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### Viewing cable 09BAGHDAD3316, NEA A/S FELTMAN'S MEETING WITH PRESIDENT TALABANI

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
09BAGHDAD3316 | 2009-12-23 09:09 | 2010-12-05 12:12 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Baghdad

`

    VZCZCXRO3815
    OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHDIR RUEHKUK RUEHTRO
    DE RUEHGB #3316/01 3570915
    ZNY CCCCC ZZH
    O 230915Z DEC 09
    FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5866
    INFO RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
    RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
    RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
    RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE
    RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE

` `

    C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 BAGHDAD 003316

    SIPDIS

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/22/2029
    TAGS: KDEM PGOV PHUM PREL SY TU EG IR IZ
    SUBJECT: NEA A/S FELTMAN'S MEETING WITH PRESIDENT TALABANI

    REF: A. BAGHDAD 3193
    ¶B. BAGHDAD 3157
    ¶C. BAGHDAD 3229
    ¶D. BAGHDAD 3205
    ¶E. BAGHDAD 3196

    Classified By: A/DCM Gary A. Grappo for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

    ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: In a wide-ranging discussion with visiting
    NEA A/S Feltman on December 14, President Talabani
    underscored the importance for Kurds of the POTUS/VPOTUS
    telephone calls with Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG)
    President Barzani, the December 7 White House statement on
    Iraq's election law and the message conveyed by Secretary
    of Defense Gates. He predicted a tough government
    coalition process in Iraq after the March elections,
    dismissed the significance of the Kurdish Goran ("Change")
    Movement and said the PUK and KDP - which will again run on
    a united Kurdish list - had agreed with PM Maliki's State
    of Law coalition to try to form a front as part of a
    government coalition after elections. On Iran ("a very
    difficult country"), Talabani said the domestic political
    situation is highly unstable and the regime's leadership
    paralyzed: Supreme Leader Khamenei fears further alienating
    the Iranian street, but is hemmed in by regime hardliners
    and cannot afford to appease the opposition, either. Iran's
    multi-ethnic population and the Islamic Revolutionary
    Guard Corps' (IRGC) efforts to expand its writ posed
    additional challenges for the regime. While Syria and Iran
    agreed on much, Syria's attempts to resuscitate Iraq's
    Ba'th Party (a mistake, in Talabani's view) worried
    Tehran. Talabani said Saudi Arabia's effort to re-tether
    Syria to the broader Arab community had prompted closer
    Egyptian-Iraqi ties. The Saudi effort to isolate Iraq from
    its regional neighbors was "misguided", but given the
    personal enmity between King Abdullah and PM Maliki,
    Saudi-Iraqi rapprochement was unlikely if Maliki won
    another term as PM. Talabani said Iraq's second oil bid
    round helped allay concerns about Iraq's credit worthiness,
    highlighted its potential to become a wealthy country and
    gave Iraq a chance to rival Saudi Arabia's oil production
    in 10-15 years. End summary.

    ELECTION LAW AND SECRETARY OF DEFENSE GATES' VISIT
    --------------------------------------------- -----

    ¶2. (C) Talabani said KRG President Masoud Barzani was "very
    pleased and satisfied" with the recent visit of Secretary
    of Defense Gates (ref A) and his reiteration of the
    December 7 White House statement on the U.S. commitment to
    Iraq's constitution (including Article 140), support for a
    census and pledge to help resolve outstanding Arab-Kurd
    issues. Talabani said that while some actors in the Iraqi
    Kurdistan Region (IKR) claimed the Kurds were "deceived"
    into settling for 43 parliamentary seats as part of the
    recently-completed election law deal (ref B), he and
    Barzani believed long-term relations with the U.S., as
    manifested in the White House statement and the SecDef's
    message, were more important than an additional 2-3
    parliamentary seats. A/S Feltman underscored the U.S.
    commitment to resolve outstanding Arab-Kurd issues in
    accordance with Iraq's constitution and Article 140.

    ¶3. (C) Talabani noted that "some Kurds" failed to
    understand that Article 142 stipulates that any proposed
    changes to the constitution cannot impinge on rights
    otherwise guaranteed to the provinces. (Comment: Mentioned
    in the White House statement of December 7, Article 142
    provides a mechanism for amending the constitution. In
    Qprovides a mechanism for amending the constitution. In
    mentioning it, Talabani likely intended to caution that any
    attempt to amend the constitution in a way that limited
    Kurds' rights to resolve DIBs issues under Article 140
    would be unacceptable. End comment.) While the Bush
    administration had been "very friendly" toward the Kurds,
    it had never publicly expressed support for Kurdish
    interests, Talabani said. (Note: He claimed former VP
    Cheney committed to doing so after Iraq adopted
    hydrocarbons legislation, which has still not occurred.
    End note). Kurds were "very glad" about the
    POTUS/VPOTUS-Barzani calls and December 7 White House
    statement, which represented a commitment by the U.S. to
    them. (Note: As reported ref C, Kurdish, Arab and Turkoman
    interlocutors have publicly and privately expressed the
    fears that the POTUS/VPOTUS calls, together with the
    December 7 statement, represent a deal by which the KRG
    agreed to accept a consensus election law agreement in
    exchange for U.S. support of a process that would lead to
    the eventual annexation of Kirkuk into the IKR. End note.)

    BAGHDAD 00003316 002 OF 005

    GOVERNMENT FORMATION - "THEN WE'LL HAVE PROBLEMS"
    --------------------------------------------- ----

    ¶4. (C) While the negotiating for a consensus agreement on
    an election law compromise had been difficult, Talabani
    claimed delaying the election until March would mitigate
    weather-related complications during the polling. After
    that would come the effort to form a coalition government.
    "Then we will have problems", Talabani predicted. (Note:
    Responding to Ambassador Hill's question about whether
    Iraqi Kurdistan Parliament Speaker Dr. Kamal Kirkuki would
    participate in the Kurdish Alliance List's negotiating
    team, Talabani characterized Kirkuki as "a foolish man" and
    joked that he was not really a doctor, not really named
    Kamal and was not actually from Kirkuk, as his surname
    suggested. End note.) Responding to A/S Feltman's question
    about whether government formation negotiations would be
    over the position of the president or the presidency
    (encompassing the president and two vice-presidents),
    Talabani said that in accordance with the Iraqi constitution,
    they would only pertain to the office of the
    president. Referring to VP al-Hashimi's unhelpful veto of
    the November 8 election law, Talabani noted that the
    current arrangement by which the president and two vice
    presidents may veto legislation had benefits and drawbacks.
    (Note: It is unclear whether parliament will approve
    holding a constitutional referendum to extend the current
    arrangement by which the president and two vice presidents
    have a veto. End note.)

    ¶5. (C) Talabani said in recent negotiations the PUK and KDP
    reached agreement with PM Maliki's Shi'a-led State of Law
    Alliance (SLA) to form a front as part of a coalition
    government after elections. The bloc with the largest
    number of seats would nominate a candidate for PM.
    (Comment: Consummation of the proposed deal will likely
    depend on how many seats SLA is able to win. End comment.)
    Talabani said the KDP and PUK will again run together on a
    united Kurdish Alliance List (KAL). Nawshirwan Mustafa's
    Goran (aka, "Change") Movement would run on a separate
    list, as would the Kurdish Islamic Union and League of
    Muslims of Kurdistan.

    TALABANI DISMISSES GORAN MOVEMENT'S SIGNIFICANCE
    --------------------------------------------- ---

    ¶6. (C) Responding to A/S Feltman's question about what
    Goran meant for Kurdish internal politics, Talabani
    characterized the movement as an expression of
    dissatisfaction with the status quo. Criticizing Goran's
    "negative agenda", he claimed the movement lacked an
    organized party structure, a program and leadership.
    (Comment: As reported ref D, Goran largely agrees with the
    PUK/KDP's "national" Kurdish agenda; however, unlike the
    PUK/KDP, Goran believes implementation of Article 140 and
    progress on resolving Kirkuk should be the first among
    them. End comment.) Talabani complained that although
    Goran members were part of a group of IKG parliamentarians
    that participated in election law negotiations in Baghdad,
    they later claimed they had been deceived into backing the
    compromise agreement.

    ¶7. (C) Sharply criticizing Goran, he claimed its members
    were "politically immature" and did not understand politics
    outside the IKR. Dismissing Goran's significance for
    internal Kurdish politics, Talabani claimed "thousands" who
    had supported the party in July's KRG parliamentary
    elections had been disappointed by it and were now
    Qelections had been disappointed by it and were now
    leaving. Talabani claimed many of those were joining
    Kurdish Islamic parties, whose ranks were swelling, to
    register opposition to the existing PUK-KDP bipolar order.

    IRAN: "NO SECURITY AND NO STABILITY"
    ------------------------------------

    ¶8. (C) A/S Feltman gave the U.S. assessment that the
    Iranian regime's failure to respond positively to elements
    of the October 1 proposal reflected divisions within the
    regime's leadership and an inability to reach a decision on
    its nuclear aspirations. Talabani cautioned against
    ignoring "the real crisis" Iran's regime now faced.
    Opposition born of the regime's heavy-handed response to
    election protests had clearly demonstrated that the regime
    lacked the support of a majority of Iranians. Supreme
    Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei does not want to lose the
    sympathy of the Iranian street, but "cannot afford to
    appease it, either." Talabani expressed his view that
    recent remarks by Majlis Speaker Ali Larijani decrying

    BAGHDAD 00003316 003 OF 005

    "plots" against Iran's nuclear program also constrained
    Khamenei's room for maneuver and threw into stark relief
    the internal political crisis the regime faces. There is
    "no security and no stability in Iran now", Talabani said.

    MULTI-ETHNIC POPULATION CHALLENGES IRAN'S REGIME
    --------------------------------------------- ---

    ¶9. (C) Compounding longstanding fissures in the political
    landscape is Iran's multi-ethnic population, which had
    become an increasingly prominent source of friction,
    according to Talabani. Noting 14 Kurdish intellectuals
    were recently sentenced to death for peacefully opposing
    the Iranian regime, Talabani highlighted what he termed the
    emerging "partisan war" between the regime and ethnic
    Azeris. Talabani flatly said there had been "interference
    in and falsification of" election results by the regime.
    He agreed with A/S Feltman's assessment that it was
    unlikely reformist Mir Hossein Mousavi had legitimately
    lost in his predominantly Azeri home province. Stressing
    the key role Mousavi played during his tenure as Iranian
    Prime Minister in developing ethnically Azeri areas of
    Iran, Talabani said he was genuinely popular and enjoyed
    wide support. Describing the current struggle between
    reformists and the regime, Talabani said Mousavi is "now
    engaged in a fight from which he cannot retreat".

    IRGC ANTAGONIZING IRANIAN ARMY AND BAZAARIS
    -------------------------------------------

    ¶10. (C) A/S Feltman observed that Iran,s Islamic
    Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) was taking advantage of
    political instability and the leadership's paralysis to
    expand its writ. Talabani agreed, but noted that while the
    IRGC's leadership is united at the senior levels,
    divisions exist among the rank and file. The IRGC was not
    popular, he said: Iranian Army leaders were unhappy that
    the IRGC, a rival for resources and influence, was
    expanding its domain and Iranian merchants were unhappy
    about the IRGC's increasing involvement in economic
    activities. A/S Feltman underscored potential short-term
    dangers stemming from increased IRGC influence. An example
    was the increased IRGC naval presence in the Persian Gulf,
    where the U.S. and Iranian navies had longstanding
    experience with each other's operations and established
    bridge-to-bridge communication protocols to mitigate
    potential miscommunication.

    ¶11. (C) Agreeing that the IRGC was trying to extend its
    influence, Talabani said the IRGC had to approve the
    appointments of most Iranian ambassadors, including all
    those appointed to "important states". He stressed the
    importance of differentiating between "what they (IRGC
    leaders) say and what is in their hearts". In their
    hearts, IRGC leaders are afraid; however, they adopt a
    maximalist public line in the belief it will help the
    regime reach the best possible deal with the U.S. and
    Europe on the nuclear program and other issues. Talabani
    attributed significant changes in the IRGC's leadership
    cadre to concerns about loyalty stemming from the
    widely-repeated view that 70 percent of IRGC officers
    voted for reformist former Iranian President Mohammad
    Khatami in 1997, and presumably remain sympathetic to the
    reform movement.

    IRAN "A VERY DIFFICULT COUNTRY"
    -------------------------------

    ¶12. (C) Noting that the U.S. had pursued bilateral and
    multilateral approaches, but had not been able to prompt
    Iran's regime to respond, A/S Feltman asked Talabani what
    QIran's regime to respond, A/S Feltman asked Talabani what
    advice he might offer. After a long pause, Talabani sighed
    and conceded that Iran is "a very difficult country".
    While some Iranians claimed nuclear weapons were
    un-Islamic, the regime was making "quick progress" towards
    acquiring nuclear weapons capability. Talabani said he
    believed there were more secret sites than the recently
    disclosed one at Qom, and assessed that the Iranian regime
    sought to approach turn-key status with respect to its ability
    to initiate production of nuclear weapons. He noted the
    potency
    of the nuclear program as a "national issue" with which the
    regime could rally the Iranian people and deflect attention
    from shortcomings in domestic programs. Citing increased
    Russian pressure on Iran, Talabani said he thought U.S.
    policies had been "wise." He offered that it would be
    helpful if China reached a similar decision with respect to
    its willingness to further pressure Iran, and suggested
    that increased Iraqi oil production could help mitigate

    BAGHDAD 00003316 004 OF 005

    China's dependence on Iranian oil, potentially freeing
    China to pursue a harder policy on Iran's nuclear program.

    IRAN-IRAQ-SYRIA RELATIONS
    -------------------------

    ¶13. (C) While Iranian leaders' views on individual Shi'a
    Iraqi leaders were "not homogeneous" (some supported former
    PM Jaafari, others supported PM Maliki), they are united in
    their desire for a Shi'a-led government and fear of a
    resurgent Ba'th Party. Talabani said a contact told him
    during his last visit to Iran that Muhammad Nassif
    Khayrbek, the former head of Syria's General Intelligence
    Directorate and a senior advisor to President Bashar
    al-Asad recently visited Tehran and proposed that Iran and
    Syria cooperate to bring Iraq's Ba'th Party back to power
    as "a bridge between Iran and Syria". (Note: Talabani flew
    to Iran on/about November 22 to appeal for the lives of
    Iranian Kurds sentenced to death. End note.) A/S Feltman
    noted that while Iran and Syria agree on much, a major
    point of divergence is Iraq. Talabani agreed, noting that
    Syria heavily supported Iraqi Ba'thists, while Iran opposed
    them. Syria is actively working to change Iranian leaders'
    minds; however, Syria's support for the Iraqi National
    Movement coalition that includes, among others, former PM
    Ayad Allawi (secular Shi'a) and Saleh al-Mutlaq (Sunni with
    Ba'thist ties) "worried Iran."

    ¶14. (C) Talabani said the Syrian regime approached him one
    month ago through a friend to ask that he help mediate
    between Syria and Iraq to reduce tensions stoked by PM
    Maliki's accusation of Syrian complicity in recent bomb
    attacks against GOI facilities in Baghdad. The emissary
    said Talabani should contact President Bashar al-Asad
    directly, and that Syria was willing to "cease all support
    for action against Iraq" if an accommodation could be
    reached. A/S Feltman noted that the U.S. was trying to
    identify ways to improve relations with Syria. Talabani
    stressed that if there were any improvement on the
    Israeli-Palestinian track, better U.S.-Syria relations
    could be possible. Recalling an exchange several years ago
    with Bashar in which he asked what Syria wanted from the
    U.S., Talabani said Bashar answered that he wanted the
    Golan back and a stable Iraq that would not work against
    Syria, in that order. Talabani said he asked Bashar if the
    order could be reversed, pointing out that strong
    Syria-Iraq ties could help Damascus with respect to Israel.

    SYRIA ERRS IN TRYING TO RESTORE IRAQ'S BA'TH PARTY
    --------------------------------------------- -----

    ¶15. (C) On Syria's support for those conducting attacks in
    Iraq, Talabani said Syria made "a big mistake" in thinking
    it could return the Ba'th Party to power in Iraq, which was
    their ultimate goal. The nadir of Syrian-Iraqi relations
    coincided with the period in which the Ba'th ruled Damascus
    and Baghdad. Syrian leaders wanted to play the role of
    "fraternal helpers" in restoring Iraqi Ba'thists to power.
    Baghdad's offer to reopen pipelines, supply gas and open
    points of entry on the Syria-Iraq border had been viewed
    suspiciously by Damascus, which did not believe a
    Maliki-led government would honor such commitments.

    ¶16. (C) A/S Feltman noted that in conversations with Syria,
    the SARG always raised Iraq. The U.S. recently asked Syria
    to stop broadcasts from Damascus of Ba'thist-backed
    satellite channels glorifying terrorism and violence, but
    had not seen any action. Talabani offered that Syria was
    Qhad not seen any action. Talabani offered that Syria was
    waiting for the results of Iraq's upcoming elections, in
    which they hoped a strong Sunni bloc would emerge, before
    making any decisions on its Iraq policy. Noting that the
    SARG was good at collecting cards, A/S Feltman asked
    Talabani when they might actually play their hand.
    Talabani replied that while Hafez al-Asad had been an
    excellent player, Bashar was still young. Referring to
    Bashar's leadership style, he said Arabs jokingly described
    Syria as a "Jamluka", a play on the Arabic words
    "Jamahuriya" (Libya's "state of the masses") and "mamluka"
    ("monarchy").

    SAUDI-SYRIA THAW PROMPTS CLOSER EGYPTIAN-IRAQI TIES
    --------------------------------------------- ------

    ¶17. (C) A/S Feltman asked Talabani what the visit to
    Damascus in October by Saudi Arabia's King Abdullah after a
    five-year hiatus in Saudi-Syrian relations meant for Iraq.
    Talabani laughingly said King Abdullah told him "You and
    Iraq are in my hearts, but that man (Maliki) is not".
    Citing Maliki's "failed promises" to Saudi leaders,

    BAGHDAD 00003316 005 OF 005

    Talabani said Abdullah and the Saudis refused to deal with
    the PM, despite U.S. attempts to mediate. Syria, too,
    blamed Maliki for Iraq's anti-Syria policies and found it
    difficult to work with him. According to Talabani, Syrian
    officials told Maliki during the latter's most recent visit
    to Damascus (shortly before the August 19 bombings in
    Baghdad) that they were supporting Iraq's Ba'th Party,
    further stoking Maliki's fear of Ba'thist conspiracies
    against him.

    ¶18. (C) Talabani said King Abdullah is trying to re-tether
    Syria to the broader Arab community, an initiative Egypt
    opposes. Partly as a consequence, Egyptian-Iraqi relations
    had improved. Riyadh tried to pressure Cairo not to
    facilitate Maliki's recent visit to Egypt, but the visit
    had come off. A/S Feltman offered that King Abdullah's
    visit to Damascus and the possibility of warming ties
    between Saudi Arabia and Syria was likely a factor in
    encouraging Egyptian ties with Iraq, to help counterbalance
    the Saudi effort. Noting
    Riyadh's important regional role, Talabani said Saudi
    Arabia was actively working to prevent Iraq from developing
    relationships with its regional neighbors, and claimed it
    had pressured Kuwait to backtrack on initial agreements
    with Iraq on issues dating to the Saddam-era. Despite
    Saudi opposition, though, Qatar and Bahrain were seeking
    improved relations with Iraq.

    SAUDI-IRAQI RAPPROCHEMENT UNLIKELY IF MALIKI PM AGAIN
    --------------------------------------------- --------

    19.(C) Talabani characterized the Saudi policy as
    misguided, noting that Iraq could play a positive role in
    attenuating tension between the Saudi government and its
    largely Shi'a opposition. A/S Feltman said the U.S. would
    encourage the Saudis to revisit their Iraq policy after
    upcoming
    Iraqi elections in March. Talabani offered that if Maliki
    remained PM, things would likely remain as is since the
    enmity was personal; however, with a different PM - even
    another Shi'ite like ISCI's Ammar al-Hakim or Allawi -
    there was a chance for positive change. He cautioned that
    such an effort could be hurt if the Saudis' efforts to
    support the emergence of a strong Sunni bloc in the Iraqi
    parliament failed, which he thought likely.

    ¶20. (C) Talabani assessed Turkey's role with respect to
    Iraq as generally good and said his relations with Turkey
    were "excellent". Noting improved relations between Ankara
    and the KRG, he pointed to Turkish FM Gul's recent visit to
    Erbil. Turkey could play a positive role in the region and
    Ankara's policy towards Kurds (Iraq) and Alawites (Syria)
    was generally positive, despite opposition from the Turkish
    General Staff and some quarters of Turkey's parliament. He
    offered that Turkey could play a positive role with respect
    to Syria.

    SECOND OIL BID ROUND
    --------------------

    ¶21. (C) Talabani expressed surprise that companies from the
    U.S., which "liberated Iraq and therefore earned the
    right", had not won more contracts during Iraq's
    recently-concluded Second Petroleum Licensing Round ("bid
    round"), held December 11-12 in Baghdad. (Note: As reported
    ref E, only three of the seven pre-qualified U.S. companies
    attended the bid round and only one (Occidental Petroleum)
    submitted a bid. No U.S. companies were awarded contracts
    during the second bid round; however, ExxonMobil and
    Occidental won contracts in the first round potentially
    allowing them to develop nearly three million barrels per
    Qallowing them to develop nearly three million barrels per
    day of future Iraqi oil production, representing nearly a
    third of the potential total increase in Iraqi oil
    production from the two bid rounds. End note.) Ambassador
    Hill underscored that U.S. oil and gas service companies
    were expected to garner significant business as part of the
    effort to increase Iraqi oil production under the new
    contracts. He also noted that with the second bid round,
    companies from all five UNSC permanent members had
    production contracts in Iraq. Noting that Iraq's oil
    production could rival Saudi Arabia's in 10-15 years,
    Talabani said the second bid round would help allay
    concerns about Iraq's credit worthiness and highlight its
    potential to become a wealthy country.

    ¶22. (U) A/S Feltman cleared on this message.
    FORD

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