    an era of higher economic growth and innovation in France.
    Such an economically re-vitalized France would cohere neatly
    with Sarkozy's fundamentally Gaullist principles: renewed
    economic vitality would bolster both France's ambitions to
    lead in Europe and to play a major role in international
    affairs.
    Please visit Paris' Classified Website at:
    http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm

    STAPLETON

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