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### Viewing cable 06PARIS7424, SEGOLENE ROYAL'S VICTORY MOVES HER CLOSER TO

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
06PARIS7424 | 2006-11-17 14:02 | 2010-12-01 12:12 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Paris

`

    VZCZCXRO2415
    RR RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
    DE RUEHFR #7424/01 3211434
    ZNY CCCCC ZZH
    R 171434Z NOV 06
    FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3171
    INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
    RUEHC/DEPARTMENT OF LABOR WASHDC
    RUCPDOC/DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE WASHDC
    RUEATRS/DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY WASHDC

` `

    C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PARIS 007424

    SIPDIS

    SIPDIS

    DEPT ALSO FOR EUR/WE, DRL/IL, INR/EUC, EUR/ERA, EUR/PPD,
    AND EB
    DEPT OF COMMERCE FOR ITA
    DEPT OF LABOR FOR ILAB

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/16/2016
    TAGS: PGOV ELAB EU FR PINR SOCI ECON
    SUBJECT: SEGOLENE ROYAL'S VICTORY MOVES HER CLOSER TO
    PRESIDENCY

    Classified By: Ambassador Craig Stapleton for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

    SUMMARY
    -------
    ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Segolene Royal's overwhelming first-round
    victory in the November 16 Socialist Party (PS) presidential
    primary makes it official -- she will be the candidate of the
    center-left in next year's presidential election, likely in a
    tight race against the center-right's Nicolas Sarkozy. The
    win is a testament to Royal's ability to confound France's
    purveyors of conventional political wisdom and her own party
    establishment. Both regularly underestimated her and
    discounted her ability to go the distance. Royal's success
    has been her ability -- as a Blair-like socialist -- to deal
    with issues non-ideologically through the prism of their
    impact on ordinary people, with a focus on concrete,
    operational proposals that she is willing to jettison if they
    prove unworkable.

    ¶2. (C) SUMMARY CONT. Royal has demonstrated these same
    traits in the foreign affairs arena, where her recent
    statements in support of the democratic government in Iraq
    and against even a civilian nuclear program in Iran were met
    with condescension by elites, but seem not to have hurt her
    with PS voters. If she were to be elected President, we
    would expect criticism of U.S. "unilateralism", environmental
    policies, and more. But her years working in Mitterrand's
    Elysee also portend an openness to pragmatic cooperation with
    the U.S. End Summary.

    THE PRIMARY ELECTION RESULTS
    ----------------------------
    ¶3. (C) On November 16, in an overwhelming vote of confidence
    in her ability to win, over 60 percent of PS party members
    endorsed Segolene Royal as their party's candidate in the
    2007 presidential race. Of the 176,220 votes cast by PS
    party members throughout metropolitan France, Royal received
    106,839, former Finance Minister Dominique Strauss-Kahn,
    36,714 former Prime Minister Laurent Fabius 32,667. Ever
    since Royal launched her bid for the presidency, France's
    purveyors of conventional political wisdom have been
    discounting her ability to go the distance. Royal has proved
    them wrong each time. The Sarkozy camp now understands it
    will be facing a formidable opponent, whom they would
    underestimate at their own peril. Throughout the race, Royal
    displayed the energy, conviction, charisma, and physical
    stamina that have made her a leading contender to be elected
    France's next president.

    A FIFTY PERCENT CHANCE OF BEING FRANCE'S
    ----------------------------------------
    NEXT PRESIDENT
    --------------
    ¶4. (C) Royal's clear-cut victory in the first-round of the
    PS primary election confirms her as the unchallenged leader
    of the center-left in France. It sets up a showdown between
    her and Interior Minister Sarkozy for France's presidency in
    ¶2007. Analysts agree that if the dominance of the
    presidential field by these two major candidates holds, the
    second round run-off between them will be very, very close.
    Though the unexpected -- including major missteps by these
    leading candidates during their campaigns -- could still
    reconfigure the electoral landscape, dislodging one or the
    other becomes more and more difficult as the election draws
    nearer.

    FUSING HER POPULARITY (AND HER CURRENT
    --------------------------------------
    ORGANIZATION) WITH HER PARTY
    -----------------------------
    ¶5. (C) Royal's primary victory gives her allies in the PS
    unchallenged control of the party apparatus. Party chief
    Francois Hollande, who is also Royal's long-time domestic
    partner, will be instrumental in putting the party fully in
    the service of Royal's campaign. The next step for Royal is
    "making the party headquarters my campaign headquarters."
    According to one of her closest allies in the party
    hierarchy, her campaign strategy projects two key lines of
    action: "continuing to be what has made her popular," while
    bringing to bear the party's electioneering expertise and
    energizing the party's dense network of elected officials
    throughout the country.

    ¶6. (C) Royal's upcoming campaign will continue to feature

    PARIS 00007424 002 OF 003

    the personal characteristics on which her popularity is
    founded, while also working to improve some of her weaknesses
    as a candidate. She has shown a vulnerability to getting
    rattled during TV appearances or before hostile publics.
    Because she has not had top-level experience in some issue
    areas, particularly foreign affairs, deepening her command of
    these briefs will be a top priority.

    THE CORE OF THE "SEGOLENE PHENOMENON"
    -------------------------------------
    ¶7. (C) PS Party spokesman and long time Royal ally Julian
    Dray recently enumerated to us the four personal
    characteristics that make Royal so popular. They are the key
    elements of "the Segolene story" that connects so powerfully
    with such a wide electorate.
    -- First, "She's a mom." Royal has raised four children with
    Hollande. That experience, according to Dray, "gives
    ordinary people confidence" that she might be genuinely
    caring towards them also -- very different from the
    subliminal sentiments towards ordinary people associated with
    members of France's aloof and inbred political class.
    -- Second, "She has a successful marriage." Even though
    Royal and Hollande have never legally married, their
    long-standing relationship is viewed as an exemplary "success
    in love" -- and people admire that, wishing for the same in
    their own lives.
    -- Third, "She's a beautiful woman." This element of novelty
    and of gender equality -- with a touch of feminist revanchism
    in an electorate that is 53 percent female thrown in -- are
    part and parcel of Royal's success.
    -- Finally, "She's highly competent." Royal has
    distinguished herself through her professional achievements.
    Her rise -- notwithstanding her family's modest means and
    very traditionalist social values (i.e. women become wives,
    not presidents) -- through France's witheringly competitive
    educational meritocracy, are recognized by voters as those of
    an extraordinary individual, worthy of consideration for
    France's highest office.

    CRITICAL OF U.S. APPROACH, YET OFTEN
    ------------------------------------
    STILL IN SYNCH ON SUBSTANCE
    ---------------------------
    ¶8. (C) Royal, as is to be expected from the standard bearer
    of France's center-left Socialist Party, can be quite direct,
    even harsh in her assessments of U.S. foreign policy
    initiatives. As is the case nearly across the board -- left
    and right -- among the members of France's political class,
    Royal has made clear that she opposed the U.S.-led invasion
    of Iraq in 2003, and what she saw as the high-handed U.S.
    dismissal of multilateral, UN-led efforts to defuse the
    crisis. However, in some of her more recent statements on
    Iraq, Royal has clearly broken with the conventional wisdom
    in France, particularly that of the French left. After a
    meeting with Iraqi president Jalal Talibabi in Paris last
    November 3, Royal told reporters that, despite all the
    problems there, Iraq "is getting back on its feet." She
    underlined that the Iraqi government, "not outsiders" should
    decide "when the time has come" for withdrawal of foreign
    forces from the country. Reflecting her penchant for seeing
    war and peace problems in terms of their effect on the lives
    of everyday people first (rather than in terms of balance of
    power among states, regional stability, etc.), Royal stressed
    the importance of "a swift reconstruction of that country,
    which was so ravaged by dictatorship, so that the Iraqi
    people who have suffered so so much (emphasis hers) might
    recover their dignity and their self-confidence, and desire
    to get back on the road to success."

    ¶9. (C) Repeatedly, in her pronouncements on international
    issues, Royal has insisted on the legitimacy and pre-eminence
    of the U.N. in acting against threats to international peace
    and security. Royal's statements on the conflict in Lebanon
    last summer, for example, reflected the view that ending the
    suffering of the conflict's civilian casualties (on both
    sides) should be the first priority, addressed by an
    immediate cease-fire, to be followed by UN-mediated
    disengagement, and the disarming of Hezbollah. In addition,
    she proposed that former President Clinton be considered as a
    special UN mediator for the conflict. A Royal advisor
    pointed to this proposal as illustrative of her inclination
    to personalize political issues. Royal's reaction to the
    Israel-Hezbollah confrontation -- seeing the crisis first and
    foremost through the prism of its impact on ordinary people,

    PARIS 00007424 003 OF 003

    while advocating the empowerment of the UN to seek a
    longer-term solution -- reflect what is likely to be Royal's
    approach to international conflicts. In Dray's words, spoken
    as a close friend of Royal's for many years, "She's not
    interested in the theory, and approaches problems in terms of
    what's being proposed to solve them." If true, this would
    certainly represent a refreshing break from the ingrained
    French preference for the theoretical over the empirical.

    ¶10. (C) In her recent statements specifically about the
    U.S., Royal has not been shy about criticizing what she has
    repeatedly termed the "attitude" of the U.S. -- America's
    willingness to act outside of the consensus of the
    international community. Royal's America-bashing however,
    concerns more the form of U.S. policy than its substance. In
    fact, to the extent she has expressed herself on them, her
    views on some key issues are in fact quite close to those of
    the U.S. A striking example of this is the way Royal has
    been the most outspoken of France's major political figures
    about the danger posed by Iran's nuclear weapons ambitions.
    She has spoken explicitly about the threat to Israel's
    existence of nuclear weapons in the hands of the current
    Iranian leadership, and has gone so far as to suggest that
    Iran's civil nuclear program, because it is a stepping-stone
    to a weapons program, is illegitimate in light of Iran's
    reneging on its non-proliferation obligations.

    COMMENT
    -------
    ¶11. (C) If elected -- and that is a big if that is still a
    long way down the road -- Royal appears to be someone who
    would approach world affairs pragmatically and would seek to
    maintain a close, if critical, relationship with the U.S.
    There may be a fresh opportunity for Washington policy makers
    to take her measure if, as we know her staff is considering,
    she goes through with plans to visit the U.S. at some point
    before the end of January, when the presidential campaign
    begins in earnest. End Comment.
    Please visit Paris' Classified Website at:
    http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm
    STAPLETON

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