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### Viewing cable 06PARIS4411, FORMER PRIME MINISTER RAFFARIN: CHIRAC SHOULD REIN

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
06PARIS4411 | 2006-06-26 16:04 | 2011-02-10 08:08 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Paris
Appears in these articles: http://abonnes.lemonde.fr/documents-wikileaks/article/2011/02/09/wikileaks-les-visiteurs-de-l-ambassade_1477418_1446239.htm

`

    This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

    261640Z Jun 06

` `

    C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 PARIS 004411

    SIPDIS

    DEPT ALSO FOR EUR/WE, DRL/IL, INR/EUC, EUR/ERA, EUR/PPD,
    AND EB
    DEPT OF COMMERCE FOR ITA
    DEPT OF LABOR FOR ILAB

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/07/2015
    TAGS: PGOV ELAB EU FR PINR SOCI ECON
    SUBJECT: FORMER PRIME MINISTER RAFFARIN: CHIRAC SHOULD REIN
    IN VILLEPIN AND SARKOZY SHOULD QUIT THE GOVERNMENT

    Classified By: Ambassador Craig Stapleton for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

    SUMMARY
    --------
    ¶1. (C) Former Prime Minister Jean-Pierre Raffarin confided
    to Ambassador Stapleton during a June 15 lunch that he was
    worried by President Chirac's waning authority. Raffarin
    said he had advised the president on the importance of
    restoring the respective roles of the presidency, prime
    minister and government, and parliament. Raffarin said that
    Prime Minister de Villepin was overstepping the prerogatives
    of his office and needed to be reminded of President
    Chirac,s ultimate authority. Raffarin also said he was
    advising Nicolas Sarkozy to withdraw from the government to
    focus on his presidential campaign. Noting that he would be
    actively supporting Sarkozy in 2007, Raffarin said Sarkozy
    had both the "image and mettle" to needed to succeed --
    campaign to victory and thereafter successfully wield power.
    He doubted this was the case for Socialist Party (PS)
    front-runner Segolene Royal. Raffarin envisioned U.S.-Europe
    relations as an equal partnership, working in parallel
    towards common goals. Raffarin worried that, although the
    U.S. and French governments may understand each other well,
    American and French society are growing farther apart, and
    that there were no government figures or public intellectuals
    able to explain America to France with media presence to make
    a difference. END SUMMARY.

    CHIRAC'S WANING AUTHORITY
    -------------------------
    ¶2. (C) Over lunch with Ambassador Stapleton on June 15,
    former Prime Minister Jean-Pierre Raffarin confided that
    President's Chirac's continuing "absence" from the political
    scene was worrisome. Raffarin lamented Chirac's waning
    authority during the president's last full year in office.
    He said Chirac's diminished stature, along with Villepin's
    excesses, had upset the balanced functioning of the
    institutions of the Fifth Republic.

    REPAIRING "INSTITUTIONAL DYSFUNCTIONALISM"
    ----------------------------------------
    ¶3. (C) Repairing what Raffarin termed "institutional
    dysfunctionalism" would require making sure the prime
    minister respects the authority of the president. He said
    the role of the prime minister was to protect the president
    during political crises. Raffarin compared this function to
    that of an air bag in a car accident -- and "not vice versa."
    In Raffarin,s view, Villepin has managed to use the
    Presidency to protect himself from the consequences of his
    own failure in managing the First Employment Contract (CPE)
    last Spring.

    CHIRAC AND VILLEPIN -- "A PAINFUL RELATIONSHIP"
    --------------------------------------------- --
    ¶4. (C) Raffarin mused that making it clear to Villepin that
    &the prime minister works for the president8 would
    nonetheless be difficult, because &Chirac and Villepin know
    each other so well." (Note: Villepin was Chirac's Chief of
    Staff from 1995 - 2002. End note.) Raffarin underlined
    Villepin's attractive qualities, his intelligence and
    preference for action, while also noting that Chirac
    mistrusted Villepin's ambition, impetuousness and
    histrionics. "It must be a painful relationship," summarized
    Raffarin.

    CHIRAC SHOULD CHANGE PRIME MINISTER
    -----------------------------------
    ¶5. (C) Raffarin said that "the prime minister should change
    or Chirac should change prime ministers." Elaborating on his
    vision of the proper functioning of the institutions of the
    Fifth Republic, Raffarin described the prime minister as the
    implementer of policy and manager of relations with the
    parliamentary majority, while the president occupies the
    heights of power "alone." Raffarin said that the prime
    minister "needs to be a team player," and that Villepin's
    unsuitableness for the job stems from "the professional
    deformation" of having worked too long at the Elysee.
    Raffarin suggested Jacques Barrot, EU Commissioner for
    Transport or, alternatively, Jean-Louis Borloo, Minister for
    Social Cohesion, as currently suitable replacements, were
    Villepin to go.

    THE PROBLEM IS VILLEPIN, NOT THE INSTITUTIONS
    ---------------------------------------------
    ¶6. (C) Raffarin was adamant that the institutions of the
    Fifth Republic were not the problem, describing at some
    length how those institutions had shown themselves to be
    flexible and effective. The problem, he said, was Villepin's
    character, "which doesn't change." Raffarin opined that
    Villepin's blind spot stems from his not being a politician
    -- he has no experience with the constant constraint of an
    electorate looking over his shoulder. That said, Raffarin
    noted that he did favor certain limited institutional reforms.

    FAVORS A MORE REPRESENTATIVE PARLIAMENT
    ---------------------------------------
    ¶7. (C) Raffarin remarked that the majority Union for a
    Popular Movement (UMP) party and the minority Socialist Party
    (PS), in aggregate, represent less than half the electorate
    (yet dominate the National Assembly (about 500 of 577
    members)). Raffarin said he therefore favored some element
    of proportionality in the apportionment of National Assembly
    seats. He said it would be better to have people "like Le
    Pen and Bove" represented in parliament than to allow them to
    posture from the sidelines. (Note: Jean-Marie Le Pen is the
    leader of the extreme right National Front (FN) party; Jose
    Bove, famous for bombing a McDonald's in 1999, is a leading
    anti-globalization radical. End Note.)

    SARKOZY SHOULD QUIT THE GOVERNMENT
    ----------------------------------
    ¶8. (C) Raffarin, who stressed that he would actively support
    Sarkozy in the 2007 presidential race, said that he believed
    that Sarkozy would be well advised to quit the Villepin
    government soon. Raffarin gave three reasons. First, since
    Chirac could not keep Sarkozy and fire Villepin because that
    would imply that Villepin was the one most at fault in the
    Clearstream Affair, Sarkozy would do well to make the move to
    leave himself. Second, Sarkozy needs a respite from the
    rigors of being in power in order to get ready for his
    campaign for the presidency. As Raffarin put it, "being in
    power uses people up," and was not conducive to the calm
    reflection required for preparing oneself to lead the nation
    into the future. Third, Sarkozy needed to break out of the
    world of motorcades, photo ops and tightly scripted events to
    meet with people on a more relaxed and equal basis. Pressed
    on when Sarkozy would have the best opportunity to leave the
    government, Raffarin insisted that it should be as soon as
    possible, that is, before the summer break rather than in the
    Fall -- in any event, well before the January date that
    Sarkozy has cited publicly.

    CLEARSTREAM
    -----------
    ¶9. (C) Raffarin summed up the Clearstream Affair as a
    complex matter of "he said, she said." Raffarin didn't
    believe there would ever be "a smoking gun" since the
    perpetration stemmed from "orders that were orally conveyed,
    if at all." He said that the judges had been mistreated in
    the affair by the politicians, and would take their revenge
    eventually -- but that this would take time. Raffarin
    admitted that voters appeared not to care about the affair
    itself, while averring that they were sensitive to the enmity
    between Villepin and Sarkozy, which could lessen their
    support for the UMP. Public opinion would inevitably fault
    both for not finding a way to work together in the interest
    of the greater good.

    SARKOZY IS UP TO THE JOB
    ------------------------
    ¶10. (C) Raffarin believes Sarkozy has the right mix of
    talent and strengths to be a successful President. Raffarin
    stressed that Sarkozy "has the political experience to know
    what is possible." Citing the importance of both "message"
    and "mettle," Raffarin said Sarkozy's strong suit was the
    latter, and so would have to take care that his message/image
    is in sync with the French electorate's expectations at
    election time. Raffarin said he had no doubt that Sarkozy
    would be the UMP's presidential candidate, and added that he
    did not believe there would be any other candidate from the
    majority in the first round of the presidential election.
    Raffarin said he hoped to help Sarkozy "re-center" his
    message in advance of the elections, and commented that what
    was "American" about Sarkozy was his pragmatism and
    results-oriented outlook. Asked if Sarkozy knows how to
    listen, Raffarin said that Sarkozy listened as a professional
    politician, "sensitive to power relations and with an eye on
    results." Raffarin added that Sarkozy knew the political
    system inside and out and was very responsible. Raffarin
    summed up by describing Sarkozy as "what the French would
    like to be, rather than what they are."

    ROYAL
    -----
    ¶11. (C) Raffarin's portrait of Royal was less flattering.
    He said that her message/image seems to be in sync with
    public expectations, but that she lacked the "force of
    character" to bear the responsibilities of power at the top.
    He said that as the electoral campaign gets underway in
    earnest, the focus will move from "message" to "character,"
    the area where Sarkozy was much more tested. Raffarin said
    that the intense scrutiny generated by a presidential
    campaign would bring to light Royal's character flaws.
    Raffarin opined that Royal would fall out of the race before
    the PS nomination primary in November, and the party would
    turn to former prime minister Lionel Jospin as the only
    candidate capable of uniting the left. Raffarin said Jospin
    was the only PS figure whose nomination would not be
    perceived as "humiliating" by all the other PS aspirants.
    Raffarin judged that Jospin would also prove a more daunting
    challenger for the center-right than Royal.

    ¶12. (C) Raffarin recounted that, although Royal beat his
    designated successor in the race for president of the
    Poitou-Charentes Regional Council (in 2004), she had earlier
    been defeated in a re-election bid as mayor of a small town
    in the region. Raffarin pointed out that incumbent mayors in
    small towns in rural France are rarely run out of office,
    unless they have a talent for rubbing people the wrong way.
    Raffarin characterized Royal as someone who generated
    tensions, and described her as "seductive from afar, but
    irritating up close." He added that her focus on image
    tended to make her think only about the short term. In all,
    Raffarin judged that Royal was too divisive a figure to play
    the role of "unifier" that the PS needs to make it into the
    second round. Raffarin said he feared "a repeat of 2002," in
    which Le Pen received around 15 percent of the vote to get to
    the second round. According to Raffarin, even many who vote
    for him don't want Le Pen as president, but Le Pen continues
    to profit from the protest vote.

    CHIRAC'S LEGACY
    --------------
    ¶13. (C) Raffarin expressed the hope that President Chirac
    would find some high notes on which to end his presidency.
    Raffarin defined finishing well as wrapping up ongoing reform
    efforts and calming some of the current social turmoil and
    mistrust of the political class. He also projected that
    Chirac might manage two or three foreign policy achievements
    as capstones to his dozen years as president. Specifically,
    Raffarin mentioned contributing to progress reining in Iran's
    nuclear weapons ambitions, bringing further improvement to
    France's relations with Israel and "getting Europe back on
    track." Raffarin suggested Chirac might also do something to
    decrease France's worrisome isolation both on the European
    scene and on the larger world scene beyond Europe.

    EUROPE
    ------
    ¶14. (C) Raffarin said that, to get the European project back
    on track, the focus should be on "defining Europe as a
    political project for its citizens," and on providing for a
    "peace and security" role for Europe commensurate with its
    wealth and historical weight. Raffarin suggested that France
    had gone about promoting the EU constitutional treaty in the
    wrong way, trumpeting the constitution as a work of
    legislative compromise -- something "mechanical" to make the
    EU work better. Raffarin saw a need to define Europe for its
    citizens, focusing on the way European social solidarity and
    social protections makes being a citizen of Europe different.

    ¶15. (C) Raffarin stressed that in a multipolar world it was
    important that Europe have &a role of consequence in the
    concert of powers." He said Europe should not be a
    counterweight to the U.S., but should be seen as another
    voice, alongside the U.S., for the West. On a foundation of
    "firm friendship" between the U.S. and Europe, Raffarin
    suggested that Europe could work separately but in parallel
    with the U.S., supporting progress towards peace in the
    Middle East and attenuating tensions with the Islamic world
    by presenting a secular, Western alternative. Raffarin also
    said Europe could also contribute to ensuring that China
    emerges as a force for balance and peace.

    U.S - FRANCE
    ------------
    ¶16. (C) Raffarin said he worried most about the potential
    for a drifting apart of the American and French peoples, and
    not the periodic disputes between the governments. He joked
    that France always knew when to call on the U.S. when in
    need, and understood that the U.S. would never be a danger
    for France. That said, citing France's penchant for seeing
    relationships through a "Marxist" lens, it was important that
    the U.S. never be seen as the "boss" in the relationship, as
    this provoked French resistance to U.S. leadership. In the
    end, the French people felt close to their American
    counterparts -- closer than to their UK and German
    counterparts in particular. The Franco-German friendship was
    unshakable "because we have decided it should be thus," but
    the French preferred to travel or study in the U.S., rather
    than Germany. Raffarin stressed the need for more exchange
    and dialogue, so that the French could get beyond the
    stereotypes of American religiosity and violence disseminated
    by the media. Raffarin said that there was a lack of public
    figures "able to explain the societies to each other." He
    focused on the dearth of public intellectuals able to provide
    the French public with an informed interpretation of American
    society and U.S. policies, as did -- Raffarin's example --
    Pierre Salinger, President Kennedy's press secretary and U.S.
    network newsman who went on become a fixture of French public
    affairs talk shows. Raffarin lamented this absence of
    American officials and public intellectuals with enough media
    presence to make a difference in guiding public perceptions
    in France away from simplistic preconceptions about the U.S.
    Raffarin said the U.S.-France economic relationship was good,
    although he believed France could do much more to improve his
    attractiveness as a destination for investment.

    COMMENT
    -------
    ¶17. (C) Raffarin took full advantage of the opportunity to
    share some thoughtful, and surprisingly detached commentary
    on the current French political scene. He hardly mentioned
    himself, his record in office or his own political ambitions.
    He made clear he thought Villepin was the wrong man, with
    the wrong experience, doing the wrong job at the wrong time.
    Raffarin's evident enthusiasm for Sarkozy and his
    presidential ambitions appeared genuine and was not expected.
    Raffarin continues to be seen as the odds-on favorite to
    replace Christian Poncelet as president of the French Senate
    in 2008. End Comment.
    Please visit Paris' Classified Website at:
    http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm

    STAPLETON

`