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### Viewing cable 08CAIRO783, MAHALLA RIOTS: ISOLATED INCIDENT OR TIP OF AN

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
08CAIRO783 | 2008-04-16 10:10 | 2011-02-01 15:03 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Cairo
Appears in these articles: http://www.lemonde.fr/cgi-bin/ACHATS/acheter.cgi?offre=ARCHIVES&type_item=ART_ARCH_30J&objet_id=1147120

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    VZCZCXRO9526
    PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHROV
    DE RUEHEG #0783/01 1071041
    ZNY CCCCC ZZH
    P 161041Z APR 08
    FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8946
    INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE
    RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE

` `

    C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 CAIRO 000783

    SIPDIS

    SIPDIS

    NSC FOR PASCUAL

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/14/2018
    TAGS: PREL PGOV KDEM PHUM EG
    SUBJECT: MAHALLA RIOTS: ISOLATED INCIDENT OR TIP OF AN
    ICEBERG?

    REF: A. CAIRO 621
    ¶B. CAIRO 697
    ¶C. CAIRO 715
    ¶D. CAIRO 724
    ¶E. CAIRO 730

    Classified By: DCM Stuart E. Jones, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

    ¶1. (C) Summary: Egyptians are uneasy about the April 6 and 7
    anti-government riots in Mahalla, which featured thousands of
    unemployed youth battling riot police in the streets of the
    Nile Delta mill-town (refs B-D). The violent demonstrations
    followed on an opposition-organized general strike on April
    6, which noticeably quieted Cairo's busy streets, as many
    Egyptians stayed home, many out of fear of potential public
    disorder, and some in solidarity with the strike (ref B).
    The Mahalla riots have both reflected and fed into resentment
    about spiraling food prices and widespread anger at the
    government. Egyptians are in a sour mood, and their
    frustration seems more vocal than just a few months ago. The
    government is paying close attention, and is now focused on
    heading off a follow-on national strike called for May 4,
    Mubarak's eightieth birthday. End summary.

    --------------------
    HEROES OR HOOLIGANS?
    --------------------

    ¶2. (C) Reaction to the Mahalla clashes seems divided along
    class lines. The lower-income Egyptians we spoke with
    expressed enthusiasm about the riots, with two independently
    telling us they were "ecstatic" at the news. Many said, "the
    government deserved it." They all attributed the riots to
    sharply increased food prices. Year-on-year inflation in
    March reached 14.4 percent; food-only inflation for March
    reached 22 percent. Many Egyptians acknowledge that the
    fundamental unspoken Egyptians social pact -- the peoples'
    obeisance in exchange for a modest but government-guaranteed
    standard of living -- is under stress, and the poor feel this
    most acutely. One worker remarked: "it is the people's
    right (to strike), if their government lies to them, tells
    them that food prices are stable, but then we go try to buy
    oil or bread, and cannot afford it." A cab driver told us,
    "God willing, such riots will occur in Cairo soon; the only
    thing stopping us is fear."

    ¶3. (C) Elites appear anxious. On April 6, many parents of
    private school children kept their children home. The
    private German School was reportedly half empty. Referring
    to Mahalla, a textile factory owner told us, "The poor are
    desperate, and this is a natural result of that. We may see
    more riots, and we will definitely see more crime in Cairo;
    it is already happening; the poor have to resort to
    stealing." Meanwhile, Cairo's limited middle class seems
    stuck in between - a reflexive fear of chaos feeds their
    worries of riots, but seems nearly equaled by their
    admiration of the Mahalla protesters for "giving the
    government what it deserves," as one shop-owner told us.

    -------------------------------
    IS THIS THE START OF SOMETHING?
    -------------------------------

    ¶4. (C) The key question is, will the localized incident in
    Mahalla spark a wider movement? The government is clearly
    focused on containing unrest. Even while the riots were
    still winding down, PM Nazif traveled to Mahalla, paid
    bonuses to factory workers and praised those who did not join
    in the riots (ref D). The government has also accelerated
    arrests of activists in Cairo (ref E). The organizers of the
    April 6 strike -- distinct from Mahalla -- have already
    called, via Facebook, for a follow-on national strike on May
    4, Mubarak's eightieth birthday. Even regime insiders have
    acknowledged the political savvy behind this tactic --
    channeling current outrage towards the next big event. The
    GOE responded with a press release announcing that President
    Mubarak will give a May 5 speech to "underline Egypt's keen
    to desire to protect the rights of laborers and accentuate
    the role they can play in the development process .... and to
    reiterate the government's commitment to safeguard the
    interests of workers against any backlashes they might face
    as a result of the economic reform program." More broadly,
    the government continues to address the shortage of
    subsidized bread by using military bakeries and distribution
    centers, and bread lines in Cairo seem to have diminished.

    ¶5. (C) The government's concern is driven by recent events,
    but likely also by worried looks in the rear-view mirror.
    Egyptians are renowned for their apathy in the face of trying

    CAIRO 00000783 002 OF 002

    conditions. Nevertheless, 1952's "Black Saturday," when many
    foreign-affiliated establishments in Cairo were burned to the
    ground; the January 1977 bread riots, when tens of thousands
    of Egyptians took to the streets nationwide in
    anti-government riots precipitated by the government's
    planned cancellation of food subsidies; and the February 1986
    riots of the Central Security Forces, protesting a rumored
    extension of their term of service, resulting in hundreds of
    deaths nationwide, and USD millions in damage, all
    demonstrate that even supposedly quiescent Egyptians have
    their limits.

    ¶6. (C) While there are currently no angry demonstrators on
    the streets of Cairo, the situation is more tense than even a
    few months ago. Widespread bitterness about spiraling
    prices, seething upset about government corruption, disdain
    for the Mubarak government's perceived pro-US and Israel
    posture, and working class economic woes (ref A) bubble up in
    virtually every conversation. It is not clear how the next
    catalyst for action -- if there is one -- might materialize.
    Neither the Mahalla rioters nor the April 6 group have
    charismatic, clearly identified leadership. It is
    significant that the Muslim Brotherhood (MB), now suffering
    under the arrests of thousands of arrests of its members,
    distanced itself from both of "movements." Egypt's
    omnipresent security apparatus is also a strong
    counter-balance to riots and demonstrations. We think it is
    possible that Egypt will witness further spasms of limited
    violence, but these are likely to be isolated and
    uncoordinated, rather than revolutionary in nature.

    ¶7. (C) Although not on the scale of the 1977 or 1986 riots,
    Mahalla is significant. The violent protests demonstrated
    that it is possible to tear down a poster of Mubarak and
    stomp on it, to shout obscene anti-regime slogans, to burn a
    minibus and hurl rocks at riot police. These are unfamiliar
    images that lower-income Egyptians thrill to. In Mahalla, a
    new organic opposition force bubbled to the surface, defying
    current political labels, and apparently not affiliated with
    the MB. This may require the government to change its
    script.

    ¶8. (C) April 6 brought together disparate opposition forces
    together with numerous non-activist Egyptians, with the
    Facebook calls for a strike attracting 70,000 people on-line,
    and garnering widespread national attention. The nexus of
    the upper and middle-class Facebook users, and their poorer
    counterparts in the factories of Mahalla, created a new
    dynamic. One senior insider mused, "Who could have imagined
    that a few kids on the internet could foment a buzz that the
    entire country noticed? I wish we could do that in the
    National Democratic Party."

    ¶9. (C) Another result of Mahalla is that Mubarak will even
    more strongly resist both economic and political reform
    initiatives. Six months ago, economic cabinet ministers
    openly discussed phasing out food and fuel subsidies in favor
    of transfer payments to the very poor. That initiative now
    seems to be off the table. We are also hearing that unrest
    over prices has strengthened the security ministers in the
    cabinet in resisting privatization and other efforts towards
    liberalization. The riots introduce a new dynamic for us as
    well. Under these stressful conditions, Mubarak and his
    regime will be even more sensitive to US criticism over human
    rights abuses and democracy shortfalls. On April 15, Foreign
    Minister Aboul Gheit, meeting with the Ambassador, cited the
    Mahalla incident as a strain and added that he hoped that the
    United States would be supportive of Egypt during this
    difficult period.
    RICCIARDONE

`