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### Viewing cable 79TEHRAN8980, NEGOTIATIONS

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
79TEHRAN8980 | 1979-08-13 04:04 | 2010-11-28 18:06 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Tehran

`

    R 130458Z AUG 79
    FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
    TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3182

` `

    C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TEHRAN 08980

    E.O. 12065: GDS 8/12/85 (TOMSETH, VICTOR L.) OR-P
    TAGS: PEPR IR
    SUBJECT: NEGOTIATIONS

    ¶1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT).

    ¶2. INTRODUCTION: RECENT NEGOTIATIONS IN WHICH THE
    EMBASSY HAS BEEN INVOLVED HERE, RANGING FROM COMPOUND
    SECURITY TO VISA OPERATIONS TO GTE TO THE SHERRY CASE,
    HIGHLIGHT SEVERAL SPECIAL FEATURES OF CONDUCTING
    BUSINESS IN THE PERSIAN ENVIRONMENT. IN SOME INSTANCES
    THE DIFFICULTIES WE HAVE ENCOUNTERED ARE A PARTIAL
    REFLECTION ON THE EFFECTS OF THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION,
    BUT WE BELIEVE THE UNDERLYING CULTURAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL
    QUALITIES THAT ACCOUNT FOR THE NATURE OF THESE DIFFICULTIES
    ARE AND WILL REMAIN RELATIVELY CONSTANT. THEREFORE,
    WE SUGGEST THAT THE FOLLOWING ANALYSIS BE USED TO BRIEF
    BOTH USG PERSONNEL AND PRIVATE SECTOR REPRESENTATIVES
    WHO ARE REQUIRED TO DO BUSINESS WITH AND IN THIS
    COUNTRY. END INTRODUCTION.

    ¶3. PERHAPS THE SINGLE DOMINANT ASPECT OF THE PERSIAN
    PSYCHE IS AN OVERRIDING EGOISM. ITS ANTECEDENTS LIE
    IN THE LONG IRANIAN HISTORY OF INSTABILITY AND INSECURITY
    WHICH PUT A PREMIUM ON SELF-PRESERVATION. THE PRACTICAL
    EFFECT OF IT IS AN ALMOST TOTAL PERSIAN PREOCCUPATION
    WITH SELF AND LEAVES LITTLE ROOM FOR UNDERSTANDING POINTS
    OF VIEW OTHER THAN ONE'S OWN. THUS, FOR EXAMPLE, IT
    IS INCOMPREHENSIBLE TO AN IRANIAN THAT U.S. IMMIGRATION
    LAW MAY PROHIBIT ISSUING HIM A TOURIST VISA WHEN HE HAS
    DETERMINED THAT HE WANTS TO LIVE IN CALIFORNIA.
    SIMILARLY, THE IRANIAN CENTRAL BANK SEES NO INCONSISTENCY
    IN CLAIMING FORCE MAJEURE TO AVOID PENALTIES FOR LATE
    PAYMENT OF INTEREST DUE ON OUTSTANDING LOANS WHILE THE
    GOVERNMENT OF WHICH IT IS A PART IS DENYING THE VAILIDITY
    OF THE VERY GROUNDS UPON WHICH THE CLAIM IS MADE WHEN
    CONFRONTED BY SIMILAR CLAIMS FROM FOREIGN FIRMS FORCED
    TO CEASE OPERATIONS DURING THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION.

    ¶4. THE REVERSE OF THIS PARTICULAR PSYCHOLOGICAL COIN,
    AND HAVING THE SAME HISTORICAL ROOTS AS PERSIAN EGOISM,
    IS A PERVASIVE UNEASE ABOUT THE NATURE OF THE WORLD IN
    WHICH ONE LIVES. THE PERSIAN EXPERIENCE HAS BEEN THAT
    NOTHING IS PERMANENT AND IT IS COMMONLY PERCEIVED THAT
    HOSTILE FORCES ABOUND. IN SUCH AN ENVIRONMENT EACH
    INDIVIDUAL MUST BE CONSTANTLY ALERT FOR OPPORTUNITIES
    TO PROTECT HIMSELF AGAINST THE MALEVOLENT FORCES THAT
    WOULD OTHERWISE BE HIS UNDOING. HE IS OBVIOUSLY
    JUSTIFIED IN USING ALMOST ANY MEANS AVAILABLE TO EXPLOIT
    SUCH OPPORTUNITIES. THIS APPROACH UNDERLIES THE SOCALLED
    "BAZAAR MENTALITY" SO COMMON AMONG PERSIANS, A
    MIND-SET THAT OFTEN IGNORES LONGER TERM INTERESTS IN
    FAVOR OF IMMEDIATELY OBTAINABLE ADVANTAGES AND COUNTENANCES
    PRACTICES THAT ARE REGARDED AS UNETHICAL BY OTHER
    NORMS. AN EXAMPLE IS THE SEEMINGLY SHORTSIGHTED AND
    HARASSING TACTICS EMPLOYED BY THE PGOI IN ITS NEGOTIATIONS
    WITH GTE.

    ¶5. COUPLED WITH THESE PSYCHOLOGICAL LIMITATIONS IS A
    GENERAL INCOMPREHENSION OF CASUALITY. ISLAM, WITH ITS
    EMPHASIS ON THE OMNIPOTENCE OF GOD, APPEARS TO ACCOUNT
    AT LEAST IN MAJOR PART FOR THIS PHENOMENON. SOMEWHAT
    SURPRISINGLY, EVEN THOSE IRANIANS EDUCATED IN THE
    WESTERN STYLE AND PERHAPS WITH LONG EXPERIENCE OUTSIDE
    IRAN ITSELF FREQUENTLY HAVE DIFFICULTY GRASPING THE
    INTER-RELATIONSHIP OF EVENTS. WITNESS A YAZDI RESISTING
    THE IDEA THAT IRANIAN BEHAVIOR HAS CONSEQUENCES ON THE
    PERCEPTION OF IRAN IN THE U.S. OR THAT THIS PERCEPTION
    IS SOMEHOW RELATED TO AMERICAN POLICIES REGARDING
    IRAN. THIS SAME QUALITY ALSO HELPS EXPLAIN PERSIAN
    AVERSION TO ACCEPTING RESPONSIBILITY FOR ONE'S OWN
    ACTIONS. THE DEUS EX MACHINA IS ALWAYS AT WORK.

    ¶6. THE PERSIAN PROCLIVITY FOR ASSUMING THAT TO SAY
    SOMETHING IS TO DO IT FURTHER COMPLICATES MATTERS.
    AGAIN, YAZDI CAN EXPRESS SURPRISE WHEN INFORMED THAT THE
    IRREGULAR SECURITY FORCES ASSIGNED TO THE EMBASSY REMAIN
    IN PLACE. "BUT THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE TOLD ME THEY
    WOULD GO BY MONDAY," HE SAYS. AN MFA OFFICIAL REPORTS
    THAT THE SHERRY CASE IS "90 PERCENT SOLVED," BUT WHEN
    A CONSULAR OFFICER INVESTIGATES HE DISCOVERS THAT NOTHING
    HAS CHANGED. THERE IS NO RECOGNITION THAT INSTRUCTIONS
    MUST BE FOLLOWED UP, THAT COMMITMENTS MUST BE ACCOMPANIED
    BY ACTION AND RESULTS.

    ¶6. FINALLY, THERE ARE THE PERSIAN CONCEPTS OF INFLUENCE
    AND OBLIGATION. EVERYONE PAYS OBEISANCE TO THE FORMER
    AND THE LATTER IS USUALLY HONORED IN THE BREACH.
    PERSIANS ARE CONSUMED WITH DEVELOPING PARTI BAZI--THE
    INFLUENCE THAT WILL HELP GET THINGS DONE--WHILE FAVORS
    ARE ONLY GRUDGINGLY BESTOWED AND THEN JUST TO THE
    EXTENT THAT A TANGIBLE QUID PRO QUO IS IMMEDIATELY
    PRECEPTIBLE. FORGET ABOUT ASSISTANCE PROFERRED LAST
    YEAR OR EVEN LAST WEEK; WHAT CAN BE OFFERED TODAY?

    ¶7. THERE ARE SEVERAL LESSONS FOR THOSE WHO WOULD NEGOTIATE
    WITH PERSIANS IN ALL THIS:

    - --FIRST, ONE SHOULD NEVER ASSUME THAT HIS SIDE OF
    THE ISSUE WILL BE RECOGNIZED, LET ALONE THAT IT WILL
    BE CONCEDED TO HAVE MERITS. PERSIAN PREOCCUPATION WITH
    SELF PRECLUDES THIS. A NEGOTIATOR MUST FORCE RECOGNITION
    OF HIS POSITION UPON HIS PERSIAN OPPOSITE NUMBER.

    - --SECOND, ONE SHOULD NOT EXPECT AN IRANIAN READILY
    TO PERCEIVE THE ADVANTAGES OF A LONG-TERM RELATIONSHIP
    BASED ON TRUST. HE WILL ASSUME THAT HIS OPPOSITE
    NUMBER IS ESSENTIALLY AN ADVERSARY. IN DEALING WITH
    HIM HE WILL ATTEMPT TO MAXIMIZE THE BENEFITS TO HIMSELF
    THAT ARE IMMEDIATELY OBTAINABLE. HE WILL BE PREPARED
    TO GO TO GREAT LENGTHS TO ACHIEVE THIS GOAL, INCLUDING
    RUNNING THE RISK OF SO ALIENATING WHOEVER HE IS DEALING
    WITH THAT FUTURE BUSINESS WOULD BE UNTHINKABLE, AT
    LEAST TO THE LATTER.

    - --THIRD, INTERLOCKING RELATIONSHIPS OF ALL ASPECTS
    OF AN ISSUE MUST BE PAINSTAKINGLY, FORECEFULLY AND
    REPEATEDLY DEVELOPED. LINKAGES WILL BE NEITHER READILY
    COMPREHENDED NOR ACCEPTED BY PERSIAN NEGOTIATORS.

    - --FOURTH, ONE SHOULD INSIST ON PERFORMANCE AS THE
    SINE QUA NON AT ESH STAGE OF NEGOTIATIONS. STATEMENTS
    OF INTENTION COUNT FOR ALMOST NOTHING.

    - --FIFTH, CULTIVATION OF GOODWILL FOR GOODWILL'S SAKE
    IS A WASTE OF EFFORT. THE OVERRIDING OBJECTIVE AT ALL
    TIMES SHOULD BE IMPRESSING UPON THE PERSIAN ACROSS THE
    TABLE THE MUTUALITY OF THE PROPOSED UNDERTAKINGS, HE
    MUST BE MADE TO KNOW THAT A QUID PRO QUO IS INVOLVED
    ON BOTH SIDES.

    - --FINALLY, ONE SHOULD BE PREPARED FOR THE THREAT
    OF BREAKDOWN IN NEGOTIATIONS AT ANY GIVEN MOMENT AND NOT
    BE COWED BY THE POSSIBLITY. GIVEN THE PERSIAN
    NEGOTIATOR'S CULTURAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL LIMITATIONS, HE
    IS GOING TO RESIST THE VERY CONCEPT OF A RATIONAL
    (FROM THE WESTERN POINT OF VIEW) NEGOTIATING PROCESS.

    LAINGEN

    CONFIDENTIAL

`